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Abstract 
This thesis examines the interplay between state regulation and the way organisations 
define performance. Performance is generally understood to be a multidimensional concept, 
but the extent to which its different facets are shaped by regulation remains an 
understudied question. This thesis aims to address this question and provide at least a 
partial answer to it. To do so, it examines whether the level of regulation amplifies or abates 
the multidimensionality of regulated entities’ performance definition, i.e. the way they define 
the concept of performance. The leading question is whether an organisation's performance 
definition can be associated with the regulatory intensity its environment confronts it with. 
Moreover, the study explores whether the type of ownership—public or private—plays a role 
in regard to how a regulated entity defines performance. In order to undertake this 
investigation, the thesis focuses on the performance definitions of organisations in six 
different sport betting and lottery regulations. Qualitative data is gathered from primary and 
secondary documents as well as through semi-structured interviews with chief executive 
officers (CEO), members of executive management and gambling experts in each of these 
countries. 
The thesis concludes that the performance definitions of the organisations under study are 
indeed multidimensional, as well as clearly influenced by their respective regulatory 
environments. However, not all performance dimensions identified in the literature are 
present, nor can they all be estimated to be part of the performance definition. In addition, 
the public-private difference in defining performance—as conceptualised in the literature—
seems to be abated in a regulated environment. The central role played by regulation in 
regard to the multidimensionality of the performance definition partially outweighs the effect 
of the nature of ownership. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
The success of organisations has been assessed through performance measures 
throughout the history of organisational research (Kennerley & Neely 2003). Indeed, all 
organisations, be they public or private, exist for a purpose, and those who take interest in 
this purpose will always query the extent to which it is in fact attained (Fried 1976; Talbot 
2010; Venkatraman & Ramanujam 1986). At the same time, the study of organisational 
performance is in constant transformation. As organisations and institutions continue to 
grow and diversify, the past decades have witnessed an increased search for clarifications 
in regard to organisational performance, and this both for public and private organisations.  
The definition of public performance has been a central focus of studies for decades, but 
despite this long research-history, there is still no consensus on the definition and 
terminology used. Scholars agree that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the 
measurement of the performance of organisations, programmes or policies (Venkatraman 
1986; De Bruijn 2007; Summermatter & Siegel 2009; Talbot 2010). Across the literature, the 
difference between the public and the private sector has however been highlighted as being 
a key influence in terms of the way performance is defined and measured (Boyne 2002a; 
Child 1972; De Bruijn 2007; Dess et al. 1997).  
This work argues that in addition to the public/private dichotomy, there may be other 
contexts that are equally influential in defining performance, such as for example the 
regulatory environment. The link between regulation, an organisation and its performance is 
recognised in literature (Genoud 2001; OECD 2002; Reger et al. 1992; Smith & Mick 1985; 
Stigler 1971), but this body of research has so far not focused on the definition of 
organisational performance, but seen it mainly in financial terms. Such an angle of approach 
bypasses the possibility that organisations diversify their objectives as a result of the 
regulatory environment, by including non-financial aspects such as equity or social impacts. 
Not only would such a reality indicate a need to decipher the multidimensionality of 
organisational performance in a regulated environment, but it would also suggest that a 
decreased influence of the public/private dichotomy on the definition of performance in a 
regulated environment.  
Organisations—both public and private—are open systems which interact with the external 
world (Pfeffer 1982; Thompson 1967) and which are occupied with their survival and 
success (Child 1997; Hatch 2006; Pfeffer 1982). The price of this survival is the adaptation 
to demands and constraints imposed by the surrounding environment (Donaldson 2001; 
Mahon & Murray Jr. 1981). Further, an organisation adapts its structures in accordance with 
the external context, and this also affects its performance (Hannan & Freeman 1977; 
Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Winter 2003). In framing this argument, this study makes use of 
the so-called contingency theory1, looking at the relationship between organisations and 
their environment (Jenner 1999) in order to conceptualise the influence of the regulatory 
environment on the definition of performance. 
                                                
1 Following Raffée (1993: 37-40), the contingency theory can be used as a meta theory illustrating 
 2 
Taking a public management approach, the primary objective of this thesis is thus to 
question the extent to which the regulatory environment influences the definition of 
performance and steers organisations, regardless of their type of ownership, towards a 
broader application of performance. Simply put, does regulation amplify or abate the 
multidimensional character of the concept of performance? Do organisations faced with a 
specific type of regulation diversify their objectives and balance different dimensions of 
organisational performance?  
1.1 DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROJECT: OBJECTIVES, QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
When looking at such multidimensional areas as the relationships between the regulatory 
intensity and the definition of performance, the ways of approaching the subject first have to 
be settled, and the subject for study clearly defined. Whether and how regulation affects the 
definition of organisational performance is, by and large, an undiscovered territory. This 
thesis presents and examines a model exploring the influence of different regulatory 
intensities on the composition of organisational performance from the perspective of the 
organisations. Before these elements are presented more in detail in the sections below, the 
following table presents the various elements that structure the research project: 
Objective of the study 
The influence of the regulatory intensity on the selection of performance dimensions from the 
perspective of the organisation 
Approach 
Public Management 
 Objectives Questions Methods 
First: 
Develop an 
analytical 
model 
Structuring possible 
performance 
dimensions 
- 
Constructing the 
regulatory intensity 
What are the possible 
performance dimensions for 
organisations? 
- 
How to construct the 
regulatory intensity? 
International 
literature review 
- 
Interview with 
experts 
Steps 
Second: 
Use the 
model in a 
specific 
context 
Evaluate the link 
between the 
selected 
performance 
dimensions and the 
regulatory intensity 
Does the regulatory intensity 
influence the selection of 
organisational performance 
dimensions by the 
organisation? 
In-depth semi 
structured interviews 
- 
Content analysis 
TABLE 1: THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
It is argued here that the dimensions of performance targeted by the organisations, i.e. the 
areas through which they will evaluate their performance, will vary depending on the 
regulatory intensity that an organisation faces. The focus of this study lies in the link 
between the ‘regulatory intensity’ and the ‘definition of performance’. Does the regulatory 
environment lead an organisation to adopt a definition of organisational performance that 
balances different dimensions, or is the definition of organisational performance more 
business-oriented in the sense that a dominant position of the financial dimension is 
observed? It is important to question whether, due to a controlled regulated environment, 
the boundaries are pushed beyond the predominance of the financial and shareholder focus 
                                                                                                                                                   
how some phenomena should be conceptualised. For this thesis, the contingency theory is thus used 
to guide the formulation and structure of the research question. 
  3 
towards a more heterogeneous, stakeholder and society-oriented picture. The study 
examines these questions using qualitative case studies conducted in the European context 
of sport betting and lottery organisations.  
1.1.1 The objective of the study 
The primary objective and purpose of this thesis is to conceptualise the performance 
definition from the perspective of the organisation and assess to what extent the selection 
of performance dimensions is influenced by the regulatory intensity. Three distinct issues 
are looked at: performance dimensions, the regulatory intensity and the existence of a 
relationship between the two elements.  
The dimensions of performance describe the areas or domains in which an organisation’s 
activities are evaluated. An essential topic is to consider whether the performance focus is 
purely financial—i.e. looking to the economic value of the organisation—or whether other, 
more social or public, dimensions are taken into account. As these dimensions are therefore 
at the heart of this thesis, they will be extracted from previous research and practice, and 
then redefined as the study progresses. This will allow for the construction of a tool of 
different performance dimensions, based on which it will then be possible to identify how 
performance is defined.  
A regulatory environment can be more or less restrictive. Different elements are evaluated in 
order to decide on the regulatory intensity, and they include, but are not limited to, the 
numbers of competitors in the market, the barriers to enter the market, the competences of 
the oversight body (i.e. the regulator) or the obligations imposed on the organisations facing 
regulation.  
In order to examine the influence of state regulation on the performance orientation of public 
and private organisations, this thesis focuses on one specific sector, namely that of 
gambling, and more particularly the example of the sport betting and lottery sectors. Not 
only will this study thus contribute to the performance and regulation debates in literature, 
but it will also provide useful information for the field of gambling, which—though it has 
gained in attention over the recent years—can still benefit from further public management 
research.  
1.1.2 A two step approach 
This thesis is divided into two consecutive and cumulative methodological steps. The first 
step consists in developing a causal model representing the different organisational 
performance dimensions and the construction of the regulatory intensity. In this step the 
possible performance dimensions and the criteria for the construction of the regulatory 
intensity are identified and explained. The second step is to examine if organisations’ 
selection of performance dimensions differs in relation to the regulatory intensity. This step 
consists in an exploration of the developed model through the use of a qualitative method 
evaluating the link between the regulatory intensity and the selected performance 
dimensions. 
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1.1.3 The research question 
The research question (RQ) of this study queries:  
• RQ: Whether and how does the regulatory environment influence the selection of 
organisational performance dimensions by the organisation? 
This question focuses on the influence of regulation on the performance concept used by 
organisations. It directly queries how organisations manage the performance concept under 
the influence of a regulatory environment. 
In order to explore this research question two sub-questions (Q1a and Q1b) can be 
formulated. Together, these questions guide the construction of a tool for analysing the 
main research question:  
• Q1a: What are the possible performance dimensions for organisations? 
• Q1b: How to construct the index of regulatory intensity? 
These sub-questions call for an in-depth literature review in order to screen for findings with 
regard to performance dimensions and approaches towards the regulatory intensity. The 
literature review pertaining to these two questions will address the challenges of properly 
defining and differentiating the various elements of organisational performance and of 
regulatory intensity.  
First, Q1a leads to the construction of an analytical tool for examining the 
multidimensionality of performance. Based on an international literature review, this tool, 
which consists of six performance dimensions, allows for a holistic identification of the 
performance concept used in organisations. The examination of the multidimensionality of 
performance is not limited to public organisations but is intentionally formulated to include 
all organisations, disregarding their type of ownership. In a regulatory environment the 
ownership of the organisation could be less decisive than the regulatory environment in 
defining organisational performance. 
Second, Q1b leads to the construction of an analytical tool for evaluating the regulatory 
intensity of a specific regulatory environment. This allows for a comparison of different 
regulatory environments based on their estimated regulatory intensity.  
By means of a qualitative analysis, the research question is then explored in light of six 
different sport betting and lottery regulatory environments in Europe. Sport betting and 
lottery activities are subject to state regulation in close to all countries around the world due 
to their socially sensitive and economically important nature. The levels of regulation vary 
from country to country, as do the types of ownership of the operators, but the games 
offered are more or less the same across jurisdictions. Hence, it provides for the ideal 
setting: not only does it contribute to the theory on performance and regulation by way of a 
sector-specific research, but it also provides new insights for the field of gambling.  
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1.2 THE MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
As will be seen in the sections below, it can be said that in the European context of sport 
betting and lottery organisations, and as reflected in the cases studied, the regulatory 
environments do indeed have an influence on the definition of performance. In a highly 
regulated environment, public and private organisations adopt a multidimensional 
performance definition, treating several dimensions as being of equal importance. In low 
regulated environments, organisations also adopt a multidimensional performance 
definition, but in doing so they attribute a differentiated importance to the performance 
dimensions, evaluating the financial dimension as the most important aspect. Put 
succinctly, regulation abates the influence of the type of ownership on the definition of 
performance. Previous research has analysed the influence of regulation mainly on the level 
of performance per se, but this study adds that not only the level but also the definition of 
performance is affected by regulation. As will be seen, the study further contributes to 
theory by proposing a move away from the public/private dichotomy in defining 
performance, towards a broader view of performance, which includes a consideration of the 
environment, and more specifically of the regulated environment.  
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In order to facilitate the read, this section lays out the structure of what is to come in the 
rest of the document. The study has been divided into four sections.  
The first section (chapter 2 and chapter 3) is dedicated to the literature review and the 
construction of the analytical tools. Chapter two focuses on the concept of performance, 
and in the first section the performance literature is outlined in order to present the origins of 
the concept. This consideration helps clarifying why the performance concept comes in 
such different shapes. In a second section the different definitions of performance are then 
presented, and the challenges linked to defining performance are highlighted. After this 
detailed discussion on the concept of performance, the study turns to the question of 
particular interest, namely the nature of performance and the possible dimensions of the 
performance definition that can be identified in theory and practice. Based on the previous 
sections, the different dimensions of performance are integrated into a purpose built tool for 
this analysis. In chapter three, the concept of regulation is discussed. In a first part, its 
changing nature over the last 70 years is thus identified. In a second part, the different 
definitions of regulation are then presented, and it is explained how the regulatory intensity 
is constructed. The reasons, motivations and potential deviances of regulation are 
presented, as these are all factors that are likely to influence the regulatory intensity. 
The second section (chapter 4) introduces the conceptual model of the research. The 
different components of the model are presented, before turning to the research 
methodology and the different data collection and analysis stages.  
The third section (chapter 5 and 6) presents the empirical aspects of the study. Chapter five 
outlines the regulatory regimes and intensities in which organisations operate and gives the 
results of the in-case analysis of the performance definition for the six cases under study. 
Chapter six presents the findings of the comparative analysis across the different cases. In 
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doing so, this chapter constructs the in-group performance definitions and gives the results 
of the comparative analysis, based on the interviews and the content analysis. It further 
examines the main research question by first comparing the definitions of performance 
between the groups; second, by examining the interview and survey responses in regard to 
the influence of regulation on performance in general and third, by examining these 
responses for each dimension individually. It further analyses the role of the type of 
ownership in defining performance and examines whether it affects the relationship between 
the regulatory intensity and the definition of performance. 
In a last section (chapter 7 and 8) the research is discussed and put in a wider context. 
Chapter seven discusses the results and links them back to the conceptual model. This 
chapter also contextualises the results in regard to theory and practice and in doing so 
highlights the theoretical and practical contribution made by this thesis. Chapter eight 
discusses the challenges faced in carrying out the research, as well as the limitations of the 
study and with a few recommendations for theory and regulated and regulating entities. The 
thesis closes some directions for future research and some final thoughts.  
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2 THE DIMENSIONS OF ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
The scholarly research on performance has changed focus over time, continuously 
emphasising different facets of the concept. This theoretical chapter first situates this strand 
of research (section 2.1), and provides an overview of the different performance movements 
that illustrate this ever-changing research-orientation (section 2.2). It then endeavours to 
provide a more general definition of performance, and explains the different reasons behind 
the variation in the understanding of the concept (section 2.3). The chapter then goes on to 
highlight the different performance dimensions identified in academic research and in 
practice (section 2.4). All of this paves the way for the construction of six performance 
dimensions that can together be used as a tool to define performance (section 2.5). 
Following this line of argument, the case is made for a holistic definition of performance, 
valid for private as well as public sector organisations. Such a holistic definition focuses on 
whether it is in fact the external context of organisations, and specifically their regulatory 
environment, that influences their definition of performance (section 2.6).  
Performance is both a buzzword in popular culture and a subject of intense interest, and 
this for both the private and the public sector, where it has evolved as a key concept of 
public management (Amirkhanyan et al. 2008; Andrews et al. 2005b; Boyne 2003; Boyne & 
Law 2005; Boyne et al. 2005; Brewer & Selden 2000; Hvidman & Andersen 2013; Meier & 
O’Toole Jr. 2002; Meier et al. 2007; Moynihan & Pandey 2005; Richard et al. 2009; 
Schönbucher 2010; Van Dooren et al. 2010). An abundant literature on public performance 
has emerged, both from academics and from practitioners. It examines the concept as such 
from a number of angles, such as performance management (Bouckaert & Peters 2002; De 
Bruijn 2007; Heinrich 2003; Ritz 2013), performance reporting (Schatteman 2008; Yang 
2009) or performance use (Kaplan & Norton 2008; Radnor 2008). Other studies have 
focused on the importance of performance more generally (Andrews et al. 2009; Behn 2003; 
Cohen 1993), while others still have concentrated on how performance is to be measured 
and monitored (Bouckaert & Peters 2002; De Bruijn 2002; Hatry 2006).  
While the origins of the notion of performance reach back centuries (Fried 1976; 
Venkatraman & Ramanujam 1986), it was essentially introduced in public sector debates 
some thirty years ago. From the 1980s onwards, performance surfaced as an important 
topic in public sector theory and practice (Talbot 1999: 15), and it has even been claimed 
that “if there is a single theme that characterises the public sector in the 1990s, it is the 
demand for performance” (Radin 2000: 168). Indeed, Radin found that the 1990s witnessed 
the birth of a mantra, “heard at all levels of government, that calls for documentation of 
performance and explicit outcomes of government action” (2000: 168). The performance 
debate will remain important: the recent economic and financial crisis has emphasised the 
call for governments to spend less and better manage the scarce resources at their 
disposal, something which in turn explains a prevailing interest in performance management 
(Van Dooren et al. 2010). In the literature, authors agree that it is a—if not the—central 
concern of managers, both public and private. Those who are interested in how well 
organisations reach their goals do need performance information (Talbot 2010; Van Dooren 
et al. 2010).  
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2.1 SITUATING THE PERFORMANCE RESEARCH  
The success of organisations, especially the factors that bring about organisational success, 
is subject to abundant research, mainly from a business management perspective. It is 
generally argued that several cause-effect relationships may contribute to organisational 
success (Jenner 1999). Research contributions have integrated different factors in their 
analysis. Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) projects have, for example, looked at the 
competitive position, the market environment, the lifecycle-stage, and the aim, capital and 
operating structure of a firm to identify how these various factors influence the performance 
of organisations defined along the lines of their profitability (Buzzell & Gale 1989).  
Other studies have considered the question of organisational success in looking at variables 
such as the structure of the environment and organisational variables (Hansen & Wernerfelt 
1989), industry effects (Rumelt 1991), or the combination of the environment, the 
organisational structure, strategies and funding of the organisation (Cameron 1986). 
Similarly, Jenner (1999) has examined the effect of the environment, resources, strategy, 
process of strategy formulation and organisational structure on the success of the 
organisation.  
A number of other studies adopt a resource-based view in exploring the resources and 
capacities of an organisation and their effect on the profitability of organisations (Barney 
2001; Wernerfelt 1984). The resources and capacities of an organisations in turn encompass 
several factors, such as market cultivation, customer proximity, flexibility, learning capacity, 
innovation capacity, cost efficiency, production capacity, quality, capacity to pursuit long 
term goals and capacity of continuing process improvements (Jenner 1999).2 
Next to the effects of resources on organisational success, an abundant amount of literature 
concentrates on the effect of strategy on a firm’s success. The work of Porter (1986, 1990), 
Mintzberg (2003) or Chandler (1962) with his famous thesis of ‘structure follows strategy’ are 
noteworthy in this regard as they have all concentrated on strategy content and its effect on 
organisational effectiveness.3 
Another stream of literature has focused not on the strategy content but on the process of 
strategy formulation (Mintzberg 2003). In this perspective, the formulation of strategies and 
decision processes that lead to a successful strategy has been analysed. Studies have also 
argued that an organisation’s success depends on its structure (Jenner 1999), or—the 
independent variable in this contribution—its environment.  
The academic literature has long recognised the importance of the environment to 
organisations, resulting in a series of theories, such as resource dependence (Pfeffer & 
Salancik 1978), institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio 1991), population-ecology (Hannan & 
Freeman 1989), and agency theories (Jensen & Meckling 1976), which in various ways 
analyse the link between the environment and the organisation. During the late 1950s, 
‘modernists’ used systems theory to establish the idea that organisations are open to their 
                                                
2 For a discussion of each of these factors see Jenner (1999: 102-126). 
3 For a discussion see Jenner (1999: 137-161). 
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environments, and then went on to conceptualise and demonstrate the importance of this 
new concept (Hatch 2006). It was in this context that the contingency theory emerged.4  
The contingency theory has become the prominent theory supporting the environment-
organisation link (Cook et al. 1983; Reger et al. 1992), and Trkman (2010). Over the last 40 
years, it has, for example, addressed the issue of fit between “an organization and its 
strategy, structure, processes, technology and environment” (Trkman 2010: 125). The 
central tenet of the theory is that there is no single organisational design that is universally 
valid for all organisations. What managers do is dependent upon the circumstances and the 
situations they are confronted with. It is argued that organisational effectiveness results 
from aligning characteristics of the organisation, such as its structure or strategy, to 
contingencies that represent the situation of the organisation (Burns & Stalker 1961; 
Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Pennings 1975; Woodward 1965). The environment of an 
organisation affects the organisational structure and design and leads to adaptation of the 
organisational characteristics to the environment (Burns & Stalker 1961; Galbraith 1973; 
Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Rouse & Putterill 2003; Thompson 1967). Several studies have 
argued that the external environment limits the range of viable strategic options (Hambrick & 
Lei 1985; Miller 1987; Venkatraman & Prescott 1990). Other authors (Mahon & Murray Jr. 
1981; Reger et al. 1992; Thompson 1967) have stipulated more generally that managers 
have to match their firm’s strategy to the environment.  
Further, specific in regard to performance, management theorists tend to agree that the 
ways in which organisations are designed and the environments in which they operate make 
a difference in affecting organisational performance (Winter 2003; Yuchtman & Seashore 
1967). In their study on organisational effectiveness, Yuchtman and Seashore identified the 
“relations between the organisation and its environment as a central ingredient in the 
definition of effectiveness” (1967: 897).  
The context dependency of organisational performance has been the subject of various 
studies (Andrews et al. 2005a; Andrews et al. 2005b; Bozeman & Loveless 1987; Hamilton & 
Shergill 1992; Ritz 2013; Williams 2003), but this study focuses on the yet understudied area 
of the definition of performance in relation to the regulatory environment, which might lead 
away from the public-private dichotomy to a more general view of performance combining 
elements of both the private and the public world (Amirkhanyan et al. 2013; Boyne et al. 
2005). Further information on this relationship will be useful for the political process when 
establishing a regulatory system, but also for managers and organisations operating in this 
sector. They are the ones facing the difficulties linked to develop an adequate performance 
strategy. Regulation is an important mode of governing economic activities. From a public 
management perspective, and public regulation point of view it is interesting to analyse its 
influence on the definition of organisational performance, it being a central concern for 
                                                
4 Researchers have focused on different contingent factors and contributed to the development of 
the theory. The environment is thus not the only contingent factor; mention can also be made for 
example of strategy (Chandler 1962) or organisational size (Child 1972). The environmental 
contingency theory is however of particular interest to this study, which is why it has been put in 
focus here. 
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organisations, both public and private ones. To sum up these studies, performance has 
certainly appeared as an important dependent variable in research. It is however no simple 
concept and definitions abound, reaching further than business performance defined in 
terms of ‘simple’ profitability. 
The definition of performance: a variable concept 
While the importance of performance is clearly recognised in theory and practice, its 
definition is not. Generally speaking, organisational performance can be seen to report an 
organisation’s achievement of outputs with regard to set targets (Bouckaert & Peters 2002; 
De Bruijn 2007; Schick 2003). One difficulty in defining performance can be linked to the 
changing shape of the concept as such, especially in the public sector (Hubbard 2006). 
Indeed, the meaning, study and analysis of performance have been described as highly 
context and time dependent (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008; Summermatter & Siegel 2008a, 
2009; Talbot 2010).  
After a long one-dimensional focus on economic profit (Baetge et al. 2007), the concept of 
performance in the private sector developed towards more qualitative approaches in the 
1980s. Attention shifted to culture and quality instead of structures, plans, and numbers. 
Traditional financial performance measures provide little indication of how that performance 
is achieved or how it can be improved (Kennerley & Neely, 2003; Talbot, 2010). The ultimate 
focus on financial performance was increasingly criticised and stakeholder value or value-
driven management emerged in some sort of countermovement. The focus on shareholder 
value seemed to be a far too limited conceptualisation of performance and it was argued 
that the total values of the organisation includes more aspects than the financial one such 
as human assets, intellectual capital, sustainability and the generation of societal wealth 
(Pohlman & Gardiner 2000: 65).  
In the public sector, after a focus on outputs and results, performance was conceptualised 
based on outcome and multiple objectives, acknowledging that an exclusive focus on 
financial performance does not correspond to public sector realities. Generally speaking, 
the definition of performance includes—besides financial/economic dimensions—
operational and social dimensions reflecting the stakeholder and context dependency of the 
performance concept (Richard et al. 2009).  
The following sections seek to contextualise the study of performance, and discuss the link 
between this definition and the environment surrounding an organisation. This is all in view 
of building an analytical tool, which will allow for the identification of different performance 
dimensions making up the performance definition. The following section outlines how the 
interest in performance has developed over time, and the different perspectives studies on 
organisational success took before adopting the current performance focus. 
2.2 A CHANGING PERFORMANCE FOCUS OVER TIME 
The significance of performance and how performance is currently conceptualised is the 
result of the ongoing interest in how governments and organisations achieve their goals. 
Governments and public organisations have undergone important changes in their 
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governance structure, from unorganised systems where nepotism and amateurism were the 
norm, through a bureaucratic model based on the Weberian principles of rules and hierarchy, 
and towards a management based system (Hood 1995; Hughes 2003; Schedler & Proeller 
2003; Weber 1922). These changes have affected different aspects of public services and 
public organisations, one of them being the definition of performance. The current 
understanding of performance is the result of a continuous emergence of performance 
theories, in both the public and the private sector. The following section will present the 
management reforms and related performance movements that have developed on the 
governmental level, with the aim of clarifying the origins of the current performance 
conceptualisation and of identifying the changing attributes linked to performance over time. 
The sections are in no means intended as an exhaustive discussion of the different 
movements, but rather as an overview of the different facets of performance, as it has been 
conceptualised from the end of the 19th century until today. 
2.2.1 The public sector performance movements: since the end of the 19th century  
It would be incorrect to claim that performance management emerged only in the second 
half of the last century. Performance ideas have been around far longer. Williams (2003) has, 
for example, studied management practices in early 20th century New York and could 
identify many elements of contemporary performance measurement. Different terms like 
accountability, control, savings, internal management or objective improvement have been 
used to refer to the performance of public administrations since the end of the 19th century 
(Talbot 1999). Generally speaking, it is true that performance management arrived quite late 
in the public administration debate. This despite the development of statistical systems and 
administrative procedures that have been essential to the development of the modern state. 
These developments were driven by a need to administer the state and were not yet linked 
to the measurement of the quality of actions and that of achievements (Desrosières 1998). It 
was only in the last half of the 20th century, and with the emergence of New Public 
Management (NPM) in the 1980s, that performance strategies were really introduced to 
public management. The following table presents four waves of performance movements 
that have been identified since the end of the 19th century. A certain continuity in 
performance movements can be observed, as previous movements have frequently heavily 
influenced subsequent ones.  
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  Performance Movement Characterisation 
Social survey movement 
Focus on social problems and targets social 
inequalities 
Scientific management & 
science of administration 
movement 
Focus on the need for infrastructure and resource 
mobilisation that arose from industrialisation 
1st wave: 
End of 19th–
1940s 
Cost accounting movement 
Focus on the process of tracking, recording and 
analysing costs associated with the activity of an 
organisation 
Performance budgeting 
movement 
Focus on outputs and objectives in the budgetary 
process instead of inputs  2nd wave: 
1950s–1970s 
Social indicators movement 
Focus on the construction of standard measures 
of social issues 
New Public Management (2nd 
generation performance 
budgeting)  
Focus on private sector techniques in the 
public sector, on results rather than inputs and 
on performance strategies as part of 
management 
3rd wave: 
1980s–2000 
Evidence Based Performance 
Focus on research and indicators rather than 
ideology and opinion have to accompany policy 
decisions 
4th wave: 
since 2000 
Democratic Governance 
Focus on multidimensional performance as a 
result of the inclusion of different actors  
TABLE 2: PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT REFORM & PERFORMANCE MOVEMENTS 
I. The first wave of performance movements 
The first wave of management reform and performance movements reached from the end of 
the 19th century until the 1940s and, as illustrated in the table, includes three different 
movements. These movements were responses to the social context of industrialisation, 
poverty and social unrest, and corruption in governments (Van Dooren et al. 2010). The aim 
was to rationalise policies and administration in order to respond to these societal issues. 
The first movement was the social survey movement, which emerged from social reformers 
who aimed to gather facts about social problems and inequalities (Bulmer 2001; Van Dooren 
et al. 2010). It was believed that the poverty debate was poor and the topic understudied. 
The social survey movement targeted three main questions: the magnitude of poverty, the 
reasons for poverty and solutions to poverty.  
The second movement was the scientific management and science of administration 
movement, which aimed to satisfy the need for better infrastructure and resource 
mobilisation as a result of industrialisation (Heinrich 2003; Rose 1976; Van Dooren et al. 
2010). Corrupt and biased governments were seen to hinder the development of 
infrastructures. Supporters of the scientific management and science of administration 
movement believed that government and its institutions required a professional, rational and 
efficient workforce. The bureaucratic model of Weber (1922) was seen as the solution, 
formalising the science of administration as a discipline, and public employment as a 
profession. Bureaucratic management was about rule based management and the respect of 
the law in order to achieve a political end (Van Dooren et al. 2010). In Weber’s bureaucratic 
model of government, performance was important, even though it was differently defined, 
and the term performance was not used specifically at that time. For Weber (1922), who 
promoted the rule of law, clear hierarchies and processes, performance referred to the 
respect of rules and the correct accomplishment of tasks. In this conceptualisation, the 
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financial perspective was not included in the performance definition. Performance focused on 
the processes of task accomplishment. This consequently allows the identification of a legal 
dimension of performance, i.e. that for bureaucracies’ performance is measured based on 
the strict following of guidelines and hierarchies in accomplishing their tasks; and not in 
terms of financial returns or efficiency. The effectiveness of bureaucracy was not only 
emphasised by Weber (1922), but also Taylor (1911) and Fayol (1917).  
The third movement of the first wave of management reform, cost accounting, emerged in 
the public and private sectors alike. As society requested more control and openness in both 
public and private organisations, stronger information systems were needed in order to 
manage these increasingly large and complex organisations. Cost accounting targeted the 
process of tracking, recording and analysing costs associated with the activity of an 
organisation (Pollit & Bouckaert 2004). The first output indicators were incorporated into the 
accounting systems of organisations. Pollit and Bouckaert (2004) have argued that whereas 
cost accounting has been completely institutionalised in the private sector, it is still in its 
infancy in the public sectors of OECD countries. These three movements were somehow 
coexisting and initiatives emerged to integrate all three movements (Williams 2003).  
II. The second wave of performance movements 
The second wave of performance movements spans from the 1950s to the 1970s, and 
includes two different movements (Van Dooren et al. 2010). The performance budgeting 
movement was a very important movement contributing to the establishment of 
performance strategies in the public sector. Its objective was established in the sixth finding 
of the first Hoover Commission (1947-1949).5 The Commission highlighted the fact that 
budgetary processes of governments required improvement, and that instead of simply 
listing expenditures, it would be necessary to define the work to be done to reach 
organisational objectives (United States 1949: 6). Outputs and their associated costs were 
the primary focus of performance budgeting (OECD 1996: 158). Performance budgeting 
became well established and was adopted in several governmental departments of the 
United States (US). Based on performance budgeting different initiatives were implemented, 
one example of which being the US Planning Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS). 
Through this programme new expenditures had to be systematically weighted against the 
marginal benefits of each programme. Other performance budgeting programmes, inspired 
by PPBS, were the Management by Objectives (MBO) or the Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB). 
MBO, still in use in public and private organisations, links organisational planning for 
performance goals with rewards for employees based on measurable organisational 
success (Heinrich 2003: 27). ZBB aimed to review total expenditures and not only the 
changes made year to year as in traditional budgeting. ZBB required budgets to be 
examined starting from scratch and not from the previous budget levels (Wetherbe & 
Montanari 1981). Performance budgeting movements spread around the world: Great 
Britain introduced performance budgeting from the late 1960s onward, notably in the 
Ministry of Defence. They soon extended performance budgeting to other departments such 
                                                
5 Officially named the ‘Commission on Organisation of the Executive Branch of the Government’. 
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as education. In France, the Rationalisation des choix budgétaires (RCB) was implemented 
in 1968 in the Ministry of Defence and was later extended to other sectors such as energy 
and the postal service. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland and Japan followed in 
implementing PPBS (Novick 1973). Despite the wide proliferation of performance budgeting 
practices it is difficult to judge the success of these initiatives. PPBS type systems were 
seemingly limited by their closed structure. This would arguably have been more 
appropriate in situations where clear goals can be formulated, something the public sector 
is not known for (Van Dooren et al. 2010). The limited number of variables in these 
frameworks did not necessarily correspond to the reality prevailing in government and 
public organisations. Hence, a move towards more open, adaptive and flexible models 
emerged, such as Total Quality Management (TQM) (Heinrich 2003).  
Another performance measurement movement of the second wave is the social indicators 
movement. The movement was initiated in part through the publication of a book ‘Social 
Indicators’ that looked into the social side-effects of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) space investment programmes (Bauer 1966). The social indicators 
movement aimed to construct standard measures on social issues like health, crime, or 
education. Even though the movement did not endure, mainly due to the economic crisis in 
the second part of the 1970s, and the restrictive budget management in the 1980s, it had an 
impact on governments as they started to take into account the social outcomes of 
governmental action (Van Dooren et al. 2010).  
III. The third wave of performance movements 
The third wave of performance movements includes two movements and started in the 
1980s and was undoubtedly marked by the New Public Management (NPM) reforms. NPM 
spread globally and changed management techniques in governments fundamentally. It has 
to be noted that this new management reform was not exclusively a performance movement 
but a management reform with performance as one of its main constituents.  
A central element of the NPM movement was the borrowing of private sector techniques for 
use in the public sector. This was believed to lead to increases in efficiency (Hvidman & 
Andersen 2013). Osborne and Gaebler (1993), for example, formalised ten principles 
characterising the NPM movement underlining the importance of clearly defining and 
separating political and the administrative tasks, adopting a market-based logic in delivering 
services and clearly defining organisations’ mission and objectives (Osborne & Gaebler 
1993). The emergence of NPM was a direct consequence of states’ macro-economic 
difficulties. As well, a number of theories underlined the bloated nature of the public sector’s 
share of the gross domestic product (Friedman 2009). From the perspective of NPM, the 
state involvement in the economy should be cut down and a focus on economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, quality, customers, satisfaction and trust should solely frame public 
institutions’ actions (Bouckaert 2001; Bouckaert & Peters 2002; Cole & Parston 2006; De 
Bruijn 2007; Heinrich 2003; Moore 1995; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000; Radnor 2008; 
Summermatter & Siegel 2009; Talbot 2010). To counter the increasing debts of states, 
downsizing was seen as a solution (Bouckaert 2001). This led to a change in managerial 
approaches, shifting governmental focus away from the social indicators towards issues of 
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savings, budget cuts and cost-control. Different initiatives were adopted, such the United 
States President Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (Grace Commission). It resulted in a 
proposal for some 2’478 cost-cutting, revenue-enhancing recommendations which would 
cut 424 billion United States Dollar (USD) from the Federal deficits over a period of three 
years (United States 1984: 4). The United Kingdom (UK) launched a similar procedure, the 
Financial Management Initiative of 1982. It was designed to focus on objectives and to 
measure outputs and performance. An important innovation of this initiative was the 
introduction of performance indicators (PIs). The NPM movement underlined the 
governmental duty to account for their performance to both politicians and citizens 
(Bouckaert 2001; De Bruijn 2007).  
Never before had performance been the main focus of a public management reform, but 
thanks to the NPM movement, it became of central concern to governments (Aucoin 1995; 
Behn 1998; Boyne 2001; Budäus et al. 1998; Christensen & Laegreid 2003; Hood 1995; 
Lane 2000; Maesschalck 2004; Osborn & Baughn 1990). For Van Dooren et al (2010) 
performance is a buzzword implying change and improvement in governments under NPM. 
Performance is the solution to inefficient and slow bureaucracies. Managers of public 
entities should adopt techniques of the private sector such as TQM, devolved management 
or tools such as performance-related pay (Boyne 2002a). Politicians, managers and citizens 
started to pay increased attention to the performance of organisations to evaluate their 
activities and their level of success. The effects of NPM reforms in public sectors in regard 
to performance were consequently far more comprehensive than in previous performance 
movements. In this view, performance information should be used in all management 
functions and not be limited to advice for future policies or to budget and planning goals as 
had been the case in earlier performance movements. The focus on results and objectives 
induced by NPM led to the development of different performance models in the public 
sector. The US Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, which required 
that federal agencies set targets for the outcomes of their activities (Boyne & Law 2005) is 
an example which still influences performance budgeting today (Moynihan 2008). Similar 
programmes are the Output-Purchase Budgeting Systems in New Zealand and Australia, 
and the British Financial Management Initiative Public Service Agreements (PSA). The UK 
has seen performance measurement introduced across all public services. Other countries 
followed a more moderated path in their adoption of performance indicator systems. In 
general continental Europe had a much less far-reaching approach to the implementation of 
performance indicators. Nevertheless, reform models stressing the importance of 
performance indicators emerged for example in Germany (Neues Steuerungsmodell) and in 
Norway (mål- og resultatstyringen). 
The downside associated with the performance measurement effort under NPM has been 
found to focus too much on measurable outputs, rather than on the performance 
measurement of social outcomes (Bouckaert & Peters 2002). The challenges in performance 
management are in this view to develop indicators that are not only more clearly related to 
the policy objectives, but also better linked to rewards and sanctions (Laegreid et al. 2008). 
Other critics of NPM have argued that business practices should not be transferred from the 
private to the public sphere because of the fundamental differences between private and 
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public organisations (Boyne 2002a). The problem in exporting private sector performance 
techniques to the public sector is that the bottom-line criteria are often missing or 
insufficient in order to manage performance in public organisations; profitability is not the 
ultimate goal of public organisations (De Bruijn 2007). Despite these criticisms, NPM has 
had and still has an enormous impact on the public sectors and on performance 
management.  
The second movement of the third wave of the performance movements is called 
Evidenced-Based-Policy (EBP). EBP prescribes that facts and figures on outcomes should 
inform policy decisions and not ideologies or opinions. Through this movement the public 
sector shifted attention from inputs and processes towards results and outcomes (Boyne 
and Law 2005).  
IV. The fourth wave of performance movements 
In the view of this author, and as illustrated in the table on page twelve, it is already possible 
to define a fourth wave of management movements that will certainly have its effect: a 
movement which conceptualises performance in the framework of democratic governance. 
Indeed, democratic governance, referring to the processes of interaction between 
government and society at large in implementing public policies, has recently emerged as a 
new mode of management in the public sector (Talbot 2010; Walker et al. 2010). The 
implementation of public policies under democratic governance implies the need for a 
network of public and private sector organisations working together for the delivery of public 
services (United Nations Development Programme 2007). The governance mode of 
government does raise several issues in regard to the measurement of performance. Power 
in such a mode of government is decentralised, and distributed away from core executives 
branches towards a network of various actors (Frederickson & Frederickson 2006). Such 
actors refer not only to regional and international organisations, like the European Union (EU) 
or the United Nations (UN), but also sideways and downwards, through delegation and 
agencification. The result is a weakened core executive, or what has been referred to as ‘the 
hollow state’ (Frederickson & Frederickson 2006). This new configuration renders 
performance measurement and management even more complex as services and goods are 
now provided through the involvement of different actors at different levels of government 
and civil society (Frederickson & Frederickson 2006; Talbot 2010; Walker et al. 2010). This 
mode of management is likely to increase the number of dimensions of performance, and the 
relationships and variables used to evaluate performance. It is also likely to make the 
aggregation of performance data a complicated undertaking. While it is clearly not yet an 
attested performance movement as such, it undoubtedly already influences the 
conceptualisation of performance.  
2.2.2 Concluding remarks 
Performance measurement has become a fully embedded part of organisational 
management. The continuity in management and performance movements illustrates a 
move towards an increasingly outcome-focused performance management in the public 
sector. Nonetheless, the dimensions attributed to performance differ in their nature, 
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depending on the context and perspective taken—as will be illustrated throughout the 
following sections—this will, in turn, influence the definition of performance. 
2.3 THE DIFFERENT FACETS OF PERFORMANCE 
Performance can refer to a number of meanings and situations, something which 
complicates the task of defining this core concept of management (Lebas 1995; Van Dooren 
et al. 2010). In the next section, different approaches to define performance of organisations 
are highlighted, and the sub-concepts involved are explained (section 2.3.1). In a second 
section (2.3.2), different explanations behind the existence of various understandings of the 
concept are discussed, emphasising further its complexity and multidimensionality. 
2.3.1 The different definitions of performance 
In its broadest meaning, performance can refer to any kind of actions. In this sense, 
Dubnick (2005) outlines that: “(…) performance can be associated with a range of actions 
from the simple and mundane act of opening a car door, to the staging of an elaborate 
reenactment of the Broadway musical ‘Chicago’. In all these forms, performance stands in 
distinction from mere ‘behavior’ in implying some degree of intent” (Dubnick 2005: 391). In 
this definition, it is the simply undertaking an action that refers to performance.  
Performance can also be defined based on the appraisal of the act that has been 
undertaken. Hence, it is not only the act that is important, but also the question of how well 
it was carried out. The basic idea behind performance is the evaluation of an action, task or 
undertaking, against a previously determined objective (Lorino 2001). One ingredient of 
performance is that it is about intentional behaviour.  
Moreover, not only the quality of the acts but also the quality of the achievements resulting 
from them can be included in the definition of performance. Van Dooren et al. (2010) have 
classified performance into four perspectives (see table 3) based on two dimensions: first 
the quality of actions and second the quality of the achievements. A few years earlier 
Dubnick (2005) presented a similar conceptualisation of performance, but in his case using 
a benchmarking approach.  
 Does the perspective imply quality of achievements? 
 No Yes 
No Performance as production  
(P1) 
Performance as good results 
(P3) 
Does the 
perspective 
imply quality 
of actions? Yes Performance as 
competence/capacity (P2) 
Performance as sustainable results 
(P4) 
TABLE 3: FOUR PERSPECTIVES OF PERFORMANCE (BASED ON VAN DOOREN ET AL. (2010)) 
The first perspective of performance (P1) refers to the tasks carried out by the performing 
person or organisation. It therefore includes all actions that are carried out: answering 
phone-calls, medical treatments, police control, teaching students, etc. Neither the success 
of the action nor the quality of the action itself is important. It is the simple execution of the 
action that is seen as performing. This is a very broad notion of performance and it is very 
neutral as it does not state any level of achievement or give any judgment on the level of 
success. The second understanding of performance (P2) takes the quality of actions into 
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account but not that of the achievements. It is therefore about the capacity or competence 
of the performing agent or organisation. The underlying assumption is that the better the 
agent or the organisation in question is at undertaking the action, the higher the 
performance to be achieved. In this sense the second understanding of performance is 
process-orientated. The third approach towards performance focuses on the quality of the 
achievements (P3). In this perspective, performance equals the results or the achievements, 
notwithstanding the actions carried out to achieve these results. This result-focus coincides 
with the statement: ‘only results matter’ (Van Dooren et al. 2010). The fourth understanding 
of performance takes both dimensions into account: the quality of the actions and the 
quality of the achievements. Van Dooren et al. (2010: 3) call this perspective “performance 
as sustainable results (P4)”. Consequently, this last perspective implies a more holistic view 
of performance considering both capacity and results and merges the input and process-
orientation with the result-focus. The four perspectives of performance illustrate that the 
focus of performance can be broadened depending on the measurement effort undertaken, 
but leaves two questions open in regard to the definition of performance: First, what 
constitutes an achievement? Are the achievements limited to direct outputs or are 
outcomes to be equally considered? Second, if performance is defined solely along the 
lines of the quality of actions and achievements and no indications are given in regard to the 
kind of actions and achievements, how can their nature be captured?  
Similar conclusions can also be drawn when performance is defined along the lines of the 
production model. It is true that this model does provide for a higher level of specification 
than the four perspectives presented above (as it clarifies that performance is based on the 
production process), but the definition of performance nonetheless changes depending on 
which elements of the production process the performance measurement effort 
concentrates on. And if the outcomes of the production process are considered as well, this 
makes the definition of performance more varied still.  
Is performance limited to inputs and processes or does it also refer to outputs and results or 
even outcomes? The span of performance model (also called the production model of 
performance) of Bouckaert and Halligan (2008: 18) provides further indications in this 
regard. The span of performance refers to “the horizontal expansion of the results 
dimension” (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008: 18) of performance and integrates and extends 
several previous performance conceptualisations and performance models, such as the 
Input-Output-Outcome (IOO)6 or the Economic-Efficiency-Effectiveness (3 E’s)6 models. In 
addition to the input, result and outcome, the span of performance integrates dimensions 
such as trust and the environment. Based on this analytical framework seven different 
relationships to conceptualise performance have been identified (Bouckaert & Halligan 
2008: 15). 
                                                
6 For further discussion see Bouckaert and Halligan (2006); Boyne (2002b); Talbot (1999). 
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Figure 1: The span of performance (adapted from Bouckaert & Halligan (2010)) 
The span of performance is smaller when the focus is on one element such as economy or 
efficiency and remains inside the ‘black box’ of the organisation (links 1 and 2). The black 
box is a commonly used term to illustrate an internal structure or system in which inputs are 
entering and outputs are leaving without a profound understanding of what happened in the 
box itself. The performance definition is broadened when looking at the outcomes and 
effectiveness that go beyond the framework of the organisation, and enter the policy level 
by including the outcomes to be achieved (links 3 and 4). When stretching the span of 
performance even further to include the concept of trust (links 5, 6 and 7) the performance 
definition is broadened (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008). Several challenges remain however 
when defining performance along the lines of the production model for the public sector. 
The definition of outputs for the public sector is complex due to the high number of 
transactions between producers and consumers. Outputs and efficiency are adequate 
conceptualisations of performance in the private sector but not in the public one. In the 
private sphere the aggregation of the individual added values is the main component of the 
profit of the firm. Over the past years, the private sector has also enlarged its definition of 
performance beyond the financial performance (see section 2.4.1). The definition of 
performance is clearly linked to the perspective taken by the organisation in regard to that 
which is to be measured. Different performance frameworks further foster the argument of a 
changing definition of performance based on the focus one adopts. Three frameworks are 
identified in the literature concerning the performance focus: first a systems resource 
perspective, second, a goal perspective and third a constituency perspective. They are 
briefly presented in order to further advance the argument of a multiplication of performance 
definitions observed in literature (Schönbucher 2010). 
First, from a systems resource perspective the focus remains on the inputs, and success is 
based on the capacity to guarantee the long-term survival of the organisation by securing 
the necessary resources and knowledge needed to fulfil an organisation’s purposes (Baetge 
et al. 2007; Selden & Sowa 2004; Yuchtman & Seashore 1967). This systemic view 
concentrates on the relationship between the organisation and its context (Yuchtman & 
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Seashore 1967). With the incorporation of the external environment, the systems resource 
approach attempts to resolve the problem of defining an appropriate success criterion 
(Schönbucher 2010). Compared to the categorisation of Van Dooren et al. (2010), the 
systems resource approach focuses on performance as competence and capacity (P2) 
neglecting the result dimension. In terms of the span of performance, the systems resource 
approach considers inputs and the environment of the organisations out of which resources 
are acquired. In this perspective, performance does not include any quality judgement of the 
achievements of organisational actions. 
From the goal perspective, the success of the organisation depends on the degree to which 
the organisation has reached its goals (Baetge et al. 2007; Etzioni 1964). Any organisation, 
firm or company formulates a series of goals which direct their actions (Daum et al. 2007; 
De Kluyver & Pearce II 2012; Mishkin 2000). Outputs and goal accomplishment are the most 
frequently used criteria to assess effectiveness in this perspective (Cameron 1978; Hitt 
1988). In other words, the focus on the quality of achievements is here identical with the P3 
meaning of the model of Van Dooren et al. (2010) or the concentration on the outputs and 
outcomes of the production model of performance. One difficulty with the goal approach is 
arguably that there is not necessarily an agreement as to which goals are to be set among 
the various parties tasked with setting them (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Schönbucher 2010). 
Performance management is consequently more useful in product-oriented organisations 
than in service-delivery organisations (De Bruijn 2002). And even in cases where there is 
agreement on goals, it can be difficult to develop indicators which determine the 
performance of public policy objectives (Frederickson & Frederickson 2006). Goals in the 
public sector tend to be vague or difficult to operationalise (De Bruijn 2007). Furthermore 
goal ambiguity frequently occurs in the public sector and is an on-going research topic 
(Walker et al. 2010; Young & Rainey 2005). Goal ambiguity can emerge from the level of 
interpretive freedom of the organisational mission (Boyne & Chen 2007; Walker et al. 2010; 
Young & Rainey 2005). Secondly, goal ambiguity can result from organisations making use 
of a discretionary interpretation when translating mission or general goals into specific 
actions geared towards accomplishing the mission (Boyne & Chen 2007; Walker et al. 2010; 
Young & Rainey 2005). Finally, goal ambiguity also relates to the difficulty in defining 
priorities among multiple goals, something which can result in a hierarchy between the 
goals (Young & Rainey 2005).  
Finally, from a constituency perspective performance is conceptualised based on the 
context the organisation or the individual is embedded in. It takes into account different 
external, but also internal, stakeholders that are vital for the survival of the organisation 
(Schönbucher 2010; Thompson 1967). In this view, performance is defined by the ability of 
the organisation to preserve the interest of multiple external and internal stakeholders such 
as employees, managers, customers, suppliers, shareholders or regulators. Obviously this 
task is not as straightforward as it may appear because the interests of these different 
stakeholders may not be aligned (Schönbucher 2010). Conflicting interests between external 
and internal stakeholders particularly need to be considered by the organisation when 
defining the direction to be taken. The point to make in regard to the constituency approach 
is that the external and internal stakeholders influence the definition of performance as a 
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result of the incorporation of the different interests they represent and defend in the 
direction of the organisation. This is an aspect that is only indirectly recognised in the four 
perspectives on performance of Van Dooren et al. (2010) as it is related to the nature of the 
objectives defined by the organisation. For this reason, the constituency perspective 
integrates the nature of the acts and achievements to a certain extent, something that is 
absent in the four perspectives of performance defined along the lines of the quality of 
actions and achievements.  
Some scholars integrate all of the three approaches in one performance definition when 
staking the claim of the multidimensionality of performance (Venkatraman & Ramanujam 
1987). Such an integrated perspective of performance focuses on processes and outputs 
equally and tries to respond to the internal and external stakeholder of the organisation 
(Schönbucher 2010). Moreover, performance is not limited to the financial dimension but 
can integrate subjective measures (i.e. include non-monetary performance dimensions) next 
to the objective measures, thus further broadening the concept of performance. Several 
studies confirm that subjective measures of success correlate with objective measures of 
success to allow for the confirmation of the validity and reliability of the integration of both 
kind of measures (Dess & Robinson Jr. 1984; Schenk 1998; Schönbucher 2010; Slater & 
Narver 2000; Venkatraman & Ramanujam 1987).  
In summary, performance can be defined narrowly, for example by focusing on the outputs 
of the production process, or broadly when concentrating on all elements of the span of 
performance (Boyne 2005; Bouckaert & Halligan 2008; Talbot 1999; Van Dooren et al. 2010). 
The different approaches presented above are the most popular when defining performance 
(Van Dooren et al. 2010). However, neither the four perspectives on performance of Van 
Dooren et al. (2010), nor the definitions of performance along the lines of the span of 
performance provide further information with regard to the nature of performance. Not only 
are the different characteristics in the private and public sector a cause for the different 
definition of the concept, but it also seems that there is not one unique definition of 
performance in the public sphere (Summermatter & Siegel 2009; Talbot 2010; Boyne 2003). 
The next section concentrates on different explanations behind the changing definition of 
performance and further strengthens the argument in favour of a multidimensional 
performance definition. Among other reasons the changing shape of the performance 
concept is a consequence of the objective of the performance management effort that is 
certainly not the same across organisations and the boundaries, especially in the public 
sector where they are not always clearly definable (Summermatter & Siegel 2010; Talbot 
2010). In addition, despite the long tradition in studies of performance, there still exists no 
agreement in the definition and terminology used (Holton 1999b; Summermatter & Siegel 
2008a, 2009; Talbot 1999, 2010; Venkatraman & Ramanujam 1986). 
2.3.2 Explaining the variability of performance definitions 
Several explanations are behind the fact that there is not one definition of performance but 
that rather it is a complex, multidimensional and context dependent concept. In the 
subsequent paragraphs, explanations behind the variability of the meaning of performance 
are highlighted. It will thus be explained that, first, there is the problem of the unit of 
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analysis; second, the organisational boundaries are often not easy to define and third, 
concepts associated with performance are often not understood in the same way. Finally, 
the definition of performance is also dependent on the focus taken in each particular case. 
These four factors will be discussed below in turn. 
I. The problem of the unit of analysis 
The definition of performance depends of the units of analysis. States are in general not a 
unified, one level construct but contain different administrative or political layers. In federal 
states exist federal and local levels of government (e.g. federal, regional and local levels) 
and even in unitary states there are normally a central and a local level of government 
(Talbot 2010). Obviously, this structure complicates performance analysis because many 
public activities take place at several levels simultaneously. To measure performance on 
these different levels is complicated and requires the levels to be well defined, and this 
especially when performance data of public entities across different levels of government 
are compared. Apparently, the levels at which performance is measured are not easily 
limited. A linkage can be observed horizontally—performance of one policy sector may 
depend upon the performance of another policy sector or the performance of an 
organisation relies also on the performance of the suppliers (quality of the intermediate 
products)—or vertically—the performance of the organisation or ministry depends upon the 
performance of the sub-units.  
Decisions taken on an upper level can influence the activities of lower levels. Schools are an 
example of where decisions on a central or national level impact the activities of local 
schoolteachers. This influence between the different levels need to be taken into account 
when analysing the performance of an unit, especially because the units cannot necessarily 
be treated as closed systems. In situations where cross-sectors or cross-country analyses 
are undertaken the problem is further amplified as the sectors and countries are not 
necessarily structured in the same manner (Talbot 2010: 28). Hence, it is crucial to define 
the level of the analysis when speaking about performance. The same problem occurs in 
private sector organisations as performance can be measured on an individual level, i.e. of 
one employee, on a unit level, i.e. one department or function, and on the level of the 
integral organisation. The presence of a linkage between the different levels of an 
organisation means that the performance of one level influences that on another level. 
Consequently, attention also has to be paid to the levels at which performance is evaluated 
or measured (Schönbucher 2010).  
Bouckaert and Halligan call this distinction the “depth of performance” (2008: 8). The micro-
level refers to the performance of an organisation and the organisation’s interaction with 
other organisations or citizens. The meso-level is at the policy level and can include several 
organisations at the same policy level (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008: 18). The macro-level 
concentrates on the performance of a government as a whole (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008; 
Van Dooren et al. 2010). However, the terminology of micro, meso and macro in regard to 
performance management is not coherently used in literature. Some scholars identify a 
macro level—the evaluation of the public policy and the micro level—the organisational 
performance (Pasquier 2009). Moreover, the micro level of performance can be further 
separated into four levels of performance: organisation, process, subsystem or individual 
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(Bouckaert & Halligan 2008). Similarly, Boschken (1994) argues that performance analysis is 
executed at three different levels: the individual employee level, the program level and at the 
organisational level and hence applies another level-definition (Boschken 1994). This 
illustrates that for some scholars micro performance refers to the performance of the 
organisation, whereas for others the organisation is the macro level and the micro level is 
the performance of individuals (Morden 2007). As long as the level of analysis of the 
performance management effort is clearly defined the different use of the concept does not 
imply further difficulties. The aggregation of performance data from different levels further 
broadens the definition of performance. The performance of governments is a result of the 
aggregation of performance of various services such as health, infrastructure, security, 
environment etc., something which renders the performance management complex. The 
same problem can arise for the performance measurement of a single organisation or 
department, which carries out multiple activities and where the assessment of performance 
in these different activities is aggregated in a single performance analysis. Aggregation of 
performance data can be difficult, especially when individual performance data is not based 
on the same indicators, or in other terms, when defined differently. 
II. The problem of organisational boundaries 
Second, another definitional problem arises in terms of what is actually a public 
organisation. Public organisations are defined in this study as “departments and ministries, 
agencies, units, programs, systems etc.” (Talbot 2010: 2) as well as public organisations not 
necessarily directly embedded in the administration. The degree of external influence on 
organisations in the public sector can vary widely across organisations and although the 
boundaries of public organisations seem to be clear, for example in schools or hospitals, 
they are more difficult to define when units of different departments are involved to achieve 
a single goal; this makes the issue of performance more complex (Talbot 2010). This is 
important insofar as the organisational effectiveness (OE) movement (1945 to early 1980s), 
the excellence movement (early 1980s onwards) and the current performance studies 
movement (early 1990s onwards) have focused on organisations in both public and private 
sectors (Talbot 2010). In the private sector the boundaries of organisations are relatively 
unproblematic although this is also questionable as the main form of modern private sector 
organisations—the limited liability joint stock corporation—has far more porous boundaries 
and is also shaped by external forces. But the boundaries of public organisations are far 
more difficult to define. 
III. The problem of a varying use of terms 
Another explanation of the variability of performance definitions lies in the different use of 
the term performance itself as well as of the different definitions of sub-concepts. For 
instance, a lot of different terms have been used to describe the same basic concept of 
performance such as ‘excellence’ or ‘results’ etc. (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008; Talbot 
2010; Van Dooren et al. 2010). De Bruijn (2007) outlines that terminologies such as direct 
(outputs) and final effects (outcomes) are ambiguously used in the literature. For instance, 
the different meanings associated with concepts such as inputs, outputs and outcomes 
illustrate the variability of meanings of these concepts that are associated with performance. 
The following table compares four sources of definitions that outline the problem.  
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 Definition Author 
“The financial, human and physical resources used to formulate and execute policy. 
An input to an activity may also be the output of an earlier activity; for example, 
hospital places are an output arising from the deployment of resources, but are also 
an input contributing to the final output of health care.” 
OECD 
(1996: 158) 
“The resources that contribute to the production and delivery of an output. Inputs 
commonly include things such as labour, physical resources and IT systems for 
example.” 
HM 
Treasury 
(2001: 29) 
“Resources (i.e. expenditures or employee time) used to produce outputs and 
outcomes.” 
Hatry 
(2006: 15) 
In
p
u
ts
 
“Resources (expenditures or employee time) used to produce outputs and 
outcomes. Performance advocates often argue that organizations emphasize the 
importance of inputs to the exclusion of other elements and, as a result, equate the 
availability of these resources with success.” 
Radin 
(2006: 15) 
“Outputs the direct product of an organisation’s activities in terms of goods or 
services (e.g. number of training person-days by type of training course). This says 
nothing about the actual outcome (e.g. skills absorbed, whether the skills helped 
gain long-term employment).” 
OECD 
(1996: 158) 
“Outputs are the goods and services produced by the organization. Outputs are 
delivered to an external party (usually to the public either individually or collectively) 
and comprise the majority of day-to-day interaction between people and 
government. Outputs include things such as issuing licenses, investigations, 
assessing applications for benefits and providing policy advice. 
HM 
Treasury 
(2001: 29) 
“Products and services delivered. Outputs refer to the completed products of 
internal activities: the amount of work done within the organization or by its 
contractors (such as number of miles of road repaired or number of calls 
answered).” 
Hatry 
(2006: 15) O
u
tp
u
ts
 
“Products and services delivered. Outputs are completed products of internal 
activity: the amount of work done within the organization or by its contractors (such 
as miles of road repaired or number of calls answered). A focus on output is 
criticized as a way for organizations to continue to do the work they have always 
done without determining whether that work actually leads to desired outcomes.” 
Radin 
(2006: 15) 
“Outcomes what is achieved in relation to objectives, to be distinguished from 
outputs, which measure what is produced or done. For example, using fewer 
resources compared with plans, previous performance or performance of other 
organisations, the outcome of a health publicity campaign might be a 5 per cent 
increase in awareness among those targeted. “ 
OECD 
(1996: 158) 
“Outcomes are the impacts on, or consequences for, the community, of the 
activities of the Government. Outcomes reflect the intended results from 
government actions and provide the rationale for government interventions. 
Improving the health status of the population is an example of an outcome. A 
distinction is sometimes made between intermediate outcomes and end outcomes. 
Intermediate outcomes are the more short term, easily measurable outcomes, 
which result from an activity, where as final outcomes are the longer term outcomes 
which may be harder to capture.” 
HM 
Treasury 
(2001: 29) 
“Events, occurrences, or conditions that are outside the activity or program itself 
and that are of direct importance to customers and the public generally. An 
outcome indicator is a measure of the amount and/or frequency of such 
occurrences. Service quality is also included under this category. While outputs are 
what work the organization does, outcomes are what these outputs accomplish.“ 
Hatry 
(2006: 15) O
u
tc
o
m
es
 
“An event, occurrence, or condition that is outside the activity or program itself and 
is of direct importance to program customers or the public. We also include 
indicators of service quality, those of importance to customers, under this category. 
While the definition of outcomes may emerge from organizational goals, the 
organization may not have the authority or resources available that allow it to 
actually reach for the goal.” 
Radin 
(2006: 15) 
TABLE 4: EXAMPLES OF DEFINITIONS OF PERFORMANCE CONCEPTS  
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Hatry (2006) and Radin (2006) include in the definitions of inputs resources that are used to 
produce both outputs and outcomes, whereas the HM Treasury (2001) specifies that inputs 
are only related to outputs. The OECD (1996) goes even further by speaking of policy 
formulation and realisation. Moreover, none of these definitions accounts for resources that 
are not attributable to outputs or outcomes but are wasted during the production process. 
The definitions of outputs by Hatry (2006) and Radin (2006) do not necessarily refer to 
products and services delivered as they include for example issues such as the number of 
calls answered.  
Comparing the definitions of outcomes also reveals differences. Hatry (2006: 15) and Radin 
(2006: 15) introduce a subjective element of “direct importance to customers and the 
public” that is not present in the definition of the HM Treasury (2001). In addition, Hatry 
(2006) and Radin (2006) include service quality in outcomes but in case it is related to the 
quality of the outputs it might be more adequate to include it in the output category than in 
the outcomes. The OECD (1996) speaks of outcomes in relation to the planned objectives 
and distinguishes them from outputs. Also Radin (2006) links the outcomes to the 
organisational goals. Outcomes of public services are either collective or consisting in 
externalities that are not taken into account by individual consumers. Outcomes can be 
intermediate or final. The final outcomes in particular are influenced by the environment, on 
which the organisation or the programme has a limited or no impact. The confrontation of 
the needs of the society and outcomes allow for an assessment of the sustainability and 
utility of the programme or the organisation (Talbot 2010; Van Dooren et al. 2010; Walker et 
al. 2010). However, it could be argued that also outputs can be measured against 
objectives. Besides, this definition excludes the unintended outcomes an organisation’s 
activity may produce. The complexity of the issue is amplified when it is linked to the units 
and levels of analysis discussion presented above. Outputs and outcomes of a subunit are 
for example part of the inputs or internal processes of the organisation as a whole (Talbot 
2010).  
The quintessence of this brief outline reveals the necessity to carefully define these 
concepts for each study before entering the discussion on performance. The comparison of 
performance definitions that are not comparable must be avoided (Sartori 1991). Following 
this advice, in the framework of this study, the following definitions apply:  
• Inputs: not limited to the resources that can be linked to an output but refer to all inputs 
going into a system.  
• Outputs: defined, following the definition of the HM Treasury (2001) as the goods and 
services produced by an organisation.  
• Outcomes: impacts on or consequences for the community, of the activities of 
organisations, a definition that extends the HM Treasury (2001) concept to any 
organisation, not just governments.  
IV. The problem of a changing performance focus 
The fourth explanation behind the heterogeneity of the performance definition lies in the 
different focus of performance. This is important insofar as it is crucial for the measurement 
and use of performance information to be clear on which aspects the performance 
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management effort is concentrating on. One crucial issue is whether performance embraces 
both ‘drivers’ of performance and the ‘results’ or not? Drivers are measures or dimensions 
that sustain or increase performance in the result dimensions (Holton 1999b). For example, 
what happens inside the organisation between the inputs and outputs (i.e. within the black 
box) is often no concern of the performance management and only outputs and outcomes 
are important (Talbot 2010). Talbot argues that this is what “found its way into phrases such 
as ‘output’ or ‘outcome-based government’” (Talbot 2010: 38). This approach has been 
challenged both in public and private sectors and a stronger focus on process (both internal 
and outcome oriented) was added in performance management. Performance has recently 
been defined based on outcomes whereas the focus of performance used to be on the 
outputs. The increased focus on outcomes renders the task of performance measurement 
difficult as the boundaries are not limited to the boundaries of individual public agencies, 
but reach further and might involve several (public) entities. Although this may result in an 
increased understanding of performance and make performance data more robust, it also 
complicates the task of defining performance.  
2.3.3 Concluding remarks 
Performance can be defined along the lines of the quality of actions, quality of 
achievements as well as based on the components of the production process. In addition, 
the performance definitions are altered depending on the perspective taken. Three main 
performance frameworks have been identified in literature: a system resource perspective, a 
goal perspective and a constituency perspective. The chapter further explained the 
difficulties in defining performance linked to the identification of the unit of analysis, the 
focus of performance measurement and the different definitions of concepts related to 
performance. All of these issues result in different definitions of performance. The remaining 
question is that of the actual nature of performance? As long as the nature of performance 
is defined in terms of physical outputs or promised activities the definition of performance is 
straightforward and performance management should not face too many difficulties in 
practice. The situation alters in case performance refers to citizen-oriented, social or 
democratic outcomes. This complicates performance management in practice, especially 
when the measures of performance and the definition of performance diverge (Hatry 2002). 
Performance is often criticised for driving the focus of managers on efficiency, outputs and 
results, ignoring other dimensions performance could be related to such as social 
outcomes, rule of law, accountability, transparency, equity and democratisation. An 
expressed concern is that performance is founded on false grounds and produces 
dysfunctional behaviour (Brown et al. 2003; Kelman & Friedman 2009; Moynihan 2008; Van 
Dooren et al. 2010). Performance certainly remains a core concept of management but 
organisations may broaden the definition of performance to include social, legal or values 
based dimensions besides financial and economic dimensions. In other words, in 
investigating the nature of performance, the performance concept may be further extended 
beyond the quality of actions and the quality of achievements as presented in the sections 
above. Scholars argue that performance management is at a turning point because of the 
problems it faces in practice (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008; Hvidman & Andersen 2013; 
Moynihan 2008; O’Toole Jr. & Meier 2009). To further explore the question on the nature of 
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performance, the next sections first present the multidimensional performance models 
(MDPMs) that emerged from the 1980s onward and second, investigate researches on 
multidimensional performance, both in order to identify potential performance dimensions.  
2.4 THE PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS IDENTIFIED IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The performance attributes have a wide span, and refer to very different concepts covering 
not only inputs, throughputs, economy, quantity and quality of outputs, efficiency, 
effectiveness, value for money, responsiveness to service needs and to consumer 
satisfaction, but also other components of organisational performance such as corporate 
social responsibility, equity, regulatory compliance, transparency, fairness or democratic 
outcomes (Amirkhanyan et al. 2013; Basu & Palazzo 2008; Behn 1998, 2003; Boyne 2003; 
Griffiths 2003; Ittner & Larcker 2003; Kaplan & Norton 1992, 1996a; Palazzo & Richter 2005; 
Summermatter & Siegel 2008a; Talbot 1998, 2008a, 2010). Several studies call these 
concepts or elements of performance dimensions. The term ‘dimension’ is inconsistently 
applied in research, and this makes the operationalisation of performance difficult (Baetge 
et al. 2007; Boyne 2002b). ‘Dimensions’ can further refer to the nature of performance, for 
example social, financial, economic or legal dimensions. It is this latter understanding of 
‘dimensions’ that is used in this study, and it follows in the footsteps of a series of scholars 
who have also defined the dimensions of performance along these lines (see Fried 1976; 
Kaplan and Norton 1996; Elkington 1997).  
Ideally, the dimensions which organisations concentrate on are a result of the objectives 
defined in the strategy, either by the owners of the organisation or—in the case of the public 
sector—by policy makers (Mintzberg 2008; Pasquier 2009). Strategy is about organisational 
effectiveness rather than organisational efficiency, and its focus is on ‘doing the right 
things’. A goal defines where an organisation wants to go and the strategy defines how the 
organisation will get there (Mintzberg 2008). Consequently, the nature of performance 
should be based on the mission (and the objectives outlined in the mission), and the 
performance dimensions can hence be deduced from there as well (Holton 1999b).  
The success of organisations has been the focus of research for a long time, but it has not 
always been directed at that which is considered ‘performance’ in the current performance-
related scholarship. This despite temptations (Talbot 2010) to call all these organisational 
theories, ‘theories of performance’.  
First, a significant body of literature developed from the 1950s onwards, which looked at 
individual, mainly private-sector organisations, highlighting the drivers or factors contributing 
to organisational success, and which would hence be necessary for organisational survival. 
The Organizational Effectiveness (OE) movement, which emerged mainly in the US from the 
mid-1940s onwards, thus aimed at defining which organisational form results in more 
successful organisations. Various studies (Cameron 1986; Price 1968; Steers 1975; 
Yuchtman & Seashore 1967) have since emerged on organisational effectiveness and it 
would go beyond the scope of this study to discuss them here.7 It is sufficient to highlight the 
                                                
7 See Talbot (2010) for an in-depth discussion.  
 28 
existence of these theories, as well as the fact that they presented a one-dimensional 
definition of effectiveness, and tended to concentrate only on the variables affecting the 
effectiveness of organisations. 
From the late 1970s and early 1980s onwards, research turned to a more quality and 
cultural approach of performance resulting in the Excellence, Quality and Culture Movement 
(Excellence movement) (Talbot 2010). The Excellence movement widened the focus of 
organisational effectiveness and included non-financial factors and their interrelationships in 
the performance concept. The quantitative element did not disappear but was reduced to 
the narrow definition of financial performance and other more individual factors. The 
performance focus thus shifted from looking only at quantity, to looking at quantity and 
quality combined. Consultants in the private sector became aware of more qualitative based 
explanations for effectiveness in organisations. The management book ‘In Search of 
Excellence’ (Peters & Waterman 1982), marked this new era because private sector 
consultants re-examined the issue of organisational effectiveness and formulated new 
questions on the topic (Peters & Waterman 1982; Talbot 2010). Talbot (2010) has also 
highlighted that this concentration on softer aspects was not completely new. Already the 
Taylorian scientific management and bureaucratic scholars said something about staff and 
skills, and this as early as 1911. The human relations school of the 1930s had also 
emphasised many of these aspects (Talbot 2010: 154), and the TQM has already focused 
on quality aspects before the emergence of the Excellence movement.8 The main claim of 
TQM was to induce a ‘culture of quality’ in the organisation, and this was evaluated as key 
to improving organisational performance (De Bruijn 2007; Ehigie & McAndrew 2005). The 
TQM became a very influential model for both the private and public sectors and led to an 
increased attention towards mission and values statement in organisations and on the focus 
on customers as an indicator of organisational performance (Ehigie & McAndrew 2005).  
The heightened concentration on quality elements did not result in the disappearance of 
quantitative approaches, but they were marginalised. Some subsequent movements have 
still highlighted the quantitative approach towards organisational effectiveness, such as for 
example the shareholder value movement that emerged in the private sector (De Kluyver & 
Pearce II 2012; Talbot 2010).  
The focus of the shareholder value movement was, as the name indicates, growth in 
profitability and the resulting increased economic value for the owners (De Kluyver & Pearce 
II 2012). It can also be seen as contrary to the Excellence movement, which was 
nonetheless the major stream at this time. Moreover, it was during this time period that the 
first multidimensional performance models (MDPMs) emerged, a development that 
continues into the current performance studies era. Along with these MDPM models, in the 
late 1980s through the 1990s, scholars were still interested in one-dimensional models of 
                                                
8 It should be noted however that there is no consensus in the literature on the exact date of 
emergence of the TQM. Most research identifies the founders of TQM to be Armand Feigenbaum 
(1951, 1961), Joseph Juran (1969), Kaoru Isikawa (1986), W. Edwards Deming (1986), and Philip 
Crosby (1980). Others state the date to be 1949 when Japan adopted the notion of TQM (Ehigie & 
McAndrew 2005). 
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effectiveness. Items like productivity and efficiency were seemingly reinvented. The concept 
of ‘organisational learning’ emerged and replaced others such as ‘flexibility’ or ‘adaptability’ 
(Talbot 2010). Another buzzword that emerged in the early 1990s was ‘strategy’, even 
though the concept as such had been around since the mid-1960s, under titles like 
‘business policy’ and ‘corporate planning’ (Mintzberg 1994).  
From the mid-1990s onwards, the actual performance focus emerged. In research, success 
factors of organisational effectiveness were neglected for the benefit of performance 
measurement efforts (Schechner 2006). The prelude of this performance studies movement 
was the ‘Performance Measurement Manifesto’ of Eccles (1991). Financial data were now 
treated as one set of measures among others instead of the foundation of performance 
measurement (Eccles 1991). Non-financial measures like quality or market share but also 
non-financial measures like customer satisfaction or success ratings conducted by owners 
or managers were increasingly used to measure performance (Rauch et al. 2009: 765). For 
this reason, there was a revival in the interest in measurable, non-financial, organisational 
performance along the lines of the OE movement (Neely 1998). In this spirit, ‘organisational 
performance’ is often referred to as ‘business performance’ in the literature (Kennerley & 
Neely 2003; Neely 2002). Neely speaks of a “performance measurement revolution” and 
underlines the increasing interest in the topic (Neely 1999: 207). Additionally, this increased 
focus on non-financial performance was not only observed in theory but also in practice, 
and non-financial dimensions of performance were increasingly outlined in annual reports 
(Neely 1999). It is therefore clear that a purely financial focus of performance is not sufficient 
to capture organisational performance, but non-financial measures need to be integrated 
even though the main focus of performance in private organisations remains the economic 
value created by the organisations. In theory and practice, there are have been 
developments which indicate that there has been a concentration on non-economic values 
also in the private sector and a concentration on economic values in the public sector 
(Charbonneau & Caron 2009; Marais & Reynaud 2008).  
Throughout the next sections, dimensions of performance are identified mainly based on the 
MDPMs that have thus emerged in theory and practice for generic organisations, as well as 
for private and public sector organisations (section 2.4.1). In a final section, studies in public 
management on performance dimensions are presented (section 2.4.2). All of this 
contributes to deepening the understanding of performance, to identifying possible 
performance dimensions and to preparing the territory for the construction of the 
performance dimensions used in this study.  
2.4.1 The dimensions of performance identified in MDPMs 
MDPMs9 are managerial models used by organisations to assess performance (Bouckaert & 
Halligan 2008). MDPMs emerged at the intersection of work by practitioners, consultancies, 
policy-makers and academia (Hubbard 2009). The multiple dimensions represent different 
areas of the organisations, which were seen as contributing to organisational excellence. 
                                                
9 It would go beyond the scope of the study to address these models in detail. For a detailed 
discussion please see Talbot (2010).  
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Talbot (2010) has identified the first model to be the Canadian Framework for Business 
Excellence of 1982, clearly inspired by notions like quality and excellence. Six principles for 
‘excellence’ were thought to increase organisational performance, still reduced to the 
financial and economic value creation as in the OE movement. These principles were 
‘people focus’, ‘process management’, ‘supplier partner focus’, ‘leadership’, ‘planning’ and 
a ‘customer/citizen/client focus’ (Talbot 2010). It was believed that the organisation has to 
concentrate on these elements in order to achieve excellence.  
Another example of a MDPM following the same logic was the Malcolm Baldrige National 
Quality Award that in fact had a very similar structure to the Canadian Framework with 
‘leadership’, ‘strategic planning’, ‘customer focus’, ‘workforce focus’, ‘process 
management’, as key aspects considered to enhance results. The assessment of excellence 
is based on the measurement, analysis and knowledge management in each of these 
attributes. The same logic also applies in the case of the European Foundation for Quality 
Management (EFQM) Excellence Award, a business excellence model based on TQM, 
identifying nine criteria that are divided into enablers and results dimensions. The enablers 
are ‘leadership (10%)’, ‘people management (9%)’, ‘policy and strategy (8%)’, ‘resources 
(9%)’, ‘processes (14%)’, whereas the results include ‘people satisfaction (9%)’, ‘customer 
satisfaction (20%)’, ‘impact on society (6%)’, and ‘business results (15%)’ (Radtke & Wilmes 
2002). The nine criteria10 refer to aspects resulting in excellence (Radtke & Wilmes 2002). 
The percentage linked to each criterion is used to weigh the indicators in order to reach a 
conclusion on organisational performance. Apparently, especially in this early stage of 
MDPMs the line between ‘dimensions of performance’ and ‘success factors driving 
organisational success’ was blurred. The multidimensional aspect did not yet relate to the 
different performance dimensions but focused on the criteria that improved organisational 
effectiveness. The EFQM Excellence Award does for example on one hand include success 
factors such as leadership, people management, policy and strategy, resources and 
processes, and on the other hand performance attributes such as people satisfaction, 
customer satisfaction, impact on society and business results. The line between 
performance models and excellence inspired approaches is sometimes hard to determine. 
The next sections are first dedicated to the evolution of performance dimensions in the 
private sector, before turning to the multidimensional conceptualisation of performance in 
the public sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The different MDPMs use different terms to describe concepts and corresponding measures. In 
order to be coherent, the terms used in the different models are used respectively. 
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I. Multidimensional performance in the private sector 
In a lot of research on performance in the private sector, performance is defined in terms of 
the financial success of the organisation, and the concentration is hence on economic value 
creation. The multidimensional character of performance therefore lies in the dimensions 
that are susceptible to increase the financial benefits. For instance, the so-called McKinsey-
7-S Framework added to the former OE perspectives of ‘structure’, ‘systems’ and 
‘strategies’, new softer aspects of organisational life, namely ‘staff’, ‘skills’, ‘style’ and 
‘shared values’ believing that it would render organisations more successful.  
One of the most influential models underlining the idea of multiple dimensions driving future 
organisational performance has been the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), developed by Kaplan 
and Norton (1992, 1996). The BSC, in line with the 7-S framework of McKinsey, put the 
strategy and the vision of the firm at the centre. The BSC attributed a broader set of 
measures to enterprises by adding three additional perspectives believed to drive future 
financial performance to the financial perspective: a customer perspective, an internal 
business perspective and a learning and growth perspective (Behn 2003; Kaplan & Norton 
1992, 1996a, 1996b, 2008). It was believed that operational performance based on 
customer satisfaction, internal business process and organisational learning and growth 
would serve to increase future shareholder value and growth in profitability (Behn 2003). It 
was recognised that purely concentrating on the cost structure did not adequately honour 
the other aspects of the business operation (Behn 2003; Kaplan & Norton 1992, 1996a, 
1996b, 2008; Olson & Slater 2002). The figure below illustrates the idea behind the BSC i.e. 
that of providing a framework that translates strategy into operational terms and enhances 
organisational performance:  
 
Figure 2: The balanced scorecard (adapted from Kaplan and Norton (1992)) 
The customer perspective considers factors that are important to customers. In order to be 
able to satisfy customer needs, managers have to focus also on internal operations (Kaplan 
& Norton 1992: 73). In regard to the internal business process perspective managers should 
identify the organisation’s core competences and the technologies required in order to 
 32 
ensure market leadership. Managers are advised to develop measures in order to evaluate 
the performance of these processes (Kaplan & Norton 1992: 75). The third perspective 
driving future financial performance is the innovation and learning perspective. In the view of 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) an organisation should innovate, improve and learn what will 
result in growth and increased customer satisfaction to increase shareholder value (Kaplan 
& Norton 1992: 75-76). Finally, the financial perspective indicates whether the strategy was 
successfully implemented and executed (Kaplan & Norton 1992: 77).  
The BSC is one of the most frequently used performance management models in the private 
sector (Talbot 2010). In literature, the benefits of the BSC are identified as being its ability to 
fit the strategy of the business, to communicate the strategic objectives and to enhance 
control and learning (Olson & Slater 2002; Slater et al. 1997). Originally, the four 
perspectives were approached in a balanced way, but other scholars propose to unbalance 
the scorecard based on the strategy of the business (Olson & Slater 2002; Reisinger et al. 
2003; Slater et al. 1997). The BSC underlines the approach shared by various 
multidimensional models that purely financial measures are not enough to measure 
organisational performance. The future financial performance of the organisation is driven 
by the performance in other areas, representing the overall performance of an organisation. 
The BSC exemplifies the multidimensional performance conception for private organisations 
well. In private sector performance concepts, the multiple dimensions are frequently found 
in the driver dimensions contributing to increase shareholder value. They remain a tool for 
measuring the economic value created by the organisation and do not incorporate 
employee, supplier or community perspectives on firm performance, something which could 
result in the creation of social value (Himmelberg et al. 2000; Hubbard 2009; Mooraj et al. 
1999). While the major concern thus remains the drivers of performance in economic terms, 
the private sector has nonetheless also emphasised perspectives other than inputs, 
outputs, efficiency and effectiveness (Kaplan & Norton 1996). More recently, it seems that 
other performance management models emerge in the private sector focusing on the idea 
that an organisation’s success should not only be measured by the financial and operational 
dimensions, but also by its social and environmental performance integrating an outcome 
based view of performance (Elkington 1997; Hubbard 2009). A stream of ideas highly 
contributing to this broadened conception of performance is the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).  
Although the CSR discussion does not concern performance of organisations per se, it is 
strongly linked to it because of its focus on organisational behaviour, the orientation of 
organisations, its mission and vision. Corporate social performance (CSP)—i.e. the 
evaluation of the performance of an organisation’s activities in line with social 
responsibility—is increasingly in the focus of managers, rendering the performance 
definition more multidimensional (Baetge et al. 2007; Carter & Greer 2013). The discussion 
on CSR emerged already in the 1950s and still today the literature struggles to find a unified 
definition (Carroll 1979; Frederick 1978; Freeman 1984; Scherer & Palazzo 2007; Whetten et 
al. 2002).  
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In a very narrow sense, the social responsibility of a firm is to obey the law (Friedman 1970; 
Levitt 1958). Another interpretation of CSR is that the social responsibility of a private 
organisation is to focus on profit seeking whereas the public problems are the responsibility 
of the state (Friedman 1970; Sundaram & Inkpen 2004). In this view the political and 
economic responsibilities are two opposed domains (Scherer & Palazzo 2007: 30). Friedman 
(1970) argues that the socially responsible behaviour of a firm can only be justified on the 
basis of increasing financial performance. Consequently, CSR activities form part of a driver 
dimension of profit maximisation (Baetge et al. 2007; Gond et al. 2009). If increased 
business results can be linked to socially responsible behaviour, such behaviour is argued 
to be desirable and an organisation should engage in it (Baetge et al. 2007; Gond et al. 
2009). In that sense, a social dimension could be added to the performance 
conceptualisation, whereas it remains subordinated to the financial dimension. Other 
scholars argue that the CSP is defined by the interests of a firm’s most powerful 
stakeholders, and based on such considerations the concept of social responsibility could 
be ethically questionable (Scherer & Palazzo 2007).  
A very broad conceptualisation of social responsibility is provided by Davis and Blomstrom 
(1966), who have argued that the social responsibility of a firm is the obligation to consider 
the effects of an action on society. If CSR were defined along this line, it could become an 
outcome dimension in itself, which could be related back to the ‘impact on society’ 
dimension of the EFQM Excellence Award. As can be recalled, this principle asked 
organisations to integrate an ethical mind-set, clear values and excellent conducts in order 
to be economically, socially and ecologically sustainable (Radtke & Wilmes 2002). Despite 
the low weight attributed to it by the creators in the EFQM Excellence Award, ‘impact on 
society’ is a goal in this framework and the achievement of social, economic, technical, 
environmental outcomes are key reasons public agencies and activities exist. In line with 
this argument, an alternative definition of CSR would highlight that the goal of a business to 
maximise profits and the goal of a state to reduce negative social impacts and to respect 
public values could be aligned, to benefit both sides (Porter & Kramer 2006; Scherer & 
Palazzo 2007). Out of this definition a dimension of performance emerges which is as 
important as the financial performance for an organisation, but which concentrates on non-
economic value creation.  
Carroll (1991) has integrated these different perspectives in a holistic definition of CSR, 
outlining that a firm should make profits, respect the law, be ethical and be a good 
corporate citizen (1991: 43). In this large definition of CSR, an economic responsibility to 
investors and consumers, a legal responsibility to the government or the law, an ethical 
responsibility to society and finally, a discretionary responsibility to the community are all 
taken into account (Hillman & Keim 2001). Similarly, Hillman and Keim (2001) have split the 
CSR in two distinctive parts. First, the ‘stakeholder management perspective’ integrates the 
views of the stakeholders, vital for the survival of the organisation because they have in 
some form or another invested in the firm. Such investments could be capital, human, 
financial or of any other kind. Essential is that the stakeholder management perspective of 
CSR is positively related to shareholder value creation and contributes to the comparative 
advantage of the organisation (Hillman & Keim 2001).  
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The second part of the CSR of firms identified by Hillman and Keim (2001) is called the 
‘social issue participation perspective’ and it refers to elements not related to stakeholders 
directly involved in the organisation but to society at large. Social issue participation is 
argued to decrease the shareholder value by either deploying revenue to participate in or in 
not engaging in something, and thus to renounce a potential source of shareholder value 
creation (Hillman & Keim 2001). A firm renouncing to use energy from nuclear power plants 
despite the lower costs associated with this kind of energy would be an example of such an 
activity (Hillman & Keim 2001). Several other concepts overlap with the idea behind CSR 
such as social and environmental accountability, business ethics, corporate accountability 
or corporate citizenship (Broomhill 2007).  
Another development observed since the late 1990s has been the increased appearance of 
the concept of sustainability in management research. Though it should be noted that the 
sustainability concept emerged in a perspective of globalisation, addressing multinational 
companies, it is nonetheless interesting to look at here insofar as it provides further 
evidence of an increase in the number of performance dimensions. Indeed, despite its roots 
in international institutions, sustainable business is a term increasingly related to the 
activities of organisations in a wider sense (UNO 2000). In the globalised world, businesses 
are increasingly active across national-borders and penetrate markets of countries with 
repressive regimes or in socio-economic difficulties. In this context an interpretation of CSR 
emerged which went beyond the common understanding of stakeholder responsibility 
(Scherer & Palazzo 2007). The UN Global Compact, a leadership platform established by the 
UN in 2000, and other similar initiatives aim to channel companies, i.e. the drivers of 
globalisation, in a way which ensures that markets, commerce, technology and finance 
develop to benefit economies and societies everywhere. In order to do so, sustainable 
policies and practices of organisations are to be developed, implemented and accounted 
for (UN 2000). The argument being that in such circumstances, firms set standards and 
assume a political responsibility (Scherer & Palazzo 2007). At least at a global level, CSR 
increasingly circumscribes the involvement of a firm in the solving of societal problems 
(Scherer & Palazzo 2007). The various domains of the global compact are covered at least in 
well-developed industrialised countries by national legislation. Nonetheless, the emergence 
of the concept of sustainability makes the case for an increasing awareness on the side of 
individual, private organisations for extra-economic outcomes. Research in this area argues 
that firms that respect social outcomes when doing business excel and are able to increase 
shareholder value more than those not engaging in sustainability (Robert 2000).  
The link between sustainability and performance is exemplified by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). In this framework, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (SRG) were developed. 
An analysis of the section on sustainable performance indicators in the SRG further makes 
the case for a multidimensional performance definition by outlining indicators organisations 
can use to measure their economic, environmental, social, human rights, society and 
product responsibility performances (Global Reporting Initiative 2011). Sustainable 
performance can consequently be seen as defined along the just-mentioned six categories.  
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Further evidence of an enlarged concept on multidimensionality can be found in studies on 
the environmental aspects of sustainability measuring the environmental impacts of firms. 
The Ecological Management System (EMS) for example deals with the implementation and 
effects of EMS (Fresner & Engelhardt 2004; Hillary 2004; Iraldo et al. 2009; Newbold 2006; 
Radonjic & Tominc 2007; Zenga et al. 2005). Prominent examples of such EMS are the Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), a voluntary framework developed by the EU in 
1993 or the ISO 14001, a certification system developed in 1996 aiming to certify the EMS 
systems of organisations in various countries around the globe. Such certificates attest that 
an organisation has a certain EMS in place and that it has the intention to manage its 
environmental impacts. The certification systems are however not measuring how well the 
system is performing in the individual organisations. The proponents of these frameworks 
believe that an increased focus on environmental performance will result in a higher 
competitive performance (Iraldo et al. 2009). The frameworks provide guidance to identify 
and analyse the critical elements of management, to define actions and to carry out 
envisaged plans effectively (Iraldo et al. 2009; Robert 2000). Such EMS systems follow the 
idea of TQM presented above and facilitate the control of firms’ activities in line with 
environmental and social standards. But they do not measure the performance through 
these aspects and the data is rarely integrated in the performance management process of 
an organisation.  
Other frameworks11 link social and environmental standards to performance measurement. 
Since the late 1990s there is an enlarged focus on how to integrate such aspects as 
performance dimensions in the management process. An important amount of literature 
focuses on the motivation of companies to act in socially responsible ways (Bansal & Roth 
2000; Sharma 2000; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998), on the financial payoffs of such behaviour 
(Berman et al. 1999; Burke & Logsdon 1996; Dowell et al. 2000; Waddock & Graves 1997) 
and on ways to improve sustainable performance (Christman 2000; James Jr. 2000; Wood 
1991).  
Consequently, concerns for the environmental and social impacts of firms seem to make its 
entry into the performance management discussion of private organisations. Numerous 
other frameworks have developed to evaluate the environmental and social performances of 
organisations besides the operational and financial performances. The term Triple Bottom 
Line (3BL) (Elkington 1997) has thus emerged, metaphorically presented under the label of 
‘profits, people and planet’ (Carter & Greer 2013) and emphasises the need to adopt and 
use social and environmental performance indicators besides the economic and financial 
performance indicators (Elkington 1997). In line with the concept of sustainability, a 
sustainable corporation creates profits for shareholders, while at the same time protecting 
the environment and improving the lives of those with whom the organisation interacts 
(Henriques & Richardson 2004). Unlike earlier frameworks, the 3BL vehicles the idea that 
organisations should in fact measure social and environmental performance and integrate 
                                                
11 The different frameworks will only be briefly discussed here in view of illustrating the different 
dimensions and the main idea. For an extensive discussion on the function, limitations and strengths 
of the different frameworks, see for example Christman (2000); James Jr. (2000); Wood (1991). 
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these indicators into the performance management process. In the 3BL, environmental 
performance is conceptualised as the amount of natural resources (water, energy etc.) a 
firm uses and the negative effects created through their activities (waste, pollution etc.). 
Social performance generally refers to the impact an organisation (and its suppliers) has on 
the communities in which it operates (Elkington 1997; Hubbard 2009; Norman & MacDonald 
2004).  
The motivation behind the enlargement of the organisational performance relies mainly on 
the idea that the focus on wider matters of the society will increase the benefits for the 
organisation. Since the late 1990s there has been a growing attention of the public, media 
and community groups with regard to organisations’ impact on the environment and society 
(Hubbard 2009). The complexity of performance management in organisations has 
increased, as environmental and social dimensions have been included in the concept of 
performance. Several frameworks have surfaced on how firms should evaluate performance 
in a business environment marked by an increased awareness for social responsibility and 
sustainability. Kaplan and Norton (2000a, 2000b) have for example suggested strategy maps 
to successfully implement the different objectives. Similarly, Epstein and Westbrook (2001) 
have developed an Action-Profit Linkage Model, concentrating on an organisation’s causal 
relationships and aiming to illustrate how a manager can respond to sustainability concerns 
while still improving corporate performance (Epstein & Westbrook 2001). Measurement 
models of organisational performance have emerged as well. Robert (2000) has thus 
developed a Five Level System Model in order to link the macroeconomic aspects of 
sustainable development with the individual firm’s level for implementing it in their business 
activities. The process of performance management in this model is adapted to 
sustainability management: first principles of ecosphere should be identified in order to then 
develop, in a second step, the principles of sustainability. Third, the principles for 
sustainable development are outlined, and fourth, the firm undertakes the activities and 
measures whether the principles of sustainability were respected or violated. Robert (2000) 
argues that when sustainability principles are violated, it is possible to measure the negative 
effects in nature. Critics of the model are sceptic to the idea that negative effects can be 
linked back to non-compliance with sustainability principles and then traced to the 
organisation that produced the negative outcomes. In their view, outcomes are not easily 
detected and negative effects are rarely directly observable but lagging behind and this 
often for several years (De Bruijn 2007; Talbot 2010). Despite the weaknesses of the model 
it illustrates the awareness and inclusion of dimensions linked to sustainability and social 
responsibility in the performance measurement of an organisation.  
Another attempt to integrate social and environmental performance into the definition of 
organisational performance is the idea of a Sustainability Balanced Scorecard. Because the 
BSC does not provide a close set of measures for each perspective, non-monetary and soft 
success factors to evaluate social and environmental performance can be integrated (Figge 
et al. 2001, 2002).  
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Social and environmental aspects are often qualitatively evaluated. It is in the nature of the 
BSC to illustrate causal relationships between different dimensions, and the influence of 
environmental and social aspects on the long-term financial success can hence be 
implemented on the basis of these cause-effect linkages (Figge et al. 2001; Hahn & Wagner 
2001). Figge et al. (2001) identify three approaches to include social and environmental 
aspects into the BSC.  
First, social and environmental aspects can be subordinated under the existing four 
perspectives of the BSC (Figge et al. 2001, 2002). In doing so environmental and social 
aspects are integrated through strategic objectives, goals, indicators and measures (Duncan 
1973; Kaplan & Norton 2001). Only aspects that are relevant for the overall organisational 
objectives are consequently integrated (Czymmeck & Faßbender-Wynands 2001; Deegen 
2001).  
Second, a social-environmental perspective can be added to the four perspectives of the 
BSC. In the view of Figge et al. (2001) this option should only be considered if the social and 
environmental aspects are relevant for the strategic objectives. The advantage of this 
approach includes the integration of social and environmental aspects into the market 
mechanism, something which facilitates the successful implementation of a strategy. This 
could be beneficial for organisations active in environmentally sensitive areas facing high 
pressure from the legislator or society to integrate such aspects in their strategy.  
The third approach is to develop a specific social- and environmental scorecard based on 
the principle of the BSC (Figge et al. 2001). Figge et al. (2001) have argued that this third 
approach should only be adopted in addition to the first or second approach because it is 
not in alignment with the BSC conceptualisation to have a completely separate 
sustainability balanced scorecard without link to the BSC. Nevertheless, a derived 
environmental and social scorecard in addition to the integrated approach can be useful for 
a specific unit of an organisation that is preoccupied with the environmental and social 
aspects (Figge et al. 2001; Hahn & Wagner 2001). Very similar to these three approaches to 
adapt the BSC is the idea of Hubbard (2009) to create a Sustainable Balanced Scorecard 
(SBSC). In this framework two additional dimensions are directly integrated into the 
balanced scorecard, namely a social and an environmental one (Hubbard 2009). Proponents 
of the SBSC have argued that the BSC is a good basis for developing a broader framework 
because first, it has already incorporated internal and external stakeholders and second, the 
already large diffusion of the BSC is not in favour of a completely new approach (Figge et al. 
2002; Hubbard 2009; Talbot 2010). The SBSC of Hubbard (2009) is represented in the figure 
on the next page.  
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Figure 3: The sustainable balanced scorecard (adapted from Hubbard (2009)) 
The SBSC adds social and environmental performance to the four performance dimensions 
of the BSC and directly defines possible performance indicators for each dimension of 
performance, based on a predefined benchmark. Obviously, this is different to the 
frameworks discussed so far (e.g. 3BL, EMS or GRS). Based on the indicators an overall 
‘organisational sustainable performance index (OSPI)’ can be calculated giving all 
performance dimensions the same weight. For this reason, the SBSC takes the performance 
conceptualisation one step further than other frameworks because it actually calculates a 
performance score based on an equal weight of all dimensions (Hubbard 2009). An 
advantage of using an overall performance score is that it can be followed on an annual 
basis and in case the OPSI score is calculated exactly in the same manner, it facilitates 
comparison across organisations.  
In summary, this section has illustrated the development in the private sector from a one-
factorial to a multidimensional performance definition. In most models, the 
multidimensionality is founded on the premise that it will increase future shareholder value. 
But there are some attempts to attribute the same weight to all performance dimensions, 
such as for example the SBSC. Overall, the private sector has witnessed a development 
towards an increased awareness for social and environmental outcomes. As the following 
section will illustrate, the importance of such outcomes had already been recognised for a 
while in the public sector, and this especially after NPM reforms had implemented 
performance management techniques; leading to a contention around the output focus and 
a recognition of its insufficiency. The next section will look more in detail into the 
development of multidimensional performance in the public sector.  
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II. Multidimensional performance in the public sector 
A large amount of research and theory on MDPMs is generic in nature. Nonetheless, there 
are some particularities in regard to the public sector performance that need to be 
discussed. These particularities relate to the fact that public agencies are located in a wider 
environment—something only recently acknowledged by private sector management 
research with stakeholder theories—and that public organisations have to pursue and 
respect public values (Talbot 2010). The discussion of public sector models concentrates on 
public organisations and agencies, meaning that it addresses individual units or 
organisations and not models developed to evaluate performance of the government at 
large or even across nations (e.g. OECD, World Bank, Bertelsmann Stiftung etc.). MDPMs 
can be traced to three different origins in public sphere. First, there are the adopted imports, 
referring to generic MDPMs simply adopted from the private sector without modifications by 
the public sector. Second, adapted imports refer to MDPMs that have been modified in 
order to make them more appropriate to public sector specificities. Third, public sector 
innovations refer to new models specifically developed for the public sector (Talbot 2010). 
These will be looked at in more detail in turn. 
a. Adopted imports 
The first MDPMs adopted by the public sector without adaptation from the private sector 
were focusing on quality and were the various models developed in the framework of the 
excellence movement in the 1980s (Talbot 2010). Examples are the Baldrige Awards 
Framework, the Canadian Quality Model and the EFQM Excellence Award discussed above 
(section 2.4.1).  
The second major round of imports was the introduction of the BSC (Kaplan & Norton 1992, 
1996a). The BSC was either implemented on a government wide basis or for specific 
sectors (Griffiths 2003). An evaluation of the impact of the BSC on the performance of 
public sectors organisations or activities is difficult and only a limited amount of research 
has investigated this relationship (Griffiths 2003). In a study on the use of the BSC in 
government departments in New Zealand, Griffiths (2003) concluded that the BSC is an 
important part of strategy development and that it links strategy to operations. Griffiths also 
found that the implementation of the BSC was only partially successful in regard to 
performance. The author demonstrated how performance objectives and the subsequent 
compensation of managers and employees were inconsistently linked to BSC measures and 
concluded with the observation of a partial application of the BSC in New Zealand (Griffiths 
2003). More frequently, as with the BSC, MDPMs were imported and adapted to public 
sector particularities. 
b. Adapted imports 
Several generic models have been imported and modified in order to match the public 
sector context. In this spirit, the BSC has for example (Moullin et al. 2007; Niven 2003; 
Radnor & Lovell 2003) also been adapted to fit public and non-profit sectors. In the for-profit 
BSC, all perspectives are believed to improve the bottom-line performance. Yet, while the 
public sector is accountable for efficient resource allocation, the bottom-line is not its 
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overall goal. Public sector goals are rather long-term outcomes such as the health of the 
population. Consequently, the mission of the organisation is at the top in the non-profit 
BSC, and the financial perspective is but one among the other three perspectives (Niven 
2003). 
Besides inverting the perspectives of the BSC, another approach is to replace them with 
different perspectives, originally not part of the BSC, while still keeping the structure of the 
framework in place (Moullin et al. 2007). Besides the BSC, other private sector frameworks 
have inspired models that have emerged in the public sector. For instance, the UK Audit 
Commission published a handbook in 1984 that was strongly inspired from the McKinsey 7-
S Framework: ‘Improving Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Local Government in 
England and Wales’. Minor modifications were made, such as the replacement of the 
category of ‘shared values’ with ‘vision’ (UK Audit Commission 1984). 
In other cases, MDPMs have been adapted or served as a basis for the creation of new 
models. An example is the European Common Assessment Framework (CAF) for public 
services that was created through a merger of the EFQM Excellence Award and the 
University of Speyer Awards Framework for public sector innovation and excellence (Talbot 
2010). It adapts the nine categories of the EFQM Excellence Award to a sector specific 
context. For this reason, ‘business results’ is for example replaced by ‘key performance 
results’ and ‘customer satisfaction’ is replaced with ‘citizen/customer oriented results’. 
Similarly, the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) in Canada was created from a 
merger of the Canadian Excellence Framework and other public sector models including the 
PSEM. Generally speaking, adaptations of private sector performance models have mostly 
resulted in the addition of categories corresponding to public sector contexts, such as for 
instance the ‘social outcomes’ in the CAF, ‘public customer service orientation’ in the PSEM 
or ‘public values’ in the MAF framework (Talbot 2010).  
c. Public sector innovations 
Several MDPMs have also emerged within the public sector per se. Talbot (2010) has found 
the first such model to be the Three Ethics approach of Fried (1976) in his book 
‘Performance in American Bureaucracy’. Many of the features of later MDPMs are present in 
this model. The Three Ethics approach emerged out of the recognition that private and 
public organisations are very different (Fried 1976).  
For Fried (1976) performance in bureaucracy was characterised by three dimensions 
labelled ‘ethics’. First, the ‘democratic (or responsiveness) ethic’ comprised the values and 
norms and raised the question of responsiveness to whom and about what. Second, the 
‘legal (or liberalism) ethic’ comprised the rules of law in responding to citizens, rules of 
equality and compliance related issues. Finally, the ‘work (or effectiveness) ethic’ comprised 
elements such as production, efficiency, and achievements. Fried also added a fourth 
concern, ‘survival’, which was very similar to the concept of trust and legitimacy in public 
agencies and to the public value approach of Moore (1995). Fried (1976) aimed to develop a 
model combining goal focus with survival.  
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The author already mentioned the possible trade-offs and contradictions that occur 
between the democratic, legal, effectiveness and survival ethics of the model. Fried’s 
MDPM is a very interesting case as it illustrates the dimension-approach taken in this thesis 
well. The list of MDPMs that has thus emerged for the public sector is long and it would go 
beyond the scope of this study to discuss them in more detail, but some general reflections 
on these models will be briefly shared. Most of these models included specific public sector 
dimensions. For example, the Strategy Change Cycle of Bryson (1995) introduced a driver 
dimension of ‘mandates’, i.e. the delegation of public service tasks to subordinated 
organisations. It referred to the public mission of the organisation and the obligations it 
would have to fulfil. Talbot (1999) relabelled this aspect ‘governance’. Some would argue 
that governance is not under the control of the organisation as executive governments 
and/or legislatures usually impose them. Therefore they cannot, or should not, be included 
in performance assessment. However, with Moore (1995) it can be argued that it is part of 
the responsibility of public agencies to at least try to shape their mandates and governance 
arrangements to the objectives they have been created to fulfil. Moreover, Carpenter (2001) 
and earlier on Lipsky (1980) suggested that this is what happens in any case, at various 
levels within public agencies. It would therefore be better to recognise and manage it rather 
than try and pretend that public agencies are rigidly following the implementation of public 
policies decided by their political or administrative masters (Talbot 2010). 
Next to these models, there were also MDPMs developed explicitly for the public sector by 
consultants. An example is the Accenture Public Service Value Model based on the book 
‘Unlocking Public Value’ (Cole et al. 2006). The model argues that public value is created 
when both outcomes and cost-effectiveness increase at the same time. If one component is 
increased on the expense of the other, a trade-off occurs between these two fundamental 
ways of creating public value. A decrease in both elements results in a reduction of public 
value (Cole & Parston 2006). Outcomes are to be defined based on the organisation’s 
mission as well as on citizens’ expectations. This definition is the reason the model centres 
on the aims of offering better services and decreasing tax-rates for citizens. In achieving 
these aims the citizens are in active contact with the other four players of the model, 
namely, the elected officials, the managers and administrators, the public service workers 
and the public-private sector partnerships (Cole & Parston 2006). Next to such holistic 
MDPMs, other MDPMs have had a narrower scopes, in order to satisfy a specific need as 
for example ‘league tables’ which rank organisational units or organisations against each 
other (Kaplan & Norton 2008; Talbot 2010).  
All these adopted, adapted or innovated models highlight three main points. First, 
performance is believed to be multidimensional. Second, performance definition is context-
dependent. And third, the performance of the public sectors attributes an equivalent 
importance to all dimensions—financial performance being only one aspect among others—
and outcomes are far more important than outputs. 
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III. Reflections on MDPMs 
An evolution from univariate to multivariate towards multidimensional models of 
performance has thus been identified in both theory and in practice (Steers 1975; Hubbard 
2009; Talbot 2010). Univariate models focus on one factor such as productivity, profits or 
growth (Steers 1975). Multivariate models concentrate on multiple criteria or elements of 
performance such as flexibility, productivity, satisfaction, profitability and resource 
acquisition (Steers 1975). Multidimensional models centre on multiple dimensions such as 
financial, social, environmental or legal aspects. The MDPMs discussion highlights that 
categories of performance models are not always performance dimensions but often 
success factors. For illustration, the criteria of the EFQM Excellence Award such as 
‘leadership’, ‘people’, and ‘strategy’ are clearly success factors whereas ‘people 
satisfaction’, ‘customer satisfaction’, ‘impact on society’ and ‘business results’ are 
performance dimensions. Resources and processes can be conceptualised as success 
factors or performance dimensions depending on whether they are conceptualised along 
the lines of the OE movement or linked to the span of performance (see section 2.3.1). This 
is further visible in the structure of driver and result dimensions in various performance 
models. Drivers are frequently success factors like leadership or policy and strategy, while 
result dimensions are regularly performance dimensions. The idea of driver dimensions is 
that high performance in the drivers will lead to high performance in the result dimension. 
Therefore, drivers are leading indicators of performance while results are lagging indicators 
(Holton 199b; Talbot 2010).  
The number of dimensions identified in the models may vary from four (e.g. Balanced 
Scorecard) to nine (e.g. EFQM Excellence Award). Most of these dimensions are composite 
of different measures and indicators of performance and can hence be broken down. 
MDPMs focus on multiple factors under several dimensions of performance. The EFQM 
Excellence Award could for example contain around 100 indicators grouped under the nine 
criteria of excellence (Radtke & Wilmes 2002). The weightings are generally given in the 
models directly (Talbot 2010). The weighting and aggregation of performance indicators 
may occur on two levels. First weighting is done within a single dimension of performance 
(aggregating all indicators) and secondly the aggregation is done across all dimensions. The 
BSC does only the weighting in each dimension, while the EFQM Excellence Award does 
both kinds of aggregation. Most MDPMs tend to imply complex, causal links between 
different dimensions of performance (Ittner & Larcker 2003; Talbot 2010). The dimensions 
may consequently influence each other and the drivers-results structure is not necessarily a 
one-way link but can go in both directions (Ittner & Larcker 2003). To identify causal 
relationships between the different dimensions of performance is complex (Talbot 2010).  
The implementation of MDPMs can be difficult. Organisations may face difficulties in 
assessing specific dimensions, as for example the ‘impact on society’ dimension of the 
EFQM Excellence Award. Moreover, in regard to public sector performance models, output 
is never an end in itself and the outcomes are the central focus. But as these outcomes are 
realised by a chain or network of organisations, public sector measurement systems should 
not be limited to the individual public organisation (Bouckaert & Halligan 2008). To 
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consolidate micro, meso and macro public sector performance is challenging and not a 
simple task. Bouckaert et al. (2008) thus suggest combining the span and the depth of 
performance to generate an integrated view of performance. 
In regard to generic or private sector MDPMs, a difference can be made between quality 
awards and other successful MDPMs such as the BSC. The quality MDPMs are highly 
normative as they do not just define the performance dimensions but specify precise criteria 
of ‘good’ performance in detail. The approach of the BSC is different. It is also an MDPM 
but it differs from the quality movement in many respects, not least in its parsimony in 
adopting only four performance perspectives. The indicators to measure the four 
perspectives of the BSC are not predefined and can be selected individually for each 
organisation. The BSC therefore has a holistic nature and can be adapted to specific 
contexts such as the public sector (Kaplan & Norton 2008; Niven 2003; Talbot 2010). The 
structure of models such as the BSC raises several questions. First, is it possible to 
construct an MDPM that captures the key dimensions of performance without precisely 
specifying the content—i.e. elements—of performance that will measure the dimension in 
question? If this is possible, how to assure that the ‘real nature’ of the performance concept 
is considered and how can the concept of performance be operationalised empirically? 
Moreover, the use of different variables in each dimension raises the question of the 
comparison across organisations using different indicators for the same dimensions. A more 
reasonable approach would seem to be to try to iteratively validate both the dimensions of 
performance and their detailed content (Talbot 2010) as is the approach taken in this study. 
This discussion on multidimensional performance models has several implications for this 
study. MDPMs try to identify elements that contribute to the successful achievement of the 
goals of organisations, programmes or sub-units. Moreover, they serve to identify the focus 
of the organisations in question. Talbot (2010) argues that most of these public sector 
MDPMs include aspects or dimensions of performance that would not apply in the private 
sector, such as public sector values, external reporting and accountability and social 
impacts. This view may be contested especially in regard to specific contexts, as will be 
discussed in section 2.6 below. In which dimension organisational activities get measured in 
order to gauge their performance is of an on-going research interest. In this study, the 
interest is clearly on the dimension of performance and not on the success factors of 
organisational excellence. Consequently, the focus of interest is the nature of performance 
per se, and the aspects that are integrated in the measurement of performance. The 
following section presents and discusses some public management research on the 
multidimensional nature of performance.  
2.4.2 Dimensions identified in previous public management research 
In public management literature, several studies attempt to identify the dimensions of 
performance. This section will highlight some of the most recent such studies. As will be 
illustrated, dimensions in public management literature refer mostly to the components of 
the production model of performance illustrated in section 2.3.1.  
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In a study on US Federal agencies Brewer and Selden (2000) identified the theoretical 
dimensions of organisational performance in order to create a taxonomy to facilitate 
performance measurement. They established the factors susceptible to influence 
organisational performance on two distinct levels. First, ‘agency factors’ included 
organisational culture, red tape, human capital and capacity, agency support for the 
‘National Performance Review (NPR)’, leadership and supervision (Brewer & Selden 2000).12 
Second, ‘individual factors’ refer to the structure of the task/work, the task motivation, the 
public service motivation and the individual performance. The two scholars tested these 
factors in a survey on employees in federal agencies and proposed a perceptual measure of 
organisational performance combining the individual (i.e. the employees’ performance) and 
the organisational levels of performance. They concluded that the most important factors 
affecting performance were efficiency and effectiveness (i.e. efficacy), teamwork, the 
building of human capital, the structure of task or work, the protection of employees, the 
concern for the public interest and the task motivation. Hence, Brewer and Selden (2000) 
used efficiency, effectiveness and added fairness to represent a specific public sector 
concern. The authors argued that the performance variables in public institutions must be 
reinforced on a broader basis than in the IOO or 3E-model. They did however not claim 
generalisability of their model, as while some of these categories, like the organisational 
culture or human capital, could readily be transferred to other organisations, others, as for 
example the support for NPR, were specific (Brewer & Selden 2000). All these elements 
reconfirmed the amalgamation of success factors and performance dimensions in order to 
define the success of organisations. Furthermore, Brewer and Selden (2002) did not 
separate performance dimensions (i.e. employees’ performance) from indicators of 
performance (i.e. efficiency, effectiveness). This can also be observed in other research on 
performance dimensions, for example in the study of Boyne (2002). 
Boyne (2002, 2002b) has identified fifteen dimensions of performance in public 
organisations and grouped them into five themes—‘outputs’, ‘efficiency’, ‘service 
outcomes’, ‘responsiveness’, and ‘democratic outcomes’ (Boyne 2002b).  
Outputs 
Quantity Quality 
Efficiency 
Cost per unit of output 
Service outcomes 
Formal effectiveness Equity 
Impact Cost per unit of service outcome 
Responsiveness 
Consumer satisfaction Staff satisfaction 
Citizen satisfaction Cost per unit of responsiveness 
Democratic outcomes 
Probity Accountability 
Participation Cost per unit of democratic outcome 
TABLE 5: PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (SOURCE BOYNE (2002B)) 
                                                
12 The NPR is a government-wide performance review initiative established in 1993 by President 
Clinton. The goal of the NPR was the identification of problems and the elaboration of solutions and 
ideas for future savings (Brewer and Selden 2000). 
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Boyne (2002b) has argued that performance indicators (PIs) should be developed in these 
fifteen domains, but further doubted the validity of PIs by arguing that it is often not clear 
what PIs are assessing. Therefore, dimensions of organisational performance first need to 
be identified before selecting the PIs. Boyne (2002b) has enlarged the span of performance 
with domains concerning responsiveness and democratic outcomes. Public management 
and public managers influence the performance of their organisations and of public 
programmes more broadly, and these domains show that financial measures are by no 
means the only determinants of performance (Boyne 2002b).  
In the same perspective, Andrews et al. (2005b) have raised the question whether 
representative bureaucracy results in a higher level of organisational performance in English 
local governments. The organisational performance, the dependent variable in their model, 
was composed of two measures, namely customer satisfaction and a constructed measure 
entitled Core Service Performance (CoSP). The CoSP measure covered six dimensions of 
performance, namely ‘quantity of outputs’, ‘quality of outputs’, ‘efficiency’, ‘outcomes’, 
‘value for money’, and ‘consumer satisfaction with individual services’ (Andrews et al. 
2005b). The CoSP was a measure based on the production model of performance and 
enlarged by consumer satisfaction, i.e. one of the main dimensions of the MDPMs outlined 
above. In the same spirit, Walker et al. (2010) have argued for an enlargement of the 
production model of performance and proposed the application of the dimensions of 
organisational performance as suggested by Boyne (2002b) with the difference that they 
replace the ‘democratic outcomes’ dimension with a dimension entitled ‘governance’ 
(Walker et al. 2010).  
Likewise, Summermatter and Siegel (2008b, 2009) have also extended the production 
model of performance with other performance dimensions. These scholars screened over 
300 academic articles in the area of public administration in order to identify the various 
definitions of performance used in these studies (Summermatter & Siegel 2008b, 2009) and 
identified ten dimensions of performance, as illustrated in the table on the next page.  
 46 
Dimension Subsumed terms and concepts 
Input Costs, budgets, expenses, revenue, expenditure, economy, resources.  
Throughput Process, production process, organisational processes, activities, capacities, 
operations, volume of work, workload, levels of activity or of proficiency, 
operating characteristics.  
Output Results end of the production process; quantity and quality of outputs, 
services. 
Outcome Effects, results, impacts, benefits, public value, accomplishments, 
consequences.  
Efficiency Relation of efforts to outputs, the ratio of output to input, technical efficiency, 
cost per unit of output, relative efficiency.  
Effectiveness How well services or programs meet their objectives, a measure of outcome, 
illustrating the result or impact of a service, the extent to which customer 
requirements are met, cost-outcome measures. 
Additional types 
of ratios 
Productivity, value for money, cost effectiveness, return on investment, return 
on taxpayer money, unit or per capita costs.  
Quality Quality of staff activity, services or outputs, extent to which the nature of the 
output and its delivery meet requirements or are suitable to their purpose, 
conformance, reliability, on-time delivery.  
Requirements Targets, goals, objectives, standards, timeliness, pledges, benchmarks.  
Stakeholder-
related aspects 
Consumer’s evaluation of various features or facets of the product or service, 
based on a recent consumption experience, satisfaction, trust of actors and 
stakeholders, customer satisfaction.  
Value and 
ethical aspects 
Equity, transparency, or other democratic values, equitable distribution of 
benefits, fairness.  
TABLE 6: VARIOUS PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS (BASED ON SUMMERMATTER & SIEGEL (2009)) 
The first eight of these dimensions are related to the production process definition of 
performance. ‘Requirements’ points to different elements that can either be internally 
requested (through the management) or externally imposed (through legislator, regulators or 
international certification associations) (Summermatter & Siegel 2009). ‘Stakeholder related 
aspects’ relate to the focus on direct stakeholders such as the consumers or suppliers and 
not on indirect stakeholders such as regulators or society. ‘Value and ethical aspects’ can 
be linked back to the public values discussion and illustrate the particularities of the public 
sector and the need to consider social outcomes. Summermatter and Siegel (2009) have 
concluded that the identified dimensions highlight the absence of a consensus about the 
performance of public institutions. In the 320 papers analysed by Summermatter and Siegel 
(2009), fifty-four papers did not contain any definition of performance. In the other 266 
papers, 4.91 dimensions were used to define the concept on average. The most frequent 
dimensions used were ‘outcomes (68%)’ and ‘outputs (66%)’, whereas ‘value and ethics’ 
accounted only for a frequency of 17% in the data set and ratios only for 25%. In regard to 
linked dimensions, the concepts most frequently linked were ‘outputs-outcomes’, with 134 
references out of the 266 definitions. Summermatter and Siegel (2009) concluded that 
research could either avoid using the term performance; it could clearly outline how the term 
performance is understood and how the different elements are defined and what the 
assumed links between them are or finally; it could apply a comprehensive definition of the 
term ‘performance’ across research. For them, the first option is not realistic because of the 
large diffusion of the term. The second option would appear more applicable, but would still 
lead to misunderstandings and render the communication between theory and practice 
difficult. The third option would require researchers to apply not only some but all relevant 
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dimensions and would hence complicate research enormously. Summermatter and Siegel 
(2009) concluded that the choice of the appropriate option would depend on the research in 
question. They suggest that a definition of performance should include outputs, outcomes, 
efficiency, and effectiveness as crucial dimensions. Inputs and requirements may be 
adjusted to the context studied. Such a ‘mainstream’ definition is argued to have been 
prominent for a long time. The inclusion of stakeholder-related, quality or ethical aspects 
broadens the concept but also renders it more complex and normative (Summermatter and 
Siegel 2009).  
Talbot (2010) has summarised that following ‘dimensions’ as the most frequently found in 
the MDPMs: 
Values (endogenous and exogenous) 
Resources management (including economy and 
efficiency) 
Aim, mission, goals, or mandate 
People management (including equality and 
diversity) 
Legitimacy, trust, responsiveness, sustainability Process management 
Governance arrangements (including 
accountability and democratic control) 
Customer/service focus and responsiveness 
Strategy, integration, and alignment Risk management 
Structures Innovation and learning 
Partnerships, joined-up working, networks Service delivery, outputs, quality of outputs 
Leadership Social impact, outcomes, results 
TABLE 7: THE DIMENSIONS DETECTED IN MDPMS (ADAPTED FROM TALBOT (2010)) 
This list does not claim to be exhaustive and Talbot (2010) has argued that further analysis 
of the models, both current and emerging, might add to that list. Obviously, the list 
summarises the themes identified in MDPMs and other research on the definition of 
performance. Recurrent themes comprise the dimensions of performance as a production 
process even though Talbot (2010) has titled them differently, for example ‘resource 
management’ referring to economy, efficiency and inputs, ‘process management’ referring 
to throughputs or ‘service delivery, outputs, quality of outputs’ including quality, 
effectiveness and other ratios. Other recurrent themes are the ‘democratic outcomes’ such 
as ‘legitimacy’ or ‘trust’ but also ‘social impact’, ‘outcomes or results’ and ‘values’.  
‘Responsiveness’ is also a theme emerging in several studies (e.g. Brewer & Selden 2000, 
Boyne 2002b). Another question in regard to values is how to categorise them. Talbot (2010) 
has suggested an approach called the Relational Models Theory (RMT) that applies to 
different categories of values. First, values that focus on social solidarity, community 
cohesion, redistribution (through taxes, benefits, and services), coproduction or services 
and so one are summarised in the ‘communal sharing’ dimension. Second, values such as 
stability, reliability, security, regulation, efficiency in delivery of services and enforcement of 
norms by the authorities are taken into the group ‘authority ranking’ (Talbot 2010). Third, 
values such as equal treatment among citizens, employees or gender are taken into the 
‘equality matching’ dimension (Talbot 2010). Finally, values such as personal benefit for the 
individual, economic value or values rooted in NPM are covered in the category of ‘market 
pricing’ (Talbot 2010). This is an interesting approach enlarging the direction of MDPMs and 
opening up the field for future research. That said, it could again be questioned whether all 
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these values identified by Talbot (2010) are in fact ‘values’, or whether they include elements 
that would correspond to other dimensions of performance, such as efficiency that could be 
included in the financial dimension of performance. 
The approaches presented above are only a selection of the extensive body of literature that 
exists on the topic of dimensions of performance in public services and institutions 
(Andrews et al. 2005a; Baetge et al. 2007; Boyne 2002b; Brewer & Selden 2000; 
Summermatter & Siegel 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Talbot 1999, 2008a, 2010; Talbot & Johnson 
2005). They are representative examples of the body of research on performance 
dimensions and have several implications for this study. 
First, they illustrate that there is no simplistic modelling of performance in the public sector 
(Holton 1999b), mainly due to the complex environment in which they are embedded This in 
turn results in complex and multiple performance dimensions (Talbot, 2010: 181). Similarly, 
Summermatter and Siegel (2009: 2) outline that no one unitary concept of public 
performance exists. Hence, a unified performance definition would not be appropriate given 
the multidimensional nature of performance.  
Second, it is widely recognised that public organisations require a wider integrated 
framework of performance, one that goes beyond the focus on the input and output 
dimensions. Public sector organisations need to consider dimensions beyond the 
production process of an individual organisation’s activity. This does by no means indicate 
that economics, efficiency, effectiveness, inputs, and outputs are not significant, but that 
the focus when evaluating an organisations performance needs to be widened. The financial 
and economic focus does not completely correspond to the public sector activities. In order 
to have an integrated picture of the performance in the public sector, dimensions need to be 
added representing the values and non-financial objectives inherent to the public sector. 
Traditionally, these objectives are different in the public and the private sector, since in the 
public sphere, objectives are often contradictory, multiple and not necessary profit-oriented 
(Boyne & Law 2005; Yaziji 2010). On which dimensions organisations concentrate is ideally 
a result of the objectives defined in their strategy (Mintzberg 2008).  
Third, the different dimensions are somehow contradictory and trade-offs between them 
occur (Andrews et al. 2011; Holton 1999b; Talbot 2010). Contradictory, because some of 
the dimensions may work against each other and trade-offs, because the fulfilment of one 
may be at the expense of another. In this spirit, the increase of economic value may for 
example be restricted by ethical or environmental considerations. Every organisation needs 
to balance the various dimensions to find a combination that is appropriate for its particular 
situation. Moreover, close to no organisation is susceptible to use all the 11 dimensions 
identified by Summermatter and Siegel (2009), or all sixteen identified by Talbot (2010).  
Fourth, the terms used to describe the nature of performance vary across research (Holton 
1999b). A lot of research uses interchangeably terms like ‘theoretical dimensions’ (Brewer et 
al. 2000), ‘measures’ (Andrews et al. 2005), ‘domains’ (Walker et al. 2010) ‘factors’ (Brewer 
et al. 2000), ‘measurement of construct’ (Brewer et al. 2000), ‘concepts’ (Summermatter and 
Siegel 2009), ‘dimensions’ (Andrews et al. 2005; Boyne 2002b; Summermatter and Siegel 
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2009; Talbot 2010; Walker et al. 2010) or ‘themes’ (Boyne 2002b) of performance. This is 
not only the case across research but sometimes even within one single study. The difficulty 
even increases where under ‘dimensions’ (or any other term used to refer to the nature of 
performance) elements of different levels are integrated. For example, economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness of the production process have an explicit meaning, as they are ratios of 
input-to-input, input-to-output, or output-to-outcome. They are hence concepts measuring 
performance in the production process. To integrate these concepts on the same level as 
the dimensions of performance, such as values or operational performance seems to be 
more confusing than actually contributing to the correct understanding of the performance. 
The complexity is amplified still when the private sector understanding of performance, such 
as environmental or social performance is added to the performance dimensions of public 
organisations (especially in regard to the different qualities of the dimensions). 
To sum up, the above outline has shown that different multidimensional performance 
models and public management studies have conceptualised performance dimensions in 
various ways, reaching from a use of financial indicators to operational, customer or 
process related aspects and at times integrating social values as well. Based on these 
various elements, taken from the public and the private spheres, but also from theory and 
praxis, performance clearly appears to be multidimensional, complex and context-
dependent. This begs the question of which are the performance dimensions that can be 
used to define performance for both public and private organisations? The next section is 
dedicated to the construction of a complete and holistic tool integrating dimensions 
identified in previous research. This tool can then be used to examine the question of the 
influence of regulation on an organisation’s definition of performance central to this study. 
2.5 SIX DIMENSIONS TO DEFINE PERFORMANCE 
So far, it has been shown that performance is multidimensional, capturing both financial and 
extra-financial dimensions. Further dimensions of performance can reach from inputs and 
outputs to values and ethical aspects, thus linking numerous concepts to performance. This 
study aims to explore whether an organisational performance concept is indeed built on 
different dimensions, what importance each dimension has, whether a hierarchy of 
dimensions can be observed and whether there exists a link between the various 
dimensions. In order to do so, an analytical tool first needs to be constructed. From the 
literature review above, six dimensions of organisational performance can be identified, 
together linking private and public sector attributes. It is believed that by bridging private 
and public performance ideas, these dimensions provide a solid framework. It is based on it 
that organisational performance can first be defined, and then measured for each individual 
organisation. In the next sections, each of the six dimensions that have been identified in 
the literature review will be outlined in turn, and examples of indicators for each dimension 
will also be provided.  
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2.5.1 The financial dimension 
The financial dimension13 is linked to what is often called financial performance or corporate 
financial performance (Callan 2009; Capon et al. 1990; Griffin & Mahon 1997; Hamilton & 
Shergill 1992; Reger et al. 1992; Stanwick & Stanwick 1998; Waddock & Graves 1997). It is 
the most traditional dimension used to conceptualise organisational performance (Baetge et 
al. 2007; Richard et al. 2009). It also coincides with what Kaplan and Norton (1996) called 
the financial perspective of the BSC. It evaluates the aspects that are linked with the 
economic value creation of the organisation (Figge et al. 2002; Niven 2003; Richard et al. 
2009). All performance models, in public and private sectors, refer in one term of another to 
the financial dimension (Bouckaert & Halligan 2006; Bouckaert & Peters 2002; Boyne 2002b, 
2003; De Bruijn 2007; Gond et al. 2009; Kirby 2005; Lorino 2001; McWilliams & Siegel 2001; 
Summermatter & Siegel 2009; Talbot 2010). Most often scholars use a single indicator such 
as ‘return on assets (ROA)’ or ‘return on investments (ROI)’ to measure aspects of the 
financial dimension of performance (Reger et al. 1992; Richard et al. 2009; Schönbucher 
2010). Such a conceptualisation is very narrow and there are many indicators measuring 
financial fitness and robustness of a company: ‘efficiency’, ‘economics’, ‘output’, ‘cost 
structure’, ‘profit’, ‘financial measures/ratio’ etc. are only a few to mention (Baetge et al. 
2007; Schönbucher 2010). Bearing in mind the process of performance measurement, three 
groups of key financial indicators are taken to measure the financial dimension in this study. 
First, ‘growth benchmarks’ such as ‘revenue growth’ are reporting the financial success of 
the organisation. Second, ‘revenue related benchmarks’ such as ‘gross revenue/win 
margins’ are examples of the financial dimension. A third group of key indicators of the 
financial dimension are ‘key financial results benchmarks’ such as ‘earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA)’ or ‘operating profits over earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT)’ margin. These three groups have been used in several studies to 
evaluate the financial performance (Baetge et al. 2007; Loterie Romande 2009, 2010, 2011; 
MECN 2012; Olson & Slater 2002; Schönbucher 2010; Swisslos 2009, 2010, 2011). But the 
economic value creation of a firm is not only linked to the financial dimension but also to its 
internal operations.  
2.5.2 The operational dimension 
The operational dimension14 refers to the operations of an organisation undertaken in order 
to fulfil its purpose. It is based on the three non-financial perspectives of the BSC. The 
operational dimension originates in stakeholder theory and the BSC as well as the 7S-
framework of McKinsey.  
First, the customer perspective concentrates on the customers of the organisation. For an 
organisation it is important to know who the customers are and what the organisation will 
offer them (Figge et al. 2002; Niven 2003). Related indicators are ‘advertising costs’, 
‘customer surveys’, ‘customer satisfaction’, ‘customer loyalty’ or ‘marketing expenses’. The 
                                                
13 For an extensive overview of indicators of financial performance please see Baetge et al. (2007); 
Richard et al. (2009). 
14 For an extensive overview of indicators of operational performance please see Baetge et al. (2007); 
Richard et al. (2009). 
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focus on customers is believed to increase the future economic value of a firm (Kaplan & 
Norton 1996b, 2008). The following indicators targeting the customer perspective are 
identified for the empirical research in this study: First, ‘customer satisfaction’ captures the 
customers’ satisfaction with the services and products of the organisation. Second, 
‘customer acquisition’ captures the focus of the organisation to acquire new customers. 
Third, ‘customer profitability’ is the difference between the revenues earned from customers 
and the expenses invested in the customer relationship during a specific time period. These 
concepts have also been identified in the literature, and highlighted as being appropriate 
indicators of the customer perspective (Figge et al. 2002; MECN 2012; Olson & Slater 2002). 
The second component of the operational dimension is the internal business process 
perspective. The internal business process perspective includes production processes, and 
how inputs are used and what throughputs are realised (Figge et al. 2002; Kaplan & Norton 
1996b, 2008; Niven 2003). Key indicators of the internal business process perspective are 
for example ‘average units of production’, ‘productivity’, ‘working capital/sales’ or ‘labour 
turnover’ (MECN 2012). The indicators identified for the empirical research in this study are 
first ‘productivity’, as defined as an average measure of efficiency of production and as a 
ratio of output to input (capital, labour, energy, (raw-) materials etc.). Second, ‘working 
capital over sales’ is a financial ratio capturing the amount of invested cash to maintain a 
certain level of sales. Finally, the ‘labour turnover’ captures the number of employees that 
leave the organisation compared to the total number of employees (Olson & Slater 2002).  
The third component of the operational dimension is the learning and growth perspective. 
The importance of learning and growth of an organisation was attested in a lot of research 
(Figge et al. 2002; Gond et al. 2009; Kirby 2005; McWilliams & Siegel 2001). It is judged to 
be the actual driver for the other three components of the BSC, recalling the customer, 
internal business process and financial perspectives. For the safeguarding of the future of 
an organisation it is necessary to constantly evolve and be innovative. Indicators of the 
learning and growth perspective are for example ‘product developments’, ‘employee 
training’, ‘suggestions made by new employees’, ‘product cycle’, ‘innovations’ and ‘new 
markets’ (Figge et al. 2002; Olson & Slater 2002). The sub-concepts identified for the 
empirical research in this study are ‘innovations’ (i.e. how important is innovation for the 
organisation), ‘product developments’ (i.e. how do existing products develop) and ‘entering 
new markets’ (i.e. diversify towards new markets) (Olson & Slater 2002).  
2.5.3 The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension integrates the views of stakeholders. These are 
vital for the survival of the firm because they have in some form or another invested in the 
firm, something which is positively related to shareholder value creation (Hillman & Keim 
2001). It refers to the stakeholder-management side of the CSR movement as defined by 
Hillman and Keim (2001) (see section 2.3.1). The CSR movement and the related corporate 
social performance are linked to this dimension when the activities result in, or intend to 
result in, an increase of future shareholder value (Hillman & Keim 2001). In including such a 
dimension, an organisation widens its stakeholder view by adding other stakeholder groups 
than customers such as employees and suppliers. Similar conceptualisations of the 
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stakeholder management dimensions can be found in the TPM, SBSC or the 7S-framework 
(Elkington 1997, 1999; Enticott & Walker 2005; Figge et al. 2002; Hubbard 2009; Peters & 
Waterman 1982). Examples of indicators for this dimension are ‘employees’ satisfaction’, 
‘social performance of suppliers’, ‘non-marketing sponsoring’ (if it exists), ‘energy used’, 
‘water used’, ‘emissions’ etc. It is believed that engagement in these activities will boost the 
future economic value of the company and is thus important for the long-term survival of the 
organisation (Figge et al. 2002). The sub-concepts identified for the empirical research in 
this study are the ‘employees’ satisfaction’, the ‘social performance of suppliers’ and the 
‘energy, water used and emissions’ as well as the ‘reduction of manufacturing waste’. 
Hence, these sub-concepts capture the CSR concept in regard to employees, suppliers, 
and environmental protection.  
2.5.4 The legal requirement dimension 
The legal requirement dimension incorporates the compliance side of the CSR movement 
and the legal ethic as defined by Fried (1976). Fried (1976) argued that it is important for 
bureaucracy to include the legal ethic in their performance definition. The legal requirement 
dimension is legitimated by the idea of Creating Public Value (Moore 1995). This approach 
concentrates on the question of how public agencies can create ‘public value’15, in analogy 
to the shareholder value creation of the private sector (Kelly & Muers 2002; Moore 1995, 
2003). When such ‘public value’ is created in order to comply with a governmental 
regulation, it is considered to be part of the legal requirement dimension. An important 
aspect—also in regard to this study particularly—is that it is not only the public sector that 
creates the ‘public value’. A private, non-profit or voluntary organisation can also produce 
public value (e.g. Bozeman 1987; Bozeman 2007; Talbot 2010). What this ‘public value’ may 
be depends on the objective defined by the government. An example is the attempt to 
minimise the negative externalities of a firm, for example in regard to pollution. The ‘public 
value’ would be clean air for the local community. The term ‘public value’ can be seen as an 
amalgamation of multiple public values (Van Wart 1998). The legal requirement dimension 
refers to compliance with regulations and the respect of legal obligations, and it includes 
any activity an organisation may undertake in order to do so. In sector-specific terms, legal 
obligations to internalise negative externalities also fall under this dimension, as does the 
redistribution in the form of taxes or share of profits to the state budget. Hence, this 
dimension can be linked to the part of ‘public value’ that can, as argued by Talbot (2010), be 
created by organisations—public and private ones—when a regulation or a law induces 
them to do so. Therefore, the mandatory public value creation is included in this dimension 
as it goes hand in hand with compliance. In the empirical part of this study the sub-
concepts used to illustrate the legal requirement dimension are the ‘reserves for regulatory 
costs’, the ‘reporting of activities to the regulator’ or the ‘compliance with legal obligations’. 
In case public value is created out of voluntary activities it is deemed part of the social issue 
                                                
15 Public value has to be separated from public values. A public value refers to a non-financial goal 
such as reducing pollution or waste. In case the engagement to create a public value is mandatory, 
these activities are in the legal requirement dimension. In cases where the public value is a voluntary 
goal, it is part of the social issue participation dimension. Public values on the other hand refer to 
values that are upheld in a society and are part of the public values dimension. 
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participation dimension. In regulated sectors, the organisations face more obligations than 
under ‘free’ market conditions. These are purposely not referred to as ‘unregulated’, 
because each organisation does face some kind of regulation (Cairns 1985; Majone 1991; 
Parker 2001; Vogel 1996). For any organisation, the respect of the law, at least in a well 
functioning society with a robust ‘Rechtsstaat’, is crucial for the survival of the organisation. 
Legal and compliance aspects gain in importance in regulated industries. Sector specific 
regulation has an influence on an organisation and requires greater compliance activities. As 
a result, the legal compliance is considered but also measured, as it may be an important 
aspect for the success of an organisation. The legal requirement dimension may be very 
important for the performance of the organisation as non-compliance may endanger its very 
survival (Carroll 1979; Fried 1976). 
2.5.5 The social issue participation dimension 
The social issue participation dimension refers to outcomes, which are not core business 
aspects and which do not contribute directly to shareholder value creation, but which are 
voluntary and not realised in order to comply with the regulation. It coincides with the wider 
definition of CSR and what Hillman and Keim (2001) called that ‘social issue participation’. It 
is the question of whether an organisation uses some if its profit for the achievement of a 
social outcome, on a voluntary basis. Such engagement is argued to decrease the 
shareholder value by either deploying revenue, or by not engaging in something, therefore 
possibly renouncing to potential sources of shareholder value creation (Hillman & Keim 
2001). The idea behind the notion of values creation is that companies should not only 
optimise short-term financial performance but create values in society and for society on a 
voluntary basis (Carter & Greer 2013). Hence, the social issue participation dimension 
coincides with values of common good and sustainability, with the ‘impact on society’ 
dimension of the EFQM Excellence Award or ‘social outcomes’ in the inventory of 
performance dimensions of Talbot (2010) or Summermatter and Siegel (2009). In spite of the 
usual focus on the public sector, the scope of values creation is enlarged in this study by 
examining also whether private organisations engage in value creation. The difference with 
public value (creation as outlined in the legal requirement dimension is that organisations 
are engaging voluntary in such activities. Indicators used to detect the presence of the 
social issue participation dimension in the empirical part of the study are for example the 
‘philanthropic use of profits’, the ‘voluntary compensation for negative externalities’ and the 
‘involvement in local community’ (Hillman & Keim 2001). What is important in regard to the 
social issue participation dimension is the voluntary nature of actions undertaken and the 
fact that it might decrease shareholder value.  
2.5.6 The public values dimension  
The public values dimension refers to the values that are important for the society in which 
the organisation is embedded. ‘Values’ refer generally to the social values that people hold 
(Talbot 2010). Public values16 are identified in public sector performance research but not as 
                                                
16 ‘Value’ and ‘values’ have their roots in different disciplines: ‘Value’ has its roots in classical 
economics such as the labour theory of value developed by Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl 
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a dimension of performance. In literature it is argued that public values potentially influence 
the definition of performance (Bozeman 2007; Talbot 2010). The public values dimension 
refers to values shared by the community and that are not outlined in the regulation but to 
which an organisation adheres. The public values dimension is based on indicators of 
‘transparency’, ‘equity’ and ‘fairness’ (Elkington 1999; Jørgensen Beck & Bozeman 2007; 
Norman & MacDonald 2004; Talbot 2010).  
Public values come from various sources such as individual, professional, organisational, 
legal and public interest values. Consequently, numerous public values17 exist. What is 
important to note however is that public values are defined as: “a society’s public values are 
those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and prerogatives to 
which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to society, 
the state, and one another; and (c) the principles on which governments and policies should 
be based” (Bozeman 2007: 13). This is by no means the only definition of public values in 
literature. Hood (1991) has for example suggested another categorisation of public values, 
namely to classify them into ‘product’, ‘process’ and ‘regime values’. Product values refer to 
the efficient and effective production of goods and services delivered by the public sector. 
Process values are linked to values that keep government fair and honest (Hood 1991: 13). 
Hood (1991) outlines that these values are often institutionalised in appeal mechanisms and 
ethical codes. Third, regime values refer to values that keep the public sector robust and 
resilient. These are values linked to crisis management and strong regimes not easily 
endangered (Hood 1991). 
Taking this idea to the definition of performance, individuals and organisations hold values 
that influence the assessment of activities and hence the meaning of performance, and this 
both in the private and the public sector (Talbot 2010). In this view, values are something 
that influence the definition of performance, but are not actually a part of the performance 
definition. So far, in previous studies, values were part of the performance assessment of 
public organisations (Talbot 2010). Van Dooren et al. (2010) have argued that two views 
exist with regard to how public values and public performance relate to each other. First, 
and similar to the product values category of Hood (1999), performance can be seen as a 
public value in itself, among other public values. Hence, performance is defined as 
efficiency or effectiveness. In a second view, performance can be seen as the realisation of 
public values and hence performance and values are distinct concepts. Values are the 
reference for performance assessment (Van Dooren et al. 2010: 24). Instead of integrating 
                                                                                                                                                   
Marx in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries (Talbot 2010). ‘Values’ on the other hand 
developed in fields such as philosophy, ethics, sociology, anthropology and so on (Talbot 2010). It 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with this extensive body of literature (for a 
discussion see for example Gaus (1990) Bozeman (2007); Jørgensen Beck and Bozeman (2007)) on 
individual values and how individuals develop and change their values. Instead, the focus is on the 
discussion around ‘values’ in relation to organisations and especially in regard to performance. 
‘Value’ and ‘values’ are sometimes difficult to separate and some authors, such as Bozeman (2007) 
do not seem to distinguish between the two, but use them interchangeably. ‘Value’ and ‘values’ are 
not new concepts, but they have for a long time been the subject of analysis both in public and in 
private organisations (Bozeman 2007; Jørgensen Beck & Bozeman 2007).  
17 For an overview see Jørgenson and Bozeman (2007). 
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performance into values or assessing them separately, public values are considered in this 
study as one dimension of performance. How well the values are achieved then contributes 
to the overall performance of organisations. The question that arises is that of whether 
organisations actually include a public values dimension in their performance definition, and 
hence engage in the creation of public values such as ‘equity’, ‘transparency’, ‘citizen 
involvement’, ‘fairness’, ‘equal treatment’, and ‘social cohesion’. This dimension is thus 
linked to the creation of democratic and public values (Bozeman 2007; Jørgensen Beck & 
Bozeman 2007; Summermatter & Siegel 2009; Talbot 2010). The difference between this 
study and previous literature is mainly that here public values are used as performance 
dimension on their own. This differs from previous research where it was mostly argued that 
public values influence the different performance dimensions, the interpretation of 
performance measures, the weighing attributed each dimension or the institutional context 
(Talbot 2010). This study takes it a step further by asking whether organisations are actually 
engaging in measuring their level of achievements in public values.  
2.6 A HOLISTIC APPROACH OF PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS IN REGULATED ENVIRONMENTS  
The six performance dimensions constructed from literature are the foundation of the 
performance definition to be used in this study. In literature it has frequently been 
highlighted that the main differences in the multidimensionality of performance between 
public and private organisations is that in the latter, multidimensionality is hierarchically 
ordered and essentially contributes to the financial dimension, whereas in the former, it is 
horizontally ordered, resulting in multiple final performance dimensions. In the private 
sector, the dominating focus was originally on economic values. Since the 1980s, with the 
transition from the OE movement to the Excellence movement the attention has shifted to 
culture and quality from structures, plans and numbers. The unique focus on financial 
measures was argued to be insufficient to manage organisations in competitive market 
environments. As well the increasing expectations of customers demanded a greater 
responsiveness and a greater external focus. Traditional financial performance measures 
focus on the performance that results from the activities of an organisation but they provide 
little indication of how that performance is achieved or how it can be improved (Keenerley & 
Neely 2003; Talbot 2010). Despite the influence from the private to the public sector in 
regard to management techniques, the performance concept in the public and private 
sector is, as shown throughout the chapter, different. Talbot (2010) states: “Outcomes are 
the primary concern (or should be) for public domain activities, whereas for private sector 
organisations they are at most a voluntary add-on – as in the corporate social responsibility 
movement” (Talbot 2010: 27). The key characteristic separating the public and private 
domain is the differentiated focus of the dimension of performance that is measured. In the 
public sector, the multiple constituencies that prevail induce organisations to emphasise 
multiple aspects of performance (Hvidman & Andersen 2013). ‘Social outcomes’ are or 
should be the primary concern for public sector activities, whereas for the private sector 
organisations outcomes represent at most a voluntary ‘add-on’, or by-products, as the 
corporate social responsibility movement illustrates (Parenteau 1997). The focus of private 
organisations remains the outputs of the activity and the economic value created for share- 
and stakeholders (Talbot 2010). Nonetheless, an equal treatment among performance 
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dimensions has also emerged in private organisations, as for example in the SBSC of 
Hubbard (2009). Hubbard (2009) noted ”sustainability concepts have dramatically widened 
the scope of measurement options and leading organizations are grappling with 
sustainability reporting, but there is no sign of consensus on a common reporting standard 
and the competing frameworks are impossibly complex“ (2009: 177). The introduction of the 
sustainability concept in organisations has implications for the strategy and consequently 
affects also how the organisation measures performance (Hubbard 2009: 181). The 
emergence of such frameworks in theory and practice suggest that the importance of social 
and environmental aspects is recognised when doing business. Businesses respond to this 
evolution by creating sustainability reports. That said the question of sustainability does not 
enter the debate on organisational performance at the top level (Hubbard 2009; O'Dwyer & 
Owen 2005). The central argument of the private sector framework is that good 
environmental and social performance, in addition to good operational performance will, in 
the long-term, result in an improved financial performance. The resulting social and 
environmental outcomes are therefore at best add-ons or by-products to the core focus—
the financial outcome. An interesting question is consequently, whether under a specific 
context, in private organisations, social outcomes become performance dimensions, 
instead of being by-products resulting out of the focus on financial outcomes. 
Public–private differences 
Wallace Syre has once remarked that “public and private management are alike in all 
unimportant respects” (Allison 1980: 282). It seems that also in regard to the definition of 
performance, the public and private sector are fundamentally different. The differences 
between public and private organisation know a long research tradition (Allison 1980; Boyne 
2002a; Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994; Marais & Reynaud 2008; Parenteau 1997; Rainey & 
Bozeman 2000). The reasons behind the differences between private and public 
management are numerous. In general, managers in private organisations are judged to 
dispose over a greater autonomy, a higher variety of actions and better opportunities to 
exploit the environment surrounding the organisation (Hvidman & Andersen 2013). 
Researchers generally argue that three variables distinguish private and public organisations 
(Boyne 2002a; Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994; Marais & Reynaud 2008; Rainey & Bozeman 
2000). First, ownership is different. Entrepreneurs or shareholders own private firms, 
whereas members of political communities collectively own public agencies. Second, the 
funding of organisations is different. Public agencies are funded largely by taxation rather 
than fees paid directly by customers (Boyne 2002a). Third, control is executed at different 
levels. Public sector organisations are controlled predominantly by political forces, not 
market forces, where private organisations are controlled by owners or a Board of Directors 
(Boyne 2002a). Bozeman (1987) has taken these three variables together into a dimensional 
model of ‘publicness’ and concluded that no organisation is wholly public or wholly private. 
Instead, private firms and governmental agencies can be arrayed on the three dimensions of 
‘publicness’. Bozeman (1987) thus argued that all organisations are public to the degree 
that they are sanctioned by the state (Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994; Bozeman & Loveless 
1987; Rainey & Bozeman 2000).  
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The external context: a move away from the public versus private performance definition? 
The private and public dichotomy in defining performance is arguably to be abated in an 
environment where public and private differences are minimised. Public and private 
organisations can take similar forms: they can both have a Board of Directors, a CEO, and 
behave in a similar way as for example in regard to investments or profit generation or 
consumer satisfaction. Consequently, to evaluate the performance based on the same 
indicators (such as annual profits, return on investments or return on assets, growth rates or 
market share) does not seem that alien (Parenteau 1997). Performance measurement and 
management is argued to be contingent on social, technical, cultural and political conditions 
(Bouckaert & Halligan 2008). Hence, the external context is also contributing to the 
performance definition of organisations. Not only is it argued that environmental 
characteristics influence the level of performance (Hannan & Freeman 1977) but also that 
organisations whose structures fit their environments achieve better results (Lawrence & 
Lorsch 1967). The organisational theory literature has since long recognised the existence of 
external stakeholders who may try to influence or shape the direction of an organisation 
(Talbot 2010).18 Based on organisational theories, Boschken (1994) has also looked at the 
multiple constituencies for public agency performance and highlighted that they can create 
a performance bias. He has thus raised the question—but left it unanswered—of how it 
would be possible to design a system balancing the interest of multiple stakeholders in 
order to limit the trade-offs between their different interests. Another question addressed by 
the author is whether a market-based allocation of public goods would result in a single 
performance emphasis by the organisation tasked with this public policy (Boschken 1994). 
Organisational theory has developed an interest in the environmental factors impacting 
internal dynamics of organisations in the mid- 1960s. Mintzberg (1983) thus outlined the 
important role of an ‘external coalition’ steering the organisation. 
Management theorists have generally agreed that the ways in which organisations are 
designed and the environments in which they operate make a difference in affecting 
organisational performance (Winter 2003). Organisations are open systems interacting with 
their environment (Meier & O’Toole Jr. 2008). They acquire resources (inputs) from the 
external sphere and the environment is absorbing the products or services (outputs) of the 
organisation (Mintzberg 1983). In general, the literature has distinguished between 
stakeholders external to the unit of analysis (i.e. organisation, programme, service etc.) but 
still within government, (including the government itself, parliament, audit and inspection 
agencies, superior organisations or units and peers (Talbot 2010), and actors external to the 
unit of analysis that are outside the government, such as private companies competing with 
public organisations, civil society and so on. 
Hence, the context dependency of performance has long been recognised in literature. The 
context in which an organisation operates is deemed influential for the definition and level of 
performance of an organisation (Cook et al. 1983; Drazin & Van de Ven 1985; Hatch 2006; 
Reger et al. 1992; Summermatter & Siegel 2008b, 2009). Different contexts are the objects 
                                                
18 For further discussion see chapter 4. 
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of different types of studies, such as for example the vertical contracting between parent 
ministries and agencies (Pollitt & Talbot 2004) and between purchasers and funders or 
providers and agents respectively (Fortin & Van Hassel 2000; Harden 1992; OECD-PUMA 
1996; Walsh et al. 1997). Other work concentrates on horizontal relationships in contracts 
between peer organisations (Collins & Butler 1997; McGuire 1997; Needham 2003; Talbot 
2008b). Talbot (2010) outlines that research in general focuses only marginally on the 
complexity of the institutional environments of the public sector. It is indeed in the private 
performance literature where the idea of stakeholders has been most developed. Neely et 
al. (2002) have for example offered a stakeholder model based on previous strategic 
management literature in private sectors. It has focused especially on the subset dealing 
with stakeholders, which has had a great deal to say about the direction of performance for 
organisations (Mintzberg 1994; Neely et al. 2002; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Talbot 2010). 
Neely et al (2002) adopt a broad definition of stakeholders including shareholders, bankers 
and other capital providers, regulators, pressure groups, labour unions, employees, 
communities, suppliers, alliance partners, customers and intermediaries. 
Work on institutional environments has also illustrated the complex sets of relationships that 
exist between agencies and parent ministries, central ministries and various regulation and 
inspection bodies (Pollitt & Talbot 2004). Some research focuses on one component of the 
institutional environment of an organisation. For example, research on performance audit, 
illustrates that besides governments, audit bodies also have an impact on the steering of 
performance of service delivery agencies (OECD-PUMA 1996). Similarly, the complexity of 
institutional actors has also been highlighted by the accountability literature, but often with 
no link to performance (for an overview see Talbot (2010) or Hood (2004)). Likewise, the 
literature on regulation inside government (Hood 1999) recognises the influence of one 
public organisation over another. 
Another aspect, close to the idea of Hood (2004) of regulation inside government, is that 
government regulation of a specific sector may influence the performance conceptualisation 
in a specific organisation. Boyne (2003) has also argued that the level and definition of 
performance is contingent upon different external factors such as ‘resources’, ‘regulation’, 
‘market structure’, ‘organisation’ and ‘management’ (Boyne 2003). Regulated organisations 
are not free to choose their processes and strategies but are limited by policy constraints 
(Boyne 2003; Hood 1998b). Hence, this would also influence the performance management 
of these organisations. Boyne has outlined that there is little proof of the influence of 
regulatory arrangements on performance, especially in regard to public organisations. It 
needs more investigation (2003). Existing research has focused mainly on quantity and 
quality of outputs and the level of outcomes (e.g. pass rates of exams in school). Much less 
research has focused on the influence of regulation on efficiency, value for money, and 
consumer satisfaction and close to no research has focused on public values such as equity 
(Boyne 2003).  
Regulatory bodies and judicial or quasi-judicial bodies are of interest as it can be assumed 
that by establishing regulation, setting standards or making specific recommendations, they 
effectively impose performance measures or targets. This is also the motivation behind this 
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study, as it is argued here that governmental regulation does not only shape the 
performance conceptualisation of public organisations, but also that of private 
organisations. Regulation represents a controlled environment and is an interesting case to 
analyse as it gives a specific structure to an environment. The rules are clear and 
transparent for all actors embedded in it. Regulation is installed in order to influence the 
behaviour of a specific group or individuals. States are regulating some economic activities 
because they judge the free market outcome to be insufficient. Such regulation impacts the 
organisation and its management. The performance of the organisation is affected by the 
regulation the organisation faces, as has been confirmed by numerous scholars. In general 
it is argued that a move toward liberalisation results in higher performance of a firm (Stigler 
1971; Smith and Mick 1985; Reger, Duhaime et al. 1992; Hood 1999; Genoud 2001; OECD 
2002). However, the research conducted by these scholars does not focus on the definition 
of organisational performance nor does it focus on the influence of regulatory systems on 
organisational performance. 
2.7 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 
Across the literature, definitions of performance in general, and organisational performance 
in particular, are numerous, and highly context and time dependent (Summermatter & Siegel 
2008a, 2009; Talbot 1999, 2010). This chapter has shown that the concept of performance 
as such is complex and multidimensional (Andrews et al. 2005b; Boyne et al. 2005; Boyne & 
Walker 2005; Meier & O’Toole Jr. 2002; Meier et al. 2007. This chapter has detailed the 
emergence of the current performance studies movement, presented various facets of 
performance and discussed the development of the concept in theory and in practice. It has 
shown that it associates various terms and concepts, and explained the reasons of the 
variability of performance definitions. The nature of performance depends on the mission 
and objective of the organisation and also on the context the organisation operates in. This 
results in multiple dimensions of performance (Boyne et al. 2005). The different dimensions 
identified and used in previous research and practice have been presented first from a 
general perspective (as it applies to all organisations), secondly from a private-sector 
perspective, thirdly from a public sector perspective, and finally, from a theoretical angle 
concentrating on public management literature. This complete discussion has allowed for 
the construction of a holistic instrument to define performance, based on six dimensions. 
These performance dimensions are a financial, an operational, a stakeholder management, 
a legal requirement, a social issue participation and a public values dimension. Together 
they provide a complete tool including financial results and economic efficiency (i.e. 
financial dimension) but also sector-specific implications and legal obligations (i.e. legal 
requirement dimension), as well as social, environmental (i.e. social issue participation 
dimension) and ethical (i.e. public values dimension) performance aspects. Based on these 
constructs, the natures of any performance definition can be captured and clearly 
examined. 
Socioeconomic contexts and the rule of law further influence the performance orientation of 
organisations. A question is hence whether there exist environments pushing organisations 
towards the implementation of both financial and non-financial performance dimensions. 
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Traditionally, the main difference between public and private organisations is that in the 
private sector, the focus lies on outputs, mostly limited to the economic value creation for 
shareholders. In contrast, for public organisations, the boundaries of performance are 
pushed beyond the individual organisation, to focus on outcomes, and to concentrate not 
only on economic value, but also on social and public values. In this context, the public-
private dichotomy might become obsolete. Depending on the situation the organisation is 
faced with, private organisations may also diversify their performance definition. It remains 
to be seen whether efforts of private companies to reflect upon their social role imply a 
converging trend between public and private concern or whether 3BL, SBSC and other 
efforts are mainly cosmetic. Organisations consider their environment when defining the 
strategic objectives. Depending on the environment, an organisation selects different 
performance dimensions representing the different values an organisation wants to create. 
The next chapter will focus on one specific environment that is believed to influence 
organisations with regard to their performance definition, namely the regulatory 
environment.
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3 THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Regulation constitutes one of the main modes of public governance today. It is frequently 
used to implement public policies and to structure the delivery of public services. 
Regulation attempts to alter the behaviour of actors in a sector. In many ways, the 
regulation put in place by the authorities is linked to the management of the organisations 
facing regulation. Hence, regulation and performance are closely related. Indeed, the way a 
sector is regulated can have important consequences in regard to how an organisation 
defines its performance.  
The regulatory environment can take various forms, as a direct consequence of the different 
components through which a government can structure it. But before entering this 
discussion, it is important to define the concept of regulation more specifically. The notion is 
used across very different disciplines, and even in the fields of political sciences and public 
administration—which have more clearly focused on public regulation—the precise meaning 
of the term ‘regulation’ varies (Goodship et al. 2004; Hood 1999; Hübner 1990; Majone 
1997; Wilson & Rachal 1977). There is a lack of consensus with regard to its definitional 
limits (Cairns 1985), and it is a difficult task to attribute one exact definition to the concept 
(Goodship et al. 2004). In order to properly analyse the regulatory environment of the 
gambling sectors and that of the sport betting and lottery sectors in particular it is important 
to clarify what is understood by regulation. In this study, the regulatory intensity serves as a 
measure to operationalise the regulatory environment in order to explore whether it 
influences the way a regulated entity defines its performance.  
This chapter does not endeavour to provide an exhaustive discussion on the notion of 
regulation, as this would clearly go beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the main aim of 
the chapter is to conceptualise the notion of regulation for this research, and link it to the 
definition of performance (see chapter 2 above). Section 3.1 presents the different ways 
states have conceived regulation over time and space, and illustrates the transition from the 
concept of the positive to the regulatory state. Section 3.2 presents the different areas that 
have been the focus of regulation, i.e. mainly social and economic issues targeted by 
regulatory regimes, and section 3.3 focuses on the body adopting the regulation. The 
section briefly summarises different definitions of governmental regulation in order to 
highlight the one used in this study, namely sector-specific regulation to alter the behaviour 
of economic actors in order to achieve a certain outcome. Section 3.4 concentrates on the 
notion of regulatory intensity. Although regulation tends to endorse the same function and 
objectives across sectors and countries, the regulatory intensity may vary greatly. This 
section therefore aims to present how the regulatory intensity can be analytically 
constructed and measured in presenting different approaches identified in theoretical and 
empirical research. In this study, the regulatory intensity is of particular importance, since it 
is the measure used to compare different regulatory environments across sectors, and even 
countries. Section 3.5 discusses the different reasons for variations in regulatory intensity. In 
so doing, it seeks to show that the regulatory intensities may vary not only as a result of 
governmental preferences, but also as a result of governments’ evaluation of the attributes 
needed to achieve the desired outcomes. Section 3.6 closes the chapter by highlighting the 
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main elements to be retained for this study, and conceptualising regulation as governmental 
rules established to influence an economic activity and to achieve a specific outcome or to 
prevent or control the negative externalities that result out of the activity.  
3.1 THE NOTION OF REGULATION: FROM THE POSITIVE TO THE REGULATORY STATE 
The notion of regulation is highly linked to the state’s role in society and markets 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007; Geiger & Hoffman 1998; Hood 1998a, 1999; Majone 1997). 
Consequently, the notion of regulation has significantly changed over time. The evolution of 
regulation since WWII is often conceptualised in literature as the transition from the Positive 
(or Keynesian) state to the Regulatory state. This transition is marked by different ideas 
about regulation and the role of the state. These have in turn influenced the nature and 
instruments of regulation.  
 Role of the state Nature of regulation 
Positive state 
(From WWII until the 
1970s) 
State as a planner and active 
producer of goods and services 
Regulation through public ownership. 
The main instrument used is 
nationalisation 
Regulatory state 
(From the 1970s to 
present) 
State steers public policies 
while delegating their execution 
to third parties 
Regulation to overview and steer, by 
using several instruments: 
- Privatisation 
- Deregulation 
- Regulatory reform 
- Indirect government 
TABLE 8: THE POSITIVE AND THE REGULATORY STATE 
3.1.1 The positive state  
From WWII onwards, regulation was linked to direct state intervention intended to rebuild 
the economy and activate post-war economic growth. Regulation was hence associated 
with a state’s intervention to improve social conditions This active state is typically 
described in literature by expressions such as ‘welfare state’, ‘Keynesian state’, ‘Keynesian 
welfare state’ or the ‘positive state’ (King 2007; Majone 1997; Scharpf 2002). Improvements 
in social policies were regarded as essential to restore and increase growth and the virtues 
of self-regulation and laissez-faire attitudes were disregarded. Instead, Keynesian 
economists claimed that the problems of the inter-war period were a direct consequence of 
the self-regulated economy, and directly linked to inadequate state policymaking (King 
2007). Hence, at the end of WWII, a paradigm change took place, turning the state into a 
planner, an active producer and a supplier of goods and services (Majone 1997). Moreover, 
it became clear that the national state and the economy were not entirely separate entities. 
It was recognised that the economic institutions of the market were in a large part politically 
determined (Polanyi 1957). Nationalisation was one of the main instruments used during this 
stage of regulation, with public services provided through state-owned companies (King 
2007; Majone 1997, 1999, 1996).  
In short, the notion of regulation was in this period closely linked to direct state intervention 
to implement public policies. However, the economic and financial distress of the 1970s 
came to throw light on the heavy costs associated with this mode of regulation, as a result, 
the mode of government changed from the late 1970s onwards.  
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3.1.2 The regulatory state 
From the 1970s onward, and in part as a response to the economic crisis (OECD 1997a), 
the ideology on the role of the state altered in a way which influenced the notion of 
regulation. States faced liquidity problems, and as the Keynesian welfare state was unable 
to stop the rising unemployment and inflation, calls were made for a new mode of 
governance. At the same time, the use of regulation increased with the construction of the 
EU and the perceived need to counteract the cartel systems that could be found in various 
member states (Majone 1997). In this environment, the notion of regulation took on a new 
form, and instead of being seen as active state intervention, it became a way to oversee and 
monitor private sector activities. This was the birth of the regulatory state (Hood 1991, 
1998a, 2004; Majone 1997, 1996).  
In the regulatory state, regulation was associated with an increased empowerment of the 
private sector and the delegation of traditional state interventions to private actors (King 
2007; Majone 1997). The regulatory state thus sets standards and opens up markets rather 
than seeking to control them through state ownership. Majone (1997) has described this 
transition from the positive to the regulatory state as follows: “Strategic adaptation to the 
new realities […] resulted in a reduced role for the positive, interventionist state and a 
corresponding increase in the role of the regulatory state: rule making is replacing taxing and 
spending” (1997: 139).  
In a number of countries, and especially in the Anglo-Saxon part of the world (e.g. UK, New 
Zealand), public organisations were privatised. Increased competition was argued to be the 
solution to state budget deficits. The arguments was not that the state should disappear 
completely, but that the regulatory state needed to be strong to ensure adequate market 
competition (Hughes 2003; Majone 1997, 1999, 1996; Schedler & Proeller 2003). Indeed, for 
some neoliberal proponents, regulation was seen as necessary to protect private actors 
from increasingly active and involved states (Goodship et al. 2004; King 2007).  
The development of the regulatory state coincided with the emergence of the NPM 
movement, which aimed at making states more efficient and cutting down state spendings. 
NPM has contributed to the increasing formalisation and dissemination of regulation, and 
the involvement of private actors in the implementation of public policies and also had a 
huge effect on performance management (as illustrated in chapter 2 above) in the public 
sector. The notions of ‘steering’ instead of ‘rowing’ (Osborne & Gaebler 1993) that were 
advocated by the NPM movement illustrated the idea of regulation as a control mechanism 
(Goodship et al. 2004: 17).  
Different instruments were used in order to decrease the role of the state in the economy. 
Privatisation, deregulation and regulatory reform aimed at reducing state intervention and 
abate the role of the state as a direct producer of goods and services. The typical control 
mechanism in the regulatory state was to merge private sector ownership of key public 
entities and a system of new rules to continuously guarantee the protection of the public 
interest (King 2007; Majone 1997). The term of ‘deregulation’ is frequently linked to the 
regulatory state. It is defined by the OECD as “the relaxation or removal of regulatory 
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constraints on firms and individuals” (OECD 1993a). This does not mean that the state 
withdraws completely, leaving market forces to play autonomously (OECD 1997a). The 
result of deregulation does not necessarily lead to a decreased in the amount of regulation. 
It is more adequately characterised as the return to the market (Cairns 1985; Evans 1982). 
This indicates a reduction in rules and administrative burdens—which are seen as 
constraints to innovations and economic development—but to achieve this, an increase in 
the quantity of regulation may occur (Cairns 1985; OECD 1997a).  
Along with privatisation, deregulation and regulatory reform, the concept of indirect 
government also emerged in the regulatory state. Instead of the state being an economic 
actor, private entities were hired through contracts or sales of public entities, in order to 
replace former state intervention. The public sector was thus no longer the sole provider of 
public services (Bundred 2006; Goodship et al. 2004). In shaping these new relationships, 
the authorities relied increasingly on regulation. The regulatory state can therefore be seen 
as closely connected to the management reforms presented in the previous chapter, since it 
is one instrument deployed by governments to fulfil public policies.  
Before looking more closely at the different forms of the regulatory state, a remark should 
be made with regard to the different use of the expression ‘regulatory state’ in literature. 
Based on Majone (1997), this section has mainly described the transition from post-WWII to 
the post-1970s as a linear transition from the positive to the regulatory state. However, such 
a linear view has been widely contested. For instance, Braithwaite et al. (2007) have argued 
that the positive state was the original regulatory state, based on legal sanctions, and a 
hierarchical command form. Hence, the regulatory state can be compared to a new 
regulatory state, which seeks to accommodate the growing pluralism of modern 
governance. Law and non-law mechanisms happily cohabit and there is no (Keynesian) 
mentality that the state ‘can do everything’. It is distinguished, rather, by its reliance on an 
increased use of regulatory techniques based, wherever possible, on soft law (codes of 
practice and voluntarism) rather than on direct command-and-control mechanisms 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007). Scott (2004) speaks of a post-regulatory state that is similar to 
Braithwaite’s notion of the new regulatory state. For Scott, the classical regulatory state is 
the sovereign state where laws are seen as the principal forms of control over social and 
economic life. In the post-regulated state, regulation is achieved increasingly through 
combinations of both state and non-state mechanisms (Scott 2004). Similarly, Hood (1998a) 
contests the notion that the regulatory state is something new and queries whether any 
system of governance is as ‘modern’ or as inevitable as adherents often claim (Hood 
1998a). Hence, the regulatory state as a system of control is as contested and potentially as 
precarious as any other. 
Despite the overall tendency towards the emergence of the regulatory state, differences in 
the application of regulation are observable. There is seemingly no observable trend 
towards a global convergence in the scope and content of regulatory regimes across 
countries and sectors (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000). This is important to keep in mind. 
Despite common objectives and common public interests among countries regulating sport 
betting and lottery activities, the study will show that different countries have developed 
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different types of regulatory regimes. This is also a result of the different conceptualisations 
of the regulatory state in different countries. The next section will therefore distinguish 
between different traditions towards regulation that can be found across countries and 
regions.  
3.1.3 Different shapes of the regulatory state 
The regulatory state takes on different forms in different countries or regions and can 
involve different regulatory and administrative levels, within the state, but also at the 
regional and at international level.19 Due to the fact that gambling regulations are national 
matters and have not been subject to regional or international treaties, this section 
concentrates on national level regulations.  
In the Anglo-Saxon world, and especially in the UK, state regulation is limited to cases of 
market failures. The overall belief is that free market mechanisms should be the norm and 
regulation only the exception. This was not always the case, as between the 1940s and 
1980s the organisations that provided main utilities were publicly owned (Baldwin & Cave 
1999). Hence, the UK utilities sector illustrates well the transition from the positive to the 
regulatory state. From the 1980s onward, through privatisation, the former public 
corporations were largely replaced with limited public companies, in which shares were sold 
to private investors. This process was accompanied by the adoption of legal acts intended 
to regulate the market and guarantee the various aspects of the services. For each utility, 
industry regulators (e.g. The Director General of Telecommunication DGT or the Office of 
Telecommunication OFTEL) were empowered to monitor the companies (Kahn 1988; 
Smithson 1978; Stigler 1971).  
In the US, the regulatory tradition is characterised by specialised agencies, which receive a 
legal mandate (King 2007). The US regulatory style allows regulatory agencies to act as 
‘mini-governments’ with an accumulation of law-making, monitoring and sanctions-
enforcing powers.  
In Norway, public ownership is an important regulatory tool, and public organisations are 
traditionally attached to a ministry that is responsible for oversight and monitoring (Majone 
1996).  
In continental Europe, regulator is frequently embedded in the administration and the 
regulatory instance is often attached to a ministry (Majone 1996). The creation of 
independent administrative bodies increased during the 1990s as these bodies became 
responsible for monitoring organisations—both public and private ones—engaged in 
delivering a public service. In France, independent administrative authorities (Autorité 
Administrative Indépendante (AAI)) have for example been created in certain sensitive areas. 
AAI are state institutions that regulate sectors that are judged to be essential but in which 
the state renounces to intervene in a more direct manner (e.g. public ownership). AAI are 
independent both from the government and from the sectors they are regulating. There are 
                                                
19 For further information see Majone (1996) and Braithwaite and Drahos (2000). 
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two main kinds of AAI: those responsible for economic activities and those who protect 
citizens’ rights (Majone 1996). Regulation is frequently the result of a political process—a 
compromise among different parties—but it is not necessarily responsive to market needs 
(King 2007). 
Though the term regulation is thus used in various contexts, there is a common 
denominator: regulation is used to structure economic sectors, and more generally society 
at large, and to implement public policies. The next section takes a closer look at the 
definition and practices of regulation, starting by outlining first of all the possible kinds of 
regulation.  
3.2 SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 
Generally speaking, a government addresses economic or social issues through regulation. 
While the role of the market and specific economic sectors is the most common focus of 
regulation, there can also be a regulation of political, ethical or social matters. Social 
regulation addresses a public interest such as health, the environment or security. The 
economic impact is here not the main concern. Regulation to address a social issue often 
uses market incentives or goal-based approaches (OECD 1997a: 6). Through social 
regulation a government consequently aims at addressing a desirable non-economic 
outcome. While social regulation is often rooted in a public action, it can also be of a private 
interest. 
In contrast to social regulation, economic regulation aims to increase economic efficiency 
and intervene directly in the market through pricing, by shaping the market structure (i.e. the 
level of competition) or through market access or exit (OECD 1997a: 6). Scholars have 
outlined that economic regulation influences the decision of economic actors by restricting 
the options on price, quantity, entry or exit (Viscusi et al. 2005: 357), or by fixing standards 
and ensuring that the restrictions are followed. This is frequently done through the use of an 
oversight body ensuring compliance (Schultz 1979: 8).20  
Closely linked to economic regulation, mention should also be made of a third kind of 
regulation, namely administrative regulation. Administrative regulations are formalities and 
regulations through which governments intervene in the decisions of economic agents, 
thereby affecting private sector. Administrative regulatory reform generally aims to reduce 
administrative burdens imposed on economic entities by simplifying administrative 
processes and improving transparency (OECD 1997: 6).  
After this presentation of the three different kinds of regulation, it is important to highlight 
that they frequently co-exist in practice. Social regulation which, for example, aims to 
prevent negative externalities that may affect citizens’ health (or well-being) often comes 
along with measures of economic regulation such as the reduction of the number of 
competitors in the market or market access obligations. Chapter five will address the 
different forms of regulation used in this study and illustrate in-depth that, in order to attain 
                                                
20 For further discussion see Viscusi (2005). 
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social objectives, measures of economic regulation—as defined above—are frequently 
used. Having thus defined the three main focuses of regulation, the next section 
concentrates more precisely on the body adopting regulation.  
3.3 GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION 
Depending on the perspective taken by the researcher and the context of the study 
regulation may refer to different things. So far it has been shown that with regulation, social 
or economic issues are addressed and administrative processes altered. Having defined the 
historical evolution of regulation in states, as well as the various types of regulation, the next 
section turns to the body adopting of regulation.  
Regulation can either be rooted in governmental or non-governmental entities, i.e. regulation 
adopted by private organisations, industries, associations or interest groups. Pierre and 
Peters (2000) have classified different modes of regulation in a continuum of political 
systems, ranging from, on one end, the systems most dominated by the state to those, on 
the other end of the continuum, where the state plays the smallest role (Pierre & Peters 
2000). Similarly, Boddewyn (1985) has suggested a categorisation of different types of 
regulation, based on the body which formally adopts the regulation. In his study on 
advertising self-regulation, six different forms of regulation ranging from self-discipline to 
pure regulation were therefore defined and summarised, as can be seen in the following 
table (Boddewyn 1985: 135).  
Types of regulation 
Self-Discipline: Norms are developed, used, and enforced by the firm itself. 
Pure Self-Regulation: Norms are developed, used and enforced by the industry itself. 
Co-opted Self-Regulation: The industry, on its own volition, involves non-industry people (e.g. 
consumer and government representatives, experts) in the development, application, and 
enforcement of norms. These outsiders are internalized.  
Negotiated Self-Regulation: The industry voluntarily negotiates the development, use, and 
enforcement of norms with some outside body (e.g. a government department or a consumer 
association). In this case outsiders remain outside.  
Mandated Self-Regulation: An industry is ordered or designated by the government to develop, 
use and enforce norms – whether alone or in concert with other bodies. This system is asking to 
‘corporatism’. 
Pure Regulation: The government monopolize the development, application, and enforcement of 
norms.   
TABLE 9: THE TYPES OF REGULATION (ADAPTED FROM BODDEWYN (1985)) 
The categorisation of Boddewyn (1985) and the classification of Pierre and Peters (2000) 
both illustrate that regulation is not only adopted by governments but also by non-
governmental actors. They can both engage in developing, using and enforcing regulation. 
A form of regulation somehow mixing governmental and non-governmental development of 
regulation is when governments are asking organisations or industries to develop regulation 
voluntarily (i.e. negotiated self-regulation) or mandatorily (i.e. mandated self-regulation). 
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3.3.1 Non-governmental regulation 
In case of non-governmental regulation, the literature often speaks of self-regulation, 
whereas the categorisation of Boddewyn (1985) uses the concept of self-discipline. This so-
called self-discipline refers to norms that are adopted and implemented by the firm itself, 
and which can either apply to members of the organisation, or—if agreed—to everybody.21 
Codes of conducts of individual organisations would be an example of this form of 
regulation and illustrate the voluntary nature of such regulation.  
The next form of regulation, self-regulation22, is developed on an industry level and is 
frequently seen as an alternative or a complement to government regulation. Self-regulation 
goes beyond the implication of the government and associates regulation with rules, 
standards or guidelines often developed by a specific group or profession on a voluntary 
basis (Boddewyn 1985). Frequently, self-regulation refers also to informal agreements 
whereby companies are to fulfil certain social responsibilities (Beardsley et al. 2005). Self-
regulation is often used in businesses in order to prevent further state regulation or to 
complement existing regulation (Boddewyn 1985). It is also generally assumed that such 
self-enforced rules will be mutually beneficent to all members of a group (Black 2002). 
Boddewyn (1985) differentiates between four different kinds of self-regulation: pure self-
regulation, co-opted self-regulation, negotiated self-regulation and mandated self-
regulation. The main difference between these is the level of involvement of governmental 
actors in developing the regulation. In the category of ‘pure self-regulation’, regulation is 
developed, used and enforced by a specific industry. Most frequently the regulation in 
question applies to the members of this industry, though it is conceivable that it could have 
a broader application as well. In ‘co-opted regulation’, an industry engages non-industry 
actors like experts or consumers for the development, application and enforcement of 
regulation. In the case of ‘negotiated self-regulation’, the industry in question voluntarily 
develops, uses and enforces regulation with the implication of an external body, like a 
governmental department. In ‘mandated self-regulation’, non-governmental actors have to 
adopt self-regulation and if they were not to do so, it would likely lead to governmental 
regulation. Indeed, in the case mandated self-regulation would not result in the desired 
outcomes, government intervention would not be far away, and it is thus frequently argued 
that self-regulation can result in explicit rules (Boddewyn 1985; King 2007).  
To sum up, non-governmental regulation can take various shapes. The common element 
being that it is not a public authority that adopts the regulation, but a specific group seeking 
to change the behaviour of its members (Hood et al. 1999). This is in contrast with 
traditional regulation—or ‘pure regulation’ as Boddewyn (1985) would call it—where a public 
authority adopts rules and laws in order to regulate a specific activity. In spite of this 
straightforward definition, several definitions of governmental regulation exist in literature, as 
outlined in the following section.  
                                                
21 The latter is undoubtedly merely a theoretical possibility and unlikely to occur without government 
engagement. 
22 More recently, scholars (Black 2002; Rhodes 1997) associate to self-regulation also the term of 
decentred regulation, meaning that regulation is decentred from the government, adopted and 
implemented by other than state institutions (King 2007). 
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3.3.2 Governmental regulation 
In regard to governmental regulation, some scholars’ definitions limit regulation to the rules 
of a state—the entire body of legislation—while others attribute a narrower meaning to it, 
arguing that it refers only to the delegation of former state activities to private entities 
(Majone 1997). This section briefly summarises different definitions of governmental 
regulation in order to highlight the one used in this study; namely sector-specific regulation 
to alter the behaviour of economic actors. 
First, regulation can at its broadest correspond to the rules set up by a government. In this 
form, regulation is an old phenomenon encompassing the integral body of a state’s 
legislation. Regulation thus defined can be traced back to the beginnings of modern 
statehood (King 2007). Typical examples are provided by Prichard (1982) and Evans (1982), 
who define regulation in Canada as the study of the appropriate or normal role of the state. 
A state regulates everything in its territory and hence, regulation is omnipresent.  
Second, government regulation can further be defined as the deliberate influence of the 
state, including all states’ actions aimed to influence an industry. This definition includes 
command-based regulation but refers additionally to other modes of influences, for example 
economic incentives, such as subsidies, contracts, attribution of resources or provision of 
information (Baldwin et al. 1999). In this approach, regulation refers to any general condition 
provided by the state for the well functioning of the economy and the market.  
Third, regulation can be seen as limited to a specific sector and this type of regulation is 
often called command and control regulation. The focus here is still rule-based, but it 
addresses actors in a specific sector or economic branch. In this view regulation is defined 
as the imposition of rules by governments, where non-compliance would be sanctioned. 
The aim is to influence the economic behaviour of a public and private sector entities (Jones 
& Thompson 1984: 746). The body of regulation is thus conceived by the state adopting it 
though the legislative apparatus (Black 2002).  
Fourth, regulation can be seen not as a static set of rules but as an global process including 
that includes the influence of stakeholder groups who lobby governments to adopt 
regulation, as well as the regulation enforcement-process itself (Bundred 2006: 182). 
Regulation consequently refers to a process of on-going negotiation: societies develop 
regulations to align the different objectives of the government and those of its stakeholders, 
as illustrated by the following figure (Beardsley et al. 2005).  
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Figure 4: Regulation as a process (adapted from Shaffer (1995)) 
When represented as a process (see figure 4), regulation includes lobbying, bargaining and 
negotiation leading up to the adoption of rules. This frequently also includes rent-seeking 
activity, i.e. a specific group lobbying for regulation in order to increase its advantage. In this 
sense, regulation also refers to the rules and laws instituted. Finally, it also includes the 
attempts of the regulated entities to manipulate and influence the regulator after the 
regulation has been implemented. Hence, regulation is in this view concerned with the 
integral relations between the government that adopts public policies, and the organisation 
which is a dynamic stakeholder that tries to interfere and influence the public policy 
formulation (Shaffer 1995). In case regulation is represented as a process, regulation 
concentrates on the policy-making process, especially in regard to the interplay between 
regulators implementing policy, and politicians, who try to control the regulators’ activity 
(Carrigan & Coglianese 2011). Shaffer (1995) speaks of a double interdependency between 
business and government. In case a government wishes to formulate new public policies an 
organisation attempts to influence the policy development. In situation where a government 
implements public policies through regulation, the organisation responds through 
adaptation (Shaffer 1995).  
This study embraces this latter understanding of regulation, i.e. as the adaptation to sector-
specific rules imposed on an economic entity to alter a sector-specific outcome. Indeed, it 
is the aim of this contribution to explore whether regulation, as it is supposed to alter 
behaviours, will influence the definition of performance in organisations, be they private or 
public in nature.  
A particularity of governmental regulation is that is can either apply to entities inside i.e. 
internal regulation or outside government i.e. external regulation. This is what can be called 
a dual role of government, because with regulation a state is either an external (market) 
regulator or an internal regulator. 
I. Internal regulation 
Wilson and Rachal raised the controversy on internal regulation in 1977 by wondering 
whether a government can regulate itself (Wilson & Rachal 1977), and by advancing a thesis 
that it is in general easier for a public agency to change the behaviour of a private 
organisation than to change that of another public organisation (Wilson & Rachal 1977). 
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Regulation inside government refers to governmental bodies that watch over other public 
entities, i.e. it focuses on the way one government entity controls another governmental 
unit. Based on Hood (1999), regulation inside government can be characterised by three 
elements. First a public organisation shapes the activities of another public agency, second, 
the monitoring body is at arm’s length from the organisation being monitored and third, the 
monitoring body has some kind of official mandate to monitor the behaviour of the ‘regulee’ 
and seek to change it (Hood 1999). In contrast to ‘internal regulation’, i.e. the regulation of 
one governmental body by another, ‘external regulation’, or ‘regulation outside government’ 
means governmental regulation to control a non-governmental entity (Hood 1998b; Hood et 
al. 1999; James 2000; Talbot 2008b).  
II. External regulation 
External regulation refers to state intervention that is focused outside of government 
activities. This kind of regulatory policies aims to correct various types of ‘market failure’ 
such as monopoly power, negative externalities, incomplete information, and insufficient 
provision of public goods (Brown & Jackson 1994; Viscusi et al. 2005). 
In both cases, i.e. internal and external regulation, a distinction can be made between 
technology-based regulation, performance-based regulation and management-based 
regulation (Coglianese & Lazer 2003). This categorisation makes a distinction based on the 
moment the regulation intervenes in the production process. ‘Technology based regulation’ 
thus refers to traditional regulation, where the state adopts rules to control specific 
technologies or behaviours. This type of regulation intervenes at the operational stage, 
specifying the technologies that are to be used or the processes that are to be followed 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007; Carrigan & Coglianese 2011; Coglianese & Lazer 2003). With 
‘performance-based regulation’, a state requires certain outcomes to be achieved or 
avoided. This form of regulation intervenes at the output stage of the production process, 
specifying social outputs that must or must not be attained. ‘Management-based regulation’ 
induces firms to engage in a planning process that is directed towards the achievement of 
public goals. Through this kind of regulation firms have to produce strategies that comply 
with general criteria designed to promote the social goal to be attained (Coglianese & Lazar 
2003).  
Concluding this section on governmental regulation, it can be noted that various 
understandings can be associated with the concept of regulation. The above discussion has 
aimed to clarify the concept of regulation by outlining the different ways in which it can be 
understood. As mentioned, this contribution sees regulation as a binding set of rules applied 
by a specific body or government department in order to change the behaviour of actors 
and to reach a specific outcome (Baldwin et al. 1999). Such regulation can use various 
instruments. In order to evaluate what instrument serves the intended goal best, 
consideration should be made of the resources a government can use to influence 
economic, social or industrial activities.23 Such tools range from the adoption of laws 
regulating the redistribution of wealth to contracts, grants or subsidies, via the channelling 
                                                
23 For further discussion see Baldwin (1999: 34-62). 
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of competitive forces or the use of information. This can involve direct state action. Finally, 
the attribution of protected rights and liability rules allocated to create the desired incentives 
and constraints (Hood 1990) can be a tool as well. Any regulation can opt for any one or 
more of these tools, and combine them as deemed appropriate. Other regulatory measures 
worth mentioning are pricing, the shaping of market structures, the definition of market 
access, the restriction of products and services and the imposition of advertisement or 
distribution-channel restrictions (Nicoletti & Pryor 2006). Governmental regulation is a 
specific form of state activity or a set of authoritative rules that are often accompanied by 
the establishment of a public agency which monitors and enforces compliance (Jordana & 
Levi-Faur 2005). Such a public agency can be called a ‘regulator’, and can be defined as an 
organisation that seeks to enforce the regulation. In general, there is an arm’s-length 
relationship between the oversight organisation and that which is being overseen, and the 
monitoring instance generally has some sort of official mandate or authority for its oversight 
(Hood & Scott 2000; Bundred 2006).  
The above discussion has demonstrated that regulation is currently a very important public 
management tool across countries, but one, which can take a large number of diverse 
forms. This means that in spite of its diffusion as a mode of implementing public policies, 
the regulation is not necessarily of the same degree in all sectors and countries. This 
difference is not only caused by the objective to be attained but it also depends on the 
instruments employed. This means that to compare different regulations across sectors, 
regions or countries, it is necessary to measure the regulatory intensity. Indeed, the 
regulatory intensity varies depending on the regulatory system in question. As will be 
underlined in the following section, the regulatory intensity is not calculated based on any 
universally applicable equation, but has been conceptualised based on scholarly literature, 
and seems to be highly sector-specific.  
3.4 THE REGULATORY INTENSITY 
The above discussion concerning the varying definitions of regulation, and its diverse 
bodies adopting regulation and types indicates that the regulatory intensities might 
frequently differ as well. In order to clearly compare regulation across different sectors and 
countries it is necessary to establish a measurement construct. The most frequently used 
concept in this regard in literature is that of ‘regulatory intensity’, though only a few studies 
venture to define it as a measurement construct. Indeed, previous research has not settled 
on one unique model for the construction of the intensity of a regulation, and the vocabulary 
used is varied: that which is here understood as ‘regulatory intensity’ has also been referred 
to as ‘degree of regulation’, ‘level of regulation’, ‘degree of environmental constraints’, etc. 
(Clemens & Papadakis 2008; Jackson 2007; Marcos et al. 2010).  
The one view shared in the literature with regard to the regulatory intensity, is that it is a 
concept that needs to be seized for an appropriate comparison of different regulations. One 
of the main reasons regulatory intensity still lacks in solid academic research however is due 
to the difficulties encountered when operationalising it (Jackson 2007). The followings 
section will discuss some previous constructions of regulatory intensity (section 3.4.1) 
before explaining how it is constructed in this contribution (section 3.4.2).  
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3.4.1 The regulatory intensity: different attempts to construct the concept 
The variety of ways used to measure regulatory intensity is in part due to country-specific 
conditions (see section 3.1.3) that may render comparison difficult. Nonetheless, it has been 
argued that accepting that local conditions may vary and consequently that some level of 
abstraction is required, it is possible to calculate the regulatory intensity, and compare it, 
not only across sectors, but also across countries (Jackson 2007). The comparison of 
regulatory environments using the concept of regulatory intensity requires that the 
measurement be well defined and be replicable in different contexts.  
Depending on the sector analysed, the variables used to measure the regulatory intensity 
will differ. The regulatory intensity can be seen as a metric, made up of different elements 
(Clemens & Papadakis 2008); though it is possible to consider also a one-factorial measure. 
For instance, Marcos et al. (2010) have focused on a purely quantifiable measure of 
regulation. Their measure was the number of pages published in the official journals. They 
argued that this measure reflected regulatory intensity in different Spanish regions. 
However, this technique appears to measure the level of activity of a regulator rather than 
the regulatory intensity itself.  
Also Jackson (2007) has concentrated mainly on the regulator, thus ignoring other factors, 
such as the structure of the sector or the obligations imposed on the regulated entities. 
Jackson conducted a study of financial regulation in different countries, and evaluated the 
regulatory intensity based on costs of financial regulation, staff size and enforcement 
actions by the regulator. Also focusing on the enforcement action or control of the 
regulatory agency, Clemens and Papadakis (2008) have tested the regulatory intensity and 
cooperative behaviour in the US Steel industry. They have suggested that cooperation may 
be coerced by a strong regulatory presence since statistical test have shown a significant 
positive relationship between the degree of regulatory intensity and the level of 
cooperativeness of the firm. They used six likert-scaled items to estimate regulatory 
intensity. These six items referred to the government’s enforcement capacities, non-
scheduled audit to verify compliance, the identification by the regulatory agencies of 
acceptable monitoring programmes for environmental contamination, publicly identified 
firms that did not meet standards, periodic on-site inspections and finally, civil penalties for 
non-compliance (Clemens & Papadakis 2008: 491). In other words, the measure of 
regulatory intensity in their study reflects the variation in regulatory burdens applied to 
different firms.  
Also concentrating on the regulator, Rhys et al. (2008) have measured the extent and 
supportiveness of external regulation. This was done though a dummy variable, regarding 
whether or not inspections took place. The level of regulatory support was measured by a 
survey item by asking if the regulatory agency was supportive or not of such a measure 
(Rhys et al. 2008). 
In other studies, the regulatory intensity has been conceptualised along different dimensions 
concentrating not only on the regulator but also on governmental involvement in the sector, 
and on the level of restrictions imposed on regulated entities. For instance, in an OECD 
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study of air passenger transport, Gönenç and Nicoletti (2000) operationalised regulation 
through several indicators. On the level of domestic regulation, they explored the existence 
of domestic air liberalisation programmes. On the level of international regulation, their focus 
was on the participation in the regional single aviation market, the maturation of the regional 
aviation market, the establishment of an ‘open sky’ air service agreement with the US and 
on the maturation of the ‘open sky’ agreement. Measures for governmental control were the 
share of the government in the equity capital of the largest national airline, the presence of a 
special government voting right in a major national airline, the government loss 
participations in airlines in the past five years and the public service obligation of large 
national airlines. Similarly, Thorpe and Phelps (1990) used two indicators measuring 
regulatory intensity, namely the extent of hospital-specific disallowances, and the frequency 
on which the base year was adjusted (the degree of ‘prospectivity’). In their analysis of 
hospitals in the US, Cook et al. (1983, 1985) used a combination of measures to evaluate 
the extensiveness of the regulation, like the percentage of a state’s hospitals involved in the 
programme, and the percentage of the hospitals’ revenues and the number of payer 
categories covered. For restrictiveness of the same regulation they included specific 
measures, like whether institutional budgets and/or rates were subjected to review by the 
agency or whether compliance with the rate and budget review process was mandatory or 
voluntary. Based on this, they concluded that regulation becomes more intense when the 
scope is widened and the regulatory stringency is higher. 
Another approach to conceptualising the intensity of regulation has been to use pre-existing 
data from international organisations (Boylaud & Nicoletti 2000; Gonex et al. 2000; Nicoletti 
2001). For instance, Duso (2002) has taken the regulatory variables from databases on 
international regulation from international organisations like the OECD. In the same spirit 
Geiger and Hoffmann (1998) have constructed the variable ‘regulatory environment’ using 
an already existing index called ‘regulatory climate’. Darnall (2008), for example, used OECD 
survey data that asked facilities to describe the environmental policy regime to which they 
were subject. The response categories reached from ‘not particularly stringent in that 
obligations can be met with relative ease’, over ‘moderately stringent in that it requires some 
managerial and technological responses’ to ‘very stringent in that it has a great deal of 
influence on decision-making within the facility’ (Darnall 2008: 424). In another OECD study, 
Conway and Nicoletti (2006) have analysed different sector regulations. They based the level 
of regulation on a maximum of four indicators, which were ‘entry’; ‘public ownership’; 
‘vertical integration’ and ‘market structure’. Parker (2001) based his analysis of regulation on 
strategic choice and performance in the telecommunication market focusing on the 
concepts of ‘regulatory reach’ and ‘regulatory incrementalism’. Regulatory reach reflects the 
level of deregulation. Regulatory incrementalism represents the speed of regulatory change 
(Parker 2001). 
It would appear that a one-factor conceptualisation of the regulatory intensity is 
inappropriate, as it does not include all the different facets of a regulatory environment. A 
multi-factor model best captures the different components of a regulatory environment in 
general, and of the sport betting and lottery sectors in particular. This is notably illustrated in 
the contributions made by Cook et al. (1983) and Reger et al. (1992). The regulatory 
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environment can further be represented by four variables: regulatory scope, stringency, 
incrementalism and duration as will be outlined in the next section. 
I. Scope, stringency, incrementalism and duration of regulation 
Several contributions have used these dimensions, or a combination of them, to measure 
the regulatory intensity (e.g. Cook et al. 1983; Reger et al. 1992). As Cook et al. (1983) have 
pointed out, the dimensions of scope, stringency, uncertainty and duration are similar to a 
number of existing conceptualisations of environmental dimensions. According to Cook et al 
(1983), the ‘regulatory scope’ constitutes a first dimension of the regulatory intensity. It can 
be defined as the extensiveness of the regulation, and it addresses the question of how 
much of an organisation’s behaviour is constrained by a regulation. The second dimension, 
‘regulatory stringency’ (or ‘restrictiveness’ or ‘stringency’), refers to the degree to which the 
organisation’s behaviour is constrained by the regulation (Cook et al. 1985). This is mainly 
related to the control mechanism and power of the regulatory instance. Third is the 
‘regulatory incrementalism’ or what can be also called ‘rate of change’. This denotes the 
progression of change of regulation. Similarly, Mahon and Murray (1981) have suggested 
that the speed of deregulation should be considered when examining firm-level regulatory 
effects. Spulber (1989) has also suggested that the amount of time firms have to adjust to 
changes in regulatory policy is important. Spulber (1989) have argued that delays in 
implementing new regulatory policies may provide warning for firms to adjust their capital 
expenditures to the anticipated environment. When regulatory change is implemented 
gradually, especially as step-by-step deregulation over several years, firms have time to 
adapt. This offers firms’ advantages not enjoyed when deregulation is abrupt or 
unanticipated (Mahon & Murray 1980). Other authors have noted that unpredictable change 
increases uncertainty (Cook et al. 1983). Beardsley et al (2005) have even argued that in 
network industries like airlines, electricity, railways and so on, regulation is the biggest 
uncertainty affecting capital expenditure decisions, corporate image, and risk management 
(Beardsley et al. 2005). Reger et al. (1992) have summarised both the rate of change and the 
logical progression of change to be influential and incorporated them into the concept of 
incrementalism. Finally, ‘regulatory duration’, the fourth dimension of regulatory intensity, 
simply refers to the length of time that the regulation has been in existence (Reger et al. 
1992). This is important in so far as one has to be aware that in some countries 
organisations are not yet fully adapted to their environment in case the regulation is new.  
Reger et al. (1992) have slightly adapted the dimensions of regulatory intensity in their study 
on the US banking industry and its effect on strategic choice and financial performance. 
Instead of four dimensions, they evaluated the level of regulation based on two dimensions, 
namely the regulatory scope and the regulatory incrementalism. In their study, the scope of 
regulation reflected both scope and stringency as defined by Cook et al. (1983), and they 
argued that it would be empirically difficult to separate the extensiveness of a regulation 
(scope) from the degree of constraints imposed by it (stringency). The regulatory scope was 
evaluated based on the ability of banks to engage in interstate banking, operate branches, 
and form holding companies. Regulatory incrementalism was evaluated based on an index 
calculating the regulatory changes that occurred over a five years period from 1981-1986.  
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It is clear that regulatory intensity is a complex concept, which is hard to measure. The 
above discussion illustrates that the indicators to measure the degree of regulation are 
context dependent. Indeed, the outline of previous research with regard to the 
measurement of the regulatory intensity has shown that there is not one unique 
conceptualisation, and that the indicators used to construct the regulatory intensity are 
highly dependent on one’s research objective. The following section will present the 
construction of the regulatory intensity used in this study to evaluate the sport betting and 
lottery regulations. Following, but slightly adapting the lead of Cook et al. (1983) two 
dimensions of regulatory intensity will be considered, namely the regulatory scope and the 
regulatory stringency.  
3.4.2 The construction of the regulatory intensity 
In this study, based on the literature review conducted above, the regulatory intensity is 
constructed as a multi-factorial construct, addressing the main elements a regulatory 
regime uses in order to structure a specific sector. More specifically, the regulatory intensity 
is here constructed mainly on the basis on the first two dimensions identified by Cook et al. 
(1983): regulatory scope and stringency. Regulatory incrementalism and regulatory duration 
are not used here to construct the regulatory intensity and this for two sector specific 
reasons. On one hand, the sector in question (sport betting and lottery sector) is 
characterised by enough transparency and stability to ensure that the regulated entities are 
able to predict the behaviour of the regulator. Regulation is based on the rules in place, and 
there are no sudden expected changes, making it possible to neglect the aspect of 
regulatory uncertainty. On the other hand, the dimension of the regulatory duration can also 
be discarded, as the regulatory environments and the organisations under study are both 
well established, and the organisations are well functioning, and do not struggle with 
adjustments as may be the case for more newly created organisations. The literature 
assumes that in newly implemented systems, the regulation is not yet completely in place, 
since the regulatory implementation processes take time (Cook et al. 1983). Moreover, the 
longevity of the organisation has been a selection criterion for the case studies in the 
empirical part of this study (see section 4.2.2), and all selected organisations have therefore 
been operational for a period of at least ten years.  
In this study, the regulatory scope, or the extent to which the sector in question is affected 
by the regulation, is evaluated based on five indicators.  
• First, the market structure refers to the level of competition in the sector, based on 
the argument that when the regulatory framework limits the number of actors in the 
market, the regulatory scope is positively affected. Hence, in a sector with no sector-
specific regulation, the number of competitors is unlimited and the regulatory scope 
is negatively influenced.  
• The second indicator of the regulatory scope is the regulatory reach, which explores 
the question of whether the regulation is only addressing the conditions of market 
access and hence, is only limited to the market structure, or whether the scope of 
regulation reaches further, thus influencing other variables of a regulated sector. If 
the regulatory reach is broader than the market access, the regulatory scope is 
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positively influenced. In case the regulatory reach is limited to market access 
regulations, the scope of regulation is narrow and hence the regulatory intensity is 
low.  
• The third criterion making up the regulatory scope is linked to the question of 
whether a specific public use of money is foreseen in the regulation. Regulations 
often require operators to allocate money, via a tax or a pre-defined amount, either 
to the general state budget or for a specific purpose. This influences the regulatory 
scope of a regulation. In cases where there is such a specific use for a public goal of 
profits, the regulatory scope is broader than in cases where no such obligation is 
established.  
• A fourth criterion constituting the regulatory scope is related to the imposition of the 
type of ownership. The arising question is whether the regulation imposes the type of 
ownership or whether the organisations are free to choose the ownership structure. 
In cases where the juridical form of the organisation is pre-defined in the regulation, 
the regulatory scope is broadened, whereas in the opposite case the regulatory 
scope is narrowed. It has to be noted that this criterion does not assume that the 
type of the ownership (public or private) influences the scope of regulation, but rather 
the fact of it being imposed or not.  
• The fifth criterion to construct the regulatory scope is called publicness and refers to 
the presence of a public nature in the organisation, above and beyond the issue of 
ownership. Publicness is observed in an organisation when the regulation requires 
officials from the government to be present in the organisation, such as on the Board 
of Directors, or that the director/CEO is nominated by the government. In cases 
where publicness is observed, the regulatory scope is broader than in cases where 
no publicness is observed. 
Based on these five criteria it is possible to construct the regulatory scope. The broader the 
regulatory scope the higher the regulatory intensity will be.  
The second dimension constituting the regulatory intensity is the regulatory stringency, 
which refers to the degree to which the organisation’s behaviour is constrained by the 
regulation (Cook et al. 1983). The regulatory stringency plays on two levels: the regulator- 
and the organisational level. The level of the regulator focuses on factors that address the 
body responsible for monitoring the sector and implementing the regulation, whereas the 
level of the organisation focuses on factors that are imposed on the organisations operating 
under the regulation.  
For the regulatory stringency on the level of the regulator, two criteria have been identified.  
• First, the general question of whether the regulation outlines the presence of a 
regulator. This component is simply related to the question of whether a regulator is 
present in the regulatory environment, and is responsible for monitoring the 
implementation and execution of the regulation. In case no regulator is established, 
the regulatory stringency is lower than in cases where a regulator is present.  
• The second criterion contributing to the regulatory stringency on the side of the 
regulator is the competences the regulator has. When the regulator can take 
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measures in regard to the regulated entities, the regulatory stringency is argued to 
be higher. Such competences comprise the licensing of the organisation and its 
products, as well as the power of sanctioning the organisation in case of non-
compliance with the regulatory obligation.  
The regulatory intensity is also influenced by the regulatory stringency on the level of the 
organisation. Three indicators make up the regulatory stringency in this regard.  
• First a regulation may impose distribution channel restrictions. When the regulatory 
environment imposes restrictions or forbids some distribution channels such as the 
internet or other remote devices, it is believed to increase the regulatory stringency. 
In the opposite case, when there are no restrictions in place, the regulatory 
stringency is lower.  
• Second, a regulatory framework may outline is advertisement restrictions. Regulation 
can impose a prohibition to publicise the products or instigates specific 
requirements related to advertising. When the regulatory environment imposes 
restrictions or forbids publicity, the regulatory stringency is argued to be higher than 
when there are no such restrictions in place.  
• The last criterion of the regulatory stringency on the side of the organisations relates 
to obligations in regard to the negative externalities of the regulated activity, or in 
other words, to the internalisation of negative externalities. Often this requirement is 
sector specific. The health specific requirements are for instance not the same for 
energy-producers and for chemical production sites, as they depend on the negative 
externalities resulting out of the production process of the organisation in question. 
A regulatory environment that requires the organisation to take responsibility for 
these negative effects by, for example, using a share of profits to limit them, renders 
the regulatory stringency higher than in cases where such a requirement is missing.  
Taken together, the two criteria that make up the regulatory stringency on the level of the 
regulator, and the three criteria that apply on the organisational level, constitute the overall 
regulatory stringency of the regulatory environment of a sector. The higher the regulatory 
stringency, the higher the regulatory intensity will be. In combination with the regulatory 
scope, this lays the foundation of the regulatory intensity. Clearly, the regulatory intensity 
varies based on the different criteria that make up the dimensions of the regulatory scope 
and the regulatory stringency. The regulatory intensity is highest when the regulatory scope 
is at its broadest and the regulatory stringency at its highest. The level of the regulatory 
intensity of a given regulation is hence a direct result of these two dimensions. 
To sum up, the regulatory intensity of a regulatory environment is a measure used to 
compare different regulatory environments and to assess the level of regulation of a specific 
regulation. It also allows us to evaluate the extent to which the regulatory intensity of a 
specific regulation can be increased, as for instance in case of non-compliance or in case of 
non-attainment of the regulatory objective. In this respect, the regulatory objectives, which 
constitute a fundamental rationale and motivation for governmental regulation, can be of 
various types, as will be illustrated in the following section.  
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3.5 RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION FOR GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION 
So far, the definitions of regulation have been considered, the types of regulation presented 
and the measure of regulation—the regulatory intensity—constructed. The subsequent 
section looks into the question of the motivation of states to engage in regulation, 
something which may have important consequences on the regulatory intensity, since the 
intensity of the regulation may depend on its objective. As pointed out at the end of the 
previous section, it is not rare that a softer form of regulation is used in the beginning, and 
that the level of regulatory intensity is subsequently increased in case the regulation is 
deemed unsatisfactory. The discussion of the definition of regulation did already indicate 
some of motives of state regulation, such as a public interest and to attain a desired 
outcome. This section will restructure and discuss further reasons of regulation in more 
detail.  
The European Commission highlights that governments engage in regulation to achieve 
various goals, such as fair competition, the protection of public health, safety or 
environmental protection. Regulation is thus an instrument used to deliver public policies 
and to satisfy citizens’ expectations (European Commission 2006: 3). Generally speaking, 
political state theories on the issue of regulation argue that regulation is a way of distributing 
power and control in a state (Dahl 1978; King 2007). However, how the power and control is 
diffused and who receives it, differs from one state theory to another. These different 
perspectives will be presented in section 3.5.1, in order to identify the reasons put forward 
to explain the need for regulation. In section 3.5.2, political- and economic theories are 
consulted in order to discuss the motivation of a state to use regulation as an interventionist 
instrument. Section 3.5.3 presents the notion of market failures and consequently 
elaborates on the reasons for regulation from a practical economic perspective.  
3.5.1 State theories on the rationale of regulation 
General theories of the state are helpful when discussing the reasons of states’ 
interventions. The common point across these different theories in regard to regulation is 
that they all have something to say about how the power and control should be distributed 
in a state. Table eleven gives a brief overview of the three most important state theories, 
which have addressed the issue of regulation. 
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Theory Perspective of regulation Philosophy behind regulation 
Pluralist theory 
Regulation as a mode to diffuse 
power and control in a state 
Power and control should not be 
centralised but diffused so that 
polycentric  
Elitist theory 
Regulation as a mode to engage 
in relationship with non-state 
actors while making sure the 
state remains the principal actor  
Power and control are centralised and 
are in the hand of the state. Regulation 
is a mode of the power and control 
holder to engage with non-state actors 
Marxist theory 
 
Regulation to counter-balance 
the negative effects of 
capitalism 
Regulation as a mode to regulate 
capitalism and prevent for 
protectionist, egoist and monopolist 
tendencies that result out of 
capitalism. 
Regulatory schools 
(derived from Marxist 
theory) 
Regulation to counter-balance 
the negative effects of 
capitalism 
Regulation as a mode to control 
accumulation 
TABLE 10: POLITICAL STATE THEORIES AND REGULATION 
Among the theories that have most explicitly and extensively dealt with the issue of 
regulation, Pluralist theory argues that regulation is a way to diffuse power in a state. The 
reason behind regulation is the idea that power should not be centralised but that a 
polycentric approach is desirable in order to prevent the concentration of power in the hand 
of a few (Croley 1998; Dahl 1978; King 2007). For lawmakers and policy-makers, regulation 
is hence an instrument ensuring a large spread of power and control, in order to prevent 
society from developing a sole power centre.  
This is in sharp contrast with what elitist theory says about regulation. The elitist perspective 
takes a centric approach to power and control. In elitist accounts, a state uses regulation in 
order to formalise its relationships with groups of civil society through more regular 
negotiations. These bargaining arrangements and negotiations between the state, business 
groups and trade unions are a particular institutional configuration in elitist thinking, but the 
state remains the principal actor (Dahl 1966; Wilson 1980). Hence, power and control are 
centralised in the hands of the state, and regulation is far from a mode to diffuse power or 
control. Rather, its goal is to enhance participation of different civil actors in government 
activities and to foster the relationship of the state with these entities (Judge et al. 1995).  
The Marxist theory takes a slightly different perspective, as it sees regulation as a mode to 
counter the effects of capitalism. State regulation is argued to be necessary because of the 
competitive character of capitalism. Unregulated competition is argued as likely to defeat 
the social market economy through ensuing protectionism and monopolisation. Regulation 
is seen as needed to contain capitalism’s contradictions and antagonisms, and prevent a 
radical revolution (Wilson 1980). Different regulatory schools24 derived from this Marxist 
origin are all concerned with the changing forms and mechanisms in the reproduction of 
capital (Bob 1990). However, it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss them in 
length and we will restrict ourselves to a popular and influential one: the ‘théorie de la 
                                                
24 For instance, Jessop (1990) identifies seven regulationist schools. For further information see 
Aglietta (1976); Boyer (1986); Jessop (1990).  
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régulation’.25 This school serves as an example for the other regulatory schools and 
illustrates the main preoccupation of these schools of thoughts (Jessop 1990). It emerged in 
France in the 1970s, and concentrates on historical changes in political economy. One 
pioneer of this so-called Parisian school is Michel Aglietta with his thesis entitled 
‘Accumulation et regulation du capitalisme en longue period (1976)’. Aglietta’s main thesis 
was that accumulation and regulation were the twin facets of the capitalist system but that 
too much focus was given to accumulation (Aglietta 1976). Robert Boyer, one of the 
members of the regulatory school, has outlined that “régulation theory offers an analysis of 
capitalism and its transformations […]” (Boyer & Saillard 2002: 1). Hence, similar to the 
Marxist theory presented above, regulation in this perspective has a strong political 
philosophical dimension, and is seen as a mode of control for capitalistic deviances.  
The théorie de la régulation is also a reason for the semantic confusion surrounding the term 
‘regulation’. In the English literature, the French term ‘régulation’ is often translated by the 
term ‘regulation’. But the correct French translation of the English term regulation is 
‘réglementation’ referring to juridical-political regulations (Jessop 1995, 1997). In the view of 
Jessop, the French notion of ‘régulation’ would have been better translated with 
regularisation or normalisation (Jessop 1995). Therefore, it is important to note that 
‘régulation’ theory analyses another phenomenon than the coordination and control of 
economic activities and social concerns. The théorie de la régulation focuses on the modes 
of capital accumulation (Jessop 1995), and Jessop has stated that “the [regulatory 
approach] thereby seeks to integrate the analysis of political economy with that of civil 
society and the state to show how they interact to ‘normalize’ the capital relation” (Jessop 
1997: 289).  
To sum up, the political state theory use the notion of regulation to carry ideological views 
on how power should be structured in a state, and how regulation is empowered to channel 
forces in a state. Besides this ideological-philosophical notion on regulation in a state, other 
theories account for regulation in order to reach certain goals, to pursue certain ideas and to 
enhance institutions and trust in society.  
3.5.2 Politico—economic theories and their accounts on regulation 
Different political and economic theories contribute to the regulation discussion and help to 
clarify the reasons of state intervention via regulation (Baldwin & Cave 1999).26 The main 
difference (besides their different origin) from the above-discussed state theories lies in the 
central focus which moves away from power and control in a state, towards an account for 
the different justifications for state intervention. 
                                                
25 For more details see Jessop (1990). 
26 Note that this is only a short overview and introduction. To develop each of the theories is beyond 
the scope of the thesis. For further information see Baldwin et al. (1999). 
 82 
TABLE 11: STATE AND ECONOMIC THEORIES AND RATIONALE OF REGULATION 
The first group of theories that ought to be mentioned are interest theories. These can be 
divided into three different categories: public-, group- and private interest theories. The 
public interest theory underlines that those wishing to establish or develop regulation are 
primarily motivated by a public interest related objective (Baldwin & Cave 1999). In fact, the 
public interest approach highlights the public good component of regulation. Proponents of 
regulation are actively working towards the achievement of the public interest. 
Group interest theory looks at the regulatory developments as the products of relationships 
between different groups and the state. Hence, it is not the public interest and the overall 
consensus to strive for the public interest that explains the existence of regulation, but the 
negotiation among different groups and the state that shapes the regulation and explains its 
emergence. In the words of Baldwin et al (1999) it is a race for power among different 
groups. It is not done in the spirit of a reaching a public interest. This does not necessarily 
mean that the interest of one group will prevail, but rather that the regulator’s role is to 
ensure the implementation and realisation of a negotiated compromise of the interests of 
different groups.  
Finally, the third approach among interest theories considers regulation to be driven by the 
pursuit of private interests instead of public or group interests. Mainly developed by George 
Stigler (Stigler 1971) and Sam Peltzman (Peltzman 1976), the private interest theory is also 
often called the ‘Chicago school’ approach. In this view welfare is best maximised by the 
exercise of individual choices. They emphasise a critical stance towards regulation, arguing 
that it is the private economic interests that drive for regulation and that it will hence not 
serve the majority in the state (Baldwin & Cave 1999). In sum, interest theories share the 
idea that a certain interest can be achieved with regulation, but they differ strongly with 
regard to the universal validity of that interest.  
Similarly, the public choice theory (Buchanan & Tollison 1984) also emphasises the interest 
to be achieved through regulation but, in contrast to the interest theories presented above, 
it evaluates state intervention negatively, arguing that it is the state that is problematic and 
not the market. Bureaucrats are regarded as possessing their own distinct and non-neutral 
 Explaining regulation 
Public interest theory Regulation to pursue public interest related objectives. Proponents of 
regulation act as agents for the public interest. 
Group interest theory Regulation as product of relationships between groups and with the 
state. 
Private interest theory Role of private economic interests in driving regulation. Incentives of 
firms to secure benefits and regulatory rents by capturing regulator. 
Public choice theory Regulation explained through choices of administration and is 
influenced by the interests of bureaucrats.  
Forces of ideas  Regulation explained by ideas that are present in a state instead of 
private interests. Ideas are defined as intellectual conceptions 
explaining how and why the government thinks to control business.  
Institutional theory Regulation explained through institutional arrangements and rules, legal 
and other. 
Trust theory Decline of societal trust in social, economic and political institutions 
explain the growth of regulation as a mode of control. 
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interests, as inevitably misunderstanding market signals and as not being sympathetic to 
the private sector. Moreover, they also argue that regulators often ‘get it wrong’, either by 
design or by incompetence. The source of monopolies and similar market-distorting 
features may be as much, if not more, the outcome of regulatory interventions as it is a 
consequence of market development (Baldwin & Cave 1999; Crew & Rowley 1988; Eskridge 
Jr. 1988).  
Compared to these interest theories another explanation for regulation is provided through 
forces of ideas. In this perspective, regulation is motivated by the ideas of members of the 
government. It is not private, public or group interests which guide regulation but 
bureaucrats and governmental representatives, which have their own views and ideas and 
try to achieve them with the regulation adopted. Ideational theories have long denied any 
role for interests. In their view, people do not possess ex ante interests. It is through the 
diffusion of ideas that they get to define their interests and preferences. Institutional theories 
can also be considered to explain the motivation of regulation. Institutionalist theories focus 
on institutional structures, arrangements and the social processes that shape regulation 
(Baldwin & Cave 1999: 27). The reasons for regulation go beyond the aggregation of 
individual preferences since individual preferences are seen to be shaped by institutional 
procedures, principles, expectations and norms that are linked to cultural and historical 
frameworks. Hence regulation is a result of more than individual rational choice maximisers 
and serves more global interests (Baldwin & Cave 1999; Blyth et al. 2011; Hall & Taylor 
1996). 
Finally, a last explanation for regulation lies in trust theories. Notions of trust have been used 
for some time in social science analysis, to explain levels of economic development and 
democracy (Jordana & Levi-Faur 2004, 2005). The decline of popular trust in a range of 
social, economic and political institutions, in particular in the context of perceived and 
actual heightened risk, scandal and crises, is regarded by some observers of the regulatory 
state, particularly in the UK, as a key factor in understanding the growth of external audit, 
inspection, formality and surveillance by the state of long-established self-regulatory and 
professional forms of governance, hence of regulation (Hood et al. 1999). In this view, 
governmental regulation is essentially an attempt to build confidence by the electorate in 
low-trust political institutions and to regain control over key delivery mechanisms and 
institutions of public and other services.  
Although these theories largely increase our understanding of governments’ motivations and 
rationale for engaging in regulation, one has to acknowledge that various classical state, 
political and economic theories primarily serve to explain the emergence of regulation. In the 
context of this study, the motivations for regulation do play a significant role in defining the 
regulatory intensity of a specific regulation. 
Another explanation for rise of regulation and hence the prevailing regulatory intensity given 
by economics lies in the notion of market failure, one of the fundamentals of welfare 
economics (Stigler 1971). It is argued that under some conditions competitive markets will 
result in a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources (Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971). Pareto 
optimal allocation assumes that competitive markets will lead to an efficient allocation of 
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resources, hence to a situation where reallocation of resources would not result in an 
optimised outcome without worsening the situation of someone in the favour of someone 
else (Majone 2007: 28). Hence market failure occurs when the conditions for the validity of 
this theorem are not given and consequently result to inefficient outcomes. Regulation is 
established to correct different types of ‘market failure’ such as monopoly, power, negative 
externalities, incomplete information, insufficient provision of public goods (Majone 1997). 
But as it is not the objective of this research to analyse the reasons for regulation in detail, 
the following section provides only a brief overview of the different motives to intervene in a 
market.27 
3.5.3 Regulation in case of market failures  
It is generally assumed that one important impetus for government intervention is the 
perceived failure of markets and distributional concerns (Ferlie et al. 2005). Market failure 
may be inherent in the characteristic of the good or service, or it may result from the shift 
from government to market provision. Sometimes a privatised state owned enterprise (SOE) 
previously enjoyed a legal monopoly but its specific assets may give it the characteristics of 
a natural monopoly. In such cases, regulation may be required to achieve efficiency (Ferlie 
et al. 2005: 225).  
Market failures28 can take different forms and sometimes regulation is motivated out of the 
sum of several market failures. The first market failure to mention is the interest to protect 
infant industry. States intervene in the market with the aim that a specific sector can 
develop without disturbances. Such regulation provides a suitable environment for growth 
to a recent branch of market activity. The goal is not to establish a permanent protection but 
to liberalise step by step once the actors are perceived to be strong enough to face 
competition (Viscusi et al. 2005).  
Secondly, regulation can be used to guarantee universal services that have the value of 
public goods and are of vital interest for a state and its citizens. Without market intervention, 
such goods may not be produced, or only insufficiently produced. Often, it is argued that 
the market forces are not playing or only working to a limited degree in the case of such 
goods and regulation is needed to prevent for a suboptimal provision. In the same spirit, 
public service regulation is defined as control, influence and monitoring by a government of 
a mix of public and private organisations delivering public services with the aim to ensure 
the political desirable goals are achieved (Goodship et al. 2004: 16).  
The third kind of market failure occurs when the free market environment may hurt a public 
interest. Hence it is the protection of this public interest that calls for state regulation. This 
public interest can be due to one or a combination of various factors, such as financial-, 
strategic, political or security reasons (Viscusi et al. 2005).  
Fourthly, regulation is installed in order to preserve the situation of competition (e.g. 
monopoly power or excessive competition). In the case of monopoly, the market fails 
                                                
27 For an extensive discussion see Viscusi et al. (2005) or Baldwin and Cave (1999). 
28 Section based on Viscusi et al. (2005). 
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because competition is absent. It may be in a public interest to prevent the consumer from 
the monopolistic position which maximises profits (Baldwin & Cave 1999). Regulation in this 
case includes general laws applying across all sectors like the prohibition of price 
agreements, cartel laws or competition laws, but also sector-specific rules, concerning for 
example the financial market (Viscusi et al. 2005).  
Fifthly, regulation is installed in order to regulate the access to infrastructure. States have an 
interest to deliver a well-functioning infrastructure since it would allow for the development 
of the economy, and is arguably vital to a state’s survival. Moreover, states do not only 
guarantee the infrastructure but take also take measure in regard to its pricing.  
Sixthly, the liberalisation of markets may have to be accompanied by regulation in order to 
control for the effects of liberalisation. This could for example be that in a first phase, 
competition is limited or some basic provision obligations are imposed on actors since the 
government expects some negative outcomes due to liberalisation.  
Seventhly, some public policies are connected to liberalised services, which require some 
sort of regulation (Viscusi et al. 2005). An illustration can be the paper production industry 
that needs to follow regulation to protect the environment. Regulation is thus installed in 
order to induce and reduce negative externalities.  
Finally, consumer protection aims are another reason for regulation (Brown & Jackson 
1994). The declaration of ingredients of a product and the protection of consumers from 
negative side effects are examples of such consumer protection objectives (Brown & 
Jackson 1994). 
All these reasons for market failures are also reasons for governments to engage in 
regulation. In practice, however, regulation is often established based on a combination of 
these reasons. The rationale of all of these motivations to intervene through regulation is to 
influence the behaviour of actors and to change the free market outcome.  
To sum up, regulation can be motivated by various reasons, with the overall aim to alter a 
situation and to achieve a certain outcome. It is frequently established out of a combination 
of several reasons. This study explores a regulation established in order to protect a public 
interest and to prevent negative externalities. In the regulated sectors, namely the ones of 
sport betting and lottery, the free market is not deemed to be desirable because it would 
endanger consumers. Evidence shows that regulation may have side effects and can 
produce deviances. But as long as these deviances are assumed to be less damaging than 
a situation without regulation, regulation will certainly be used to alter or reach a certain 
outcome. 
3.6 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 
This chapter has explained the origins of regulation and its changing nature in order to 
outline how it is conceptualised and measured in this research. Regulation is an ancient 
instrument of governmental action, though its importance has evolved over time. At present, 
regulation is one of the main modes of governance. Governments adopt regulatory regimes 
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to achieve a desired outcome or to alter the behaviour of economic or social actors. The 
objective of this chapter was to illustrate the different facets attributed to regulation in 
literature and practice, and to discuss the different meanings associated with the term 
regulation. As well, different types of regulation exist. This chapter has shown that regulation 
is not necessarily based on a governmental action, but it can also be the result of private 
sector initiatives (for example through individual organisations or industries).  
In this study, regulation refers to governmental rules established to influence an economic 
activity and to achieve a specific outcome or to prevent or control the negative externalities 
that could result from the operation of the activity in question. Hence, it is a combination of 
economic and social regulation in the sport betting and lottery sectors in different countries 
that have established regulatory regimes for various reasons such as the prevention of 
gambling problems, to prevent criminality and have at least a part of the revenues 
generated to serve a public interest. Further a specific regulatory body—either independent 
from the administration or embedded in it—is trusted with the implementation of the 
regulation and the control of the regulated entities. Such regulation affects the organisations 
and also the ways in which they operate their business. Moreover, it influences the 
management of the organisation and its organisational structure.  
Regulation has not necessarily the same degree of intensity in all sectors, regions or 
countries. It varies depending on the rules established and obligations imposed on the 
regulated entities. Based on a thorough literature review, the regulatory intensity appears to 
be the appropriate instrument for comparing the level of regulations across different 
regulatory environments. The regulatory intensity is a composite indicator including various 
different general and sector specific measures along the two dimensions of regulatory 
scope and regulatory stringency.  
The next chapter presents how the influence of the regulatory intensity on the definition of 
performance used by regulated organisations will be empirically examined. More generally, 
the next chapter will also explain the research design (section 4.1), including the research 
model constructed in this study. It will then finally outline the empirical part of the study 
(section 4.2), based on a case study research, and the more specific units of analysis used 
to explore the research question, namely the sport betting and lottery organisations (section 
4.2.2).  
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4 EMPIRICAL PART: LINKING THE PERFORMANCE DEFINITION TO REGULATION 
The goal of this research is to gauge the influence of the regulatory intensity (chapter 3) on 
the dimensions of organisational performance (chapter 2). The question this relationship 
raises is whether the regulatory environment influences organisations in the way they define 
performance. Organisations operating under different regulatory intensities may select 
different organisational performance dimensions to define performance. If such a 
relationship between the regulatory environment and the selection of performance 
dimensions were to exist, this knowledge could be useful for the political process when 
establishing a regulatory system, but also for managers and organisations who need to 
develop adequate performance strategies. Regulation is an important way to structure 
economic activities. From a public management perspective it is interesting to analyse its 
influence on the definition of organisational performance, as it is central to the 
understanding of the very effectiveness of the regulatory framework. The key elements of 
this analysis have been introduced through the literature review: the regulatory intensity and 
the definition of performance have been presented and a tool for each component has been 
constructed, and they will now be integrated into a coherent analytical model. In a first 
section of this chapter (section 4.1), the research design will be presented, including the 
conceptual model and the research questions, already shortly outlined in chapter one, will 
be presented in detail. In a second section (section 4.2), the empirical research will be 
presented. This includes in-depth descriptions of the sector used to explore the model—the 
sport betting and lottery sector—as well as the research method and the different stages of 
data collection and data analysis. 
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In general, any empirical research is built on a research design that serves to outline the 
research objectives, the research questions and the methodology involved, including the 
case selection, the data collection and the criteria for the data analysis (Yin 2009; Maxwell 
2005; Mayring 2002). The specific research-procedure depends on the research-goals and 
the units of analysis to be investigated (Yin 2009). This chapter focuses on these different 
components, starting with the research question already briefly introduced in chapter one.  
4.1.1 Defining the research question 
Performance has been a central issue in modernising the public sector. The literature on the 
“performing state” (Schick 2003: 75) has raised numerous questions as to the specificity of 
public sector performance, its nature and its objectives (Boyne 2002b; Boyne & Dahya 
2002). Chapter two presented the different facets of performance, put forward different 
definitions and constructed six different dimensions that can be used to substantiate 
performance. This research thus focuses on the nature of performance, and it questions 
which organisational performance dimensions are selected to report the organisational 
success under a specific level of regulatory intensity.  
This study argues that there is more to the definition of performance than the type of 
ownership and that the regulatory environment of the organisation is decisive in it defining 
performance. Regulation is, as illustrated in chapter three, one of the main modes of 
governance today, and it is frequently used to implement a public policy or achieve a 
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specific outcome. In spite of the importance of regulation for structuring economic sectors 
and achieving policy objectives, the link between regulation and the definition of 
performance remains understudied. This study will seek to address this question by 
exploring the performance dimensions used in a specific sector. This will be done in order 
to see whether the regulatory environment of the organisation influences the structure of the 
performance definition of individual organisations. It is also explored if—in a regulated 
environment—the influence of the type of ownership, i.e. private versus public, in defining 
performance is abated as a result of the intensity of the regulatory environment. In doing so 
the study contributes not only to the performance and regulation debates, but it also adds 
to the corpus of public management research a sector-specific study, gambling, which has 
so far been declared missing (Talbot 2010). This is all the more pertinent, as the sector in 
question has gained in importance in recent years.  
Organisational performance can be seen as a composite index, based on a number of 
dimensions, of which the financial/economic performance is only one among many others. It 
is argued here that the type of ownership (private or public) counts, but so does the 
environment of the organisation, something which may induce a performance concept that 
bridges public and private performance perspectives. As presented in chapter three, 
regulation differs across sectors and countries. As such, the various regulatory 
environments provide ideal settings in which to analyse whether regulation plays a role in 
defining performance. Indeed, thanks to the measurement construct of the regulatory 
intensity, it is possible to compare different cases of regulation. 
The general research question posed by this study is:  
Whether and how does the regulatory environment influence the selection of organisational 
performance dimensions by the organisation? 
In order to be able to answer this general research question, several sub-questions emerge: 
• Is the performance definition of the unit of analysis multidimensional? 
• Is there a difference in the performance definition observed between unit of analysis 
facing low and high regulatory intensities? 
• Is there a difference between public and privately owned units of analysis? 
4.1.2 Key analytical concepts 
From the literature review (see chapters two and three), the following conceptual 
framework29 can be drawn to illustrate the theoretical links between the variables. Figure 5 
shows the dependent variable, ‘definition of performance’ in relation to the independent 
variable ‘regulatory intensity’, which is assumed to influence the definition of performance. 
Further, several control variables are susceptible to intervene in this relationship and this 
study focuses on one, namely the type of ownership.  
                                                
29 Note that the figures in this chapter are not measurement models, but analytical models that 
illustrate the theoretical relationship between different components of the research, and as such they 
are simplified representations of a fraction of reality (Lave & March 1975). This remark is valid for all 
conceptual models from this point on.	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In order to build the analytical model, a number of key concepts need to be defined. They 
were introduced in the previous chapters and will be recalled throughout the next sections:  
• The regulatory intensity, based on: 
o Regulatory scope 
o Regulatory stringency  
• The organisational performance, constructed through the following dimensions:  
o  Financial dimension 
o  Operational dimension 
o  Stakeholder management dimension  
o  Legal requirement dimension 
o  Social issue participation dimension 
o  Public values dimension 
The following sections will present the research model, its different variables, and the 
methodology used to respond to the research question. 
4.1.3 Research model 
As mentioned previously, the aim of this study is to analyse whether organisations select 
different organisational performance dimensions depending on the degree of the regulatory 
intensity. In doing so an influence of the regulatory environment on the definition of 
performance can be observed. The concept of performance is judged to be 
multidimensional not only in the public but also in the private sector. Nevertheless, the way 
these dimensions are prioritised by an organisation may differ. Whether the concept of 
performance is multidimensional and how the different dimensions are assessed could be 
influenced by the regulatory intensity an organisation is facing. The following figure 
represents the conceptual model developed in this study and illustrates the theoretical links 
between the variables. 
 
Figure 5: The conceptual framework 
Figure 6: The conceptual model enlarged 
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The main focus of this model lies in the link between the ‘regulatory intensity’ and ‘definition 
of performance’, and it is adapted from the models developed by Reger et al. (1992) and 
Cook et al. (1983). Their models evaluated the influence of the regulatory intensity on 
financial performance (Reger et al. 1992) or organisational responses to different regulatory 
intensities (Cook et al. 1983), and both attested to an influence of regulation on the 
organisations. In the model of this study, the selection of potential performance dimensions 
is based on the literature review conducted in chapter two, and integrates a holistic view of 
performance by combining public with private sector dimensions. Ownership figures as a 
control variable in the model (see section 4.1.3), as the question can be raised as to whether 
there exists—as literature proclaims (Allison 1980; Boyne 2002a; Bozeman & Bretschneider 
1994; Marais & Reynaud 2008; Rainey & Bozeman 2000)—a difference between public and 
private organisations with regard to the definitions of performance. Indeed, it could be that 
the type of ownership is less important than the regulatory environment for the definition of 
performance. This implies that in a regulated environment also private organisations would 
apply a multidimensional performance definition, the focus on financial performance being 
abated through regulation. These questions will be explored in light of the example of 
organisations operating in the sport betting and lottery sector, a sector that is subject to 
state regulation. But before the cases for analysis are looked at in more detail, the next 
section will elaborate on the different variables of the model. 
I. Variables of the model 
The main variables of the model, ‘regulatory intensity’ and the ‘definition of performance’ 
are both latent variables, meaning that they are both constructed based on other elements, 
as will be recapitulated throughout the following sections. First the dependent variable is 
presented before turning to the independent variable and closing the section with the 
control variable. 
a. The dependent variable (DV): the definition of performance 
It is interesting to know which specific dimensions are selected to construct the 
performance definition of each organisation. Indeed, as discussed above, performance is a 
construct based on different dimensions, which are measured by the use of different 
indicators, being of quantifiable or non-quantifiable, monetary or non-monetary nature 
(Baetge et al. 2007). Only if organisations are clear about what they want to measure, can 
they identify the right performance indicators and link performance data to results (De Bruijn 
2007; Niven 2003; Talbot 2010; Van Dooren et al. 2010). The exact dimensions and 
measures an organisation uses to define its success is an individual choice, which depends 
on the organisation’s mission and strategy, its relationship with its environment and its 
overall goal of survival. Clearly, organisations do not necessarily employ all possible 
dimensions but may prioritise among them, and the performance dimensions may thus be in 
competition with each other, the focus on one being done at the expense of another.   
In line with current performance research (see chapter 2), the conceptualisation of 
performance is in this study considered multidimensional. The following table briefly recalls 
each dimension potentially used by organisations to define their performance: 
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Economic entrepreneurship  
Financial dimension Refers to the economic value created by the organisation (e.g. bottom-line) 
Operational 
dimension 
Refers to the operative undertakings of the organisation to deliver the 
products and services. It includes three different perspectives: 
 
• The customer perspective focuses on the customers and how they are 
satisfied. 
 
• The learning and growth perspective focuses on how the organisation 
can change, improve and innovate. 
 
• The internal business process perspective focuses on how business 
processes perform and how they can further be improved.  
Stakeholder 
management 
dimension 
Refers to the interests of the stakeholders vital for the survival of the firm 
because they have, in some form or another, invested in the firm. This is 
positively related to shareholder value creation (it is about the social and 
environmental aspects related to stakeholders). 
Legal entrepreneurship 
Legal requirement 
dimension 
Refers to compliance with industry specific regulation and the respect of the 
legal obligations it imposes. 
Social entrepreneurship  
Social issue 
participation 
dimension 
Refers to social and environmental activities, which are not realised in order 
to comply with the regulation or to increase economic value of the 
organisation. Such behaviour is argued to decrease the shareholder value by 
either deploying revenue to participate in something, or by not engaging in 
something and therefore renouncing a potential source of shareholder value 
creation (i.e. the fight against gambling problems even though this means 
discouraging customers from engaging in games, and thereby potentially 
reducing wagers). 
Public values 
dimension 
Refers to public values, which are important for civil society and which the 
organisation desires to create and to respect when doing business (i.e. 
transparency, equity or fairness) and to evaluate the level of achievement of. 
TABLE 12: THE PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS RESUMED 
The first three dimensions refer to the economic focus of an organisation, i.e. the economic 
entrepreneurship.30 They have their origin in the private sector and are the dimensions of 
performance mainly identified in private management literature (Kaplan & Norton 1996; 
Elkington 1997; Hubbard 2009). They are based on the balance scorecard (Figge et al. 
2002; Kaplan & Norton 1992, 1996b) and the social and environmental dimensions 
(Elkington 1997; Figge et al. 2002; Hubbard 2009; Wood 1991) believed to drive future 
economic value. This future economic value creation is the common denominator of the 
three dimensions placed under the label of economic entrepreneurship, i.e. the financial, the 
operational and the stakeholder management dimensions. The stakeholder management 
dimension is part of this group of economic entrepreneurship dimensions because it is 
argued to increase the competitive advantage and shareholder value of the firm. 
The legal requirement dimension is a specific dimension for organisations facing sector-
specific regulation forwarding restrictions that would not impact non-regulated 
organisations, i.e. organisations operating in a free market environment. This dimension is 
put under the heading legal entrepreneurship, reflecting the legal consideration of specific 
sector regulations in the orientation of the organisation. 
                                                
30 The word ‘entrepreneurship’ is used as it indicates the orientation of the activities that are 
undertaken. This specific terminology refers back to the literature on social entrepreneurship. 
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Under the heading of social entrepreneurship, the social issue participation and the public 
values dimensions of the organisational performance are addressed. The social issue 
participation dimension is linked to social outcomes that are not targeted due to potential 
future economic profit or to compliance obligations, but which have been voluntarily 
selected in order to create a certain outcome. An organisation may, for example, have set 
out non-economic or social objectives to attain, and in doing so, created non-economical 
added-value for society. This dimension goes beyond the output of the organisation and 
focus on the impact of the organisation’s activity on society. The public values dimension 
refers to values such as transparency, equity or fairness, an organisation desires to create 
and to respect when doing business and to evaluate the level of achievement of it. The 
social issue participation and the public values dimensions thus represent the engagement 
of the organisation as a creator of social, democratic and public values. There are many 
different definitions of social entrepreneurship. They all share the idea that its main 
motivation is to create social value, rather than personal or shareholder value (Zadek et al. 
1997). Social entrepreneurship is closely linked to the social issue participation and public 
values dimensions because social entrepreneurship circumscribes the deployment of 
resources to address a specific social issue, and this not based on legal regulatory 
obligations. The question is whether organisations actually measure part of their 
performance using these dimensions. This research examines whether organisations deploy 
resources to undertake activities in regard to these two dimensions. Not surprisingly, the 
measurement of these performance dimensions is more complex, as qualitative indicators 
need to be defined above and beyond quantitative measures. Moreover, the difficulty of 
evaluating such performance is increased due to the different perspectives one takes on 
social impacts (Austin et al. 2006). Obviously, social entrepreneurship has an important role 
to play in regard to non-economic value creation. As presented in chapter two, the voluntary 
aspects of CSR validate the existence of these two dimensions. 
To sum up, it is assumed that performance is a socially constructed measure reflecting real 
activities. An accurate understanding of performance has therefore to consider—as it is 
done here—financial/economic and non-financial/non-economic aspects of business 
making. This also explains why a multidimensional framework combines both hard and soft 
factors in the definition of performance (Talbot 2010). The figure on the next page illustrates 
each dimension of the definition of performance and the indicators that will be used to 
identify each dimension in the empirical part of the study.  
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Having thus presented the dependent variable under scrutiny the following section recalls 
the independent variable of the research.  
b. The independent variable (IV): the regulatory intensity  
Chapter three presented the regulatory environment and the measure of the regulatory 
intensity, which is the independent and latent variable of the model. The variable includes 
two dimensions, namely the regulatory scope and the regulatory stringency (Cook et al. 
1983, 1985; Reger et al. 1992). Consequently, the study adopts a multi-factor approach of 
the regulatory environment (see section 3.4). To recall, the regulatory intensity is evaluated 
based on following ten criteria: 
Regulatory scope Regulatory stringency 
The regulatory level: The organisational level: • Market structure 
• Regulatory reach 
• Specific public use of money  
• Imposition of type of 
ownership 
• Publicness 
• Presence of a regulator  
• Competences of the 
regulator 
• Distribution channel 
restrictions 
• Advertisement restrictions 
• Obligations in regard to 
negative externalities 
TABLE 13: THE REGULATORY INTENSITY RESUMED 
The construction of the regulatory intensity in this study differs in three main ways from 
previous research, as presented earlier (see section 3.4). First, the use of ten indicators are 
seemingly more appropriate for evaluating the regulatory intensity, and this study therefore 
does not restrict the model to a single or two-factor model, as other research has done.  
Figure 7: The definition of performance 
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Second, a slightly different conceptualisation of regulatory stringency is adopted, by 
dividing the regulatory stringency, looking at it with regard to the regulatory level on the one 
hand, and the organisational level on the other. Third, conceptualising the regulatory 
intensity only with regard to the regulatory scope and regulatory stringency is arguably 
sufficient, and the aspects of regulatory uncertainty and regulatory duration have therefore 
here been discarded (see section 3.4.2).  
 
The regulatory intensity of the regulatory environments is estimated, and grouped into two 
categories based on the logic of Mahon and Murray Jr. (1981), who developed a continuum 
of three overlapping and compatible strategies of organisations facing different levels of 
regulation. In their research on strategic planning for regulated companies, Mahon and 
Murray Jr. (1981) found that organisations faced with a low level of regulation follow an 
economic strategy, concentrating on profit and cost reductions. Organisations facing a 
middle regulatory intensity adopt a political strategy and organisations facing a high 
regulatory intensity adopt for a social or public policy strategy (Mahon & Murray Jr. 1981).  
This study uses a two groups structure of regulatory intensity: a low-middle and a middle-
high regulatory intensity. This is argued to be more adequate in order to differentiate 
between the different groups and to reduce any possible overlap. Indeed, as also found by 
Mahon and Murray Jr. (1981), the strategies developed by organisations tend to be 
overlapping. In a regulated sector, like the one in focus of this research, the regulatory 
intensity is never as low as in a completely liberalised market environment. Therefore, even 
in the group of lower regulation, organisations still face at least some regulatory 
requirements. A pure economic strategy without any considerations of regulation is 
therefore not likely to be an option among any of the cases looked at in this study. 
Consequently, the model of Mahon and Murray Jr. (1981) has been adapted accordingly.  
Mahon and Murray Jr. (1981) concluded that in an environment with a low degree of 
regulation, an organisation takes the ‘economic strategy’, i.e. the reference for planning 
purposes, consists in traditional economic orientation. However, it is argued here that in the 
Figure 8: The regulatory intensity  
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case of the specific sector under study, a purely economic strategy would not fully apply. 
Even in situations where the regulatory intensity is low, a political strategy is also present, as 
the organisation needs to comply with at least some regulatory requirements. Mahon and 
Murray Jr. (1981) concluded that with a moderate regulatory intensity, an organisation 
adopts a more complex and sophisticated role. By way of a more ‘political strategy’, the 
regulatory agency becomes key to set and achieve goals. This role is not found in non-
regulated situations and the organisation’s structure is designed to foresee changing 
political and regulatory climates. Hence, in a low-middle regulatory intensity, the firm is 
concerned with costs, prices and profits. But as the organisation still faces a certain level of 
regulation, the legal requirement dimension is also included in the performance definition 
(Mahon and Murray Jr. 1981). As the model of this study is explored in a setting where non-
compliance is not an option, the regulation formulates some goals, which will in any case 
need to be addressed and may therefore be represented in the performance definition. 
However, the dimensions could still be organised hierarchically, with the financial dimension 
as a clear priority. Mahon and Murray Jr. (1981) further concluded that organisations faced 
with a high degree of regulation adopt a ‘social or public policy strategy’. The organisation 
faces a potentially diverse set of goals, and the strategy in this case therefore has to satisfy 
more parties (e.g. the regulatory agency, interest groups, etc.). In this situation, an 
organisation is also occupied with the relationship (process) and the outcome of the 
regulatory decision (social outcome) (Mahon & Murray Jr. 1981). Hence, it could be that 
organisations facing a middle-high regulatory intensity focus on several performance 
dimensions equally.  
The categorisation in the two groups is based on the use of a cluster analysis that allows for 
a grouping of a population based on several selection criteria (Ketchen Jr. & Shook 1996). 
For each regulation under evaluation, the ten criteria are assessed in order to group the 
regulation in either low-middle regulatory intensity or middle-high regulatory intensity. 
 
Having thus defined the dependent and independent variable of the model, the ‘control 
variable’, i.e. the type of ownership will now be briefly outlined.  
TABLE 14: CONTINUUM OF REGULATORY INTENSITY 
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c. Control variable 
The model focuses on one control variable, namely the type of ownership. It introduces the 
question whether the public-private dichotomy actually also holds in regulated 
environments. Completely aware that there are other control variables applicable, ownership 
is considered to be of most interesting in this case, essentially because of the public/private 
divide that scholarly performance research has been focusing on. Moreover, as the research 
is of a qualitative nature, and the model is not statistically tested, control variables do not 
serve to control for sample biases, but simply represent the widely held theoretical 
explanation that the type of ownership would be influential for the composition of the 
performance definition. Control variables may also have an effect on the relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Thus, they may act as 
moderators, by amplifying the relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variables, or be mediators, by changing the direction of the relationship between the two 
variables (Ketchen Jr. & Shook 1996). In this case, it is likely that the type of ownership is 
not only a control variable, but also a moderator, influencing the relationship between the 
regulatory intensity and the definition of performance. In theoretical and empirical research, 
the definition of performance is often argued to be different in public and private 
organisations. However, as this contribution ventures to show, the effect of the type of 
ownership might be abated by regulation, and ownership would thus not be decisive for the 
construction of the performance definition of regulated organisations.  
Figure nine presents the research model, including all variables and sub-concepts of the 
analysis.  
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Figure 9: The research model 
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Having thus presented the research question, the conceptual models and its different 
variables, the next sections present the methodological approach used to activate the 
model presented above in order to explore it in practice. The next section starts with a 
description of the sector to be analysed and the units of analysis to be used.  
4.2 EXAMINING THE THEORETICAL MODEL IN PRACTICE 
As mentioned above, the model that has been constructed will be empirically explored in a 
number of regulated organisations.  
4.2.1 Case studies research: the sport betting and lottery sectors  
Case studies are primarily useful when a currently understudied phenomenon needs to be 
investigated in its holistic form, and this with due recognition of its specific context (Yin 
2009). The literature identifies several types of case study analysis. In such studies, the 
objects of research are normally people or other more sophisticated social units, such as 
organisations (Mayring 2002; Lamnek 2009; Maxwell 2005). In this doctoral research, 
multiple case studies31 are used, the unit of analysis being organisations from the sport 
betting and lottery sector. The reasons behind this choice are elaborated in the following 
sections.  
I. Case selection: presentation of the unit of analysis 
Before the methodology is presented in detail, the sport betting and lottery regulation and 
the organisations operating in this environment will be presented.  
Before outlining the arguments in favour of the choice of the gambling sector as an 
interesting setting in which to examine the research question, the gambling market will be 
briefly presented, as will the reasons behind the existence of an industry-specific regulation 
found in almost every jurisdiction. 
a. Games of chance: an introduction 
The central role of games in human society dates back thousands of years. In a study of the 
history of games, Huizinga (1944) goes as far as introducing the concept of the ‘Homo 
Ludens’ to underline the importance and pregnancy of games in the life and development of 
early humans. Indeed, gaming is a cross-cultural phenomenon that is “…older than culture” 
(Huizinga 2006: 4) and as such it can be seen as truly universal (McMillan 1996).  
                                                
31 For further information on case studies see Eisenhard (1989), Yin (2009) or Maxwell (2005). 
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The history of gambling, and the various attempts at its regulation and control, is therefore a 
very long one, which is not limited to any one specific continent (Tosney 2010). Many 
suppose that the origins of gambling are to be found in fortune-telling practices (Reith 
1999), which—just like gambling—are attempts at predicting what the future holds. 
‘Pessomancy’ was one of the earliest such methods of fortune telling. Pebbles were cast 
and the results were then used to answer a variety of questions, ranging from the eventual 
success of a particular crop to a military venture. Through divination interested parties could 
entertain themselves by betting on the outcome of rituals, to predict the will of the gods 
(Reith 1999: 16). 
In Asian culture, gambling has always been an important activity. Chinese gambling can be 
traced back more than 4000 years, and remains an important part of Chinese society today 
(McMillan 1996). Indeed, gambling accompanies festival and other cultural events. They 
have thus an inherent social character (McMillan 1996).  
Governmental attempts at regulating gambling are as old as the tradition of gambling itself. 
Already under the Roman republic, games of chance, especially dices, were forbidden. The 
punishment for any infringement of this prohibition was set at four times the amount of the 
possible gains. Both Cicero and Horatius refer to this law—the Lex Talaria—in their writings, 
indicating the importance that gambling played in their society (Gizycki & Gorny 1970: 24). 
In the UK the first tax on gaming was introduced in 1711, and it targeted the instruments of 
gaming, i.e. the cards and dice used to gamble (Tosney 2010). 
At this point, it is important to note that the terms ‘gambling’, ‘games of chance’ and 
‘gaming’ can all refer to the same activity. They all describe the process of playing for 
money or another monetary aspect of a game that either leads to a loss or a benefit for the 
player. Not surprisingly, the concept and activity of gambling emerged within the wider 
aspect of game-playing. For gambling to take place one has to place a wager that a certain 
event will or will not happen, in the hopes of making a certain gain. The determining factor in 
the gambling process is the general concept of chance or hazard, in regard to the 
occurrence—or not—of the predicted event (Gizycki & Gorny 1970). A key aspect of hazard 
is that no amount of skill increases the possibility of a gain, but it is question of ‘pure luck’, 
‘hazard’, and ‘chance’ (Gizycki & Gorny 1970). In contrast to games of chance, games of 
skill are those in which a player has the abilities and skills to override the element of chance 
that determine the win or the loss. Nonetheless, the delimitation between games of chance 
and games of skill is not homogenous in all jurisdictions. In some jurisdiction, a game of 
chance is a game where the outcome depends exclusively or predominantly of chance (e.g. 
Switzerland, Austria), whereas other jurisdictions define games as games of chance even if 
the element of chance is only complementary for the outcome (e.g. Belgium). This study 
takes a broad definition of games of chance and covers all games, which are not entirely 
dependent on skill. Thus, in the purpose of this study, and based on the approach taken by 
recent research in the area of gambling (Diaconu 2010), gambling services cover any service 
which involves wagering a stake with monetary value in uncertain events driven at least 
partially by chance, including lotteries, casino and betting (Diaconu 2010).  
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b. Types of games of chance 
Several online and offline32 market sectors—charitable or commercially run—are covered by 
the definition presented above: lotteries, betting services, casino games, gambling 
machines outside casinos, media gambling services and sales promotion services. 
Charitable or ‘non-profit games’ refer to games of chance only occasionally organised by a 
non-profit organisation, where the profits are intended for a religious, sports, philanthropic, 
cultural, educational, social or other civic purpose (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 
2006a; Diaconu 2010).  
Casino gambling  
Casinos, since their earliest days (in the 13th and 14th century licensed gaming houses 
emerged in Europe), represent a particular world centred on the hope for the big jackpot. 
This idea of glamorous world was already present at the opening of the gambling house of 
Monte Carlo in 1856. The rise of the importance of Las Vegas, after the legalisation of 
gambling in Nevada in 1932, and the success of Macau since the liberalisation of gambling 
in 2002 are more recent example of the incarnation of this idea of a ‘Disneyland for adults’.  
Casinos are defined as a location where games of chance are organised. The games of 
chance normally offered are table games, slot machines, bingo games etc. Some of them—
roulette, slot machines, bingo or keno—rely completely on chance whereas others, like card 
games such as poker, baccarat, blackjack, and dice games such as craps, are combined 
with the skill of the player.  
Bingo is a specific game of chance, which is mostly operated in casinos. In some 
jurisdictions, there exist bingo halls (e.g. UK, USA) next to gambling houses. In most 
jurisdictions, bingo refers to “a game of chance, in which the player uses a scorecard or an 
electronic representation thereof bearing numbers and is played by marking or covering 
numbers identical to numbers drawn by chance, whether manually or electronically, and won 
by the player who first marks or covers the “line” which is achieved when, during one game, 
for the first time all five numbers on one horizontal row on one scorecard are drawn; or the 
‘house’ or ‘bingo’ is achieved when, during one game, for the first time all the fifteen 
numbers on one scorecard are drawn” (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 2006b: vIII). 
Some countries define Bingo differently, and in Belgium, for example, it “consists in a ball 
game where the player must lodge the ball in holes on the horizontal side of the machine 
and thus obtain a number of points that light up on the vertical side of the machine. Bingo 
can equally be a sort of table game in Belgium, in which event it can only be organised in 
casino facilities or after authorisation of the local authorities” (Swiss Institute of Comparative 
Law 2006b: vIII). 
Lottery 
The emergence of the first lottery cannot be traced back to a precise year. The first games 
truly similar to modern lotteries developed in Roman banquets and festivals. Lots were sold 
to guests who could then win prizes of different values. Building on this idea, Emperor 
                                                
32 ‘Offline’ market sectors are also referred to as ‘land-based’ or ‘retail’. 
  101 
Augustus established a public lottery to finance the renovation of Rome, a funding model 
that would come to be used time and again by various governments. The Lotto di Genova, 
the first number lottery, dates back to 1620. Originally it was not a game but a way to 
choose—randomly—the people who would take the five-senate seats of the city. They were 
to be selected out of some 90 possible candidates. Soon, the public started to bet on the 
names of the candidates that were to win. As time passed, the names were replaced by 
numbers, leading to the development of the ‘5 out of 90’ game. And, from Italy, the number 
lottery spread throughout Europe and the world (Gizycki & Gorny 1970). 
“Technically, a lottery is defined (in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and 
Slovakia) as a prize game in which an organiser accepts bets on the chances which several 
numbers have of being extracted at random from a defined series of numbers or symbols. 
The winning numbers are determined by public draw” (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 
2006b: vII). Generally, lotteries have the following characteristics: First, they are based on a 
scheme designated to attract a large number of participants. A defined amount has to be 
paid for participation, and the participants compete with each other to win a prize. Second, 
the lottery organiser has no competitive interest against the participants. This is contrary to 
casino games, where operators compete against the player. And finally, lotteries involve no 
skill (Diaconu 2010). Lotteries occur across countries and are of the same nature, 
representing a very popular form of games of chance.  
Betting on sport and non-sport events 
Betting services are another type of games of chance.33 Highly linked to sport competition 
and events it has an—if not the most—ancient history. Homer describes a horse race bet 
between Idomeneus and Ajax in the city of Troy (Homer 800 B.C.E). In the US, the first 
racetrack was built in 1665 on Long Island (Arnold 1978). In England, the Jockey Club was 
founded in 1750 and the first Derby, named after the 12th Lord Derby, was organised in 
1780 in Epsom, England. Similarly, in France Emperor Napoleon III inaugurated the 
Longchamp racetrack in 1857 (Diaconu 2010).  
Betting services refer to the act of making or taking a bet either on the outcome of a race, 
competition event or process, or on the likelihood that anything occurs or not, or again on 
the possibility that something is true or not (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 2006b: vIII). 
Betting services are not only limited to horse and dog racing, but bets can be placed—
legally or illegally—on motor and car races, cycling, marathons, fighting sports, other sports 
like football, basketball, tennis, hockey, rugby, cricket etc., and even on non-sporting events 
such like awards (e.g. Academy Awards (Oscars) or Nobel Prizes) or elections. In sport 
betting two different styles of bets normally occur. Pool betting are pari-mutuel games 
meaning that the payout percentage of the game is fixed. The potential gains are not fixed 
                                                
33 Betting activities are not in all jurisdictions (e.g. sport betting in Austria) seen as games of chance 
because the element of skill, i.e. the knowledge of the punter about the sport, players, horses etc. 
may be important and influence the chances of winning. It is up to the legislator to categorise bets as 
games of chance or games of skill. In this study, betting games are considered as games of chance 
and in cases where countries are evaluating them otherwise it is specified. 
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in advance but depend on the whole income of the game, on the payout percentage and on 
the number of winners in the different prize categories. Therefore, the company offering the 
bet has no financial risk, but the punters compete against each other. The oddset betting 
implies fixed odds and the punters do compete against the company and not against each 
other. If a prediction is correct, the odds are multiplied with each other and then with the 
amount of the stake. The odds are calculated by the organiser and communicated to the 
customer. The punter selects the amount of the stake and the possible winning (Diaconu 
2010).  
Other forms of land-based gambling 
Machine gambling outside casinos refers to slot machines, which are allowed in other 
facilities than licensed casinos (e.g. gambling houses). “A slot machine is a mechanical, 
electronic or electric process that can result in the distribution of prize money or anything 
else of value, including a right or mechanism permitting free play on the machine. Success 
depends completely or predominantly on the coincidence and cannot be influenced by the 
player” (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 2006b: vII). The approaches in regard to slot 
machines located outside casinos vary highly across countries. Some countries, such as 
Switzerland, forbid them, but others, like Germany, allow slot machines outside casinos.  
Media gambling and sales promotion services serve commercial or advertisement 
purposes. The Swiss Institute of Comparative Law defines a broadcasting media game as 
“any game which is organised by the owner or operator of a radio or television station, 
where the participation of players therein takes place by or as a result of their presence 
during the transmission or recording of the programme during which such game is 
organised or by any intervention on their part by any means of distance communication 
(Internet, handy) during or after the transmission or recording of the programme during 
which such game is organised (Malta, Sweden)” (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 2006b: 
vIII). Similarly, sale-promotion services consist in promotional games, offering a significant 
prize or where participation is only possible when purchasing something (Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law 2006a).  
Lotteries, casino and betting are the most frequent forms of gambling. Another feature is 
remote gambling, i.e. gambling via telecommunication devices such as the internet, mobile 
phones or television. If and to what extent any of these gambling categories is available for 
players depends on the national regulation adopted in each country.  
c. The rationale for regulation 
The motivations behind gambling regulation are very similar from one country to another. 
Statistics show that the gambling ‘industry’—encompassing all its sectors—generates 
substantial revenues. In the US, the total gross gambling revenue (GGR) (i.e. the amount 
wagered minus the winnings returned to players), a veritable measure of the economic value 
of gambling, was estimated to be 89 262 million USD in 2009. The global gambling market, 
offline and online, was estimated at 385 billion USD in 2012 (H2 Gambling Capital 2010). In 
2008, the GGR of the gambling market in the EU was estimated at 75.9 billion Euros. The 
online gambling market share of this was 6.16 billion Euros (European Commission 2011). 
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The traditional land-based gambling market of the EU was in 2010 estimated to generate 95 
billion Euros GGR by 2012 (H2 Gambling Capital 2010). Therefore, states clearly have an 
economic interest in keeping a share of the revenues generated by games of chance. This 
can be done either through taxes or by through the exploitation of games of chance by 
public enterprises.  
Next to this economic interest, security issues provide another rationale for gambling 
regulation. Criminal activities, even large-scale organised crime, have managed to penetrate 
some gambling markets by way of money laundering, fraud and corruption. The betting 
scandals in the football world that dominate the newspapers these days are only the most 
recent examples of such criminal conduct in the world of gambling. Money laundering has 
found an ideal setting in gambling “because of its big volumes and frequent transactions” 
(Viren 2008: 10). Indeed, “[l]aw enforcement representatives [have] said that the anonymity 
and jurisdictional issues characteristic of Internet gambling make online gaming a potentially 
powerful tool for money launderers. They noted that few money laundering cases involving 
Internet gambling had been prosecuted but attributed the small number of cases primarily to 
a lack of regulation and oversight” (United States General Accounting Office 2002: 2). The 
challenge linked to such problems is a legal one, and it requires regulatory adaptations and 
resources to be properly addressed.  
Another sort of criminal activity noteworthy in this regard is illegal gambling, both land-
based (in back-stores) and cross-boarder (via internet). Though illegal gambling is very hard 
to quantify, it clearly represents a worldwide phenomenon, and online illegal gambling in 
particular is spreading. Illegal gambling includes lotteries, betting and casino games. In 
Switzerland, a report done by the cantons in 2009 estimated that illegal gambling over the 
internet generated a GGR of around 1 to 2 million Swiss francs (CHF) for the operators via 
lottery games, 34 million CHF via sport betting and 39 million CHF via casino games. The 
same report estimated that around 35’000 persons play illegally lotteries and betting games 
online in Switzerland, and around 40’000 play illegally casino games. The illegal operators 
can be categorised into two groups. The first group is made up of so-called ‘grey market’ 
operators, who are licensed in one country but who offer games of chance online illegally in 
other. Most of those operators hold a valid licence in a country allowing internet gambling 
such as Malta, Gibraltar or Isle of Man, but they do not respect the national borders in their 
activities. Next to these grey market operators, there are the so-called ‘black market’ 
operators, which do not hold a licence in any nation state. The problem with illegal 
operators is that they do not comply with obligations imposed on legal operators, such as 
taxation or prevention measures. They therefore do not take the social and economic costs 
into account, but these are left to be dealt with by the countries in question and civil society.  
A main reason to regulate games of chance is the negative external effects gambling can 
create in the form of gambling addiction or pathological gambling. It is characterised by 
enduring and repeated maladjusted gambling behaviour that diminishes personal, familiar or 
professional aims. Gambling problems can cause financial and psychological problems. It 
affects not only the players themselves but has consequences for their relatives and for 
society at large. State and gambling organisations as well as various social institutions do 
address this situation. Gambling addiction is a problem in its own right for the persons 
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afflicted by it, but more cynically, it can also be perceived as a problem in terms of the 
limitations it puts on the operations of organisers. In a sense it threatens the business model 
by introducing limitations and blockages at the social and political levels. It is a situation 
that very few organisations in very few gambling markets can ignore. For whatever reason, 
organisers do have to face this challenge, and so do political authorities, for both political 
and social reasons. It is in this sense that gambling addiction can be considered yet another 
rationale for gambling regulation. It is common for regulations to force operators to take 
measures to limit or prevent addiction. Operators can be obliged to monitor or inform 
gamblers, or implement bans blocking the access of certain gamblers to the premises 
(mostly for casinos). Another rationale for gambling regulation is the protection of minors. In 
most jurisdictions, gambling is not allowed for minors and the regulation requires operators 
to ensure that no minors are allowed to participate.  
These rationales for gambling regulation are shared by jurisdictions. They force states to 
balance economic objectives with social ones. The UK Gambling Act 2005 clearly states in 
its very first section that the objectives of licensing are, inter alia, to prevent gambling from 
being a source or a tool for crime and to ensure that it is conducted in a fair and open 
manner, protecting children and vulnerable persons (United Kingdom 2005).  
In most systems, the government collects a part or the total of the benefits. The use of the 
extra income varies: some cover state deficits, others accomplish public tasks, and others 
still use the money to support benevolent or charitable projects. Obviously, the states face a 
paradoxical situation: they have to weigh the economic benefits generated through the 
games of chance against the risks in terms of criminality and addiction.  
For all of these reasons, gambling regulation has been implemented around the world, with 
the prevailing aim of protecting public interests and therefore this has most frequently 
tended to take the form of social regulation. It should be highlighted however that while the 
regulation of gambling is a universal phenomenon, and while such regulation tends to share 
the same components across countries, it does differ in terms of its degree. For example, 
the sport betting sector in the UK can be said to have a low regulatory intensity, allowing for 
numerous competitors and imposing only a low level of restrictions on operators. In 
contrast, the regulatory system of sport betting and lottery games in Germany can be 
deemed of a high regulatory intensity, as it limits operation to few organisations, imposing 
several restrictions on them.  
The gambling sector provides an interesting case through which to analyse the influence of 
the regulatory intensity on the definition of organisational performance. Indeed, such a 
regulation can have important effects on organisations by pushing them to balance 
economic interests with social responsibilities. The aim to make profit and the aim to 
prevent gambling problems are seemingly contradictory, and significant trade-offs between 
them have to be made. The following section will justify the reasons why games of chance 
represent an ideal setting in which to examine the research question. 
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II. Justification of the unit of analysis 
The organisations that are licensed to operate gambling differ in their nature. In some 
countries, they are public, in others private, and in others still they take a hybrid form. They 
do however share the need to balance their objectives between the demands of the 
regulatory framework and the goals of efficiency. By thus merging regulation and 
performance theory, this sector becomes very interesting in terms of the objective of this 
research. The regulatory system influences managers of organisations in their selection and 
prioritisation of performance. Not only are financial and operational dimensions of relevance, 
but also social or legal requirement dimensions. This means that it is not a question of 
choosing either exclusively economic (e.g. financial) or social dimensions (e.g. social issue 
participation), but the spectrum is far broader, and intimately linked to how organisations 
respond to their regulatory environment.  
Moreover, countries are increasingly aware of the importance of the gambling sector. The 
economic interest and the potential addictive consequences for consumers and the social 
costs for society explain, in large part, why government regulation is maintained. The profits 
to be made are huge but the potential dangers for the civil society are not to be neglected. 
However, in recent years the risk inherent to gambling has been recognised by states and 
civil society something which has had an impact on operators. Indeed, organisations 
operating in gambling cannot neglect the environment when doing business, and this is 
even more the case for organisations that operate in regulated markets (Mahon & Murray Jr. 
1981). The survival of organisations is not only linked to their economic wellbeing, but also 
to the goodwill of the state and society. As such it is interesting to analyse the extent to 
which a regulatory system renders an organisation to adopt also a more social performance 
definition. Nevertheless, how far these social and environmental consequences will be 
included in the organisational performance definition is an understudied area.  
As discussed in chapter two, the expression of corporate social performance has emerged 
as an inclusive and global concept in the management literature. For the gambling industry 
this has a double validity as it is regulated and under public scrutiny. In order to evaluate if 
an organisation envisages ethical and philanthropic considerations in CSR, the performance 
definition can be examined. At first sight, the paradox mentioned above seems to be 
reinforced and the argument could be made that performance and responsible gambling are 
two sides of one coin. Therefore, it could be that effective organisational performance 
requires and mandates an organisational engagement in CSR initiatives. One could 
envisage a situation in which higher benefits would be problematic, for example a case 
where too many ‘side-effects’ of gambling in the form of gambling addiction were to appear. 
Therefore, for the gambling sector, and possibly also for any other similarly regulated sector, 
CSR would be the process through which actors manage to respect the non-formalised 
boundaries inherent in the spirit (as opposed to in the letter) of the social regulatory 
obligations, be it to ensure their short-term business survival or their long-term societal fit.  
For all of these reasons, the gambling sectors represent an ideal setting in which to gauge 
the influence of a regulatory intensity on the organisational performance definition.  
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III. Selection of the sport betting and lottery sectors 
As illustrated above, the gambling sector is mainly composed of three different types of 
activity: casinos, lotteries and (sport) betting. The approach of gambling regulation differs 
from one country to the other and some countries have developed one regulatory system 
for all three kinds of gambling (e.g. Canadian provinces) whereas other countries have 
developed different regulatory systems for the different types of games (e.g. Switzerland 
and the UK). Hence, the first question that arises is whether this study includes all three 
activities or whether it concentrates on one gambling activity. As the activities are judged to 
be different depending on the regulatory regimes established in the countries, and as some 
activities are not necessarily comparable to others (e.g. casino games are different to bets 
or lotteries), it is believed that the three sectors cannot be compared to each other (at least 
not in an amalgamated manner). If this is done, it would incur too high a risk that the 
analysis focuses more on the differences between these types of games than on the 
performance and regulation related aspects.  
This leaves the question of which sector would offer the most variety in regulatory intensity 
across countries. This criterion is the one that will best allow the expression of our model. 
The regulatory systems in the sport betting and lottery sectors are the most different ones 
across countries. Indeed, the regulatory intensity in this regard reaches from a very low level 
(in the cases of Austria or Malta) to a very high level (in the case of Germany or Sweden).  
The reasoning is very different in regard to casino gambling. Casino gambling, as sport 
betting, faces a variety of different regulatory intensities in different countries. However, in 
regard to the ownership, there is mainly an occurrence of privately owned companies, and 
this in highly restricted regulatory regimes as well. This is not the case in the lottery and 
betting sector, in which there are different kinds of ownership. Moreover, the public element 
is much less present in the casino sector than in the sport betting and lottery one. 
In selecting the lottery and/or sport betting sector regulations as a basis for this study, 
different challenges have to be addressed. The first challenge is their dual presence in most 
organisations. They would be hard to separate and distinguish as units of analysis as they 
are present and operated often from the same organisational construct. Betting can occur 
on sporting and non-sporting events, and in this regard the views of countries diverge, as 
some countries do not allow for non-sport betting at all, whereas others fully allow it. 
Another challenge to address is that sport betting and lottery can be offered both on- and 
offline. In order to start from a common basis, the selection chosen consists in 
organisations that offer mainly offline games while online sport betting and/or lottery games 
are also possible.  
Having thus defined the unit of analysis, the next section will present how the data to 
answer the research question has been collected. 
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4.2.2 Data collection 
Data has been collected during three different phases, as summarised in the following table.  
Data collection  Focus What Time 
Phase I Theoretical model Expert discussions Summer 2011 
Phase II Independent variable Document analysis & expert 
panel  
Spring-Summer 2012 
Phase III Dependent variable Document analysis & 
interview/survey research 
July 2012 – June 2013 
TABLE 15: THE PHASES OF DATA COLLECTION 
In the next sections, the phases will be outlined in sequence.  
I. Data collection phase I: the exploratory stage 
In a first exploratory phase, six open, informal discussions with experts from the Universities 
of Lausanne, Berne, Paul Cézanne Aix-Marseille III and Montreal (ENAP—École nationale 
d'administration publique) were conducted. Overall, this phase focused on three pillars: first, 
the importance and interest of the research objective; second, the case of gambling; and 
third, the general model. The following paragraph will discuss the findings of the expert 
discussions. These are presented here, as they form the basis of the analytical model’s 
construction. 
First, the pertinence of the research question has been confirmed, as there is consensus 
that there is not one unique definition of organisational performance given in public 
management literature. Even though performance dimensions have been identified in public 
management literature before, these dimensions have been primarily targeted at 
government activities and traditional public organisations, and not so much organisations in 
regulated industries. A study, which aims to analyse the dimensions applied in a regulated 
sector and to evaluate the influence of the regulatory system on this selection, is therefore 
something that has rarely been done. Furthermore, the bridging of public and private 
performance dimensions was especially mentioned as a novelty for regulated sectors. The 
interviews mainly confirmed that regulation is an important topic. Moreover, the experts 
agreed that the link established between regulation and organisation is valid, and that 
regulation is generally assumed to impact on organisations. Studies have also confirmed, as 
mentioned above, that there is a link between these components. However, the impact of 
regulatory intensity has been analysed there in regard to the performance level and not in 
regard to the dimensions applied by organisations as this research aims to do.  
Second, concerning the gambling sector, discussants agreed that it was a good idea to 
conduct two expert interviews for each case, as it is important to know how a system 
changes the behaviour of the organisation. They were also convinced that the gambling 
sector provides an interesting terrain for the study. The gambling sector is in evolution and 
has to face various challenges. Different countries have, or will in the near future, (re-) 
regulate the sector. Therefore, for them it is crucial to know the influence of regulatory 
intensity on the regulated entities; what does a change in the regulatory system mean for 
the operators; how does a state want to change the system? Moreover they also raised the 
fact that the societal concern over the negative impacts of gambling has increased over the 
past years.  
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Third, in regard to the general model, the construction of the regulatory intensity appears 
convincing to them. Several experts from the public management field have highlighted the 
fact that the nature of the organisation (public or private) influences the performance 
definition but that public ownership does not necessarily go along with a more social focus. 
They have further argued that gamblers evaluate the offers of state enterprises to be ‘good’ 
or ‘better’ than those of private entities. Hence, experts have argued that the social 
dimension tends to receive less attention. This is especially the case where the state 
enterprise is attached to the department of finance and the goal is to increase state 
revenue. In contrast, a private organisation facing a high degree of regulatory intensity could 
concentrate more on responsible gambling and thus assess non-financial and economic 
dimensions as more important. Indeed, it is clear that the nature of the organisation is an 
interesting point that lies rightly at the heart of this analysis.  
Some comments were made in the expert interviews in regard to the motivation behind the 
chosen dimensions. Several experts have thus argued that in the gambling sector, 
organisations are self-regulating some aspects, especially in regard to gambling problems, 
in order to prevent more binding rules. This point has been expressed for the Loto-Québec 
where the company puts the engagement in social aspects in a prominent place in the 
annual report. However, the two international experts interviewed argued that this is more a 
marketing strategy than an expression of any real concern for the issue, or a preventive 
measure on behalf of the organisations. In the case of Québec for example, where the 
regulatory intensity is believed to be low, according to an expert, the organisation focuses 
on social aspects because it increases the prospect for profits since corporate social 
responsibility is something most companies are engaging in. Therefore, it does not do so 
because of a real concern but because of a strategy to increase profits. One expert argued 
that the focus should be put on the real social performance of a gambling organisation to 
internalise the negative effects of their core business, i.e. gambling addiction. Other 
attempts, such as sponsoring, environmental projects or art collections, are undertaken 
more to show that the organisation is socially active, in order to legitimate the business. The 
challenge is consequently that the motivation behind the activities may not be clearly 
captured in the model. Arguably however, the model is a simplification of reality per se, and 
the motivation behind the selection is therefore less important, since the focus is on the 
question of which dimensions are selected and how they differ across the different 
regulatory intensities. A concern has been expressed in regard to the answer of 
organisations queried. Here the risk prevails that even if questions are addressed in the 
interviews, the answers may not represent reliable preferences, but rather ‘strategic’ or 
‘political’ considerations.  
The phase I expert discussions provided invaluable feedback for the evaluation of the 
conceptual model of this study. This exploratory stage was therefore particularly significant, 
as it confirmed the pertinence of the model and justified taking the work into its next phase, 
i.e. the grouping of the regulatory intensity, the selection of countries and the data collection 
in the organisations.  
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II. Data collection phase II: the regulatory intensity  
In this phase, other internationally renowned experts were first asked to categorise the 
regulatory intensities of several countries into groups, based on the regulatory criteria 
presented above. As it is not the main objective of this thesis to analyse the regulatory 
environment and the gap between the perceived and intended regulatory intensities, this 
was perceived as a good way to approach the regulatory intensity and allow for it to be 
established for various countries.  
An alternative option would have been to directly ask the organisations themselves how 
they perceive their regulation. This was judges a less convincing method however. 
Organisations that face the same level of regulatory intensity do not necessarily objectively 
evaluate this level to be the same. Also, the regulatory intensity perceived by organisations 
in the same regulatory environment might vary. They could thus wrongly end up in different 
groups of regulatory intensity, something which would cast doubt on outcome of the 
research.  
The criteria founding the regulatory intensity have been tested by the author in the 
framework of the research project Governance, Regulation and Economics of Gambling 
(GREG), which categorised different gambling sectors based on these criteria. Hence, the 
criteria were pre-tested on a broad basis.  
A panel of experts were asked to validate the criteria selected to categorise countries and 
the classification of the countries into the two groups. The expert panel was composed of: 
• Dr. Sandra Marco Colino (Chinese University of Hong Kong) 
• Dr. Madalina Diaconu (IDHEAP/University of Neuchâtel)  
• Dr. Martin Doris (Chinese University of Hong Kong) 
• Dr. Dimitrios Doukas (Queen’s University of Belfast, UK) 
• Mr. David Folker (General Manager, Football DataCo London) 
• Dr. Alan Littler (Tilburg University, The Netherlands) 
Based on the ten variables of regulatory intensity, the experts were asked to categorise 
twenty countries into two groups of regulatory intensity: low-middle (hereafter low level or 
LRI) and middle-high (hereafter high level or HRI). This categorisation was then compared 
with the author’s own classification which was based on a documentary analysis of legal 
documents establishing the regulatory system relevant to each country (see chapter 5 
below). Where the experts did not agree among them or with the author’s categorisation, 
they were re-contacted and the differences were clarified. The sport betting and/or lottery 
regulation of six countries were selected based on the agreement of the categorisation 
among the experts and the type of ownership. As in the sector of analysis low regulatory 
intensity combined with public ownership does not exist in continental Europe, no such 
case could be studied. In the end three groups comprising six cases were selected for this 
study (summarised in the next table): 
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TABLE 16: CASE SELECTION: COUNTRIES 
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In a next step the organisations in each country were selected as the units of analysis. 
Further selection criteria (next to the type of ownership) were the market leadership and the 
longevity of the organisation. In regard to market dominance, where possible, the market 
leaders of the sector in each jurisdiction were targeted. 
Longevity was also used as a selection criterion since the age of the organisation can have 
an impact to the extent that younger organisations may not have had time to develop a 
sufficient routine in regard to the regulation and would possibly require more time to adapt 
to their environment (Cairns 1985; Cook et al. 1983, 1985; Jackson 2007; Keeler 1972; 
Reger et al. 1992; Stanley 1973). Hence, only organisations that are mature (older than 10 
years) were considered. Ensuring that all organisations considered have the same level of 
maturity allows for a better level of comparability within our sample. 
Table 17 presents the organisations selected as units of analysis of the gambling 
regulations regimes listed in table 16. The table provides the basic characteristics of each 
organisation (see chapter five for a detailed discussion of the regulatory environments in 
each case). In the cases of Belgium and Austria, numerous organisations operate in the 
retail sport betting sectors, and the study therefore focused on the market leaders. 
However, in the case of Austria, it was not possible to access the market leader (Admiral 
Sportwetten GmbH), and other important organisations were hence approached instead. 
The ‘Österreichische Sportwetten (tipp3)’ serves as main reference in Austria, though other 
sport betting organisations were also interviewed. In the case of Belgium, Ladbrokes PLC—
the market leader—serves as the main reference.  
Group A France Norway 
 Française des Jeux (FDJ) Norsk Tipping SA 
Date of creation 1976 (Loterie nationale 1933) 1948 
Legal form of organisation 
Public organisation hold by 72% 
by state 
State owned corporation 
Headquarter Boulogne-Billancourt Hamar 
Games offered 
Scratch tickets, drawings, sport 
betting34 
Scratch tickets, drawings, 
sport betting 
Retail and online Both Both 
Number of employees 1079 366 
Total wagered 2011 11.4 billion Euros 16 219 056 000 NOK 
Profits 2011 89 billion Euros 3.33 billion NOK 
Going to public use by law  72% to state 100% 
 
                                                
34 The precise market share of each category of game is available: scratch tickets (43.8%), drawings 
(46.3%), sport betting (9.9%). 
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Group B Netherlands United Kingdom 
 De Lotto 
Camelot UK Lotteries 
Limited35 
Date of creation 1961 1994 
Legal form of organisation Private foundation Private stock company 
Headquarter Rjiswjik Watford 
Games offered 
Scratch tickets, drawings, sport 
betting 
Scratch tickets and drawings 
Retail and online Both Both 
Number of employees 150 594 
Total wagered 2011 348 million Euros 6,525.9 million GBP 
Profits 2011 81 million Euros 5,213.7 million GBP 
Going to public use by law  100% 1,825.1 million GBP 
   
Group C Belgium Austria36 
 Ladbrokes PLC37 
Österreichische 
Sportwetten (tipp3) 
Admiral Sportwetten 
GmbH 
Date of creation 1961 (1886) 2000 1991 
Legal form of organisation Private company38 Private company39 Private company40 
Headquarter Harrow, London Vienna Gumpoldskirchen 
Games offered Sport betting Sport betting Sport betting 
Retail and online Both Both Both 
Number of employees 
n/a (1566 whole 
European retail 
including Ireland, 
Belgium and Spain) 
45041 (thereof 28 
only tipp3) 
n/a19 (Novomatic 
Group end 2011 
world wide 12’057 , 
thereof 2670 in 
Austria) 
Total wagered 2011 175.5 million GBP n/a 207 million Euros 
Profits 2011 6.6 million GBP n/a42 n/a20 
Going to public use by law  No43 
No44 (only a sport 
betting tax) 
No22 (only a sport 
betting tax) 
TABLE 17: CASE SELECTION: ORGANISATIONS 
 
                                                
35 The fiscal year goes from 31.03.2011-31.03.2012. 
36 The reports of these two organisations were analysed. Admiral Sportwetten, the market leader, was 
not available for an interview.  
37 These organisations do not dispose of their own annual reports. Hence, the sections on these 
specific organisations in the annual reports of the corporate group were consulted. 
38 Ladbrokes PLC is a British multinational company listed on the London stock exchange since 
1967. Ladbrokes was originally founded in 1886 in the UK.  
39 Casinos Austria and Austrian Lotteries and smaller shareholders (newspapers) are the owners of 
the Österreichische Sportwetten GmbH (tipp3). Tipp3 is integrated in the corporate structures of the 
Casinos Austria and Austrian Lotteries albeit tipp3 is an organisation itself.  
40 Admiral Sportwetten is part of the Novomatic Group. 
41 Tipp3 shares employees with the Casinos Austria and Austrian Lotteries (same headquarter in 
Vienna). 28 employees are working exclusively for tipp3, whereas the other 422 are shared with the 
other companies. 
42 As the organisation is integrated in a wider corporate group, this information is not available for the 
company in question.  
43 In Belgium, companies pay a sport betting tax (as is the case with the organisations in the other 
countries). The tax rate varies among the regions. This is not classified as a specific public use of 
profits. 
44 In Austria, companies pay a sport betting tax of 2% (as is the case with the organisations in the 
other countries). This is not classified as a specific public use of profits.  
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III. Data collection phase III: the definition of performance 
Having constructed a model based on an extensive literature review, a model then vetted by 
international experts in the fields of both public management and gambling, the third data 
collection phase concentrated on the dependent variable: the definition of performance.  
This stage of the data collection was based on two main pillars. First, annual reports of all 
organisations were gathered and screened for indication of the use of various performance 
dimensions (as per our construct) and more general ‘hints’ on the influence of the regulatory 
intensity on the performance definition. Second, in-depth interviews were carried out with 
experts of the gambling sector in each of the countries under study. This double approach 
was taken to validate the analysis and strengthen the responses obtained from the 
qualitative evaluation under taken in the first step. The baseline year was 2011. This was of 
course important to bear in mind during the document selection, but something which was 
also important to clarify with interviewees in order to have a reference year for the 
discussion. In the next sections, these two steps are presented in more detail. 
a. Collection of primary data: in-depth semi structured interviews 
Before presenting the interview approach45 taken in this study, some ethical concerns in 
regard to interviews will be discussed.  
Where interview participants asked for it, full anonymity was granted and completely 
respected. This is the reason why only the masculine form is used in citations. It is also in 
order to ensure confidentiality that the comparison of cases and discussion of text 
passages is not always detailed as would have been ideal, as this would have incurred a 
risk of making the participant identifiable. Moreover data protection considerations mean 
that it is not possible to annex the interview transcriptions to this document. Indeed, in this 
study, all interview participants asked for anonymity with the exception of one, who desired 
to re-read the interview transcript; something which was of course respected.  
In order to reach the stated objectives, the author decided to conduct semi-standardised in-
depth single interviews that also included a small number of quantitative questions. The 
combination of qualitative questions with a smaller part of quantitative ones has several 
advantages. Open questions have the advantage of allowing respondent to answer freely 
and without being influenced by pre-defined answer categories, while still directing the 
discussion towards the specific research problematic (Mayring 2002). In-depth semi-
structured interviews also have the advantage that answers can readily be compared with 
each other (Mayring 2002).  
                                                
45 See annex IV for the interview/survey questions. 
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The procedure of the in-depth interviews included different stages: (1) Introduction to the 
interview (2) general open questions (thematic access to the topic) (3) quantitative 
evaluation of concepts in form of a small card game (concentration on concepts, weighting 
of dimensions) (4) small survey questions (5) concluding remarks (adapted from Lamnek 
2005: 365). The open questions were particularly interesting as they allowed for the 
discovery of new aspects, something which from time to time induced ad hoc questions or 
clarifications.  
In the framework of the case studies research in the gambling sector an interview guide for 
each respondent was developed. A total of fourteen interviews were conducted from 
September 2012 to end of January 2013. 
24.09.2012 NL 1 Interview 1 17.12.2012 B 1 Interview 8 
27.09.2012 F 1 Interview 2 13.12.2012 NL 2 Interview 9 
05.11.2012 N 1 Interview 3 26.12.2012 B 2 Interview 10 
24.10.2012 A 1 Interview 4 28.12.2012 NL 3 Interview 11 
25.10.2012 A 2 Interview 5 04.01.2013 N 2 Interview 12 
30.10.2012 A 3 Interview 6  22.01.2013 UK 1 Interview 13 
21.12.2012 F 2 Interview 7 23.01.2013 UK 2 Interview 14 
TABLE 18: INTERVIEWS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER 
The respondents are all experts in the field of gambling, either directly employed in one of 
the selected organisations operating games of chance, academic or other professionals 
linked to the sport betting and lottery sectors. For each case two experts were queried, with 
the exception of Netherlands and Austria, where three experts were questioned in order to 
increase the quality of the data. The experts were selected based on three criteria: 
• The function they occupy  
• They have expressed themselves in public and in a critical way about the issue 
• They are recognised by their peers as experts 
The aim of the interviews was on one hand to explore which dimensions the organisations 
are effectively using to define their performance. On the other hand, the research desired to 
explore whether the dimensions used by the organisations differ between cases of low and 
high regulatory intensity. Leading questions for the interviews were how the performance of 
the organisation is defined, and whether the respondents see an influence of the regulatory 
system on the selection of organisational performance dimensions. To answer these 
questions, it was deemed necessary that only top executives in the organisations be 
queried (such as CEO and other executive managers) or experts in the field of gambling that 
have a proven high knowledge about the organisation under study. 
The data collected represents the performance dimensions identified by these interviewees. 
But as the people interviewed are either working in the organisations at the top 
management level or are experts of the gambling regulation and organisations in question, it 
is believed that this provides a close picture of the performance definition representing the 
effective performance concept used by these organisations. Moreover, with the 
enlargement of the data from other sources (organisational and other reports), it is believed 
that the data was further enriched and controlled. 
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In the aim of triangulating the data, the quantitative questions of the interview were also sent 
to other participants. The quantitative questions target the indicators used by the 
organisation to measure its performance, the different dimensions and how they prioritise 
them. The experts working in the sport betting and lottery organisations were asked to 
disseminate the survey among the top-level management. However, the response rate was 
very low and as had already been feared before the survey was conducted, could only be 
used on an illustrative basis. Next to the fourteen surveys resulting out of the interviews, 
only ten more survey responses were gathered from these other groups. Rather interestingly 
in regard to the low response rate is that the lower the regulatory intensity the more people 
were ready to answer to the survey.  
Before the actual interview phase started, a pre-test was conducted. In order to achieve a 
broad feedback, academics and practitioners were asked to answer the various questions 
and to fill the survey. The test group was composed of three lawyers, six public 
management experts, a methodologist, and a gambling specialist. They were queried as to 
the clarity, pertinence and understandability of the questions. The feedback of the test 
group did not lead to any major adjustments, but only to some minor changes in formulation 
of the questions. First and foremost, it served in validating the questions. It is on that basis 
that the interviews were conducted. 
b. Collection of secondary data: content analysis of different documents 
The compiled secondary data was taken from annual reports, other publications of the 
organisations, internal statistics, websites and newspaper articles.  
 Documents 
 Organisational Other 
F Française des Jeux, annual reports 2010; 
2011.  
Rapport public de cour des comptes 2010  
Rapport l’Etat acctionnaire 2012 (France 2012) 
Screen for newspaper articles ‘Le Parisien’ 
N Norsk Tipping, annual reports, 2010, 
2011.  
Norwegian Gaming Board (Lotteritilsynet 2004) 
Screen for newspaper articles ‘Aftenposten’ 
NL De Lotto, annual reports, 2010, 2011. Screen for newspaper articles ‘De Telegraaf’ 
UK Camelot UK Lotteries Limited, Group and 
Company financial statements for the year 
ended 31 March 2012. 
Annual and stakeholder report 2010, 2011. 
National Lottery Commission Annual Report and 
Accounts 2011/2012 (National Lottery 
Commission 2012) 
Screen for newspaper articles ‘The Guardian’ 
B Ladbrokes PLC, annual reports 2010, 
2011. Ladbrokes PLC 2011a, 2011b, 
2012a, 2012b, 2012c). 
Commission des jeux de hasard, rapport annuel 
2011/2010 (Commission des jeux de hasard 
2011, 2012). 
Screen for newspaper articles ‘Sudpresse’ 
A Casino Austria, annual and sustainability 
reports 2010, 2011. 
Novomatic AG, annual and sustainability 
reports 2010, 2011. 
Österreichische Lotterien, annual reports, 
2010, 2011. 
Buchmacherverein, Handbuch 2010 
(Österreichischer Buchmacherverband 2011). 
Screen for newspaper articles ‘Krone’. 
TABLE 19: DOCUMENTS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
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Using these documents, an extensive content analysis was conducted.46 The primary basis 
of the analyses was the organisational documents of 2011 and this for two reasons. First, an 
examination of the organisational documents of the previous year (2010) showed them to 
have a similar structure as the 2011 reports. This indicated that it was sufficient to focus on 
2011, as the lack of any substantial changes meant that the analysis would not include any 
situation that would subsequently prove exceptional. Second, documents of other sources 
(newspapers, regulatory reports, etc.) were studied but yielded no results in regard to the 
nature of performance. In cases where a CSR report existed but was also integrated in the 
annual reports, the special report was not coded in order to prevent double coding and an 
artificial inflation of the number of quotations. 
c. Identification of performance dimensions in the data set 
For each dimension of performance, sub-concepts and indicators are identified in order to 
evaluate the presence and importance of each dimension in this study. Through the 
performance management process, the indicators of performance and the targets of the 
performance measurement effort can be identified.47 This directly points to the performance 
dimensions used in an organisation. The question of what to measure refers to what 
performance is, because performance measures should ideally indicate the nature of 
performance (Lebas 1995). By looking at what kind of performance information is integrated 
and used, for example in the communication with the various stakeholders, the dimensions 
behind the performance construct can be identified. Similarly, performance data is outlined 
in annual and other organisational reports. Following a bottom-up approach, it is possible to 
identify the indicators and the targets using such reports. This then allows for the deduction 
of the corresponding performance dimensions and hence also for the identification of the 
definition of performance used by the organisation.  
For example, in order to detect the financial dimension, in the document analysis indicators 
such as growth benchmarks, revenue related benchmarks or key financial results 
benchmarks were looked for. In the interviews, participants were asked whether they use 
those indicators to measure their performance. In the figure above, this logic is illustrated by 
presenting for each dimension three indicators or themes that are used to identify a specific 
performance dimension. Obviously, many other indicators exist and during the analysis 
many others were indeed used to evaluate the existence of the performance dimensions. 48 
Consequently, in the document analysis, indicators were coded based on their affiliation to 
a specific dimension. 
 
 
                                                
46 See Annex I for a list of coded documents. 
47 The process of performance management is a logical sequence of defining targets, collecting data, 
integrating the data into a management system and putting the information to work (Curristine 2005). 
Further information on this can be found in performance management and measurement literature 
such as Van Dooren et al. (2010), Hatry (2006) or Moynihan (2006). 
48 The list of codes identified in the data analysis to detect the individual dimension can be found in 
annex II. 
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4.2.3 Data preparation 
All interviewees agreed to have the interviews recorded. The duration of the interviews was 
between 37 and 151 minutes. A total of 12.46 hours of recording material exist. In case 
statements or answers were not clear, the interview partners were re-contacted afterwards 
via email or telephone. The interviews were conducted in English, French or German. The 
final file of interview transcripts includes 217 pages of text, and around 10 survey 
responses, in addition to the fourteen that result from the main interviews. The 
interview/survey was developed with the MAMP data software. 
4.2.4 Data analysis 
In oral and written words, humans express purposes, positions, interpretations and 
knowledge about their environments. Their statements are largely influenced by the social 
cultural system they belong to. Therefore they are not only expressing their personal 
attitudes but also particularities of their culture; for example institutionalised norms and 
values (Miles & Huberman 1994; Rihoux 2006; Rubin 2011). The content analysis of audio 
material allows, among other things, to draw conclusions on individual or collective non-
verbal phenomena (Lamnek 2005). The content analysis has therefore been considered 
appropriate in order to analyse the notion of performance in organisations facing sport 
betting and lottery regulation. In conducting the content analysis, the strategies developed 
by Mayring (2002) for the document analysis and Yin (2009) for the interview data were 
followed. The two strategies are very similar, though Yin (2009) concentrates explicitly on 
interview-generated data. The content analysis of the documents, including the interview 
transcripts and secondary data collected, was undertaken based on pre-elaborated codes, 
a list that has been enlarged during the analysis.49  
I. Qualitative content analysis  
A force of the qualitative content analysis50 is that data material is analysed step by step and 
in a method-oriented manner, and this even in cases of large text volumes (Lamnek 2005; 
Mayring 2002). For the secondary data, i.e. the documents, where necessary, the 
documents were first summarised in order to gain in clarity through abstraction. Second, 
where necessary, text passages were completed with additional material in order to clarify 
certain sections. In a third step, with content structuration (Mayring 2002), passages of the 
text material were extracted and consolidated under specific topics based on the pre-
defined code list (Charbonneau & Caron 2009). This form of structuration was deemed 
appropriate for the research purpose, and based on the conceptual model the main and 
subcategories could be defined (e.g. dimensions of performance, regulatory intensity with 
the sub-concepts and control variable). The indicators pointed to individual performance 
dimensions and consequently a bottom-up approach was followed. The data material was 
                                                
49 See Annex II for the list of codes. 
50 For 30 years, QDA software has been used to analyse qualitative data (Miles & Huberman 1994) 
without defining a specific method of the analysis. The most frequently used software is Atlas.Ti, 
NVivo and MAXQDA. In this dissertation Atlas.TI was used to administer the data material, to access 
certain sections and to evaluate the text based on the codes of the qualitative content analysis. 
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coded based on these categories and, where necessary, the categories were adapted.51 
Finally, the material in each category was summarised and interpreted.  
For the primary data, i.e. the interviews, a very similar strategy was chosen, mainly based on 
the procedure presented by Yin (2009). First, all interviews were transcribed and passages 
were, where necessary, summarised. Second, the transcripts were screened and coded 
based on the main and sub-categories that were used also for the secondary data (see 
table 19 above). Third, the data materials from the interviews were merged under the 
different concepts and themes. Their content was further summarised where necessary in 
each file. Afterwards, the material in each category and theme was sorted by comparing the 
content of different subgroups and the results were further summarised where deemed 
necessary. Further, the different concepts were completed with citations from different 
interviews. Finally, the concepts were combined based on the model developed in order to 
examine the research question.  
II. The analytical framework to address the research question 
Having presented the various tools, the methodologies to activate them as well as the 
various steps in the data collection and analysis, we are now at the very last step of this 
research: squarely addressing the main research question (see section 4.1.1). The following 
analytical framework was developed in order to answer the research question of the 
influence of the regulatory intensity on the performance definition: 
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Figure 10: The analytical framework 
To examine whether and how the regulatory environment influences the selection of 
organisational performance dimensions by an organisation, a first step is to identify the 
dimensions of performance used for each case analysed and construct a performance 
definition for each of the group. In a second step the comparison of organisations facing 
high and low regulatory intensity allows for an examination of the research question, and an 
empirical exploration of the accompanying research model. In order to address this 
question in a systemic way, the performance definitions of the different groups are 
compared, concentrating mainly on the high regulatory intensity groups A (France and 
Norway) and B (Netherlands and United Kingdom) compared to the low regulatory intensity 
group C (Austria and Belgium). This examination provides responses in regard to the 
regulatory intensity and the multidimensionality of the performance definition in these 
                                                
51 See annex II for the list of codes. 
 119 
different countries. In a final step group B is compared to group A and group C, as it 
represents the intermediate group (high regulated, private ownership) between the two 
extremes that are group A (high regulated, public ownership) and group C (low regulated, 
private ownership). This final step explores the argument that the type of ownership is less 
influential in defining performance than the regulatory environment.  
Based on all these elements, the following chapter presents the empirical research results 
obtained through the methodology and approaches outlined in this chapter. 
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5 INDIVIDUAL CASE DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSES 
Six jurisdictions mean six approaches to regulate games of chance, and also six different 
ways in which states implement regulation to attempt to control and channel gambling 
activities. But what exact shape does gambling regulation take in these countries? Although 
this research focuses primarily on the definition of performance in a selection of sport 
betting and/or lottery organisations, the main characteristics of the gambling regulations of 
each country will also be briefly presented in order to provide the necessary context in 
which they are embedded.  
This chapter therefore provides a description and basic analysis of each of the six cases. 
Each case description is structured as follows: first, a short historical introduction of the 
regulation of games of chance paves the way for an overview of the main legislative setting, 
i.e. an outlining of pertinent legal instruments, and their primary objectives. Next, the 
primary components of each regulatory system are presented, based on the ten criteria 
described in chapters three as making up the regulatory intensity (see section 3.4.2). As can 
be recalled, market access, the regulatory reach, the public use of money, the imposition of 
the type of ownership and the publicness of the organisation constitute the foundation of 
the regulatory scope (RSc) of the regulation. For its part, the restrictiveness of the 
regulation—the regulatory stringency—intervenes on two levels. On the level of the 
regulator, it is determined by the presence or not of a specific regulatory instance and on 
the competences of the regulator (RS I). On the level of the organisation, it is determined by 
the obligations and restrictions imposed on the organisation (RS II).  
Once these elements related to RSc, RS I and RS II have been presented, the results of the 
individual case analysis are detailed, focusing on the appraisal of the performance 
definition. The objective is to highlight which dimensions the organisations focus on when 
reporting their performance. For each individual case, the dimensions are presented in the 
same order (following their appearance in the research model as in section 4.1.3). This is 
done to maintain a structural logic and make the reading of these descriptions more 
effective. For each dimension a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the document and 
interview analyses is outlined. A table summarises the results and provides an evaluation of 
the importance of the various aspects by indicating their occurrences numerically. The 
quantitative occurrence refers to the number of times a reference can be found in each 
dimension. The qualitative interpretation (or evaluation) is based on the author’s subjective 
evaluation of the importance of each dimension. As the occurrence of the codes in the 
dimensions does not tell anything about the nature and relations of the dimension, a 
qualitative evaluation was added in order to deepen the results of the analysis. After the 
dimensions are discussed for each case, the case-specific section is concluded with a small 
summary that outlines the first—but not yet final—evaluation of the performance definition 
to be attributed to the case in question. This chapter will thus provide the descriptive 
material for the subsequent comparative analysis to be found in chapter six, which focuses 
more specifically on the question of the influence of regulation on the performance concept 
and the possible influence of ownership with regard to this relationship.  
 121 
5.1 THE FRENCH SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR 
5.1.1 The genesis of gambling in France 
Gambling regulation has a long history in France. It is a history marked by caution and by 
prudence. It is marked by a general prohibition, only exceptionally allowing for games of 
chance and if so only through a formal process of authorisation. As early as 1254 a 
complete prohibition of all games of chance was established (Littler 2011b: 65). Despite this 
early prohibition, the first state lottery in France, the Parisian 'blanque', was organised in 
1539. Its main goal was to restore the state's finances following the numerous wars 
undertaken by Francis I (Gizycki & Gorny 1970). But due to the large presence of foreign 
lotteries, this first state lottery failed to attract a sufficient number of players. After an 
unsuccessful second call for participation in 1541, Francis I’s reaction was to introduce a 
law forbidding the activities of foreign lotteries. From that point onwards, only the ‘blanque’ 
(only under the personal auspices of the monarch) and charitable lotteries during carnivals 
were permitted. Private lotteries was thus prohibited (Gizycki & Gorny 1970).  
Later, in 1705, Louis XV instituted a permanent national lottery to collect money for the state 
Treasury. It also served to help pay for some of his social projects, including the 
modernisation of hospitals and the restoration of churches and other monuments. In 1776, 
the government decided to integrate all lotteries into a national organisation, while 
contracting out the sale and distribution of tickets. A state model was born: the national 
monopoly. It came to influence neighbouring countries such as Switzerland and Italy 
(Descotils & Guilbert 1993). In 1805, under the rule of Napoleon I, lotteries were prohibited. 
They were later to be included in the 1810 Penal Code. Soon after the establishment of the 
prohibition, an exception was established for the organisation of national lotteries (France 
1836). The ‘Loterie Nationale’ was created in 1933, and by 1978 the Française des Jeux 
(FDJ) took over the operations of the games (France 1978).  
Following the same logic of prohibition as for lotteries, legislation was passed in 1806 
prohibiting the establishment of gaming houses, with the exception of the ones located in 
thermal resorts and in Paris (France 1806). Thanks to this system of exceptions, French 
gaming houses became hugely popular, attracting people from across Europe. In Paris, 
gaming houses were rented out to private entrepreneurs, something which immediately led 
the French government to take restrictive measures. By banning the entry for some people 
and limiting opening hours and stakes, private gaming houses saw a drastic decrease in 
revenue. Finally, the negative approach toward gaming houses in Paris led to their closure in 
1837 (Schädler 2007). A law confirming this approach was adopted in 1907: the casinos in 
the spa destinations were still accepted but gaming houses in Paris were to be forbidden 
(France 1907). In 1920 a financial law was passed which followed the same logic but which 
excluded as well the still legal the ‘cercles de jeux’ that operated under the banner of 
associative organisations (Schädler 2007).  
This brief summary of the French approach towards gambling is interesting in so far its 
general logic is still valid today: an initial complete prohibition, which is rapidly followed by a 
system of tightly controlled exceptions (Littler 2011: 67).  
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5.1.2 The current gambling regulation 
The French system is not based on any one single piece of legislation, but it has been 
enacted in a piecemeal fashion. It has even been argued that there has been "no visible 
attempt […] to secure a degree of coherency between the regulation of the various forms of 
gambling" (Littler 2011: 67). Nonetheless, the following table aims at providing an overview 
of the different gambling sectors and the main laws.  
General Logic 
General prohibition of games of chance based on the law of May 21, 1836.52 But 
allowing for exceptions when authorised by government. 
Sectors Lottery Betting Casino 
Sub sectors - Sport betting Horse race betting - 
Legal basis:     
Retail 
Article on sport 
betting games 
(1984)54 
Laws on Horse Race 
Betting and Horse 
Breeding (1891; 
1997)55 
Law on Casinos 
(1907; 1959; 2007)56 
Online 
Law on 
Organisation 
and 
Operation of 
Lottery 
Games 
(1978)53 
Law on Opening 
Up Online Games 
of Chance 
(2010)57 
Law on Opening Up 
Online Games of 
Chance (2010) 
Law on Opening Up 
Online Games of 
Chance (2010) 
Operator:    
Retail Française des Jeux (FDJ) 
Pari Mutuel Urbain 
(PMU) 
Various private 
owners 
Online FDJ 
Various licence 
holders (including 
FDJ) 
PMU 
Various licence 
holders for certain 
types of games 
TABLE 20: THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES OF CHANCE IN FRANCE 
Before the recent online gambling legislation of 2010, the clearest set of objectives that 
could be found in French legislation concerned lotteries and was provided in the Law on 
Organisation and Operation of Lottery Games (France 1978: Article 1). The first article of 
that law explained that it aimed to ensure the integrity, security and reliability of gambling 
operations as well its transparency. It further mentioned that its objective was to channel the 
gambling demand towards publicly controlled gambling, in order to prevent the 
development of criminal or fraudulent offers and to prevent and limit gambling addiction 
(Littler 2011: 67). 
                                                
52 Author’s translation of: Loi du 21 mai 1836 portant prohibition des loteries. 
53 Author’s translation of: Décret n° 78-1067 du 9 novembre 1978 relatif à l'organisation et à 
l'exploitation des jeux de loterie autorisés par l'article 136 de la loi du 31 mai 1933 and Loi n° 94-
1163 du 29 décembre 1994. 
54 Author’s translation of: Loi n° 84-1208 du 29 de ́cembre 1984 portant loi de finances pour 1985. 
55 Author’s translation of: Loi du 2 juin 1891 ayant pour objet de réglementer l'autorisation et le 
fonctionnement des courses de chevaux and Décret n° 97-456 du 5 mai 1997 relatif aux sociétés de 
courses de chevaux et au pari mutuel. 
56 Author’s translation of: Loi n° 1907-06-15 du 15 juin 1907 réglementant le jeu dans les cercles et 
les casinos des stations balnéaires, thermales et climatiques; Décret n° 59-1489 du 22 décembre 
1959 portant réglementation des jeux dans les casinos des stations balnéaires, thermales et 
climatiques and Arrêté du 14 mai 2007 relatif à la réglementation des jeux dans les casinos. 
57 Author’s translation of: Loi n° 2010-476 du 12 mai 2010 relative à l'ouverture à la concurrence et à 
la régulation du secteur des jeux d'argent et de hasard en ligne. 
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With the adoption of the online gambling legislation in 2010, the previous lack of well-
defined objectives was addressed. (France 2010b: article 3 § 1). The new objectives were 
stated as preventing gambling addiction, protecting minors, ensuring the integrity, reliability 
and transparency of gambling operations, preventing criminal behaviour, and monitoring a 
balanced and equitable development of different branches of gambling in order to prevent 
their economic destabilisation (France 2010b). 
The economic interest of the state is not mentioned in this enumeration of objectives, 
although the distribution of revenues arising from the different gambling activities illustrates 
the importance of gambling revenues for the state (Littler 2011: 68). Nonetheless, as 
economic interests are inadmissible as justifications for restricting the principles of free 
movement of the EU, it seems obvious why they cannot be included in the list (European 
Union 2007: article 49 and 56). However, in view of the way the French state does approach 
gambling regulation and the important revenues from it that are allocated to local and 
national government, economic factors are arguably significant. Revenues of games of 
chance are in fact allocated to the state budget or to charitable causes, either completely (in 
cases where the organisation is a public enterprise), or partially (based on substantial levels 
of taxation) (Littler 2011: 68).  
In regard to the delimitation of games of chance, it is defined for each game category. In a 
report of the senate (Trucy 2002) it has been outlined that for each game several 
characteristics are present in different proportions, contributing to the different character of 
each specific game. These elements are the pure hazard, the skill of players and the use of 
calculation and strategy. In sport betting and lottery games, the chance to win is exclusively 
related to hazard. In casinos machines and ‘boules’ games are also exclusively related to 
hazard. With card games, calculation and strategy play a more significant role. In the case 
of horserace betting, the player’s knowledge in regard to the horses, the trainer, the jockeys 
and the course is important for the prediction of the outcome (Trucy 2002). It is only 
presence of a small amount of luck that is decisive when it comes to categorising a game as 
a game of chance though it is not necessarily expressed in this way legally.  
A consequence of this different evaluation of games of chance is the sector-approach in the 
gambling regulation. Games of chance are regulated on the national level and the territorial 
reach is unified, but the structure of the gambling sector is fragmented in four parts: offline 
sport betting and lottery, offline horserace betting, offline casinos and gaming circles and 
finally, the online gambling sector for certain games, such as poker and sport betting.  
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Card games, boules and gambling machines are operated in casinos and gaming circles, 
the Pari Mutuel Urbain (PMU) operates horserace betting and several licensed operators 
operate online games of chance. The PMU is in the hands of the horse breeding 
associations and the profits are used for that specific purpose. Private operators run the 
around 200 casinos in France, where a system of taxation ensures a certain income for the 
state budget. The recently adopted online gambling regulation (France 2010b), allows the 
operation of certain types of games on the internet under a system of licences, to private 
and public operators. Finally, the lottery- and retail sport betting sectors are exploited by a 
single state operator, the Française des Jeux (FDJ), i.e. the organisation that is considered 
in more detail in this thesis.  
I. The regulatory scope of the sport betting and lottery regulation 
The market structure of the retail sport betting and lottery sector is based on an exclusive 
licence, forming a monopoly. One operator holds this unique right to operate lotteries, sport 
betting games and scratch tickets on the French territory. The Law on Organisation and 
Operation of Lottery Games (France 1978) and article 48 of the Law on Finance of 199458 
(France 1994) attribute the operation of lotteries to the FDJ. Sport betting services were 
permitted through the establishment of the ‘Loto sportif’ in the article 42 on sport betting 
games in the Finance law of 1984 (France 1984: article 42), as modified by the Law on 
Finance of 1993 and the Decree on the Organisation and Operation of Lottery Games59 of 
1997, and are, at least in the retail sector, also exclusively operated by the FDJ (France 
1993, 1997).  
The regulatory reach of the sport betting and lottery regulation is not limited to the market 
structure but goes further in its scope, and thus increases the intensity of regulation. The 
regulatory regime establishes a specific public use of money as a part of the revenues goes 
to the state budget and another part to sport and solidarity projects. The largest segment 
(approximately 69% of the gross global annual revenue) is directed to the general state 
budget, for example via the Treasury. The ‘Centre National de Développement du Sport 
(CNDS)’ is the only ‘charitable’ body that receives funding from the FDJ (Littler 2011: 92-94). 
To this adds contributions to the social security system that are not specific to the gambling 
regulation but applies to all French companies (France 1996). The aggregate rate of taxation 
for the FDJ seems to fluctuate on an annual basis, at around 29% of total turnover 
(Interview 2). 
The type of ownership of the FDJ is imposed by law, as it has to be a public enterprise in 
form of a stock company and the bylaws are approved by the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance60 and the Ministry of the Budget61 (France 1978). The FDJ is de lege a fully state 
                                                
58 Author’s translation of: Loi n° 94-1163 du 29 décembre 1994 de finances rectificative pour 1994.  
59 Author’s translation of: Décret N° 97-783 du 31 juillet 1997 relatif à l'organisation et à l'exploitation 
des jeux de loterie autorisés par l'article 136 de la loi du 31 mai 1933 et modifiant le décret n° 78-
1067 du 9 novembre 1978. 
60 Author’s translation of: Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 
61 Author’s translation of: Ministère du budget, des comptes publics, de la fonction publique et de la 
réforme de l'État 
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owned company, even though de facto the state holds only 72% of the capital.62 Of the 
remaining 28% of the shares, 20% are held by the ancient holders of the national lottery, 
and the rest by the employees of the FDJ and other smaller shareholders (Trucy 2011). One 
interviewee added in that the shareholders are very much aligned in regard to the strategic 
orientation of the FDJ (Interview 2). Therefore, even though the company operates under 
private law (Interview 7), a high degree of publicness can be observed. Moreover, the 
French president appoints the president of the FDJ for a period of five years after the Board 
of Directors of the FDJ has nominated the potential future president. The Board of Directors 
of the FDJ is composed by nine government representatives who are senior officials 
appointed by decree (Française des jeux 2012).  
TABLE 21: RSC SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR IN FRANCE 
II. The regulatory stringency of the French sport betting and lottery regulation 
a. The regulator level 
The regulatory instance is the Ministry of Economics and Finance and the Ministry of the 
Budget (France 1978: article 24). In 2010/2011 the Gaming Advisory Board (‘Comité 
Consultatif des Jeux’ (CCJ)), whose jurisdiction covers all gaming and betting, was 
established to advice the budget minister in implementing the policy for the games operated 
by the FDJ (France 2010b: article 3). It also advises the minister in regard to a marketing 
initiatives programme and on the action plan of the FDJ on responsible gambling and the 
fight against money laundering. Even though the law of 2010 (France 2010b) covers online 
gambling mainly, its first section does apply to all games of chance. The CCJ has units for 
different kinds of games, in which one is for the PMU and the FDJ together (Interview 2), 
and it approves the responsible gambling programmes. However, it seems that there is no 
further inspection in regard to the efficient implementation of the programmes. 
In regard to competences of the regulator, en amant there appears to be nothing concrete. 
Once the organisation is created it is under the supervision of the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance and the Ministry of the Budget. In regard to the competences en aval, the system is 
quite strict, as each new game needs an authorisation in form of an enactment. Since the 
earliest days, the palette of products has been steadily enlarged. For example, the birth of 
the sport lotto was based on article 42 of the Finance Law of 29 December 1984, and the 
mid-1990s saw the authorisation of the operator to offer individual, disposable games 
(France 1994: article 48). In regard to illegal gambling there are no special competences. 
There is in France however a so-called ‘police des jeux’ which tackles illegal gambling, and 
                                                
62 It is not that the state has diminished its shares over time but it has on the contrary increased them 
(Interview 2). In the beginning, the ‘Société de la Loterie Nationale et du Loto National’, as FDJ was 
initially called, was held to 51% by the state. In 1990, the name was changed to the Française des 
Jeux, and through a 1997 decree it was established as the operator of the national lottery (France 
1997). 
The regulatory scope of the sport betting and lottery sector 
Market structure  Exclusive licence forming a monopoly held by FDJ 
Regulatory reach Broader than market structure 
Specific public use of money Total of profits used for public use 
Type of ownership Imposed 
Publicness High 
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the Law for the Adaptation of Justice to the Evolutions in Crime63 (2004) outlines obligations 
in regard to illegal gambling (France 2007: articles 36, 37, 38 and 40; Interview 2).  
TABLE 22: RS I SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR IN FRANCE 
b. The organisational level 
The first component to consider in regard to the regulatory stringency is the distribution 
channel restrictions. The FDJ is allowed to operate its games on the internet, but two 
different types of online regimes apply. The traditional lottery sector is under the retail sport 
betting and lottery regulation, and the FDJ is the only operator to be permitted to offer 
lottery products online. The situation differs in regard to online sport betting games and 
poker. With the opening up of the online sector in 2010, the FDJ acquired licences for the 
two types of games, and faced other licensed competitors. The online poker games are 
operated in association with the group Lucien Barrière (Barrierepoker.fr) under the 2010 
licence system. 
In regard to advertisement, the CCJ can advise the budget minister in regard to the 
marketing programme initiated by the FDJ. With the new online gambling regulation 
established with the Law on Opening Up Online Games of Chance, any operator of games 
of chance in France is subjected to the same advertisement restrictions (France 2010a). 
Adverts are allowed for legal games in all media (France 2010b: article 7). Further, the 
concession specifications can also include conditions in regard to advertisement. 
Responsible gambling objectives have only recently entered the regulatory agenda 
(Interview 2) and this, as Littler (2011) highlights, is mainly for two reasons. First, due in part 
to the signals sent from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and other European institutions 
and second, due to modern technologies such as the internet, making gambling much more 
accessible and thus spreading the risks of problem gambling (Littler 2011: 68). Even though 
responsible gambling has become increasingly important, and the French legislation 
prohibits the sale of the organisation's products to minors, it defines the latter rather sonly 
as those who are less than 16 years old. This is in sharp contrast to casino and horse 
betting games, which cannot be sold to minors less than 18 years old. This seems quite 
paradoxical for a state supposed to propose a secure gambling environment (Littler 2011: 
68). But in two decrees concerning the FDJ, an explicit reference to the prevention of 
gambling addiction64 as an objective was made in 2006 (France 2006a, 2006b; Littler 
2011b).  
 
                                                
63 Author’s translation of: Loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux 
évolutions de la criminalité (1). 
64 The French term used is not the one of problem gambling but of addiction (as in the case of the 
Netherlands). In respect of national terms of art, addiction is not replaced with problem gambling, but 
consequently both terms refer to the same issue. 
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting and lottery sector: the level of the regulator 
Presence of a regulator Yes, Ministries of Budget and of Economics and Finance 
Competences of regulator Large 
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In 2006, a consultative body—the ‘Comité consultative pour l'encadrement des jeux et de 
jeu responsable (COJER)’—was established by the Ministry of Economics and Finance to 
generate a responsible gambling framework as outlined in article 19 of the Law on 
Organisation and Operation of Lottery Games (France 1978, 2006a).65  
The COJER gives its opinion on the FDJ's annual commercial plans before they are 
approved by the Ministry of Economics and Finance. Moreover, the COJER has a more 
general mandate to advice the government in regard to control and frameworks of FDJ 
products. With the new online gambling law the COJER was integrated in the CCJ (France 
2010: article 3), i.e. the body that advises the minister of budget in the matter (Interview 2).  
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting and lottery sector: the organisational level 
Distribution channel restrictions  Yes 
Advertisement restrictions Moderate 
Obligations in regard to gambling addiction Moderate 
TABLE 23: RS II SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR IN FRANCE 
In summary, and despite the recent opening up of online games as a response to the 
pressure coming from the European community and from the reality of illegal gambling, the 
regulation in France is a regulation of prohibition, which provides a strict framework for 
sport betting and lottery games (Anderson et al. 2012). Games of chance are a sensitive 
activity in France, calling for social regulation (Interview 2). The French government keeps a 
tight relationship with the sport betting and lottery operator. It is of interest therefore to 
question how the FDJ defines its performance under the high regulatory intensity, 
something which will be done in the next section.  
5.1.3 The performance definition of the Française des Jeux 
The results of the qualitative analyses yield a multidimensional performance circumscription 
of the FDJ. The table below illustrates the quantitative occurrence of codes for each 
dimension and their qualitative evaluation in both the interviews and the reports of the 
organisation.  
Occurrence and evaluation of 
dimensions 
Interviews Reports of Organisation 
 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Financial dimension 30 ++ 52 ++ 
Operational dimension 20 = 57 + 
Stakeholder management dimension 14 = 23 + 
Legal requirement dimension 23 + 14 + 
Social issue participation dimension 54 ++ 45 ++ 
Public values dimension 10 - 11 - 
Total 151  202  
Legend:  ++ very high importance  + high importance  = neutral importance 
   - low importance   -- very low importance 
TABLE 24: OCCURRENCE AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS OF THE FDJ 
                                                
65 Author’s translation of: Décret du 17 février 2006 relatif à l'organisation et l'exploitation des jeux de 
loterie autorisés. 
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Nevertheless, the results of the quantitative evaluation66 of the interviews and organisational 
reports illustrate that two dimensions occur more frequently, namely the financial—and the 
social issue participation dimensions. The qualitative interpretation67 of the occurred codes 
reinforces these observations especially for the social issue participation dimension. 
I. The financial dimension 
The financial dimension is quantitatively (52 occurrences in the reports and 31 occurrences 
in the interviews) and qualitatively very important for the performance definition of the FDJ. 
The importance of the financial dimension is already apparent in the CEO’s message 
clarifying the mission of FDJ to promote gaming model in the service of the public based on 
trust and redistribution (Française des Jeux 2012b: 1; Interview 7).  
For the FDJ, the term ‘redistribution’ is a key term, which refers to three things: first to the 
redistribution of winnings to the players, second to the redistribution of profits to the state 
budget, sport and solidarity projects (legal requirement dimension) and third to society at 
large, through the foundation of the FDJ (the social issue participation dimension) (Française 
des Jeux 2012b: 1; Interview 7).  
Interestingly, the financial dimension is throughout the data set outlined in relation to other 
dimensions, namely the legal requirement, social issue participation and public values 
dimensions (Française des Jeux, 2012; Interview 2 and 7). Profit development is arguably 
not pursued at all costs, but the sales progression has to be reasonable, supportable, 
sustainable and then finally profitable. Moreover, individual wagers have to follow a 
moderate development (Française des Jeux 2012b: 1; Interview 2). In case the progression 
is too risky or unreasonable the FDJ intervenes. When games are developing too fast they 
are re-evaluated and adapted in view of responsible gambling (Interview 2). An aggressive 
sales strategy is not in alignment with the gaming model of the FDJ (Interview 7). For 
example, the FDJ is very proactive in regard to match-fixing and as soon as they detect 
abnormal wagers they stop sales immediately, something which is not “a normal economic 
reflexion” (Interview 2), and even more so as the wagers in the French sport betting and 
lottery system are guaranteed by the state and not by the operator itself. In the view of the 
interviewee, a pure-profit driven company would not be that proactive. But trust is very 
important for the business model of the FDJ and hence there cannot be any suspicion 
(Interview 2). Of course, it can be argued that it has also to do with the reputation and the 
image of the firm, but the FDJ is very balanced in the profit/risk equation and hence, 
profitability is surely important but not at any price.  
Another important indicator of the FDJ is cost-efficiency. The FDJ operates under a 
commission system, i.e. a percentage of the total amount wagered can be used to cover 
                                                
66 Quantitative occurrence refers to the number of times references occur in each of the dimension. 
67 Qualitative interpretation (or evaluation) refers to the author’s subjective evaluation of the codes. As 
the occurrence (quantitative evaluation) of the codes in the dimensions does not tell anything about 
the nature and relations of the dimension the qualitative evaluation was added in order to deepen the 
results of the analysis. 
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their activities. In case the operator is too cost-efficient, this percentage would be lowered. 
Over the past twelve years, the commission has been decreased from 8% to 5% (Interview 
2). It is argued that if profits were to be the sole objective, the state protection of the sector, 
via the creation of a monopoly, could not be defended (Interview 2). This fact is another 
indication that the financial performance is of course important to the company, but that it is 
not the ultimate goal. Moreover regulation is guiding the business activities (Interview 2):  
“Regulation can drive a company to act unprofitably (...)”  
In the view of the company in question, its role is to be a depositary of money owned by the 
state. The company pursues a balanced economic model in which pure commercial 
performance is not the primary objective. It is far more important to respect regulation and 
to achieve public objectives (Interview 2; 7).  
In summary, the financial dimension is very important for the French performance definition, 
but it is not the sole or the primary one.  
II. The operational dimension 
The operational dimension is quantitatively more important in the reports (57 references) 
than in these interviews (20 references). The qualitative evaluation reveals that it is an 
important dimension in the reports and of neutral importance in the interviews. It is not a 
final performance dimension. 
One aspect of the operational dimension occurring frequently is the customer perspective, 
which is at the heart of the mission, with the company constantly engaged to satisfy its 
clients (Française des Jeux, 2012: 1, 9; Interview 2). Several targets have been developed to 
measures customer satisfaction, for example the satisfaction rate of customers (Française 
des Jeux 2012: 22, 24, 28, Interview 7). The acquisition of new clients is also a key indicator 
for the FDJ, although the question of responsible gambling is constantly taken into account 
(Interview 7). Indeed, in order to pilot a viable business model, the FDJ focuses more on 
acquiring new customers than on increasing the amount wagered by existing clients 
(Interview 2). Moreover, voluntary operational measures have been taken to limit excessive 
gambling, for example through an upper limit of wagers per scratch ticket (Interview 2; 7). 
Another central concern is the need to constantly adapt to consumers’ expectations and, in 
order to live up to these expectations, the customer perspective has been closely linked to 
the learning and growth perspective (Française des Jeux 2012: 24, 28, 61).  
For the learning and growth perspective, product and distribution channel innovations are 
very important (Française des Jeux 2012: 8, 10, 22, 28). The FDJ is very creative and for 
example develops games in co-production with customers (e.g. ‘Poil à gratter’). Similarly, 
one interviewee labelled clients ‘wiki-consumers’, meaning that they do not want to be 
treated as passive targets but as partners, having a say with regard to the products 
(Interview 2). New ways to stay in contact with the consumers have been constantly 
developed, for example through social media such as Facebook (Interview 14). Innovations 
are accompanied by the evaluation of possible risks for consumers and society. One 
interview participant (Interview 2) called this approach ‘responsible innovations’ and argued 
 130 
that in a very business-like environment a company would play against its players and try to 
encourage them to loose money. However, this was explained as being against the values 
of the FDJ, where responsibility and other values are not only an instrument of corporate 
communication but guides all business operations and activities (Interview 2): 
 “(...) All the FDJ tries to do is, in a legally protected and regulated framework, to couple 
values (with a ‘s’) and performance to create value (without ‘s’). And this is called 
‘responsible innovation’.” 
In regard to the internal business process perspective, an element worth mentioning is the 
link between the financial security in the processes and the integrity of the various games. 
Secure transactions and strict control processes are essential requirements for the 
company (Française des Jeux 2012: 8, 11, 58 etc.). Other indicators are quality 
management systems that are constantly improved and certificated in order to enhance 
efficiency and productivity (Française des Jeux 2012). Interestingly, in the interviews, the 
internal business processes did not occur once, indicating that it is a dissatisfier, i.e. as long 
as all is well, it is not of a concern, but dissatisfaction would result in an immediate reaction 
(Interview 2, 7).  
In summary, the operational dimension is surely important for the FDJ but it is not an end in 
itself, but rather enhances the overall financial performance. Consequently, the operational 
dimension is often linked to other performance dimensions, first of all to the financial 
dimension but also to the legal requirement- and the social issue participation dimensions 
(Française des Jeux 2012; Interview 2, 7).  
III. The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension is occurs quantitatively more frequently in the 
reports (23 references) than in the interviews (14 references). In the reports, the qualitative 
evaluation reveals the stakeholder management dimension to be an important one, whereas 
it is of neutral importance in the interviews. Overall the qualitative evaluation results in a little 
importance given to the stakeholder management dimension, and this despite the fact that 
some stakeholders, such as the state, the customers and the employees, are important for 
the company (Française des Jeux 2012: 37, 57, 62). There are numerous examples testifying 
to this, such as the establishment of a social programme to assist winners dealing with a 
possibly destabilising experience (Française des Jeux 2012: 24, 56, 58). Not all stakeholder 
management activities of the organisation are directed towards stakeholder satisfaction 
however, but some are directed towards good social performance and compliance with 
corporate values. Retailers for example have to share the values of the organisation as it is 
believed to increase the attractiveness of the selling points and to enhance the economic 
development of the region in which the selling points are located (Française des Jeux 2012: 
26, 31). In case a retailer acts fraudulently, there are strict policy guidelines. Such retailers 
will not receive a second chance (Interview 2).  
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The environmental footprint of the company is another concern, though it is less dominant in 
the reports (Française des Jeux 2012: 64) and even less so in the interviews (Interview 2, 7). 
The FDJ is measuring its environmental impact through quantitative measures, but these are 
not actually linked to the organisational performance (Française des Jeux 2012; Interview 2, 
7).  
In summary, the stakeholder management dimension seems to be of neutral importance to 
the performance definition of the FDJ. Nonetheless, employees, the state and the 
customers are important stakeholder groups who are the subjects and objects of 
performance measurement.  
IV. The legal requirement dimension 
The legal requirement dimension is quantitatively (23 quotations in the interviews and 14 in 
the reports) of little importance to the performance definition of the FDJ. The qualitative 
evaluation alters this position to a high importance for the performance definition of the FDJ.  
There are mainly two reasons that can explain the underrepresentation of the legal 
requirement dimension in the quantitative evaluation. First, the organisation does not count 
the legal requirement dimension as part of the performance definition, despite that fact that 
compliance with legal requirements is of very high importance to the organisation. 
Secondly, and closely linked to this first explanation, the legal requirement dimension 
occurs frequently in an indirect manner. The redistribution of profits to charity, which is 
mandatory by law, is often referred to and is the focus of the performance measurement 
effort. The company does however not outline this aspect in terms of compliance with legal 
obligations, as the organisation’s ‘raison d’être’ (Française des Jeux 2012). Indeed, it is 
explained that it is the gaming model (‘modèle de jeu’) of the FDJ, which gives priority to 
responsible gambling and to the redistribution to charitable causes (Française des Jeux 
2012; Interview 2, 7), two aspects that do include compliance with regulation. An area where 
direct reference to the legal requirement dimension occurs is when the FDJ claims to go 
beyond legal obligations to prevent negative effects such as excessive gambling (Française 
des Jeux 2012). 
The importance of the legal requirement dimension was also underlined at several 
occasions in the interviews (Interview 2, 7). It was clearly indicated that a successful sport 
betting and lottery organisation needs to respect the entirety of the regulatory framework 
(Interview 7). In the absence of a derogation to the general prohibition of games of chance, 
the FDJ would not exist and hence compliance with legal obligations is crucial for the 
company’s survival (Interview 2). One interviewee added that as it holds a monopoly, the 
organisation is accountable to the government to justify the state protection (Interview 7), 
something that further underscores the importance of the legal requirement dimension.  
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Another interviewee went even further in this regard, by arguing that the operator plays the 
role of a second regulator, not by substituting existing regulation, but by directing future 
regulation towards new developments (Interview 2). It is in this spirit that the European 
Lotteries Association, on the initiative of French and Finish operators, developed a few years 
ago a code of conduct for sport betting. This code of conduct has inspired numerous 
legislations, one of them being the French online gambling law of 2010 (Interview 2).  
In short, the legal requirement dimension is very important for the performance definition of 
the FDJ, and this from two angles. First, it is a precondition for any other activities that legal 
obligations are satisfied, or the whole business would be at risk. This means that the legal 
requirement dimension is a so-called ‘prerequisite dimension’. Second, it is also a ‘result 
dimension’ of vital significance for the performance measurement effort, as it calls for a 
mandatory redistribution of profits and measures to prevent gambling addiction. 
V. The social issue participation dimension 
The social issue participation dimension is both quantitatively (54 references in the 
interviews and 45 in the reports) and qualitatively of a very high importance to the 
performance definition of the FDJ.  
Three main indicators were revealed in the data set for the social issue participation 
dimension, the first of them being the voluntary redistribution of profits to sport. The FDJ 
created a foundation over twenty years ago that engages in patronage (Française des Jeux, 
2012; Interview 2, 7). Recently, the Board of Administrators decided to double the budget of 
this foundation to around 4-5% of the annual profits (Interview 2). The second indicator 
illustrating the importance of the social issue participation dimension is made up of 
voluntary measures to prevent and reduce gambling addiction. The FDJ goes beyond the 
mandatory measures (e.g. the legal requirement dimension) and takes various additional 
measures such as the sensitisation of retailers toward gambling problems, or a risk-
evaluation of new products before applying for a license (Française des Jeux 2012; 
Interview 2, 7). For the FDJ the social aspects are embedded in the business and only 
responsible products are developed and offered (Interview 2). For instance, during the 
competition for the design for the scratch ticket ‘poil à gratter’, where the winning picture of 
a pet would be printed on the ticket, a message was circulated, explaining that only adult 
animals were accepted in the competition, in order to underline the fact that games of 
chance are not intended for minors (Interview 2). The third indicator illustrating the 
importance of the social issue participation dimension is made up of voluntary measures 
against match fixing, doping and corruption in sports. In the daily operations of sport bets, 
as soon as abnormal behaviour is detected the sales are stopped (Interview 2). The sport 
betting and lottery business is an economy of trust and redistribution, and the interview 
participants underlined the impossibility of accepting any kind of illegal behaviour which 
would disturbing this confidence (Interview 2, 7). At the same time, such actions are clearly 
also necessary to protect the reputation of the company and to prevent the organisation to 
loose money. Organisations have a financial incentive to stop sport betting activities that are 
under suspicion of being fixed because otherwise they would risk losing money and 
customers. It could be argued that this motivation is hence clearly operational and financial 
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but since the motivation for action is not in focus in this study, it has here been deemed an 
indicator of the social issue participation dimension of performance.  
In summary, the social issue participation dimension has a very important position in regard 
to the performance definition. Interestingly, interviewees insisted that the focus on the social 
issue participation dimension is only possible thanks to the exclusive right attributed to the 
company and the subsequent protection from direct competitors. Operating under a 
competitive framework, the resources invested in the social issue participation dimension 
would be redirected for other aspects (marketing, communication, etc.), something that 
would lower the importance this dimension for the definition of performance (Interview 2, 7).  
VI. The public values dimension 
The public values dimension is quantitatively (10 references in the interviews and 11 in the 
reports) and qualitatively of a low importance to the performance definition of the FDJ. 
Nonetheless, across the data set, several values were mentioned such as integrity and 
security (Française des Jeux 2012; Interview 2, 7). Clearly these values are linked to the 
internal business perspective because they are crucial for risk management and process 
systems. Another value that is worth mentioning is solidarity, and it is mainly linked to the 
mandatory (i.e. legal requirement dimension) and voluntary (i.e. social issue participation 
dimension) redistribution to good causes (Française des Jeux 2012; Interview 7). Equity is 
also seen as a crucial value, and it is mostly related to the promotion of an honest, fair and 
transparent game that serves the public interest. Integrity, solidarity and equity are all values 
directing the business model of the company. These values are arguably also outlined in the 
regulation as an operator is required to ensure the integrity, reliability and transparency of 
the gaming operations (Interview 7). The FDJ incorporates these values and takes a social 
and public perspective, which goes beyond the financial dimension (Interview 2).  
In summary, despite sporadic reference to different values throughout the data set, the 
public values dimension does not appear to be a proper performance dimension, but rather 
an almost hidden element, which guides other processes. The public values dimension is 
consequently often linked to other dimensions, such as the operational, the legal 
requirement or the social issue participation dimensions. 
VII. Concluding remarks: a bottom-up reflection 
In conclusion, the performance definition of the FDJ is multidimensional. First, it is defined in 
terms of the progression of wagers and the redistribution of profits to the different 
beneficiaries, something which points to the financial, legal requirement and social issue 
participation dimensions. Second, it is defined in terms of the offer and the development of 
the offer in each product segment, i.e. the operational and financial dimensions. Third, as 
the key financial report outlines, it focuses on the players, their wagers and their gains as 
well as on the retailers in terms of their number, the location in the national territory, and the 
investments for the modernisation made by retailers, i.e. the operational and financial 
dimensions. Fourth, in regard to social responsibility, seven aspects through which the FDJ 
measures performance are outlined, namely responsibility, human resources, clients, 
partnerships, environment, governance and societal aspects, i.e. the social issue 
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participation, legal requirement and stakeholder management dimensions. Finally, the 
financial report of FDJ (Française des Jeux 2012a) closes with a section on sport financing, 
which can be mandatory (via the profits allocated to the CNDS), i.e. the legal requirement 
dimension, and voluntary (via the foundation created by the FDJ), i.e. the social issue 
participation dimension.  
Three dimensions, namely the financial, the social issue participation and the legal 
requirement dimensions, are of tremendous importance for the performance definition of the 
FDJ, and they are measured based on redistribution (for the financial and legal requirement 
dimensions), and the responsibility needed when offering games of chance (for the legal 
requirement and social issue participation dimensions). Another aspect that is not directly 
detected but which is still present is the idea that the organisation is pursuing a public 
policy and has a strong compliance focus, i.e. the legal requirement dimension. One 
interview participant summarised the performance focus nicely by stating that the FDJ is 
obliged to have a regulatory vision, a commercial vision, a political vision and a social vision, 
because these aspects separate the FDJ from unlicensed operators (Interview 7).  
5.2 THE NORWEGIAN SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR 
5.2.1 The genesis of gambling in Norway 
Gambling has a long tradition in Norway, but its regulation was never in its favour. Since 
hundreds of years, there has been a general prohibition of games of chance, based on the 
Norwegian objective to protect its citizens from the negative effects of gambling 
(Lotteritilsynet 2004: 10). This general prohibition is outlined in the General Civil Penal Code 
section 298 and 299 (Norway 1902). Despite the general prohibition Norway does however 
allow for certain games of chance when authorised. The first legalised gambling was 
introduced when Denmark and Norway were united under the Danish King in 1719, and the 
revenues from these activities were intended for the benefit of orphans. After the 
independence from Denmark, lotteries were regulated under the Act on Lotteries and other 
Games of Chance, dating back to 1851 (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 10). This act prohibited all 
forms of gambling, but created a regime of exceptions for certain games for charity. Hence, 
in 1912, the government granted an authorisation for 15 years for a publicly controlled 
lottery to operate for the benefit of forestry and the fight against tuberculosis. The Act of 17 
July 1925 subsequently extended the lottery. Gambling activities were increased as well, 
and through the Act of 1 July 1927, permission was given to arrange wagers through a 
totalisator linked to horse racing. Licences could only be granted to organisations and 
companies whose objective was support horse sports, horse husbandry and breeding 
(Lotteritilsynet 2004: 10-11).  
As regards to gambling machines, the first were deployed in 1937, and the only legal 
requirement at that time was a police authorisation for business purposes (Lotteritilsynet 
2004: 10-11). As the technological evolution rendered the machines more and more 
electronic and increased the speed of payouts, the legislation was adapted and the 
deployment of gambling machines came to be further defined in the Lottery Act of 1995. As 
a result of this legislation, benevolent and humanitarian organisations were permitted to 
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arrange lotteries, which included operating gaming machines. It was thought that this would 
decrease the deployment of such machines for pure business reasons, but it rather led to 
the emergence of intermediaries, i.e. private companies that operated and deployed the 
machines in agreement with organisations holding a licence. For their efforts they were 
either paid by a part of the profits or on a commission basis (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 11). This 
evolution, combined with an increased focus on gambling problems, called for a stricter 
system for gaming machines, something which resulted in a change in policy. In 2007 Norsk 
Tipping was hence attributed an exclusive licence to entertain such machines, with the 
obligation to reduce them in numbers, restrict their presence to certain places and to 
eliminate certain risk-elements from the machines (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 11).  
At present the Norwegian gambling market is completely run by state owned enterprises. 
Norsk Tipping offers sport betting and lottery games, and shortly also online casinos, while 
Norsk Rikstoto offers various types of horse betting. 
5.2.2 The current gambling regulation 
As illustrated, in Norway, money games are prohibited in general under General Civil Penal 
Code sections 298 and 299 (Norway 1902). Derogation from the general principle of 
prohibition is possible if authorised by the government. Therefore, a system of exclusive 
licences allowing some form of legal gambling is in place for horse race betting, sport 
betting and lotteries.  
TABLE 25: THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES OF CHANCE IN NORWAY 
                                                
68 Lov-1902-05-22-10 Almindelig borgerlig Straffelov (Straffeloven). Unofficial translation: 
http://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Norway_General%20Civil%20Penal%20Code.pdf. 
69 Author’s translation of: Lov-1995-02-24-11 Lov om lotterier m.v. (lotteriloven). 
70 Author’s translation of: Lov-1992-08-28-103 lov om pengespill m.v. (pengespilloven). 
71 Author’s translation of: Lov-1927-07-01-3 Lov om veddemaal ved totalisator (totalisatorloven). 
General Logic 
General prohibition of games of chance under General Civil Penal Code.68 But 
allowing for exceptions when authorised by government. 
Sectors Lottery Betting 
Sub sectors - Sport betting Horse race betting 
Legal basis:    
Retail 
& 
Online 
Lottery Act 199569 
Gaming Act 199270 
Lottery Act 1995 
Gaming Act 1992 
Lottery Act 1995 
Tote Act 192771 
Operator:   
Retail 
& 
Online 
Norsk Tipping Norsk Rikstoto 
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Three different laws regulate the legal gambling in Norway. The Tote Act of 1927 regulates 
all horse race betting exclusively operated by Norsk Rikstoto. The Lottery Act of 1995 
regulates gaming in general and all lotteries that can be organised by charitable and 
humanitarian organisations, when authorised (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 12). With the exception of 
one game (‘the extra game’) this law does not apply to Norsk Tipping. Games of chance 
operated by Norsk Tipping are regulated by the Gaming Act of 1992 (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 
12). Casinos have always been, and still are, forbidden in Norway.  
A consequence of the three laws regulating the exceptions to the general principle 
prohibiting gambling is a dual approach, with sport betting and lottery on one side and 
horse race betting on the other (Lotteritilsynet 2004). The territorial reach of these two 
gambling sectors is nation-wide. The current licence holder allowed operating horse race 
betting games is Norsk Rikstoto. Norsk Rikstoto is an independent foundation created in 
1982 by the Norwegian Trotting Association and the Norwegian Jockey Club, and it 
operates a broad range of horse race betting games (Lotteritilsynet 2004). The Ministry of 
Agriculture administers the Tote Act and the profits are used, among other things, for horse 
breeding (Norway 1927: article 1). On the other hand, a single state operator named Norsk 
Tipping exploits the sport betting and lottery sector. It is the regulation of this organisation 
that is in the focus of the next sections. 
The objectives of the government with regard to the regulation of lotteries are outlined in 
article 1a of the Lottery Act, where they are stated as being to ensure that lotteries are held 
under secure circumstances and under public control in order to prevent negative social 
consequences, as well as to ensure that revenues are used for social and humanitarian work 
(Norway 1995). The government assumes that to channel the desire to gamble into an offer 
operated by public organisations is the most efficient way to achieve these objectives, as 
such gambling is secure and under full control and supervision by the state (Lotteritilsynet 
2004: 12-14).  
The way ‘lotteries’ are defined in the Norwegian legislation they not only refer to lottery 
games and scratch tickets but also to betting- and casino style games, and is therefore akin 
to a general definition of games of chance (Norway 1995: article 1a). The delimitation of 
games of chance from games of skill is based on the need for a stake, the chance to win a 
prize based partially or totally on luck. It is also worth highlighting that the article concerning 
the objectives of the regulation explicitly refers to the economic interest of the state in the 
games of chance, as it is outlined that it will provide revenues for social and humanitarian 
purposes (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 12). On first sight this economic objective could be argued to 
be inadmissible under EU law based on the article 49—freedom of establishment—and the 
article 56—freedom to provide cross border services of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
EU. Though Norway is not part of the EU, it is member of the European Economic Area 
allowing the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to participate in most aspects in the 
internal market of the EU, which means that the question of the inadmissibility of the 
Norwegian law could be raised. Indeed, the Norwegian regulation has been contested 
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before EFTA courts, where it was argued by Ladbrokes72 to be incompatible with EEA 
agreements corresponding to the free movement of services of the EU (Anderson et al. 
2012). The EFTA courts confirmed the compatibility of the Norwegian legislation with the 
EEA agreement however (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 12).73  
I. The regulatory scope of the sport betting and lottery regulation 
As mentioned, two different laws touch the sport betting and lottery sectors in Norway: the 
Lottery Act of 1995 which is also pertinent for other gambling activities, and the Gaming Act 
of 1992, which applies exclusively to the games operated by Norsk Tipping.  
The market structure of the Norwegian sport betting and lottery sector is based on a 
government approved monopoly. Indeed, the Gaming Act of 1992 attributes the right to 
operate sport betting and lottery games to one organisation (Anderson et al. 2012). The 
regulatory reach of the sport betting and lottery regulation is not limited to the market 
structure but has a wider scope. The regulatory regime establishes a specific public use of 
money as outlined in article 10 of the Gaming Act (Norway 1992). Following amendments in 
2002 to the Gaming Act, Norsk Tipping’s profits are allocated in equal parts to culture and 
sport. The government redistributes the funds for sports. Two thirds of the cultural funds are 
redistributed by the parliament, and the rest by the government. In a report of the 
Norwegian Gaming Board the new redistribution key is given as 45.5% to sports, 36.5% for 
culture and 18% to humanitarian organisations and organisations benefiting society 
(Lotteritilsynet 2004: 18-19). For example, the proceeds from the so-called ‘Extra’ game go 
to health and rehabilitation and were in 2011 of 223.7 million Norwegian krones (NOK) 
(Norsk Tipping 2012: 1). Similarly, the profits of the VinnVinn scratch card were allocated to 
the ten biggest humanitarian organisations in Norway (Norsk Tipping 2012: 1). And very 
innovatively, the Grassroots Share allows the customer to decide over an amount equal to 
five per cent of the stake what team or association they want to support (Norsk Tipping 
2012: 1). The profits from the game ‘Extra’ are to be allocated by the charitable foundation 
Health and Rehabilitation, which allocates the funds in equal shares to projects for 
preventative measures, rehabilitation and research (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 18). The annual 
report of Norsk Tipping outlines that the ordinary profits of 3.33 billion NOK and the returns 
from investments of 260 million NOK were used for the benefit of good causes (Norsk 
Tipping 2012: 1).  
The juridical form of the company is imposed by law, which stipulates that it has to be a 
public enterprise (Norway 1992: article 3). Norsk Tipping was established in 1946 and is 
since 1993 de jure and de facto a fully state owned limited liability company (Lotteritilsynet 
2004: 11). In the annual report of the organisation, it is written “Norsk Tipping is a 
corporation owned 100 per cent by the government” (Norsk Tipping 2012: 1). All games and 
gaming rules are subject to ministry approval. The report of the organisation also states that 
                                                
72 See EFTA court rulings: e.g. Judgment of 30 May 2007, Ladbrokes Ltd. v the Government of 
Norway. 
73 For further information see Anderson et al. (2012); Littler (2011b); Littler et al. (2011). 
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“the Minister of Culture functions as the company’s general assembly, and the profits are 
distributed by the Ministry of Culture” (Norsk Tipping 2012: 1). For all of these reasons, the 
organisation incorporates a high degree of publicness, and even more so as the Board is 
composed of at least five members all appointed by the King for a period of two years 
(Norway 1992: article 6). The Board than appoints the president and determines the wager 
and other conditions. The CEO participates in Board meetings, but without voting rights 
(Norway 1992: article 6).  
The regulatory scope of sport betting and lottery sector 
Market structure  Monopoly created by the government  
Regulatory reach Broader than market structure 
Specific public use of money Total of profits used for good causes 
Type of ownership Imposed 
Publicness High 
TABLE 26: RSC SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR NORWAY 
II. The regulatory stringency of the Norwegian sport betting and lottery regulation 
a. The regulator level 
The Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs administers the Gaming Act (Lotteritilsynet 2004). 
The Lottery Act establishes a Gaming Board and a Lottery Complaints Board (Norway 1995) 
competent for the integral gambling sectors, hence including Norsk Tipping AS and Norsk 
Rikstoto gaming (Lotteritilsynet 2004: 13). In 2001 a new state supervisory entity for lotteries 
and betting games was created, named the Gaming Board. The Gaming Board monitors the 
implementation and correct application of the three laws. It is also responsible for the 
design of the games in regard to their potential to trigger gambling problems. In regard to 
the competences, the Gaming Board authorises en amont the operator and approves en 
aval each game that the licence holders aim to operate. For each game the Gaming Board 
defines the payout-rates to the players. The Gaming Board can also withdraw authorisations 
and granted permits, and impose coercive fines (Norway, 1995, section 14). It even acts as 
the administrative appeal body for police decisions in the frame of the Lottery Act 
(Lotteritilsynet 2004: 13). The Lottery Appeal Board is the administrative instance litigating 
appeals against decisions of the Lottery Gaming Board (Norway 1995: section 4). In regard 
to illegal gambling, the Norwegian Gaming Board has competences in the matter, and 
collaborates closely with the police to tackle illegal gambling (Norwegian Gaming Board 
2004).  
TABLE 27: RS I SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR NORWAY 
b. The organisational level 
The stringency of the regulation is not only influenced by the mere presence of the regulator 
and its competences but also by the restrictions imposed on the organisation. The 
regulation has several impacts on the business activity of Norsk Tipping.  
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting and lottery sector: the level of the regulator 
Presence of a regulator  Yes, the Lotteritilsynet (Gambling Board) 
Competences of regulator Large 
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The first element is in regard to distribution channels. Norsk Tipping is allowed to offer 
remote gambling and will soon offer casino style games on the internet (Interview 3). It is 
argued that in this way it meets its objectives to channel gambling activities away from 
illegal gambling, and towards legal gambling. Any form of remote gambling needs 
authorisation by the Gaming Board (Interview 3).  
In regard to advertisement restrictions, the company is allowed to advertise its games. The 
regulation does not restrict advertisement by authorised operators but does not allow illegal 
operators to advertise their games. Responsible gambling objectives are important and the 
regulation establishes several obligations concerning gambling addiction. As mentioned, the 
profits made from the ‘Extra’ game are allocated to a health foundation that in turn 
attributes them to projects in the area of prevention, treatment and research on gambling 
problems. The Gaming Act stipulates that machine gambling is not for people under 18 
years and that the ministry can also establish age limitations for other games (Lotteritilsynet 
2004: 44). Norsk Tipping has introduced stricter regulation on its own accord, by applying 
an 18-year age limit on all of its games and has also voluntarily limited the stakes allowed. 
Moreover, the organisation is actively working for the prevention of gambling problems 
through mandatory limitations of the wagers for all people using the internet offer. Each 
player has to pre-define his or her budget, and in case of modifications a player has to wait 
for 24 hours before playing again (Interview 3).  
The regulatory stringency of sport betting and lottery sector: the organisational level 
Distribution channel restrictions  Yes 
Advertisement restrictions Moderate 
Obligations in regard to gambling addiction High 
TABLE 28: RS II SPORT BETTING AND LOTTERY SECTOR NORWAY 
In summary, the Norwegian regulation is one of prohibition, and it provides a strict 
framework for games of chance. The reasons behind this strict regulation are the inherent 
risks associated with gambling, such as gambling addiction and criminal behaviour like 
match fixing, money laundering or fraud in general. The Norwegian government has close 
ties with the gambling operators and the operator itself follows a policy of strict control and 
prevention measures. It is believed that there is a need for a strong attractive offer in order 
to channel consumers of illegal gambling towards the legal gambling offers operated by 
Norsk Tipping (interview 3). This is also one of the reasons why Norsk Tipping will soon offer 
casino style games on the internet.  
Having thus presented and discussed the regulatory intensity of the Norwegian sport betting 
and lottery sector, the next section will elaborate on the performance interpretation of Norsk 
Tipping.  
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5.2.3 The performance definition of Norsk Tipping 
The qualitative analysis of the interviews and reports draw a multidimensional picture of the 
performance definition of Norsk Tipping, as illustrated in the following table. 
Occurrence and evaluation of 
dimensions 
Interviews Reports of Organisation 
 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Financial dimension 31 ++ 48 ++ 
Operational dimension 47 + 74 + 
Stakeholder management dimension 22 = 19 = 
Legal requirement dimension 34 ++ 31 ++ 
Social issue participation dimension 51 ++ 34 ++ 
Public values dimension 11 - 1 -- 
Total 195  207  
Legend:  ++ very high importance  + high importance  = neutral importance 
   - low importance   -- very low importance 
TABLE 29: OCCURRENCE AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS OF NORSK TIPPING 
Despite the multidimensionality of the performance definition, some of the dimensions are 
more important than others. The financial dimension, the legal requirement dimension and 
the social issue dimension are of a particularly high priority for the performance evaluation, 
even though, especially for the latter two dimensions, they are only implicitly expressed in 
the data set. 
I. The financial dimension 
The financial dimension is quantitatively (48 occurrences in the reports and 31 occurrences 
in the interviews) and qualitatively of a very high importance for the performance definition 
of Norsk Tipping. 
The importance of the financial dimension is clear in the annual report, which opens with the 
quote of the CEO: “records made yet again in 2011” (Norsk Tipping 2012: 3). The profits 
made and their redistribution to players in the form of winnings and to charity are key 
focuses of Norsk Tipping (Norsk Tipping 2012; Interview 3, 13). In the case of Norway, 
redistribution is mandatory, though Norsk Tipping also spontaneously supports some 
activities in the local community (i.e. voluntary redistribution).  
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Interestingly, the financial dimension is linked throughout the data set to other dimensions. 
Profits are not realised at the expense of the legal requirement dimension (i.e. mandatory 
measures of responsible gambling) or of the social issue participation dimension (i.e. 
voluntary responsible gambling measures) (Norsk Tipping 2012). The market share is 
another important indicator for the financial dimension, and it is also linked to other 
dimensions, such as the operational dimension (i.e. product development and innovation) 
and the social issue participation and legal requirement dimensions. The latter since it is a 
main objective to increase the market share and hence to channel gambling towards legal 
offers (Interview 3, 12). Another link can be observed between the financial dimension and 
the operational dimension, since an attractive offer is needed in order to increase the market 
shares, and this will increase the bottom-line for charitable causes (e.g. legal requirement 
dimension) (Interview 3).  
An interesting aspect is also that the organisation a few years ago followed a strategy very 
similar to that of the illegal operators currently offering their products in Norway over the 
internet (Interview 12). Indeed, Norsk Tipping was developing new games similar to those 
operated by these companies. There was then an increased focus on profits and the 
financial performance, something which resulted in the monopoly being challenged before 
the EFTA courts. Consequently, the organisation stepped back, and instead aligned its 
success criteria more with the legal aspects that would defend the monopoly (Interview 12). 
Gambling addiction was another reason for this strategic reorientation, as Norsk Tipping is 
very careful that financial results are not realised at the costs of its responsibility in this 
regard (Interview 12). 
In summary, financial performance is very important for Norsk Tipping but not the primary 
objective. Norsk Tipping does not aim to make profits at any price, and—indeed—this 
would in any case not be possible, as too aggressive a strategy would question the state 
protection of the sector. 
II. The operational dimension 
The operational dimension is quantitatively (74 occurrences in the reports and 47 codes 
occurrences in the interviews) and qualitatively evaluated an important dimension for the 
performance definition of Norsk Tipping. 
Especially the customer perspective is very important and customer acquisition is a key 
performance indicator. In the strategic plan, the company wants to acquire 150 000 new 
customers by 2015, something which is linked to the goal of increasing the market share to 
70% (Norsk Tipping 2012: 11; Interview 3). Adverts are crucial in order to reach these 
targets, as is a successful channelling of illegal gambling towards the legal games offered 
by Norsk Tipping (Norsk Tipping 2012: 16; Interview 13). Despite a high marketing activity, 
the guidelines for government-controlled games are strictly followed and a marketing code 
of conduct exists. Moreover, compared to 2010, less spending was made on marketing in 
2011 (Norsk Tipping 2012: 16). Norsk Tipping’s market strategy—compared to that of the 
illegal operators present on the online market—is said to be reasonable and dictated by 
responsible gambling reflections (Interview 3). Customer satisfaction is another important 
 142 
aspect of the organisation and it is something that is constantly reviewed in customer 
surveys (Norsk Tipping 2012: 16; Interview 3).  
Interestingly, the customer perspective is closely linked to the learning and growth 
perspective and the internal business process perspective. A core focus of the organisation 
is to improve the attractiveness of the game portfolio (Interview 3). Therefore products are 
constantly renewed, more matches are offered, live betting is introduced and distribution 
channels enlarged (e.g. through mobile devices) in order to give the player the opportunity 
to play wherever he or she is (Interview 3). The Ministry of Culture and the Norwegian 
Gaming Authority approved the plans of Norsk Tipping for some online casino games in 
2011, something which will probably be launched by the end of 2013. For the first time, the 
state owned company will thus offer casino style games on the internet, and only there 
(Interview 3). Being creative and innovative is arguably important for Norsk Tipping in order 
to live up to customer expectations, and this with an active contribution from the players. 
For instance, as mentioned, customers can choose the type of charity to support with a 
fixed percentage of their stakes in the Grassroots game (Norsk Tipping 2012: 18; Interview 
3). 
In regard to the internal business process perspective, several developments have been 
undertaken. An internal restructuring process was launched in the autumn of 2011. This 
effort targeted an increased business and customer orientation. A bigger focus was thus 
placed on the competences of the human resources, in order to have the right people at the 
right places to reach the goals of increased business and customer orientation (Norsk 
Tipping 2012: 12; Interview 3). Moreover, various internal management systems were 
improved or established: the responsibility platform was improved, for example through the 
introduction of a better monitoring system of the gaming behaviour of customers (Norsk 
Tipping 2012: 6, 7, 9, 16 etc.; Interview 3). In a similar effort, the ID and payment system 
was improved. The internal business process perspective can thus be said to be in constant 
management focus of the management, and this in turn contributes to the customer 
perspective and the financial dimension (Norsk Tipping 2012: 6; Interview 3).  
In summary, the operational dimension is very important in the Norwegian setting, and as it 
is seen as enhancing future financial performance it is definitely also linked to the financial 
dimension. Further linkages are observed to the legal requirement (e.g. mandatory measures 
to prevent gambling problems) and to the social issue participation dimensions (e.g. 
voluntary measures to reduce gambling problems).  
III. The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension is quantitatively (19 references in reports and 22 in 
the interviews) and qualitatively of neutral importance to the performance definition of Norsk 
Tipping.  
The quotations detected refer to different stakeholder management issues where 
performance is evaluated, often through the use of indicators. The improvement of the 
ecological footprint by reducing the paper used and other emissions is one aspect 
evaluated (Interview 13). An effort is also intended in order to follow a separate 
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environmental policy for the company in the future (Norsk Tipping 2012: 17-18). Moreover 
relationships with retailers and sales bodies are close, and a conference has for example 
been held to meet retail partners and sales representatives. The sales segment accounts for 
the majority of sales and it was hence seen as important to get their feedback (Norsk 
Tipping 2012). Next to the relation with the stakeholder group of the retailers, the employees 
are also an important stakeholder group. Employee satisfaction is put in focus as the 
organisation arguably makes effort to generate a good working environment (Norsk Tipping 
2012). Despite tight relationships with stakeholders, the performance of the stakeholder 
management dimension is only marginally measured.  
One important question is whether or not to include the beneficiaries of the profits in the 
stakeholder management dimension. As discussed, beneficiaries can be placed in this 
dimension when they are shareholders profiting and investing in the organisation to increase 
future profits. In the Norwegian case, this does not apply and the beneficiaries do therefore 
not fall in this dimension. However, for the organisation they are argued to be important 
stakeholders, and this especially in the case of sport organisations. This is also linked to the 
fact that the organisation interacts actively with humanitarian and sport organisations in 
product development (Interview 3). So, in this regard they are clearly stakeholders and 
partners in product developments, as the latter hopefully increases the future profit of the 
organisation. The stakeholder management dimension is a prerequisite to satisfy society, 
and to contribute to the positive image of the company. In case the organisation fails, its 
image would be hurt, something that the regulator would not be likely to appreciate, and 
consequently intervene (Interview 3).  
In summary, the stakeholder management dimension is not a core focus of the performance 
concept of the company. It is often linked, more or less indirectly, to other dimensions, such 
as the financial dimension, or the stakeholder management dimension. 
IV. The legal requirement dimension 
The legal requirement dimension is quantitatively (34 references in the interviews and 31 in 
the reports) and qualitatively of a very high importance to the performance definition of 
Norsk Tipping.  
The importance of mandatory redistribution (e.g. the legal requirement dimension) for the 
performance definition is already apparent on the first pages of the annual report (Norsk 
Tipping 2012: 3). By law, the organisation has to redistribute its profits and to be 
responsible, not only in regard to gambling addiction but also in regard to fraud, money 
laundering and illegal gambling (Interview 3, 12). The regulation obliges Norsk Tipping to 
offer responsible and attractive games, and to give the proceeds to charity (Norsk Tipping 
2012; Interview 3, 12). This also highlights a second element of importance to the company: 
responsibility. Responsible gaming is said to guide the business activity (Interview 12), and 
although the annual report and during the interviews, the words ‘responsibility’ or 
‘responsible’ were common (Norsk Tipping 2012; Interview 3, 12). Indeed, that the 
organisation acts and operates games of chance in a responsible way is also a legal 
requirement, and it is the ‘raison d’être’ of the monopoly. 
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A third indicator of the legal requirement dimension that often occurs in the data set is the 
fight against illegal gambling. The strategy in this regard is that an attractive offer will 
channel gambling behaviour towards the legal operator (Interview 12). The organisation 
assumes a very proactive stance towards the regulation, voluntarily taking many initiatives 
(Interview 3; 12). Hence, the voluntary measures in regard to responsible gambling and the 
fight against illegal gambling are indicators of the social issue participation dimension.  
In summary, the legal requirement dimension is a prerequisite dimension, as disrespect 
would result in the closure of the business. Moreover all games and gaming rules are 
subject to approval by the ministry (Norsk Tipping 2012: 15, 16, 31 etc.) As mentioned, the 
legal requirement dimension is highly important for the performance definition and this is 
mainly illustrated by three indicators: mandatory redistribution to charity, mandatory 
measures in regard to gambling addiction and voluntary efforts to prevent illegal gambling.  
V. The social issue participation dimension 
The social issue participation dimension is quantitatively (51 references in the interviews and 
34 in the reports) and qualitatively of a very high importance to the performance definition of 
Norsk Tipping. 
Three main indicators illustrate the importance of the social issue participation dimension. 
First, the social issue participation dimension relates to voluntary measures to combat illegal 
gambling, doping and match fixing. For the latter, for instance, Norsk Tipping is in a working 
group on match fixing with sports organisations and the department of sport (Norsk Tipping 
2012; Interview 3). In regard to illegal gambling, Norsk Tipping outlines that an attractive 
offer is an important tool to channel gambling behaviour from illegal to legal games (Norsk 
Tipping 2012: 16; Interview 3). Hence, the social issue participation dimension is linked to 
the operational- and financial dimensions.  
A second indicator, though of a far smaller degree, is voluntary redistribution. This is only 
possible to a limited extent as the mandatory redistribution already uses all profits for 
charity, leaving the organisation with close to no leeway for voluntary redistribution. 
Nonetheless, some money is occasionally allocated to projects in the local community 
(Interview 3, 13).  
Third, and most importantly, the voluntary measures to prevent gambling addiction are a 
main indicator for the social issue participation dimension (Norsk Tipping 2012; Interview 3, 
13). The list of measures in this regard is long and comprises for example a risk evaluation 
of all new games, an obligation that all players have to register and acquire a player card, 
the voluntary introduction of the age limit of 18 years for all games, the setting of loss 
limitations by the players that apply to all sales channels, the possibility to reduce the loss 
limitations when pre-defined (e.g. Multix and Belago), adjustments of limitations online 
followed by a 24 hours break, staff training and training of the employees of retail partners, 
and regular meetings with professional institutions of gambling problems (Norsk Tipping 
2012; Interview 3,12). Very interestingly, Norsk Tipping can analyse gambling behaviours of 
customers through the information from the playing card. At present Norsk Tipping has 
observed that there are few players who play large sums, and who are using the global 
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limitations to a maximum. Considering that these customers are at risk, they are closely 
observed by the organisation (Interview 3). In 2013 a monitoring system for responsible 
gaming will be established in order to get even more data on a monthly basis (Interview 3). 
The performance of Norsk Tipping in regard to responsible gambling is measured on an 
annual basis with KPIs (Interview 3). To actually measure performance of these activities 
and not only undertaking them, is indicative of the high importance of the social issue 
participation dimension for the performance definition of Norsk Tipping. 
In summary, Norsk Tipping is highly committed to the social issue participation dimension, 
and particularly responsible gambling, which it places in the centre of the performance 
measurement effort (Norsk Tipping 2012; Interview 3). 
VI. The public values dimension 
The public values dimension is quantitatively and qualitatively found to be of low importance 
in the interviews (11 references). Similarly, the evaluation of the quotations in the reports 
also reveals a very low occurrence of this dimension, if not a complete absence. 
The lack of references in the data set indicates that the public values dimension is not a 
performance dimension for Norsk Tipping. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the data 
suggests that certain such values are important when it comes to guiding the business 
processes and the behaviour of the organisation. Values that are constantly in focus of 
Norsk Tipping are security and transparency in regard to internal processes (Norsk Tipping 
2012; Interview 3, 12), and they can therefore be linked to the operational dimension. The 
data set suggests that the public values dimension is a dissatisfier for the organisation: a 
few years ago Norsk Tipping was struggling when it pursued a more aggressive business 
strategy and the values were less respected (Interview 13). Hence, after the re-orientation 
towards a more balanced strategy, public values have been placed in a central focus in 
order to build up the reputation and foster a robust organisation. At present, the 
organisation respects these values, which is why they are in less direct focus (Interview 3). 
One interviewee also added that as soon problems would occur in this regard, the focus 
would be likely to shift towards public values again (Interview 3). 
In summary, the public values dimension guides processes and the behaviour of the 
organisation but does not actually constitute a performance dimension per se. Moreover, 
such values are mostly outlined in relation to other dimensions such as the operational or 
the legal requirement dimensions. 
VII. Concluding remarks: a bottom-up reflection 
In conclusion, the performance definition of Norsk Tipping is multidimensional, with a strong 
focus on three dimensions: the financial, the social issue participation and the legal 
requirement dimensions. 
The analysis has revealed five groups of indicator that occur frequently in the data set. The 
first such group is defined in terms of progression of wagers and the redistribution of profits, 
cash flows, gross sales, number of active players, number of prizes or average sales per 
player, something which points to the financial, legal requirement and social issue 
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participation dimensions. A second group uses terms like the offer and the progression of 
the offer in each product segment, i.e. the operational and financial dimensions. Third, the 
market share is of high importance for the performance measurement. Fourth, in regard to 
social responsibility several aspects are measured based on the information on the player 
cards, and this in order to closely monitor players and to conduct research in the matter of 
gambling problems, something which points to the social issue participation dimension. 
Fifth, indicators are also developed mainly based on the GRI for the environment, 
employees’ health and satisfaction. 
The three dimensions that dominate the performance definition Norsk Tipping relate 
particularly to redistribution (e.g. the financial and legal requirement dimensions) and the 
responsibility in offering games of chance and the paybacks to society (e.g. the legal 
requirement and social issue participation dimensions). Another aspect that is not directly 
detected but which is still present is the idea that the organisation pursues a public policy 
by channelling illegal games towards the legal gambling offer in Norway, in order to achieve 
this target it is of tremendous importance to maintain an attractive offer that can compete 
with the illegal products offered to Norwegian citizens (Interview 3). 
5.3 THE DUTCH SPORT BETTING, INSTANT LOTTERIES AND LOTTO SECTOR 
5.3.1 The genesis of gambling in the Netherlands 
Games of chance and gambling regulation in the Netherlands (NL) know an ancient history. 
The first signs of active gambling in the NL were found on walls and vases and date back 
more than 40’000 years (Anderson et al. 2012: 176). Gambling regulation on the other hand 
dates back to the early 18th century when lotteries were used to fund political campaigns 
(Huls 2002: 5). Before a regulation was established, gambling addiction and its 
consequences were a topic of societal debate and it was believed that legalised gambling 
would prevent such negative externalities. This resulted in the establishment of the Dutch 
State Lottery in 1726 (Anderson et al. 2012: 176).  
In the 19th and 20th centuries games of chance were regulated through criminal law (Huls 
2007: 69-79). In the beginning, the State Lottery was operating in competition with several 
private lotteries. A century later, in 1848, a general prohibition on lotteries was established 
but it did not apply to the state lottery, something which therefore ensued in a state 
monopoly. Today, the Dutch State Lottery is the oldest still operating lottery in the world 
(Anderson 2012 et al. 2012: 176). In 1905 the sector was opened up, through a legislation 
that allowed other lotteries for charitable purposes, but until 1961 only prizes in form of 
goods and services were allowed. Horse race betting was very popular in the NL since the 
18th century onwards, but it was banned in 1911 (Anderson 2012 et al.: 177). Horse race 
betting was legalised again in 1949 under a Totalisator Act, which also introduced a 
monopoly system (Anderson et al. 2012). 
The system of games of chance was consolidated in the Betting and Gaming Act (BGA) in 
1964. The BGA reunited the lotteries (state owned and licensed private charity lotteries), 
sport betting (football pool) and horse race betting under the same umbrella (Anderson et al. 
2012: 178). Hence the BGA initially applied to the state lottery, charitable lotteries, sports— 
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and horse race betting. The BGA was several times amended for instance in 1974 in order 
to also include lotto and casino games in the monopoly system (Littler & Franssen 2012). In 
1976 not only the first lotto draw took place but also the first casino was opened in the city 
of Zandvoort (Littler & Franssen 2012). Similarly, in 1994 more amendments to the BGA 
resulted in a monopoly for instant lotteries (Littler et al. 2011). On 1 January 1996 the Dutch 
Gaming Control Board was established in order to advice the Ministry of Justice in regard to 
the gambling monopolies (Littler & Franssen 2012). In 2000, the BGA was further modified in 
order to update the slot machine legislation, including linked jackpots and multi players for 
arcades. The arcades were hence transformed into slot casinos. In the same year the 
government wished to review the gaming regulation in order to liberalise the gambling 
market. However, this plan was not realised as only few years later a new government 
followed a more restrictive gambling policy, keeping the monopolies system for the different 
types of games (Anderson et al. 2012).  
5.3.2 The current gambling regulation 
The BGA of 1964 is still the main law regarding games of chance in the NL (Diaconu 2010: 
27). Games of chance are generally forbidden unless the operator holds a license issued by 
the Dutch authorities (Netherlands 1964: article 3(1)). The only licences that can be granted 
are specific types of games of chances mentioned in the Act of 1964. The recognised 
exclusive licence types are lottery (Netherlands 1964: 9(1)), good causes’ lotteries 
(Netherlands 1964: 3(1)) (including a bank giro lottery, a national postcode lottery and a 
sponsor bingo lottery), instant lotteries (Netherlands 1964: 14b(1)), sports betting 
(Netherlands 1964: 16(1), lotto (Netherlands 1964: 27b(1)), horse betting (Netherlands 1964: 
24) and casinos (Netherlands 1964: 27h(1)) (Littler & Franssen 2012). Non-exclusive licences 
can be granted for small-scale charitable lotteries. The State Lottery and Holland casinos 
hold permanent licences whereas the other exclusive licences are issued for a period of five 
years (Netherlands 1964: 27h(1)). Even though the act is silent in regard to online gambling 
licences some of the retail licence holders are allowed to operate their games online (Littler 
& Franssen 2012). The following table provides an overview of the main gambling sectors 
and the laws they are based on. 
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General Logic General prohibition of games of chance under the Betting and Gaming Act of 
1964.74 But allowing for exceptions when licensed by government. 
Sectors Lottery Betting Casino 
Sub sectors - Sport betting Horse race betting - 
Legal basis:     
Retail 
& 
Online 
Betting and 
Gaming Act of 
1964 
Betting and 
Gaming Act of 
1964 
Betting and 
Gaming Act of 
1964 
Betting and 
Gaming Act of 
1964 
Operator:    
Retail 
Holland Casino 
Online 
De 
Staatsloterij 
(the State 
Lottery) 
De Lotto (instant lotteries 
(not online); lotto and 
sport betting) 
Sportech Racing 
PLC  
Prohibited 
TABLE 30: THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES OF CHANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
The BGA is silent on the objectives of the regulation (Netherlands 1964). Nonetheless the 
Minister of Justice reports every few years to the lower house of Parliament. The 2005 such 
report summarises the objectives of the gambling regulation as being the regulation and 
control of gambling, with particular attention to combating gambling addiction, the 
protection of the consumer and the fight against illegal gambling and criminality 
(Netherlands 2006). In the 2012 proposal of the Secretary of State for Security and Justice 
to reorganise the regulatory regime, these objectives were later confirmed (Netherlands 
2012). Furthermore, the objectives have also been affirmed in various court proceedings, 
both on a Dutch and a European level (Littler & Franssen 2012).  
In regard to the delimitation of games of chance, it is not explicitly provided, but Article 1(a) 
of the BGA mentions that without a licence under the act it is prohibited to engage in games 
of chance, defined as competitions for prizes or premiums, where the outcome is 
determined by chance and can in general not be influenced by the participants (Littler & 
Franssen 2012). Rather interestingly and contrary to many other jurisdictions, this definition 
is not conditioned by the need to have placed a stake before participation. The degree of 
chance needed is not clear (Littler & Franssen 2012). This is illustrated by a recent debate 
with regard to Poker, a game which used to be considered a game of chance and that was 
only offered in casinos (Littler & Franssen 2012). In 2010 the District Court of The Hague 
held that poker is not a game of chance under the current legislation (Netherlands 2010). 
This does not imply that chance has no role to play in determining the outcome of poker 
games but rather that it cannot be shown ‘in general’ that it plays the role required to fall 
under the definition of the BGA (Littler & Franssen 2012). However, as an appeal is pending, 
poker is still considered a game of chance and therefore continues to be offered only in 
casinos (Littler & Franssen 2012). 
Article 27g BGA provides the legal basis to offer casino games in the NL while article 27h(1) 
BGA establishes the basis for the licence (Littler & Franssen 2012). The sole casino licence75 
                                                
74 Author’s translation of: Wet van 10 december 1964, houdende nadere regelen met betrekking tot 
kansspelen. 
75 In Dutch: Beschikking Casinospelen 1996 Nationale Stichting tot Exploitatie van Casinospelen. 
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is issued to Holland Casino that operates fourteen casinos (Netherlands 1964). In January 
2011 governmental plans privatise Holland Casino and breaking up the monopoly were 
made public (Interview 1). Holland Casino allocates all net profits to the state, with the 
exception of amounts allocated to its equity (Littler & Franssen 2012). Slot machines are 
also allowed outside of casinos when licensed. The machines can only be operated in 
relation to cafés and restaurants where no further activities are found, or in gaming arcades. 
Licences are non-exclusive and for a limited or unlimited period of time (Littler & Franssen 
2012).  
The lottery sector in the NL is composed of the State Lottery76 and a number of charitable 
lotteries. The Ministry of Justice has issued the licence to the foundation for the Exploitation 
of the Dutch State Lottery (Littler & Franssen 2012).77 The State Lottery holds the licence for 
an unlimited period of time. The State Lottery is regulated by Title II of the BGA, which 
specifies that only one licence can be granted and that 60% of the stakes must be paid 
back to players under the form of winnings (Netherlands 1964: 9(1)). The licence cannot be 
transferred to any other entity than the licence holder. Moreover only the latter is allowed to 
sell, offer, distribute or promote the lottery products of the State Lottery. The profits of the 
State Lottery are remitted to the exchequer (Anderson et al. 2012: 183).  
Besides the State Lottery, charitable lotteries are permitted and they can apply for a five 
years licence with the specific purpose to raise funds for charitable purposes (Netherlands 
1964: 3). At least 50% of the sales revenues must be used for charitable causes and the 
licensee decides on the distribution of the revenues (Littler & Franssen 2012). For all lottery 
operators, online gambling is not mentioned in the BGA but outlined in the individual licence 
terms. Neither the licence for the State Lottery nor the licences for the charitable lotteries 
expressly state online gambling as possible. But as the operators need to submit the 
participation rules to the Minister of Justice for approval, it may be possible to operate the 
games of chance also online if they include a reference to online gambling in their 
submission (Littler & Franssen 2012). Aside from the State Lottery and charitable lotteries, 
De Lotto offers lotto games and instant lottery in form of scratch tickets (Littler & Franssen 
2012).  
Horse race betting is regulated in articles 23 to 27 of the BGA and is subject to a monopoly. 
Further conditions are enumerated in the Totalisator licence.78 Only one licence can be 
issued for horse race betting, and it is always valid for a period of five years, though renewal 
is possible. The present licence holder is the Scientific Games Racing, which operates horse 
race betting in the NL since 1 July 1998. In October 2010, Sportech Racing PLC acquired 
Scientific Games Racing and is now operating under the Dutch licence (Littler & Franssen 
2012). They can also operate online wagering as the operation through direct electronic 
channels is allowed in the licence (‘e-commerce’).  
                                                
76 Author’s translation of: De Staatsloterij. 
77 In Dutch: Stichting Exploitatie Nederlandse Staatsloterij. 
78 In Dutch: Beschikking van de Minister van 19 juni 2008, nr. 5551529/08/DSP, houdende verlening 
van een vergunning tot het organiseren van een totalisator. 
 150 
Taxation on gambling is regulated in the Law on Gambling Taxation.79 Two main distinctions 
are made. First, it depends on whether the provider is domestic or foreign, and secondly 
what type of gambling is operated, online gambling, offline casino games or other offline 
games and slots (Littler & Franssen 2012). A tax rate of 29% on gross gaming revenue is 
applicable to slots, offline casinos games, and online games when provided by a party 
located in the NL (Littler & Franssen 2012). For all other offline games of chance winnings by 
players above Euro 454 are also subject to a gambling tax of 29% (Littler & Franssen 2012). 
In the same logic, if a Dutch resident participate in online gambling provided from outside 
the NL, a rate of 29% applies to gross earnings per month, and stakes are hence deductible 
from prizes and the tax has to be paid on a monthly basis. A player winning a prize in an 
offline foreign game of chance also has to pay gambling tax at 29% on the prize (Littler & 
Franssen 2012: 15).  
Although the Dutch gambling market is not very important in size it is a quite complicated 
one. Since its adoption the Gaming Act has been amended on numerous occasions 
resulting after 45 years in “a hopelessly complex piece of legislation that even insiders 
sometimes find difficult to understand” (Littler et al. 2011: 210). Plans to open up the internet 
gambling sector were envisaged but have not (yet) been introduced (Littler & Franssen 
2012). The Dutch government prepared changes to the legal framework for online gambling 
in the country, and a gambling bill was originally expected to licence poker and other games 
by the summer of 2012. However, political turmoil in the NL in early 2012 resulted in 
postponing this initiative (Interview 1). However, at the moment of writing, no further steps 
have been taken in regard to the modifications of the gambling regulation even though the 
Dutch operators and gambling experts do believe that they will come soon (Interview 1, 9, 
11).  
Despite the suspension of the restructuring of the gambling regulation one element has 
emerged from the plans to re-regulate games of chance. On 20 December 2011 the Dutch 
Senate approved a legislative proposal introducing a new independent regulatory body, ‘the 
Gaming Authority’. On 1 April 2012 this body began its work with the aim of more efficient 
enforcement of the BGA (Moussaoui & Franssen 2012). The drivers behind the 
establishment of the new Gaming Authority were the proved incapacities to restrict 
unregulated gaming activities, especially in regard to remote gaming, as prior to the recent 
amendments the BGA was only enforceable based on Criminal Law (Moussaoui & Franssen 
2012). Moreover, the former regulators, namely the Ministry of Security and Justice, the 
Ministry of Finance and the National Gaming Control Board did not dispose over any means 
through which to combat unlicensed operators (Moussaoui & Franssen 2012).  
So, keeping in mind that the Dutch gambling regulation is likely to change in the near future, 
the following sections discuss the sport betting, instant lotteries and lotto regulation. 
 
                                                
79 Author’s translation of: Wet van 14 september 1961, houdende regelen inzake de belastingheffing 
met betrekking tot kansspelen. 
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I. The regulatory scope of the sport betting, instant lotteries and lotto regulation  
The market structure in the sport betting, lotto, and instant lottery sector is a monopoly. As 
mentioned above one licence is possible for each type of game. The National Sports 
Totalizator Foundation (De Lotto in short) holds semi-permanent licenses in these three 
games, creating one monopoly over the three exclusive licences. De Lotto has held the 
exclusive licence for sport betting since its introduction in 1969. The licence was originally 
supposed to expire in January 2012 but was extended until January 2015 (Littler & Franssen 
2012). Articles 15 to 22 BGA outline the provisions for sport betting along with further 
conditions enumerated in the licence agreement (Littler & Franssen 2012).80 Title IIA of BGA 
authorises the Minister of Justice to allocate a licence to one entity to operate an instant 
lottery. The instant lottery licence has been held since 1994 by De lotto and is renewed 
every five years. The instant lottery licence outlines the various provisions of the licence 
(Netherlands 2011).81 Similarly, Title IVA of BGA authorises the Minister of Justice to issue 
one licence to organise the lotto, plus a corresponding ‘regular’ lottery, to one entity. The 
lotto licence has been held by De Lotto since 1974 and is also renewed every five years 
(Littler & Franssen 2012). 
The regulatory reach of the sport betting, lotto and instant lottery sector is not limited to the 
market structure but has a wider scope and thus increases the intensity of regulation. The 
regulation establishes a specific public use of the money. The BGA outlines that the sport 
betting licence can only be issued if the revenues are used for the public benefit. Hence, 
profits are used in their totality for sports, culture, social wellbeing and public health 
(Netherlands 1964: article 16(1)) (Littler & Franssen 2012). 
Even though the BGA is silent on the type of ownership, it is considered as imposed, as the 
government issues licences only to entities allocating all profits for good causes and it is 
unlikely that a private for-profit operator would receive the licence. De Lotto is a non-profit 
foundation governed by private law. A five-member commission whose Chairman is 
appointed by the Minister manages De Lotto. Other members of the commission belong to 
organisations representing the beneficiaries of the revenues generated by De Lotto (De 
Lotto 2012; Interview 1). In March 2011, the Council of State held that only one member 
appointed by government does not allow for a strict governmental control, as the person 
can be easily overruled by the majority.82 This finding resulted in the appointment of an 
additional member of the board by the government (De Lotto 2012: 11), which further 
increased the publicness of De Lotto. 
                                                
80 In Dutch: Beschikking van de Minister van Justitie van 14 januari 2010, nr 5637097/10/DSP, 
houdende verlening van een vergunning tot het orgnisieren van sportprijsvragen, lotto en het 
cijferspel, as amended by the Wijziging Beschiking Sporttotalisator 2010 of 7 December 2010. 
81 In Dutch: Beschikking instantloterij. Beschikking van de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie van 28 
September 2011, nr. 5710109/11/DSP. 
82 For further information see Littler (2011a). 
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The regulatory scope of the sport betting, instant lotteries and lotto sector 
Market structure  Exclusive licence per type of games forming a monopoly held by 
De Lotto 
Regulatory reach Broader then market structure 
Specific public use of money Total of profits used for public end 
Type of ownership Imposed, non-profit organisation 
Publicness Low 
TABLE 31: RSC SPORT BETTING, INSTANT LOTTERIES AND LOTTO SECTOR IN THE NETHERLANDS 
II. The regulatory stringency of the sport betting, instant lotteries and lotto 
regulation 
a. The regulator level 
In 1996, the Gaming Control Board83 was established to monitor the legal gambling 
institutions in the NL and to control the distribution of gambling licences (Anderson 2012: 
180). The Gaming Control Board was not an independent regulatory body, although it 
provided non-binding advice to the Ministry of Security and Justice primarily regulating the 
games of chance. Since April 2012 a new regulatory entity controls and monitors the 
gambling market namely the Dutch Gaming Authority84 (Littler & Franssen 2012).  
The Dutch Gaming Authority is composed of three members: a president, a substitute 
president and member and a member. Hence, there is not only a regulator present, but the 
Gaming Authority also disposes over far reaching competences en amont and en aval: it is 
now responsible for issuing, enforcing, revoking and supervising all Dutch licences and 
gaming policy, whereas policy formulation remains the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Security and Justice. The existing licences have been awarded and renewed by the Ministry 
of Security and Justice. In future it will be for the Gaming Authority to issue and renew the 
licences. Once awarded or renewed the licences are published in the official gazette while 
the parties can oppose the decision during the eight weeks following the publication (Littler 
& Franssen 2012).  
The Dutch Gaming Authority is also responsible for keeping an updated register for self-
exclusions. Furthermore, the Dutch Gaming Authority disposes over various administrative 
enforcement instruments, such as the distribution of fines of up to EUR 780,000 or 10% of 
the company’s turnover, or the issuing of administrative orders to confiscate goods or enter 
a building (Littler & Franssen 2012). Furthermore, it can impose incremental penalty 
payments to enforce the gaming regulations. In case of more severe infringements or 
criminal offences the Dutch Prosecution Service would be activated (Littler & Franssen 
2012). Moreover, in regard to unlicensed gambling, operators are blacklisted. In the 
proposal for the new gaming policy, financial transaction blocking and IP blocking have 
been discussed, but at the time of writing no further indications have been given as to 
whether such measures will be introduced in the near future. The Gaming Authority is 
funded by the industry as the licensees pay a certain fee (Littler & Franssen 2012).  
                                                
83 Author’s translation of: College van Toezicht op de Kansspelen. 
84 Author’s translation of: Kansspelautoriteit. 
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TABLE 32: RS I SPORT BETTING, INSTANT LOTTERIES AND LOTTO SECTOR IN THE NETHERLANDS 
b. The organisational level 
The licence agreements issued to De Lotto contain conditions for the products that may be 
offered. De Lotto can for example not offer bets on more than 400 events a year. Moreover, 
limits are set restricting the maximum amount of wagers that can be placed on one bet and 
on a weekly basis. A single stake cannot be higher than 22.69 EUR on off- and online 
products. Online the weekly limit is 250 EUR for participants over the age of 24, and 100 
EUR for participants aged between 18 and 24 (Littler & Franssen 2012). For Lotto games, De 
Lotto is permitted to offer 422 games on an annual basis. The maximum single stake is the 
same as with sport betting, namely 22.69 EUR, and players cannot play for more than 100 
EUR per day on lotto games over the internet (Littler & Franssen 2012). In regard to instant 
lotteries, De Lotto is permitted to offer up to 120 million scratch cards per year. Although 
free scratch cards are permitted, the maximum selling price is of 30 EUR per card. Over the 
course of a year the payback rate to players in prizes must be between 47.5% and 65% of 
the stakes (Littler & Franssen 2012).  
In regard to distribution channels, online gambling in the NL is subject to a restrictive policy. 
As noted above, the BGA is based on a ‘prohibited-unless-licensed’ approach and does not 
contain any legal basis for the award of licences, which permit online gambling. Through the 
approval of participation rules, an online offer can be possible (Littler & Franssen 2012). The 
NL has adopted an ‘e-commerce’ approach of offering gambling services over the internet, 
which is not defined in the BGA, nor in the semi-permanent licences, and which allows the 
licensee to offer their services online (Littler & Franssen 2012). In a letter to parliament 
dating from July 2007, the Minister of Justice interpreted e-commerce as “the use of the 
internet as an alternative sales and communications channel for existing gambling products” 
(Netherlands 2007: 9) and which did not “encompass ‘interactive gambling’ or ‘e-gaming’” 
(Netherlands 2007: 9). Hence, De Lotto holds licences that include provisions to allow online 
gambling of the gaming products also offered in the retail sector (Littler & Franssen 2012). 
In regard to advertisement restrictions, rules concerning advertisement are found in the 
Dutch Advertising Code85 and apply to all current operators (Littler & Franssen 2012). The 
code deals with three areas, namely the advertising content, vulnerable groups and 
sponsorship. Advertisement should not be misleading with regard to the chance of winning, 
nor should they suggest that gambling is a means to solve financial or social problems 
(Littler & Franssen 2012). Other provisions impose that information is provided, such as in 
regard to responsible gambling and addiction, to maintain the anonymity of winners and the 
availability of independent advice on how to deal with large wins (Littler & Franssen 2012). 
Advertisement for unlicensed games of chance is prohibited (Netherlands 1964). Overall the 
                                                
85 Author’s translation of: De Nederlandse Reclame Code. 
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting, instant lotteries and lotto sector: the 
regulator level 
Presence of a regulator  Yes, Dutch Gaming Board  
Competences of regulator Large 
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restrictions on advertisement are moderate. However, the regulator monitors the marketing 
operations of the operators and takes steps in case it is too expansive. One interview 
participant stated that few years ago De Lotto was advertising in an expansive way and the 
regulator advised it to reduce its advertisement activities (Interview 1).  
In regard to obligations in regard to gambling addiction, the BGA is silent on the matter in 
the sport betting sector, though it is an issue in other gambling sectors, and has since 
always been a topic of discussion in Dutch society (Littler & Franssen 2012). Despite the 
disregard for the matter in the legal texts, the fight against compulsive gambling is a key 
objective of the Dutch gaming policy. This is for example underlined by the minimum age of 
18 established for sport betting, by the limited number of products allowed to be offered on 
an annual basis and by the limitation of the individual stakes per game and per week or day. 
Moreover, in contrast to the sport betting and lotto licence, the instant lottery licence sets 
out the explicit obligation to have a balanced policy in the field of the prevention of gambling 
addiction and advises the operator to take measures to prevent excessive participation in 
instant lottery games. However, across all De Lotto products it is required to state ‘Do not 
put everything on the game—play with moderation’ on the front receipt of participation 
(Littler & Franssen 2012).  
TABLE 33: RS II SPORT BETTING, INSTANT LOTTERIES AND LOTTO SECTOR IN THE NETHERLANDS 
III. Outlook 
The Dutch gaming legislation and the corresponding licences and case law are proof of a 
high regulatory intensity in the gambling sector. The gambling regulation in the NL is marked 
by the legal battles between De Lotto and private operators, such as Betfair and Ladbrokes, 
since 2003. In both cases the circumstances were similar as De Lotto is able to offer sports 
betting products over the internet and other European licensed operators are not able to 
obtain a licence and are therefore restricted from entering the Dutch market. In its final 
ruling on 23 February 2012 the Dutch Supreme Court concluded that the Dutch authorities 
pursue a coherent and consisting gambling policy (Littler & Franssen 2012). 
Even though changes will occur in the Dutch gambling regulation in the near future, 
especially in regard to the online regulation and the privatisation of Holland Casino, the 
regulatory intensity of the private foundation operating in the sport betting and lottery sector 
is high at present. Hence it is interesting to discuss how De Lotto defines it organisational 
performance in this regulatory environment. 
5.3.3 The performance definition of De Lotto 
The performance definition in the Dutch sport betting, instant lottery and lotto sector is of a 
multidimensional nature. Several dimensions are seemingly of the same importance and the 
performance concept is horizontally constructed. The table below summarises the results of 
the qualitative analysis in the different performance dimensions: 
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting, instant lotteries and lotto sector: the 
organisational level 
Distribution channel restrictions  Yes (other remote than internet) 
Advertisement restrictions Moderate 
Obligations in regard to gambling addiction Moderate 
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Occurrence and evaluation of 
dimensions 
Interviews Reports86 of Organisation 
 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Financial dimension 36 ++ 21 ++ 
Operational dimension 45 ++ 23 + 
Stakeholder management dimension 27 = 9 - 
Legal requirement dimension 47 ++ 27 ++ 
Social issue participation dimension 35 + 21 + 
Public values dimension 23 = 2 -- 
Total 213  103  
Legend:  ++ very high importance  + high importance  = neutral importance 
   - low importance   -- very low importance 
TABLE 34: OCCURRENCE AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS OF DE LOTTO 
I. The financial dimension 
The financial dimension is quantitatively (21 occurrences in the reports and 36 occurrences 
in the interviews) and qualitatively of a very high importance for the performance definition 
of De Lotto.  
In the message of the CEO an increased focus was laid on the development of sales, the 
turnovers, and consequently, the return to the beneficiaries (De Lotto 2012: 11). In the 
reports of the organisation sales developments, in general and per product, and the profits 
and their redistribution are key focuses of the financial dimension (De Lotto 2012: 13, 14, 20, 
21, 22, 23). Redistribution is often mentioned in relation to the profits paid to the 
beneficiaries, but also to the players in the form of winnings as well as the pay-out rate of 
each game (De Lotto, 2012: 15, 23; Interview 2; 9). Hence, throughout the data set, the 
financial dimension is linked to other dimensions such as for example the legal requirement 
dimension (e.g. through mandatory redistribution of profits to beneficiaries) (De Lotto 2012; 
Interview 1; 9; 11).  
The financial dimension is crucial to the performance definition of the company (Interview 1, 
Interview 9, Interview 11). Hence, another key indicator is cost control in order to maximise 
the profits (Interview 1). The commercial performance was frequently mentioned as one of 
the main focuses of the organisation. One interviewee mentioned that it is of course one of 
the main elements but that the regulation also protects the consumers, raising the attention 
of the organisation on other important aspects (Interview 11). Another interview participant 
summarised it as following: “overall, I think they would define themselves along the line of 
how much money they raise for charity, they raise for sports and good causes” (Interview 9). 
De Lotto is a private non-profit foundation that by definition does not look to maximise the 
profits for shareholders but for the beneficiaries (Interview 9). However, as the beneficiaries 
are partially the founders of the organisation this line is obliterated. Hence, the financial 
performance dimension is clearly a very important dimension for the performance definition 
of De Lotto.  
                                                
86 The report of the organisation is not very voluminous what explains the lower number of references. 
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II. The operational dimension 
The operational dimension is quantitatively (45 occurrences in the reports and 23 in the 
interviews) a very important dimension and interestingly, the operational dimension occurred 
even more frequently than the financial dimension in the codes. Despite this however, the 
qualitative evaluation of the quotations reveals a slightly different result, because 
qualitatively, the operational dimension is higher valued in the interviews (very important) 
than in the reports (important). 
The customer perspective is an important part of the operational dimension (Interview 1, 9, 
11; De Lotto 2012). Customer-focus and player-orientation are core aspects of operations 
(De Lotto 2012: 15, 23). One interview participant argued that the organisation is closely 
monitoring the marketing and public relation activities (Interview 11).  
The organisation outlines in its report that as a result of the financial crisis consumer 
confidence has decreased and the consumer spending has declined, as measured based 
on the number of subscriptions (De Lotto 2012: 13). Customer loyalty is very important for 
the organisation, especially in times of economic difficulties. De Lotto was able to keep the 
number of customers constant, whereas in other gambling sectors the turnovers have 
decreased sharply and lost customers due to the economy. For De Lotto it is very important 
to keep the customers and to sustain the relationship with them (Interview 1).  
The learning and growth perspective also occurs frequently and especially product 
developments make up a crucial indicator (De Lotto 2012; Interview 1). For each product 
group, the sales development and the product cycles are closely monitored (De Lotto 2012: 
20, 21, 22). Another important indicator is innovation, as measured by the investments 
made in new distribution channels (De Lotto 2012: 23). Especially in the future, technical 
innovations will gain in importance because De Lotto needs to attract the younger 
generation (18-34 years old). The average age of the customer is around 35, and the 
question that follows is how to attract the future costumers who are more focused on new 
media (Interview 1).  
The internal business process perspective did not occur many times across the data set for 
De Lotto (De Lotto 2012; Interview 1, 9, 11). This could lead to the assumption that the 
internal business process perspective is of little importance, but it would arguably be a rash 
conclusion, as it appears more likely that the internal business processes are not mentioned 
by the organisation as they function well. Indeed, it is far more probable that the internal 
business process perspective is thus a dissatisfier factor, i.e. that as long as it works well, it 
is not in the focus of the organisation. Inversely, as soon something would go wrong the 
organisation would concentrate on these aspects. 
In summary, the operational dimension is important for the performance definition of De 
Lotto and is evaluated to contribute to future financial performance and is hence closely 
linked to the financial dimension. The organisation needs to evolve, innovate and keep up 
with the technical developments constantly. But not all perspectives covered to the same 
extent in the performance definition. 
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III. The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension is quantitatively more important in the interviews 
(29 references) than in the reports (9 references). The qualitative evaluation reveals that it is 
of low importance in the reports and of neutral importance in the interviews. 
The organisation may disagree with this result, as they are likely to consider the mandatory 
redistribution to beneficiaries as part of the stakeholder management dimension. However, 
in line with the definition used this study, the mandatory redistribution is counted into the 
legal requirement dimension. One aspect that does appear frequently in the stakeholder 
management dimension is however the relationship with the beneficiaries (De Lotto 2012).  
Another stakeholder group worth mentioning is that of politicians, and the highlighted 
importance of lobbying by the government. One interviewee mentioned that the organisation 
is very successful in lobbying discretely behind the scenes (Interview 9) and another 
mentioned that De Lotto is very successful in lobbying to preserve the regulatory status quo 
(Interview 11).  
Close to absent form this data set is the employee satisfaction evaluation: codes in relation 
to employees’ are missing, and the term ‘employees’ is mentioned only four times in the 
report (De Lotto 2012), 
Similarly, indicators on suppliers are missing from the data set, and De Lotto seemingly 
considers that they adhere to the values of the organisation and are performing socially 
(Interview 1; De Lotto 2012). One element entirely absent and even evaluated of little 
importance when directly asked is that of ecological aspects, such as the green footprint of 
the organisation (De Lotto 2012; Interview 1, 9, 11). 
In summary, the stakeholder management dimension appears to be of little importance for 
the performance definition and it is rarely evaluated or measured through the use of 
performance indicators. One interviewee mentioned that De Lotto is reactive to European 
and Dutch developments and not pro-active. Hence, the interview participant doubted that 
De Lotto is actually measuring the performance in the stakeholder management dimension 
(Interview 11). Another interviewee also deemed the stakeholder management dimension as 
absent in the performance definition of De Lotto (Interview 9). 
IV. The legal requirement dimension 
The legal requirement dimension is quantitatively (47 references in the interviews and 27 in 
the reports) and qualitatively of a very high importance to the performance definition of De 
Lotto. 
The mission statement to offer responsible games and to contribute to the development of 
sports, culture, social welfare and health reveals the importance of the legal requirement 
dimension (De Lotto 2012: 3). Two main indicators for the legal requirement dimension are 
referred to. First the mandatory redistribution, though not outlined as a legal obligation, is 
important for the performance definition of De Lotto (Interview 1, 9, 11; De Lotto 2012). 
Close to every time the organisation outlines its financial performance it indicates the 
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amount allocated to charity and sport, and it hence indirectly refers to the legal requirement 
dimension (De Lotto 2012: 15, 34). Second, the mission statement underlines the 
importance of responsible gambling, which is part of the legal requirement dimension in 
case this target is outlined in the regulation. De Lotto is active in the prevention and 
treatment of gambling problems and takes several measures in this regard (Interview 1, 9, 
11; De Lotto 2012). 
A further element related to the legal requirement dimension and closely monitored by the 
organisation is the legal developments in the Dutch gambling landscape and the aims of 
modernising the regulation (De Lotto 2012: 8-12; Interview 1, 11). These developments take 
a large part in the report and are mentioned by the CEO and the president of the Board of 
Directors (De Lotto 2012: 8-15).  
To litigate against illegal operators that offer their products online to Dutch citizens and to 
report on the results is also one aspect of the legal requirement dimension that is used by 
De Lotto (De Lotto 2012; Interview 11). De Lotto defines compliance as the set of measures 
that focus on the implementation and enforcement of external regulations, professional 
standards as well as internal procedures and rules to prevent the reputation and integrity of 
any harm (De Lotto 2012). Reports are submitted to the regulator on a regular basis 
(Interview 1, 11). All of these measures are examples indicating the importance of the legal 
requirement dimension to De Lotto’s performance definition. The crucial position of the legal 
requirement dimension to the performance conceptualisation of De Lotto is also mentioned 
in all interviews (Interview 1, 9, 11).  
In sum, De Lotto defines its success based on commercial success, i.e. the financial and 
operational dimensions) and the legal performance, i.e. the legal requirement dimension. 
The balance between these two dimensions is crucial for De Lotto (Interview 1) and the data 
analysis reveals the importance of the legal requirement dimension as an important 
component to define performance, but also as a prerequisite for any business activity. 
V. The social issue participation dimension 
The social issue participation dimension is quantitatively (35 quotations in the interviews and 
21 in the reports) and qualitatively of high importance to the performance definition of De 
Lotto. 
Especially one indicator underlines the importance of the social issue participation 
dimension, namely the voluntary measures in regard to gambling problems. Responsible 
gambling as a main focus is already expressed in the mission statement of De Lotto (De 
Lotto 2012: 3). Interestingly, in the interviews, the issue was rarely raised and interviewees 
explained that though De Lotto is active in the matter and it is part of the social issue 
participation dimension, but it is not something that is communicated externally (Interview 1, 
9, 11). First, because they do not want it to be perceived as a marketing and communication 
tool and second De Lotto does to not worry the society too much in regard to this matter 
(Interview 9, 11). 
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In regard to problematic issues such as match fixing, the extent to which such areas count 
towards the performance definition is doubtful. The organisation is active in the discussion 
on match fixing (Interview 1) and does evaluate it as inherent to the business, but in how far 
the performance of these activities are measured is a pertinent question and no indication 
was found, in reports and interviews, that De Lotto does measure its actions in that issue. 
Two interviewees expressed the view that the activities in regard to match fixing are not part 
of the performance conceptualisation (Interview 9, 11).  
An indicator that is absent in the case of De Lotto is the voluntary redistribution and this 
because the organisation allocates all profits mandatorily to charity and sport, and it is 
hence part of the legal requirement dimension. Indeed, the financing of charities, sport and 
charity is the ‘raison d’être’ of the company (Interview 1).  
In summary, the social issue participation dimension is important for the performance 
definition of De Lotto and this is mainly measured by the various undertakings in regard to 
responsible gambling. 
VI. The public values dimension 
The public values dimension is quantitatively and qualitatively evaluated to be of neutral 
importance based on the quotations in the interviews (23 references), whereas the 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the reports (2 references) reveals a very low 
importance of the public values dimension for the performance definition of De Lotto. 
The analysis of the documents illustrates that the public values dimension is not an 
important performance dimension and it could even be argued that it is not part of the 
performance definition of De Lotto. In the interviews, values such as transparency, fairness, 
security, equity and reliability are evaluated to important to the organisation as they guide 
the processes and activities of De Lotto, but they are not part of the performance definition 
of the organisation. Values such as fairness, transparency and security were often outlined 
in relation to the internal processes, but they belong to the operational dimension and do 
not form a distinct performance dimension (Interview 1, 9, 11).  
In summary, public values are important for the organisation but not for the performance 
definition and they do not constitute a separate performance dimension in this case. If 
public values were detected in the data set they were related to operative business aspects 
and not in the name of a public values dimension.  
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VII. Concluding remarks: a bottom-up reflection 
In conclusion, the performance definition of De Lotto is multidimensional, with a strong 
focus on two particular dimensions, namely the financial and the legal requirement 
dimensions. The bottom-up analysis has found the following indicators to occur frequently 
in the data set: The overall sales development and the sales development of each product 
and the profits made are closely monitored, i.e. the financial dimension. Closely linked is the 
revenues realised for sports and good causes, i.e. the legal requirement dimension. Other 
indicators include customer satisfaction, i.e. the customer perspective, innovations, i.e. the 
learning and growth perspective, internal processes, i.e. the internal business process 
perspective or responsible gambling, i.e. partly the legal requirement, and partly the social 
issue participation dimension).  
One interviewee summarised it quite nicely by outlining that De Lotto balances commercial 
performance and legal performance and has a multidimensional focus of performance by 
including other aspects, such as operations or customers, crucial for a successful 
organisation (Interview 1).  
5.4 THE UNITED KINGDOM’S NATIONAL LOTTERY SECTOR 
The object of this chapter is the analysis of the gambling regulation in the UK. The territory 
of the UK encloses England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Moreover, some 
overseas territories (as Alderney, Gibraltar or the Isle of Man) are also part of the UK. This 
research concentrates on England, taken as an example for the other countries.  
5.4.1 The genesis of gambling in the United Kingdom 
The history of games of chance in England is very ancient and, as presented in detail by 
Ashton (1898), dates back to the dice introduced by the Saxons, the Danes and the Romans 
(Ashton 1898: 12). With regard to gambling regulation, there were directives concerning dice 
gambling already in the 12th century. The first actual Gaming Act was passed by Parliament 
in 1710 (Anderson et al. 2012). Since then gambling and gambling regulation has undergone 
many changes, moving from a prohibitive stance towards a stance of liberalisation. Orford 
(2012) has thus identified three eras of gambling regulation. In a first era of partial prohibition 
gambling was mostly prohibited (Orford 2012). Since 1853 betting houses were illegal and 
the passing of the Street Betting Act in 1906 prohibited also the acceptance of bets on 
streets and public places (Orford 2012). The Brit’s most popular form of gambling at that 
time—horse race betting—was hereafter illegal with the exception of betting at the 
racecourses themselves. But the implementation of the prohibition was ineffective and new 
forms of gambling appeared, such as betting on football matches or dog races (Orford 
2012).  
The second era of gambling regulation has been identified by Orford as the era of tolerance 
(2012: 2083) and it began with the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960. During this time, close 
to all forms of games of chance were legalised, including commercial gaming clubs and 
casinos, licensed betting offices and gambling machines in and outside casinos. Despite the 
legalisation of games of chance, gambling activities were more tolerated than encouraged 
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and provisions applied to the providers of games of chance, for example betting offices 
were prohibited to serve food or drink and the interior of the shops had to be invisible from 
the streets. Games of chance were at that time not yet seen as having a productive 
economic function (Miers 2004). Gambling operators were allowed to meet the existing 
demand but not to stimulate it. Proposals for new casinos and bingo clubs, for example, 
would be denied unless they could provide evidence of an existing need to satisfy the 
demand. Casinos, that were small by modern standards were members only clubs and had 
to be located in one of the 52 permitted areas (Orford 2012).  
The third era identified by Orford is the era of liberalisation, introduced with the adoption of 
the National Lottery Act in 1993 (2012: 2083). The National Lottery offered its first products 
in 1994 and became highly popular immediately. Funds were partially used for charity and 
the government promoted lotteries as being of a different nature from other forms of 
gambling, or only hardly evaluated them as gambling at all. Promoters of other forms of 
games of chance started lobbying for a move towards liberalisation and the liberalisation of 
the National Lottery can thus be seen as a catalyst of these demands. In consequence the 
Gambling Board regulating games of chance at that time undertook minor liberalisations 
that did not demand a change in legalisation such as the lowering of restrictions (Orford 
2012) on membership and opening hours for casinos, an increase in numbers and types of 
gambling machines in bingo halls and betting shops, a reduction of the minimal age to 16 
for the participation in football betting pools and so on. Games of chance were now 
regarded as a ordinary business which should be allowed to innovate and flourish with 
restrictions in place that were absolutely necessary (Orford 2012). This resulted in the 
current gambling environment in Britain, which is marked by a colossal and diverse 
gambling market (Orford, 2012: 2083).  
5.4.2 The current gambling regulation 
The regulatory environment in the UK changed on 1 September 2007 with the full entry into 
force of the Gambling Act 2005 (UK Gambling Commission 2008). This act governing close 
to all forms of gambling, with the exceptions of the National Lottery and spread betting, 
replaced previous legislation dating back to 1845 (UK Gambling Commission 2008). The 
Financial Conduct Authority regulates spread betting, which is not subject of this study, as it 
is a part of financial services (UK Gambling Commission 2013e). The National Lottery is 
regulated by the National Lottery Act of 1993 and has its own regulator namely the National 
Lottery Commission (NLC). Out of the legal separation, a multiple system of gambling 
emerged in the UK. Next to the traditional forms of games of chance such as betting on 
horse and dog races and private card games and sport betting via bookmakers, and the 
more recently legalised casino, bingo, lottery, pools and machine gambling spread betting 
was added (which originated as a form of financial speculation and is regulated as a 
financial service), as well as betting on different sport and non-sport events through a 
betting exchange (rather than a bookmaker). To this list adds poker tournaments, playing 
virtual casino games on new machines, so called fixed-odds betting machines in betting 
shops, and using the internet and other remote channels to access games of chance or 
playing virtual games of chance (Orford 2012). The UK Gambling Act of 2005 will be briefly 
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presented, as it concentrates on betting, casino and lotteries (while keeping in mind that 
other forms of gambling exist), before turning to the National Lottery regulation which is the 
main focus of the research. Hence the main regulation and sectors of games of chance in 
the UK are the following: 
General Logic General allowance of games of chance under the UK Gambling Act of 2005 when 
licensed.  
Sectors Lottery Betting Casino 
Sub sectors 
- Sport Horse race 
Non-sport 
events 
- 
Legal basis:      
Retail 
& 
Online 
National Lottery 
Act 1993 
(amended 1998, 
2006)  
Gambling 
Act 2005 
Gambling 
Act 2005 
Gambling 
Act 2005 
Gambling Act 
2005 
Operator:      
Retail 
& 
Online 
Camelot 
Numerous 
operators 
Numerous 
operators 
Numerous 
operators 
Numerous 
operators 
TABLE 35: THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES OF CHANCE IN THE UK 
The objectives of the gambling regulations are outlined in the mission of the Gambling 
Commission. First, to it aims to keep crime away from the industry, second, to ensure 
gambling is fair and open and third, to protect children and other vulnerable persons from 
being harmed or exploited by games of chance (UK Gambling Commission 2013h). The 
basic rule is that gambling is allowed when an operating licence has been acquired and for 
certain establishments a personal licence is also requested (United Kingdom 2005). The 
local authority in question issues these licences and since the enactment of the Gambling 
Act in 2007, local authorities are to publish a statement of Gambling Policy to set out the 
licensing guidelines (United Kingdom 2005: section 349). 
Gambling is defined as gaming, betting, or participating in a lottery (United Kingdom 2005: 
section 3). Therefore, for an event labelled as gambling, a contribution of something 
valuable and an outcome dependant on chance is needed. Activities that have these 
characteristics but that are neither gaming, betting nor participating in a lottery are also 
covered by the law. In regard to the delimitation of games of chance, the presence of a little 
luck classifies a game to be a game of chance in the UK, i.e. it is a game of chance even 
when superlative skills can overcome chance (United Kingdom 2005).  
The newly created Gambling Commission (GC) is the regulator and it is funded through 
application and licence fees, based on the sector, size and complexity of the gaming 
operation. The GC is an independent non-departmental public body sponsored by the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) (UK Gambling Commission 2013e). The 
GC licences operators and individuals in Great Britain that provide gambling services in 
form of arcades, betting (with the exception of spread betting), bingo, casinos, gaming 
machine supply and maintenance, gambling software supply, lotteries (with the exception of 
the national lottery) and external lottery managers, remote gambling (including online 
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betting, betting by telephone or via any other electronic communication device) using 
British-based equipments (UK Gambling Commission 2013e). 
The Gambling Act 2005 designates certain kinds of local authorities in England and Wales 
and ‘licensing boards’ in Scotland as to be licensing authorities. Such authorities have 
different tasks: they issue premises licences, regulate gaming and gaming machines in 
clubs, grant permits to family entertainment centres for the use of well-defined lower stake 
gaming machines, grant permits for prize gaming and register small society lotteries (UK 
Gambling Commission 2013a). 
At the time when the Gambling Act 2005 came into force on 1 September 2007, over 140 
land-based casinos were in operation. These casinos were, and still are, operating under the 
Casino Act of 1968. Since then, the number has remained overall stable with openings and 
closures more or less in balance. Since the Gambling Act 2005 was adopted only one 
casino has been established. In addition, there are some establishments that do not operate 
as casinos and that are licensed by local licensing authorities, but which operate casino-
style games. Under section 175(4) of the Gambling Act 2005, it would be possible to open 
one regional casino and an additional 16 casinos, of which eight small and eight large ones, 
and this in pre-defined regions. However, the government has decided not to go ahead with 
the regional casino for the moment (UK Gambling Commission 2013a). The first large casino 
under the Gambling Act 2005 opened in the London Borough of Newham in December 2011 
(United Kingdom 2012). Three companies own the majority of casinos in the industry, 
namely Genting UK (Genting Casinos/Clubs) with 44 casinos, the Rank Group (Grosvenor 
Casinos and ‘G’ Casinos) with 36 casinos and the Gala Coral Group (Gala Casinos) with 27 
casinos (UK Gambling Commission 2013f: 31). 
The betting sector in the UK has a long tradition and it is one of the most liberalised 
gambling sectors across the world. Betting is defined in the Gambling Act 2005 as the 
making or accepting of a bet on the outcome of a race, competition or other event or 
process; the likelihood of anything occurring or not occurring; or whether anything is or is 
not true (United Kingdom 2005). The non-remote betting activity is organised by off- and on-
course betting operators. As of 30 September 2012, there were 418 licences held by 
operators for the activity non-remote general betting standard (off-course) and 614 licences 
for the activity non-remote general betting limited (on-course). Four operators dominate the 
betting industry, namely William Hill, Ladbrokes, Gala Coral Group and Betfred. As of 30 
September 2012, their estates accounted for 84% of all betting shops (UK Gambling 
Commission 2013f: 16).  
There are four types of betting identified by the Gambling Act 2005: general betting (on and 
off course bookmakers), betting prize competitions (for example, fantasy football), pool 
betting (for example Tote) and betting intermediaries, who provide services to facilitate the 
making/acceptance of bets. The licence system knows different type of licences. For 
example, general betting licence holders are able to offer facilities for betting at premises-
based bookmakers (off-course), on tracks (on-course) or by remote means (UK Gambling 
Commission 2013d). Pool betting on the other hand incorporates racecourse pool betting, 
football and other sports pool betting and many of the ‘fantasy football’ type competitions 
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(UK Gambling Commission 2013d). The organisations active in betting pay application and 
annual fees, but there is no public use of the money stipulated by law (United Kingdom 
2005).  
As concerns the lotteries regulated by the Gambling Act 2005, the act separates between 
‘simple’ or ‘complex’ lotteries, with the main difference being that the latter are allowed to 
allocate prizes by a series of processes of which only the first has to be exclusively based 
on chance (UK Gambling Commission 2013b). In simple lotteries prizes are allocated 
integrally by chance. The term lottery includes raffles, tombolas, and sweepstakes. In 
contrast, free draws and prize competitions are not lotteries. Lotteries cannot be organised 
for commercial or private gain (UK Gambling Commission 2013b). The GC continues to 
regulate society lotteries with proceeds of over 20’000 pound sterling (GBP) in a single 
lottery or total proceeds of over 250’000 GBP in a calendar year, and local authority 
lotteries. It also regulates all external lottery managers. Societies and local authorities 
promoting these lotteries and external lottery managers need to be licensed by the GC (UK 
Gambling Commission 2013b). Smaller society lotteries are regulated by local authorities 
(United Kingdom 2009). A society is defined as non-commercial if it is organised for 
charitable, sporting, cultural or other purposes, apart from private or commercial gain. 
Societies may employ a licensed external lottery manager to promote all or part of their 
lottery on their behalf (UK Gambling Commission 2013f: 46).  
Remote gambling is defined by the Gambling Act 2005 as gambling in which persons 
participate through the use of remote communication that includes the internet, telephone, 
television, radio, and any other kind of electronic or other technology facilitated 
communication (United Kingdom 2005). This definition is arguable very broad, susceptible 
to also include future technological developments. Remote gambling is possible if the 
operator holds a licence issued by the GC for all forms of games of chance regulated under 
the Gambling Act of 2005, as for remote casinos, remote betting and remote lotteries (UK 
Gambling Commission 2013c). As a result of the Gambling Act 2005 any remote gaming 
operator based in the European Economic Area (EEA), including Gibraltar, or in a 'white 
listed' country, can advertise and locate some of their operation in the UK without paying 
the standard UK gambling taxes, as long as they do not have any of their remote gambling 
equipment (as defined in section 36 of the Gambling Act) in Britain. Operators located in 
other countries than the EEA or white listed are prohibited from advertising their sites in the 
UK, but the Gambling Act 2005 does no prohibit foreign operators from take bets from 
customers in the UK. Remote gambling is relatively highly taxed, with a tax rate of 15% on 
the gross gambling revenue. In addition operators based in the UK also have to pay a 
corporate tax, which can be as high as 28% (in contrast to other countries such as Malta, 
that has a corporate tax rate of 5%). 
Having thus shortly presented the gambling sectors of the UK not covered in this study, the 
next section will present the sector in focus of this study, namely the National Lottery 
regulation.  
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I. The regulatory scope of the national lottery regulation  
The primary legislation founding the national lottery regulation is as mentioned the National 
Lottery Act of 1993 (NLA) (as amended in 1998 and 2006). Section 5 of the NLA creates the 
market structure of a monopoly, by stipulating that only one body can be licensed under the 
act at the same time (United Kingdom 1993).  
The NLA of 1993 defines two kinds of licenses. First, the section 5 licence is the operating 
licence that is granted by the NLC to the operator of the National Lottery. The licence 
application process is organised in the form of an auction system. The auction is organised 
so that competitive bidders make their offer to the NLC that then issues the licence to one 
chosen bidder. In August 2007, Camelot was awarded a third licence to operate the 
National Lottery, which started on 1 February 2009 and was due to run to 2019 (Camelot 
2012: 9). However, in March 2012, Camelot’s licence was extended by four years, to 2023, 
following the NLC’s agreement to Camelot’s proposal to deliver some 1.7 billion GBP in 
additional lottery funding over the next 11 years (Camelot 2012b). 
The regulatory reach is broader than the regulation of the access to the market. The section 
5 licence sets out the way in which the National Lottery must be run. The section 5 licence 
contains conditions that require the operator to issue and comply with codes of practice, 
strategies or procedures that are subject to the approval of the Commission. The second 
type of licence is for bodies to promote lotteries. Each constituent lottery promoted as part 
of the National Lottery requires a separate licence under Section 6 of the National Lottery 
Act. Section 6 licences operate for a limited time. There is no restriction on the number of 
bodies that can hold such licences, although if the section 6 licensee is not the operator (i.e. 
the section 5 licensee), then a licence can only be granted with the agreement of the 
operator (United Kingdom 1993).  
Moreover there is a public use of money. The National Lottery Act 1993 (as amended) 
provides that the section 5 licence must contain a condition that requires the operator to 
pay sums to the National Lottery Distribution Fund (NLDF) and the Olympic Lottery 
Distribution Fund (OLDF) (United Kingdom 1993). These funds are the channels through 
which the operator transfers the ‘good cause’ allocation of the lottery income to the 
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State oversees these two funds and the money is then 
divided between the distribution bodies. The proceeds of the National Lottery support the 
arts, heritage, sport, charities and community and voluntary groups as well as projects 
concerned with health, education, the environment and sports (Camelot 2012c). The lottery 
funders decide which projects have successfully applied for a grant independently, though 
they have to follow government guidelines in making their decision.87 Further, in case the 
profits of Camelot go beyond a certain level, depending on sales, they are partially 
redistributed to good causes as defined under the Third Licence (Camelot 2012: 10). 
Moreover, Camelot pays a lottery duty of 12% of the sales and a corporation tax that was in 
2011 of 11.5 million GBP, something which represents an effective tax rate of 27.1% 
(Camelot 2012: 11).  
                                                
87 Further details can be found at www.lotteryfunding.org.uk. 
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The publicness of Camelot is low as there are no government representatives in the 
organisation. However, the organisation is controlled by the NLC, something that has a 
positive influence on the publicness criterion. The law does not impose the type of 
ownership, though the government indirectly selects the ownership during the license 
tender process. 
The regulatory scope of the national lottery sector 
Market structure  Exclusive licence forming a monopoly held by Camelot Group PLC 
Regulatory reach Broader then market structure 
Specific public use of money Close to all of profits used for public use 
Type of ownership Not in the law but indirectly through the licence attribution 
Publicness Low 
TABLE 36: RSC NATIONAL LOTTERY SECTOR UK 
II. The regulatory stringency of the national lottery regulation  
a. The regulatory level 
The NLC is the main regulator for the national lottery sector and it is established as an 
executive non-departmental public body. The DCMS is responsible for the National Lottery 
policy. It also sets the policy and financial framework within which the distributing bodies for 
National Lottery grants operate. 
The NLC commission is responsible for the National Lottery. They ensure fairness in regard 
to players, that their interests are protected and that the selected operator works in the 
interest of maximising the benefits that the Lottery brings to the nation. The NLC’s work is 
funded through the NLDF (National Lottery Commission 2012). The NLC has several 
competences en amant and en aval. The NLC is responsible for the regulation and licensing 
of the National Lottery, and runs the competition to award the licence to a commercial 
operator. The NLC is also responsible for the licensing of games, and has the power to 
impose financial penalties when the organisation does not comply with regulation (National 
Lottery Commission 2012). In regard to measures against illegal, unlicensed gambling, it 
falls upon the Gambling Commission to take measures but they follow a very reactive 
approach in that matter (UK Gambling Commission 2013g). The GC is only proactive in the 
sense that complaints brought to its attention are not always investigated as the resources 
are limited. The GC uses its resources to investigate matters of national or regional 
importance, matters of high risk to licensing objectives as well of high risk to the integrity of 
the licensing regime (UK Gambling Commission 2013g).  
The regulatory stringency of the national lottery sector: the regulatory level 
Presence of a regulator  Yes, National Lottery Commission 
Competences of regulator Large 
TABLE 37: RS I NATIONAL LOTTERY SECTOR UK 
b. The organisational level 
In the UK, the type of ownership is not imposed by the regulation, but it is indirectly decided 
by the NLC during the tender process. The organisation operating the National Lottery at 
present is Camelot Group PLC, an organisation held since 2010 by he Ontario Teachers' 
Pension Plan (OTPP). The organisation is governed by private law, and the license 
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agreement imposes several obligations on it (Camelot 2012c). In the interviews the 
regulation was often referred to as process based, meaning that the operator has to follow 
guidelines for its operations while the regulation under the Gambling Commission is referred 
to as output based (Interview 13, 14). However, one interviewee pointed out that with the 
merger of the NLC into the GC, this could change in the future (Interview 13). In regard to 
distribution channels the organisation is allowed to operate some categories of games 
online, namely the lottery game, draw-based games and interactive instant win games. 
Another form of remote gambling is via interactive digital television and play by text. All new 
forms of distribution channels need the prior approval of the NLC, as outlined in the licence 
agreement (National Lottery Commission 2009)  
Some advertisement restrictions are in place as the operator is obliged to adopt a code or 
codes of practices covering advertising, sales promotion and public relations of the National 
Lottery and any other ancillary activities (National Lottery Commission 2009). In regard to 
obligations to prevent gambling addiction, the operations of Camelot have to be conducted 
in a responsible manner. The licence agreement requires the operator to have a strategy in 
place to prevent and ensure that the design and promotion of the games do not encourage 
excessive play. This plan has to be approved by the NLC and provides among other things 
the way of monitoring and support for the treatment of problem gamblers under the age of 
16 should be carried out, the restriction of the access to the games and maximum amount 
of draws per hour (National Lottery Commission 2009).  
The regulatory stringency of the national lottery sector: the organisational level 
Distribution channel restrictions  Yes 
Advertisement restrictions Moderate 
Obligations in regard to gambling addiction Moderate 
TABLE 38: RS II NATIONAL LOTTERY SECTOR UK 
III. Outlook 
In 2010 the government announced that the GC and the NLC were to merge (Commission 
2013). At the time of writing, the merger was not yet completed and the analysis here 
therefore concentrates on the situation prior to it. However, the plans to merge the two 
bodies would arguably result in a lowering of the regulatory level, despite assurances to the 
contrary (Interview 13). The regulation of the national lottery sector in the UK is currently 
very high. One interview participant highlighted that at the moment, the NLC is an input-
based regulator. They tell Camelot what they should do in order to achieve regulatory goals. 
By contrast, the GC follows an output-based policy. They do not really care how an 
organisation carries out the activities as long as they achieve the envisaged result. One 
example given by an interview participant is that nobody under the age of 18 is supposed to 
play, so the GC regulation obliges operators to put an indication above the machines saying 
that nobody under the age of 18 should play on them, but this is how far it goes. Camelot 
on the other hand has to prove to the NLC that nobody under the age of 16 can actually buy 
a ticket, indicating that the National Lottery regulation is stricter and more prescriptive in 
nature (Interview 13). The merger of the two commissions is supposed to save costs and it 
is not supposed to change the way the regulators operate. However, one interview 
participant doubts that it will not influence the operative level (Interview 13). Furthermore, 
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the same interview participant explained that the GC has to pursue an output-based policy 
as it is responsible for over 180 organisations and cannot apply a prescriptive policy. At the 
same time, the NLC and Camelot are in a one-to-one relationship, something which would 
of course allow for more prescriptive regulation, though the interview participant in question 
guesses that with the merger the NLC regulation is most likely to soften (Interview 13).  
In summary, the regulatory intensity of the National Lottery Regulation in the UK is at 
present very high, with a regulation going further than market access and establishing 
several restrictions for the private operator. The next section is devoted more specifically to 
the performance orientation of the national lottery operator Camelot Group PLC.  
5.4.3 The performance definition of Camelot  
The performance orientation in the UK national lottery sector is multidimensional. Several 
dimensions are of the same importance and the performance concept is horizontally 
constructed. The table below summarises the results of the qualitative analysis in the 
different performance dimensions. 
Occurrence and evaluation of 
dimensions 
Interviews Reports of Organisations 
 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Financial dimension 23 ++ 69 ++ 
Operational dimension 32 ++ 47 + 
Stakeholder management dimension 20 = 28 + 
Legal requirement dimension 21 ++ 45 ++ 
Social issue participation dimension 23 + 40 + 
Public values dimension 16 - 9 -- 
Total 135  238  
Legend:  ++ very high importance  + high importance  = neutral importance  
   - low importance   -- very low importance 
TABLE 39: OCCURRENCE AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS OF CAMELOT 
I. The financial dimension 
The financial dimension is quantitatively (69 occurrences in the reports and 23 in the 
interviews) and qualitatively very important for the performance definition of Camelot. The 
importance of the financial dimension is very clearly outlined in the annual report (Camelot 
2012). Redistribution is a key focus for Camelot (Camelot 2012; Interview 13, 14) and the 
message of the CEO outlines that the records in sales mean more money for good causes 
(i.e. mandatory redistribution), more money for the players in the form of prize money (i.e. 
redistribution to winners), and more money paid in the form of taxes (i.e. mandatory 
redistribution). The redistribution to various stakeholders (stakeholders being defined very 
broadly in the context of the National Lottery) is mentioned in close to all quotations that 
relate to the financial dimension. Throughout the data set, the financial dimension is linked 
to other performance dimensions, such as the stakeholder management, legal requirement 
and social issue participation dimensions.  
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Another key indicator for the financial dimension is sales development (Camelot 2012; 
Interview 13). One interviewee argued that the organisation focuses on the consumers and 
consumer expectation and offers the games of chance desired by customers, and this 
wherever and whenever they want it, without neglecting the responsible gambling target. 
The same interviewee continued by saying that such matters are all driven in the same, one, 
direction, i.e. that of maximising profits for shareholders and the returns to good causes 
(Interview 13). Even though this is a very frank way to state it, the impression gained from 
the introduction of the CEO goes in a similar direction, as the CEO is quite eager not to 
mention the financial benefits for the shareholders, but hides commercial success behind 
how different stakeholders benefit from the profits. The bottom line of the message of the 
CEO is nonetheless the overall financial performance and the financial results in the different 
products and distribution channels, and the link to the redistribution to good causes 
(Camelot 2012). All kind of financial indicators are measured and performance information of 
the different activities is collected and used. One interview participant emphasised that 
retailers either rewarded or punished based on how they are scored (Interview 13).  
One interview participant explained that even though the operator positions itself externally 
as responsible, other priorities, such as sales and profits, tend to prevail in internal 
communication (Interview 10). This financial focus is identified in the data set but the data 
also reveals the importance of other performance dimensions and in sum, the financial 
dimension is certainly very important but not the sole performance dimension. 
II. The operational dimension 
The operational dimension is quantitatively (47 references in the reports and 32 in the 
interviews) and qualitatively (with a slightly higher evaluation in the interviews than in the 
reports) important for the performance definition of Camelot.  
Especially the customer perspective is very important for the operational dimension. The 
organisation places its customers at the heart of the business and wants to be a trusted 
brand (Camelot 2012). Customer satisfaction is a very important indicator, and one 
interviewee argued that this is mainly in the perspective of increasing sales, since the 
customer basis drives profits and returns to good causes and shareholders (Interview 13). 
Hence, the operational dimension is clearly linked to the financial dimension.  
The learning and growth perspective is also very important for Camelot. Here research and 
development targets make up an important indicator. Innovations that drive diversity are a 
priority and this for products and distribution channels alike (Camelot 2012; Interview 10). 
This improves the market position and is essential to attract new customers and to satisfy 
existing customers (Camelot 2012). Moreover, the organisation emphasises that being 
innovative also carries with it a certain risk, as the innovation may not succeed, or the 
regulator may not allow the organisation to use it (Camelot 2012). For example, the 
organisation desired to add commercial services such as mobile-phone top-ups to the 
lottery terminals, a proposal that was turned down by the National Lottery Commission.  
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Moreover, Camelot looks to enter other markets through diversification, for example by 
engaging in consulting and private management services to lotteries in other countries (e.g. 
the Californian state lottery). Consequently, they are open to opportunities to grow 
(Interview 14).  
In regard to the internal business process perspective, productivity is an important indicator. 
The distribution network and the retailers’ performance are evaluated in this regard (Camelot 
2012). The organisation wants to deliver the products wherever the consumer desires to 
consume them (Interview 10). Moreover, restructuring processes have been undertaken in 
Camelot in order to better achieve the objectives of diversification and penetration of new 
markets (Camelot 2012). Another important aspect that is worth mentioning is the risk 
management of Camelot, where the assessment is made using financial and non-financial 
indicators (Camelot 2012). Camelot has several key indicators to measure the operational 
dimension such as systems up time and systems performance. In summary, the operational 
dimension is important and is linked to the financial dimension, as good performance in the 
operational dimension results in good performance in the financial dimension (Interview 10).  
III. The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension is quantitatively more important in the reports (28 
references) than in the interviews (20 references). The qualitative evaluation reveals that it is 
of high importance in the reports and of neutral importance in the interviews.  
Camelot has a very broad definition of stakeholders, including anyone who is affected by 
the organisation or who impacts the way it does business (Camelot 2012). Therefore 
shareholders, employees, players, the wider public, retailers, suppliers, the government, the 
media, the regulator, the National Lottery distribution bodies, the public-interest groups and 
the local communities are all mentioned in the organisation’s annual report (Camelot 2012; 
Interview 14). Employee satisfaction is an indicator of the stakeholder management 
dimension, and in this regard targets and KPIs are defined and staff surveys are conducted 
(Camelot 2012; Interview 14). The organisation has also set up a staff forum to discuss and 
improve policies that affect its employees.  
Another aspect pointing to the importance of the stakeholder management dimension is the 
concern for the environment. The company desires to reduce the environmental footprint of 
its offices by using less paper, power and fuel, and targets are measured through KPIs 
(Camelot 2012). Moreover, the organisation is sensitive to the ethical and social 
performances of its suppliers, which are also measured and monitored through KPIs 
(Camelot 2012). The relationship with the government is also a significant aspect with regard 
to the stakeholder management dimension. The organisation continues to work with 
relevant governmental departments on the development policy and legislation that affect the 
business (Camelot 2012).  
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The stakeholder management dimension occurred much less frequently in the interviews 
than in the annual report. One interviewee outlined that engagements in that regard do not 
really guide the operations but that they are mainly communicated externally to increase 
acceptance in society, justify the licence and keep up a good reputation, something which 
will benefit future profits (Interview 13). This argument abates the importance of the 
stakeholder management dimension for the performance definition.  
In summary, the stakeholder management dimension is present and valid for the 
conceptualisation of performance but it is not one of the most important dimensions. 
Moreover, it seems to be used exactly in the way defined in this study, as the different 
activities are essentially undertaken in order to enhance future financial performance, rather 
than constituting outcome dimensions in their own right.  
IV. The legal requirement dimension 
The legal requirement dimension is quantitatively (21 quotations in the interviews and 45 in 
the reports) less important than in the qualitative evaluation. The qualitative analysis 
suggests a very high importance of the legal requirement dimension for the performance 
definition of Camelot.  
The mandatory redistribution to good causes is an important indicator for the legal 
requirement dimension, though it is not presented in this case as being part of this 
dimension (Camelot 2012; Interview 13, 14). Close to every time the organisation discusses 
its financial performance, it indicates the amount raised for good causes. The main part of 
this charitable contribution is required by law, as the licence agreement stipulates that the 
National Lottery has to allocate 28% of sales profits to good causes.  
Compliance with all licence requirements and any other law that is applicable to the 
organisation is an important aspect of performance, and something that is closely 
monitored by the organisation itself (Interview 14; Camelot 2012). This key role of the legal 
requirement dimension was also highlighted by one interviewee, who mentioned that 
Camelot succeeds in making a substantial profit for good causes while actually 
guaranteeing compliance with all the rules that they are subjected to (Interview 14). The key 
role of the legal requirement dimension and its influence on the operative level is also 
illustrated in regard to permitted products and distribution channels, in particular when it 
comes to innovations. The organisation explains that there is also a certain risk involved in 
this aspect, due to the regulator. As authorisation by the NLC is needed for new 
innovations, there is a certain element of uncertainty as to whether new innovations will be 
accepted, and it has already happened that the regulator has refused to issue product 
licenses following a risk evaluation (Camelot 2012).  
Another significant indicator for the legal requirement dimension is responsible gambling, 
and the measures taken to protect players. Camelot does not outline this aspect as being a 
question of compliance with legal obligations however, even though they are partially 
mandatory measures to prevent gambling addiction.  
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The licence renewal is also a subject that is important for Camelot, because it is obviously 
the key for the survival of the company, and the organisation therefore deploys resources 
and energy to acquire new licences or to extend the existing licence (Interview 14). Both 
interviewees raising the question as to whether this would not be a negative aspect of 
regulation, as it induces the organisation to concentrate on the license tender process and 
less on the business, thereby using resources that could be better used elsewhere 
(Interview 13, 14). 
In summary, the legal requirement dimension is key to the performance definition of 
Camelot. However, it is a dimension that is often hidden in the data set, and this not only in 
the sense that the compliance aspect is not mentioned, but also in the sense that it is not 
directly considered part of the performance definition The legal requirement dimension is 
not only a prerequisite dimension but also a main dimension for the performance definition 
of Camelot. 
V. The social issue participation dimension 
The social issue participation dimension is quantitatively (23 quotations in the interviews and 
40 in the reports) and qualitatively of a high importance to the performance definition of 
Camelot.  
The first indicator for the importance of the social issue participation dimension is made up 
by voluntary measures in regard to gambling addiction. Several measures are considered in 
this regard, such as the establishment of a player protection panel to develop strategies to 
protect players and non-players from harm, financing of research, treatment and education, 
risk assessment of new games, etc (Camelot 2012; Interview 14). Some doubts were raised 
in one interview with regard to the requirements of these assessment tools (Interview 13), 
but in another interview the risk assessments were evaluated as being very efficient 
(Interview 14).  
Across the interviews, the participants’ opinions diverged on the matter of the motivation of 
responsible gambling activities for Camelot, ranging from being seen mostly as a marketing 
and PR tool, to being considered a core focus of mission and strategy (Interview 13, 14). If 
the correct motivation is the one in the line with the first argument, it would fall under the 
stakeholder management dimension, whereas if it would follow the second latter line of 
reflection, it would rather be a part of the social issue participation dimension. On second 
thought, the interview participant who first argued that Camelot does not take measures in 
regard to the social issue participation dimension acknowledged that it does takes voluntary 
measures in regard to gambling problems (Interview 13). This is significant especially as 
there are also other elements to indicate the importance of these indicators to Camelot. 
Indeed, Camelot was a driving force behind the European Lotteries Corporate Social 
Responsibility Code and the certifications of organisations in regard to responsible 
gambling (Interview 14). Moreover, the performance of responsible gambling activities is 
evaluated based on pre-formulated targets that are measured through KPIs. This underlines 
the importance of responsible gambling to Camelot. Another indicator of the social issue 
participation dimension that is worth mentioning is the voluntary redistribution to good 
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causes. Camelot voluntarily supports local communities with time, money and skills, 
through charities and projects that are significant to their employees (Camelot 2012). 
In summary, the social issue participation dimension is present but the evaluation of its 
importance is difficult. The evaluation of the different sources nonetheless allow for the 
argument that the social issue participation dimension is important for the performance 
definition, and that responsible gaming is of a particular importance, for the organisation, as 
it guides its business activities and is evaluated through KPIs.  
VI. The public values dimension 
The public values dimension is quantitatively and qualitatively evaluated of a low importance 
based on the quotations in the interviews (16 references), whereas the quantitative and 
qualitative evaluations of the reports (9 references) reveal a very low importance of the 
public values dimension for the performance definition of Camelot.  
In the data set, transparency and accountability are mentioned as core values for the 
operation of the games (Camelot 2012). Trust is another value that is mentioned by Camelot 
in relation to the brand itself: British citizens have evaluated Camelot to be one of the most 
trusted brands (Camelot 2012). Another value mentioned in an interview was empathy with 
customers (Interview 13). Moreover, solidarity, integrity and precaution are important values 
for Camelot, which influence the way it manages the lottery business (Interview 14).  
In summary, the public values dimension is seemingly not a distinct performance dimension 
for the performance definition of Camelot. Public values were identified in the data set, but 
rather tend to guide the operations of the organisation and are not part of the performance 
definition.  
VII. Concluding remarks: a bottom-up reflection 
In conclusion, the performance definition of Camelot is multidimensional, with a strong 
focus on two dimensions, namely the financial and the legal requirement dimensions. 
A bottom-up approach indicates the following indicators as occurring very frequently in the 
data set: First, elements such as sales and shareholder value, i.e. the financial dimension, 
second, returns to good causes, i.e. the legal requirement dimension, third, compliance with 
all regulations, i.e. the legal requirement dimension are frequently mentioned. Further, 
customer satisfaction (i.e. the operational dimension) and relationships with shareholders, 
suppliers, retailers and government (i.e. the stakeholder management dimension) are also 
important for the performance definition of Camelot.  
5.5 THE BELGIAN SPORT BETTING SECTOR 
5.5.1 The genesis of gambling in Belgium 
Games of chance in Belgium know an ancient history. The casino in Spa is one of the oldest 
casinos in the world, and it has been operating since its foundation in 1763. The first 
organised lottery even dates back further, to 1465, and was organised to raise money to 
build chapels, almshouses, canals and ports.  
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Charitable lotteries were regulated by the Act of 1851 (Belgium 1851) and the National 
Lottery Act of 22 July 1991 (Belgium 1991) regulated the National Lottery. The organisation 
of horse race betting needed an authorisation by the Minister of Finance. This requirement 
was based in tax law, and more precisely on article 66 of the Tax Act (Belgium 1970c) and 
articles 44-56 of the Royal Decree of July 8, 1970 on Taxes (Belgium 1970b) and articles 6-7 
of a Ministerial Decree of 17 July 1970 (Belgium 1970a). Certain types of sport betting were 
also in need of an authorisation issued by the Minister of Sports. This requirement was 
established in the Act of June 23, 1963 on Physical Education (Belgium 1963).  
The Gaming Act of 1902 delivered a general prohibition of games of chance but allowed for 
a few exceptions. The Criminal Code punishes non-authorised games of chance through 
articles 301-304. Despite the prohibition of casinos in the Gaming Act of 1902, the presence 
of eight casinos was tolerated for over a century and casinos paid taxes on their revenues to 
the Ministry of Finance (Littler et al. 2011). Hence, they were operating in some sort of a 
grey area.  
As a result of this fragmented regulatory landscape, the adoption of the Gambling Act (GA) 
of 1999 was seen as the logical consequence. It aimed to channel the gambling activities in 
a way to protect players, guarantee the integrity of the game and to prevent crime (Littler et 
al. 2011). Moreover, it aimed to organise an effective control on all gambling activities and to 
install an efficient licensing body advising the actors and monitoring compliance with the 
legislation in force (Belgium 2009). The two most important innovations were the 
establishment of a gaming authority and the licensing system, which included the following 
five types of licenses (Littler et al. 2011: 154): 
• Type A for casinos (max. 9); 
• Type B for gaming machine halls (max. 180); 
• Type C for bars (includes the right to place two bingo machines); 
• Type D for employees in a casino or gaming machine hall; 
• Type E for different activities linked to games of chance such as the sale, lease, 
delivery, putting at disposal, import, export, manufacture and services concerning 
maintenance, repair and equipment of games.  
The E licence cannot be combined with an A, B or C licence (Belgium 1999: section 20 and 
25). The newly created gaming commission delivers these licenses. The gaming commission 
advises and controls the operators and is established within the Ministry of Justice (Littler et 
al. 2011). It is composed of representatives from different ministries including Justice, Home 
Affairs, Finance, Public Health, Economics and the Minister who has the National Lottery in 
his/her competences (Belgium 2010: 10§2; Littler et al. 2010). 
Even though the GA contributed to the consolidation of the games of chance regulation in 
Belgium, two parts remain apart: the National Lottery and the sport betting sector that was 
regulated elsewhere (Littler et al. 2011). The National Lottery Act (NLA) of 1991 was modified 
in 2002 and regulates the National Lottery (Belgium 2002). The National Lottery disposes 
over a monopoly for the provision of lotteries and also has the right to offer gambling and 
betting (Belgium 2002). Moreover, the GA of 1999 did not foresee the past few years’ boom 
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in internet gambling. This kind of games would arguably have been prohibited, as there was 
no licence foreseen by law, but the enforcement of such a prohibition has proved highly 
inefficient (Littler et al. 2011). For this reason, the GC took the lead in 2008, to revise the 
Gambling Act, something which resulted in the implementation of a modified GA (Belgium 
2010) on 1 January 2011 extended to further include bets, online gambling and media 
games (Marique 2012).  
5.5.2 The current gambling regulation 
The GA of 1999 is still the main instrument on gaming in Belgium today, but as just 
mentioned, it was updated in 2011. All betting activities are now under the control of the 
GC. Before this modification, betting was mainly unregulated and did not fall under any tax 
measures. The new provisions apply for horse race and sport betting, betting on sports 
events being prohibited in Belgium (Littler et al. 2011). As only retail sport betting is in focus 
of this research, the next section will concentrate on land-based sport betting, keeping in 
mind that the situation also applies for horse race betting. It should be noted that the 
previous legislation remains in force, something which means that the general prohibition of 
games of chance persists, as does the idea of the licence system.  
General Logic Prohibition of gambling is the general rule with the granting of licences as 
exception (Gambling Act 1999).88 
Sectors Lottery Betting Casino 
Sub sectors - Sport and horse race  Non-sport events - 
Legal basis:      
Retail  
& 
Online 
National Lottery 
Act 200289 
Gambling Act of 1999 
(as modified 2010) 
Prohibited in the 
Gambling Act of 
1999 (as modified 
2010) 
Gambling Act 
of 1999 (as 
modified 
2010) 
Operator:     
Retail 
& 
Online 
Monopoly Numerous operators - Nine casinos 
TABLE 40: THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES OF CHANCE IN BELGIUM 
The main objective of the gambling regulation as established by the Gaming Act is to 
implement effective protection measures for players and minors, and to combat illegal 
gambling offers (Marique 2012). Hence, one of the measures established in the new 
Gambling Act was the minimal age limit of 21 for players in casinos and arcades and of 18 
for players on machines in street locations (Littler et al 2011). A similar measure was the 
limitation of the maximum hourly loss to 25 Euros in establishments holding a B licence, and 
12.50 Euros in street locations. Moreover, credits were forbidden in all gaming 
establishments, as well as large progressive (linked) jackpots (Belgium 2010).  
In regard to the delimitation of games of chance, the Gaming Act clarifies the matter only 
implicitly. The definitions of various terms can be found in its section 2, where it is stated for 
                                                
88 Author’s translation of: Loi du 7 mai 1999 sur les jeux de hasard, les établissements de jeux de 
hasard et la protection des joueurs modifié par la loi du 10 janvier 2010. 
89 Author’s translation of: Loi du 19 avril 2002 relative à la rationalisation du fonctionnement et de la 
gestion de la Loterie Nationale. 
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that for a game to be considered gambling, it needs to contain a small element of chance 
(Belgium 2010). Based on this definition, the Gaming Commission decided to evaluate poker 
as a game of chance as it involves the pledging of an amount combined with a degree of 
chance (Commission des jeux de hasard 2011). This also highlights that only little chance is 
sufficient to categorise a game as a game of chance.  
Games of chance are regulated mostly on the national level—with the exception of the 
applicable tax rate for online gambling, which is a regional matter—and the territorial reach 
is unified. The gambling sector is nevertheless fragmented in five sectors, as a result of the 
gaming classes outlined in the GA of 1999 (Littler et al. 2011) and the separate law for the 
lottery sector. Indeed, the GA outlines four classes of gaming establishments (Belgium 
2010: article 6). Class I are the casinos, Class II and Class III are the gaming arcades and 
establishments, and since the 2010 amendments, Class IV are the betting shops (this 
category is in the focus of this research and explained in detail in the next section) 
(Commission des jeux de hasard 2012). In addition to these classes, there is also a lottery 
sector, which is divided into the operations of the national lottery and bingo, tombola and 
prize draws organised by charitable organisations (Commission des jeux de hasard 2012).  
The Lottery Act of 1851 regulates the charitable lotteries. Under this act a charitable 
organisation can use gaming to raise funds when authorised (Belgium 1851). Charitable 
lotteries are exempted from the tax code and must only pay the licence fee (Commission 
des jeux de hasard 2012).  
The National Lottery is regulated by its own National Lottery Act and was modified in 2002 
(Belgium 2002). The National Lottery disposes over a monopoly for the provision of lotteries 
and also has the right to offer gambling and betting (Belgium 2002: article 6, §1 1°-3°). The 
National Lottery can operate other forms of gambling in competition with other operators 
(Commission des jeux de hasard 2012). The organisation was founded in 1934 and is since 
2002 an anonymous society (S.A. corporation). It remains a public corporation that is 
connected to the government with a management contract defining its operations and 
structure. A licence issued by the GC has to be received when the National Lottery offers 
games of chance in gaming establishments (Belgium 2004). Some measures were 
introduced then in order to protect players, for example temporary or permanent self-
exclusion and limits on the amounts wagered (Commission des jeux de hasard 2012). 
Class I establishments are the nine casinos, and they are regulated by the GA. Sections 25-
43 of the GA stipulate the rules that apply in order to receive a class A licence (Belgium 
2010). Applicants have to provide a recent copy of their criminal record, a recent certificate 
of good character that outlines that they possesses over their civil and political rights, a 
copy of individual and corporate taxes paid, and they also have to disclose the identity and 
financial stake of all shareholders. In addition the applicants must provide proof that they 
are able to pay the 250’000 Euro warranty fee (Belgium 2010). The federal gaming taxes for 
casinos can be found in sections 43-75 of the Tax Code (Belgium 1992). 
Another gambling sector in Belgium is the gaming machines established outside casinos 
(Class II and Class III). Class II establishments are the gaming arcades and amusement park 
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venues, which are limited to 180 in total. In these establishments only games of chance 
authorised by the Gaming Commission can be operated. Class III establishments are bars 
or entertainment locations allowed to sell any type of drinks, but which have to be 
consumed on the premise, and in which a maximum of two games of chance can be 
operated, but where the number of gaming machines is unlimited. In Class II and Class III 
establishments the player’s average loss per hour is limited to 25 Euros and 12.50 Euros 
respectively (Belgium 2010: section 8). The gambling machines have to be verified prior to 
the certification by the Gambling Commission. Responsible for this control is the Metrology 
Division of the Belgian Ministry of Economy (Belgium 2010: section 52). Similar to casinos, 
the applicant has to reveal the identity of the shareholders as well as provide a certificate of 
good character for each director and a copy of individual and corporate tax returns. Further, 
there is a requirement for a letter from the major of the borough certifying that the legal 
operating conditions are fulfilled. The applicant also has to prove his or her financial ability 
to pay the 75’000 Euros warranty fee, and to disclose the financial interest of the directors. 
Moreover, the legislation outlines several conditions, when for example the establishment 
moves location. Similar, though less stringent conditions are also required for a Class C 
licence. Moreover, there exist five different categories of amusement machine taxes 
(Belgium 2010).  
Online gambling has been allowed since 2011 when the government introduced online 
gambling licences. The licences A+, B+ and F1+ can only be issued to operators that hold a 
Class A, B or F1 land-based licence (Commission des jeux de hasard 2012). The online 
licences are subject to a licence fee and the validity period is linked to the main licences, 
which are for 15 years for Class A, and 9 years for Class B and F respectively (Commission 
des jeux de hasard 2012). The licensing authority is the GC. All licensing documents, 
policies and guidelines were made public months before the market opened. The difference 
to the French online regulation is that in Belgium only existing land-based operators can 
obtain an online licence (Commission des jeux de hasard 2012). To combat illegal gambling 
the gaming commission uses blacklists and ISP blocking (Commission des jeux de hasard 
2012). Technical standards and rules apply for the operators. Moreover, an organiser of a 
sporting event or the representative of a foreign company in Belgium involved in taking bets, 
must pay a betting tax (Belgium 2010). 
Having presented the general structure of the gambling sectors in Belgium, the next 
sections concentrate on the land-based sport betting regulation, the sector in focus of this 
study. 
I. The regulatory scope of the sport betting regulation 
With the 2010 amendments of the GA, sport and horse race betting is now also under the 
control of the GA and the GC (Belgium 2010; class IV as defined in article 6). Non-sport 
betting remains prohibited in Belgium (Littler et al. 2011). Class IV establishments have to 
transfer bets to a betting organiser that holds a F1 licence and they are not authorised to 
offer betting on unlicensed events (Marique 2012). Class IV establishments may be mobile 
or fixed (Belgium 2010; article 43/4, §2, first subsection). All Class IV licences need to be 
paired with a F1. The licence types as presented above are maintained. Hence, the market 
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structure is based on a closed licensing system (currently 34 licences are operating but 
soon there will be 35 operators as the National Lottery will receive a licence for betting 
games). The number of F1 licences is limited but not the number of establishments that a F1 
licensee can operate. So therefore, the system is allowing for several competing shops. Two 
different licences exist for land-based sport and horse race betting. The F1 licence is for 
permanent betting establishments and the F2 licence is for temporary venues located close 
to site of the sporting competitions (Commission des jeux de hasard 2012).  
The regulatory reach of the sport betting regulation is narrow even though there exist some 
licence conditions. F2 licence holder cannot serve alcohol and F2 holders are not allowed 
close to a location that can serve alcohol. In F1 locations alcohol servings are allowed but 
need to be consumed on the premises. F1 licence holders are permitted to sell specialised 
newspapers, sports magazines, gadgets and non-alcoholic beverages and are allowed to 
operate two automatic gaming machines offering wagers on activities similar to those 
undertaken in the betting establishments (Belgium 2010; article 43/4, §2, subsection 2). 
These machines offer bets placed on virtual events and not online bets on real events. 
Hence, the regulatory reach is very narrow. License holders have to pay a licence fee and a 
gaming tax applies but there is no specific public use of money in the Belgian sport betting 
market. Moreover, the type of ownership is not imposed and no publicness is present in the 
sport betting organisations.  
The regulatory scope of the sport betting sector 
Market structure  Competitive closed licence system 
Regulatory reach Narrow 
Specific public use of money No 
Type of ownership No 
Publicness None 
TABLE 41: RSC SPORT BETTING SECTOR IN BELGIUM 
II. The regulatory stringency of the sport betting regulation 
a. The regulatory level 
In Belgium, the presence of the regulator was already established in 1999 with the 
empowerment of the GC. Since the amendments of the GA in 2010 the GC is responsible 
for issuing the nine different types of operating licences as stipulated in article 25 of the GA 
(Marique 2012). The GC has competences en amant and en aval as it grants the licences 
and controls the licensees. It can sanction licensees, for example through suspension, and 
administrative fines can be imposed even on non-licensees (Belgium 2010: article 15§1 and 
15§3). However, the GC does not have large competences in regard to illegal gambling but 
can only inform the crown prosecutor of an infringement (Belgium 2010: article 15§2, 
subsection 1). Overall, and as outlined by the interview participants, the GC and the 
operators’ relationship relies on trust and the GC is more focused on illegal online operators 
in order to blacklist and block IP addresses (Interview 8, 10).  
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting sector: the regulatory level 
Presence of a regulator  Yes  
Competences of regulator En amont large, en aval small 
TABLE 42: RS I SPORT BETTING SECTOR IN BELGIUM 
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b. The organisational level 
In regard to the regulatory stringency on the organisational level, there are few restrictions in 
place. No distribution channel restrictions can be observed and online betting is allowed 
when holding a F1+ licence in addition to the land-based licence (Belgium 2010). Hence, the 
regulation requires a connection between online and offline operations in the sense that only 
land-based operators can apply for an online licence (Littler & Franssen 2012). Other mobile 
devices are also used to offer the betting games (Belgium 2010). Moreover, no 
advertisement restrictions appear to apply for legal operators (Belgium 2010).  
In regard to obligations to prevent gambling addiction, it is less the operator and more the 
gaming commission that is active (Interview 8, 10). The GC itself is very active, mandating 
different studies. The main tool used by the commission to combat the problem gambling is 
the self-exclusion database and the GC is in contact with a number of problem gambling 
clinics and institutions and distributes the literature to these establishments. Nonetheless, 
some restrictions are in place. For the class IV establishment and betting, a minimum age of 
18 applies (Belgium 2010: article 54§1). Moreover, any gambling on credit is forbidden 
under the GA (Belgium 2010: article 58 subsection 1).  
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting sector: the organisational level 
Distribution channel restrictions  None  
Advertisement restrictions None 
Obligations in regard to gambling addiction Low (but regulator takes measures) 
TABLE 43: RS I SPORT BETTING SECTOR IN BELGIUM 
In summary, the regulatory intensity in the sport betting sector in Belgium is low. The market 
structure is competitive and few requirements are imposed on operators once the licence is 
granted.  
5.5.3 The performance definition of Belgium Ladbrokes PLC  
The performance orientation in the Belgium sport betting sector is multidimensional, 
concentrating mainly on the commercial or economic performance dimensions. The table 
below summarises the results of the qualitative analysis in the different performance 
dimensions. 
TABLE 44: OCCURRENCE AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS OF LADBROKES PLC 
Occurrence and evaluation of 
dimensions 
Interviews Reports of Organisation 
  
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Financial dimension 28 ++ 65 ++ 
Operational dimension 32 ++ 51 ++ 
Stakeholder management dimension 16 - 27 + 
Legal requirement dimension 25 + 16 - 
Social issue participation dimension 19 - 18 - 
Public values dimension 14 -- 6 -- 
Total 134  183  
Legend:  ++ very high importance  + high importance  = neutral importance 
   - low importance   -- very low importance 
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I. The financial dimension 
The financial dimension is quantitatively (65 occurrences in the reports and 28 in the 
interviews) and qualitatively very important for the performance definition of Ladbrokes. The 
financial performance is at the heart of the focus of the organisations. The annual report of 
Ladbrokes lists the business and financial highlights directly after the front page and even 
before the table of contents (Ladbrokes PLC 2012b). These statements point to the 
turnovers realised and the market position as a leader (Ladbrokes PLC 2012). The financial 
indicators are numerous times mentioned throughout the report (Ladbrokes PLC 2012). 
These statements are of course not limited to the Belgian sport betting market but relate to 
the overall business activities of Ladbrokes (Ladbrokes PLC 2012). Nonetheless it shows the 
overall aim of long-term growth and value for shareholders (Ladbrokes PLC 2012). The 
importance of profitability and the revenue realised is also outlined as the overall definition 
of success in the interviews (Interview 8). One interview even emphasised that all that 
counts is profits and shareholder value (Interview 10).  
Under measuring our performance the report outlines the key performance indicators (KPIs) 
that include for example gross win per shop, EBIT per shop or net revenue (Ladbrokes PLC 
2012). The financial focus of the organisation is also illustrated in the reports when the 
different markets and distribution platforms are presented (Ladbrokes PLC 2012).  
Under European retail, the example of the Belgian sport betting market is typical. The 
amounts staked, the net revenue, the betting tax, the gross profit, the operating costs and 
finally the operating profits are stated in table form for the year 2011, compared with the 
year 2010 and the year change in percent is indicated. In the text describing the Belgian 
results, it is highlighted that the “performance of the Belgium business has been 
predominantly driven by a change in tax regime from a turnover tax to a 15% gross profits 
tax. (...) This change was fully passed on to customers and we have seen amounts staked 
increase steadily throughout the year with an expected decrease in net revenue more than 
offset by the decline in betting tax” (Ladbrokes PLC 2012: 11). This quote illustrates not only 
the importance of financial results but also the positive influence of a decrease of a 
regulatory requirement, in this case the level of taxes, and its positive influence on financial 
results.  
Another important aspect, as briefly mentioned above, is the number of competitors in the 
market and the anticipation of the future (Interview 8). The organisations need to take into 
account the competitors, something which increases the focus on costs and revenues. 
Market shares and the number of customers are therefore other very important indicators 
for the performance of the organisation (Interview 10). In regard to competitors one interview 
participant spoke about fair rather than free competition, as also being important for the 
profitability of the organisation (Interview 10). Therefore, all these other aspects also point in 
the same direction, namely that of the profits realised at the end of the year. Therefore, the 
financial dimension is the overall goal of any other activity undertaken, and it is thus 
categorised as the most important result dimension.  
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II. The operational dimension 
The operational dimension is quantitatively (51 references in the reports and 32 in the 
interviews) and qualitatively evaluated to be very important for the performance definition of 
the Ladbrokes PLC.  
The customer perspective is frequently mentioned in the data set and is very important for 
the operational dimension and vital for the growth of the organisation (Ladbrokes 2012; 
Interview 8; 10). Key indicators are developed to measure the organisation’s performance in 
regard to customers (e.g. ‘net promoter score‘ to asses how likely customers recommend 
Ladbrokes to other people) (Ladbrokes 2012). Moreover, Ladbrokes mandates third party 
audits and monitors customer complaints. The customer focus aims to drive brand loyalty 
and brand reputation, including trust and integrity (Ladbrokes 2012). The customer 
perspective is also outlined in relation to the internal business perspective, with the indicator 
of secure processes for transaction, which increase the trust of customers, and with 
responsible gambling (Ladbrokes 2012; Interview 8). Both of these indicators arguably point 
to the social issue participation dimension (Ladbrokes 2012). In the interviews it was 
outlined that such activities are mainly carried out to enhance customer trust and feeling of 
security, and to increase sales and to distinguish the organisations from illegal operators 
present in the market (Interview 10). Hence, this focus on responsible gambling appears 
linked to the stakeholder management dimension, as it will increase future profits. This is 
confirmed through the CSR report, as concerns the customers (Ladbrokes PLC 2012a, 
2012c). Indicators include the requirement to understand the customers’ needs, to provide 
clear customer information, to protect customers’ interests and to satisfy the customers 
more generally. These are all indicators that are linked more to the customer perspective 
and less to the stakeholder management or the social issue participation dimensions.  
The learning and growth perspective is also important for the operational dimension. Very 
important indicators in this regard are innovations in technology and products (Ladbrokes 
2012) as well as the investments done in R&D. The developing and delivering of best-in-
class products in all sectors and distribution channels is a main focus of the responsible 
business unit in the organisation and the organisation highlights that the technology is the 
basis of all betting and gaming products (Ladbrokes 2012). Innovations in technology and 
the development of new or the adaptation of old products are crucial in order to remain 
attractive to customers and to keep up with the competitors (Ladbrokes 2012; Interview 8; 
10).  
Innovation is not limited to products and technologies but also to advertisement strategies 
and player advantages (e.g. free bets) (Interview 8). Another important indicator is the 
entering of new markets (e.g. Asia or USA) and the desire to grow in size (Interview 8; 10). In 
regard to the internal business process perspective few quotations were discovered in the 
data set. The quotations discovered refer mainly to restructuring of the organisation in order 
to move away from a product or distribution channel focus and towards a customer and 
service orientation (Ladbrokes 2012). Other indicators are quality and productivity of 
operations in order to increase outputs. Especially in the interviews the internal business 
process perspective lacked mention (Interview 8; Interview 10). Another noteworthy aspect 
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is the importance of succession planning and that of having right competences in place, 
and this also for the future (Interview 10),  
In summary, the organisational dimension is a very important dimension for the Belgian 
performance definition and it is evaluated to drive financial performance (Interview 8, 10; 
Ladbrokes PLC 2012). For example, the learning and growth perspective is clearly linked to 
the financial dimension as its successful accomplishments results in a higher number of 
sales. One interviewee argued that the operational dimension is the most important 
performance dimension as without operations, no product could be offered and there would 
be no business that would result in shareholder value (Interview 8). 
III. The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension is quantitatively more important in the reports (27 
references) than in the interviews (16 references). Overall, the few numbers of quotations in 
the reports is surprising compared to the number of pages analysed. Nonetheless, the 
qualitative evaluation reveals that it is of a high importance in the reports and of a low 
importance in the interviews.  
The stakeholder management dimension focuses mainly on regulators, employees, 
environment and business partnerships and performances in these areas are evaluated with 
KPIs against fixed targets (Ladbrokes 2012).  
The existence of a specific CSR report may indicate that the stakeholder management 
dimension is a core objective. And indeed, interestingly, the Board of Directors does the 
overall governance of CR and is considering CR and governance issues when defining 
group strategy. Hence, it seems to be part of the strategy (something that attributes a higher 
position to CSR than when it is part of communication). But it can also be argued that as it 
is only considered when defining the strategy, it is not a strategic objective in itself and not 
object of performance measurement for the overall organisational performance. Hence, it is 
not actually a core dimension of the organisational performance. This impression is 
reinforced by the interview results, which indicate that the stakeholder management 
dimension is linked to the reputation of the organisations and that it is in this regard very 
important. But it is evaluated by its contribution to future commercial performance (Interview 
8, 10). Hence, CSR—as defined by Ladbrokes—concedes perfectly with the stakeholder 
management dimension that comprises elements contributing to future financial 
performance.  
In summary, the stakeholder management dimension, despite a large discussion of CSR in 
the reports, is of moderate importance to the performance definition and is conceptualised 
as a driver for future financial performance.  
IV. The legal requirement dimension 
The legal requirement dimension is quantitatively of little importance to the performance 
definition of Ladbrokes (25 quotations in the interviews and 16 in the reports). Also the 
qualitative evaluation results in a similar picture with a slightly higher evaluation of the 
quotations of the interviews. 
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The impression is that the compliance with legal requirements is important but not part of 
the performance definition. The compliance with regulatory requirements is an important 
aspect for the operators and something that is frequently mentioned in the data set 
(Ladbrokes PLC 2012a; Interview 8, 10; 2012c). Moreover, in the CSR concept of the 
organisation, the compliance with regulation is listed. The organisation has created special 
units to comply with the different regulations (e.g. anti-money laundering, health and safety 
in betting shop etc.) (Ladbrokes PLC 2012). It was also outlined in the interviews that a 
successful sport betting operator takes the objectives of the country it engages in into 
account.  
Responsible gambling is an indicator of the legal requirement dimension, as it is outlined 
that the obligations are met in all countries where the organisation is licensed (Ladbrokes 
2012). In the CSR report, responsible gambling is listed under compliance and regulator 
(Ladbrokes PLC 2012a). In the interviews the impression was reinforced that the measures 
for responsible gambling are mainly taken to comply with the legal requirements and hence 
point to the legal requirement dimension (Interview 8, 10).  
Nonetheless, one interview participant also stated that it responsible gambling is inherent in 
the logic of the business, and that they are not to blame for only engaging in mandatory 
measures (Interview 8). However, another interview participant added that at the moment 
the responsible gambling aspects are vague, as the law, which is imposing a number of 
conditions, is not yet implemented and the decrees not yet published (Interview 10). This is 
not the GC’s fault though, as it has not received the political support necessary to actually 
put everything in place at the right time with the right number of people (Interview 10).  
Another aspect appearing in the context of the regulation is that especially internet gambling 
is characterised by intense and substantial competition and by relatively low barriers for the 
entry of new participants (Interview 10). In addition, Ladbrokes faces competition from 
market participants who benefit from greater liquidity as a result of accepting bets and 
wagers from jurisdictions in which Ladbrokes chooses not to operate (for legal reasons or 
otherwise) (Ladbrokes 2012). Another indicator mentioned by Ladbrokes for the legal 
requirement dimension is the gambling taxes paid and outlined to contribute positively to 
society (Ladbrokes 2012; Interview 10).  
In summary, the legal requirement dimension seems to be a prerequisite dimension but not 
actually part of the performance definition of Ladbrokes, even though compliance with 
regulation is very important for the organisation (Interview 8; 10).  
V. The social issue participation dimension 
The social issue participation dimension is quantitatively (19 quotations in the interviews and 
18 in the reports) and qualitatively of low importance for the performance definition of 
Ladbrokes. Indeed, only few references were made in this regard.  
Most codes found for the social issue participation dimension concern gambling problems 
or match fixing, and the impression gained was that such activities are more a result of 
business related reflections than of social value creation motives. For this reason it appears 
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that the activities are more likely to be linked to customer relationships and could 
consequently be integrated in the stakeholder management dimension. The organisation 
does take voluntary measures in that regard, such as the graining of employees or the 
contribution in international associations in defining industry-wide standards and promoting 
responsible behaviour (Ladbrokes 2012; Interview 10). One interview participant mentioned 
that the organisations do not have an interest to have vulnerable players as they risk not 
being able to pay for the financial losses (Interview 8). Besides, throughout the data set, it 
was indicated that the majority of actions are taken for reasons of compliance (e.g. legal 
requirement dimension) (Ladbrokes 2012; Interview 8, 10).  
The second indicator for the social issue participation dimension is the voluntary measures 
taken to fight corruption and match fixing. In the CSR concept of the organisation, security 
is listed and the objective is to keep crime out of gambling and tackling bribery and fraud 
(Ladbrokes PLC 2012a, 2012c). It could be argued that this is a regulatory objective and 
hence part of the legal requirement dimension, but in one interview it was stated that 
Ladbrokes actually measures the performance of these activities because they are 
sometimes the first victims of match fixing and have therefore an interest to tackle the 
problem (Interview 8). Another interview participant mitigated the subject by pointing out 
that it is not a new phenomenon but an accelerated one that has been made more public 
because of new technologies. Moreover, in the retail market the problem is only marginal 
but governments impose on all operators to be involved even though it does not apply to all 
of them, and especially not to retail operators (Interview 10).  
The third indicator is the voluntary redistribution of profits to local communities in the form 
of investments for example for health, education, charities etc. Indicators in this regard 
could be found especially in the reports. The voluntary redistribution seems to be limited to 
the UK and Ireland as the examples in the report only refer to these regions (Ladbrokes 
2012). For Belgium the voluntary redistribution seems to be absent. Moreover, in the 
interviews the voluntary redistribution is completely missing (Interview 8, 10). Despite the 
indicators detected in the data set, the social issue participation dimension constitutes an 
add-on and less an outcome orientation of the performance definition. Several of the 
identified elements could also be attributed to the stakeholder management dimension as 
for example the concentration on the customers in regard to responsible gambling and the 
absence of reference to the larger society in that regard. Also the absence of any 
sponsoring or philanthropic undertakings in Belgium indicates that these undertakings are 
less directed towards the society and more towards reinforcing the customer base and to 
acquiring new customers.  
In summary, the social issue participation is of little importance to the performance 
definition of Ladbrokes. A critical evaluation could even argue that it is not an actual 
performance dimension—with the exception of the responsible gambling activities—but 
more an add-on or a follower, once financial success allows for engaging in such activities.  
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VI. The public values dimension 
The public values dimension is quantitatively (14 references in the interviews and 6 in the 
reports) and qualitatively of a very low importance to the performance definition of 
Ladbrokes. The quotations related to these codes point mostly to the importance of public 
values such as fairness and integrity to the reputation of the organisation and contribute to 
the growth of the organisation (Ladbrokes PLC 2012). The link between values and 
reputation is often revealed in the data set (Ladbrokes PLC 2012; Interview 8, 10). Another 
value judged to be important to the organisations in the Belgium sport betting sector is 
transparency, in processes, towards the regulator and towards the customers (Interview 8). 
Security was also revealed under the public values category and is apparently closely linked 
to the operational dimension in general and business processes in specific.  
In summary, despite the presence of several values the public values dimension is 
seemingly not part of the performance definition of Ladbrokes. For Ladbrokes public values 
are important for business processes and the reputation of the organisation, something that 
is believed to result in growth, but values are not targeted with performance indicators. 
VII. Concluding remarks: a bottom-up reflection 
In conclusion the performance definition of Ladbrokes is multidimensional but marked by 
the saliency of two dimensions: the financial and the operational dimensions. Among the 
other performance dimensions a clear hierarchy is observed.  
A bottom-up approach has revealed the following indicators to occur frequently in the data 
set. Profitability and other key financial indicators, as already outlined in the CEO’s 
statement in the report, point to the financial dimension. Ladbrokes speaks in its report of 
five critical success factors to grow and create value for the shareholders (i.e. financial 
dimension) (Ladbrokes PLC 2012). These critical success factors point to different 
dimensions: the ‘retail excellence’ based on products by optimising the margin and 
operational efficiency (i.e. operational and financial dimension); the ‘digital capability’ aims 
to expand the digital products by acquiring and developing improved technology (i.e. 
operational dimension); the ‘pricing, trading and liability management’ aims to optimise 
margins, broaden the product range and have a best in class product portfolio (i.e. 
operational and financial dimensions), the ‘customer and brand factor’ aims to make the 
Ladbrokes brand more exciting and place the customer at the heart of the business (i.e. 
operational dimension) and finally ‘regulatory leadership’ includes compliance (i.e. legal 
requirement dimension) and revenues generated for the states in form of taxes (Ladbrokes 
PLC 2012). One remark can be made with regard to the term ‘performance’. Ladbrokes 
mainly associates financial indicators to performance. This does however not indicate that 
the other dimensions do not occur, but only they are not necessarily referred to through the 
term ‘performance’, something which is also illustrated through the key success factors 
presented above.  
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5.6 THE AUSTRIAN SPORT BETTING SECTOR 
5.6.1 The genesis of gambling in Austria 
Gambling and gambling regulation know an ancient history in Austria. The first rules on 
gambling were adopted in 1696 when Emperor Leopold I decreed rules for criminal 
prosecution of illegal gambling. Consequently, different games of chance developed and 
were regulated. The first numbers lotto dates back to 1751 and was privately operated. It 
was a privilege the operator received from Emperor Maria Theresa under the form of a 
patent right. This system was valid until 1 November 1787, when Emperor Joseph 
established the ‘k.k. Lottogefällsdirektion’ in Vienna and took over the state lottery. Only in 
1813, under the rule of Emperor Franz I, was the system changed, as new legislation was 
introduced to regulate the state lottery (Zollinger 1997). This law remained in place until 
1986. 
New legislation was constantly introduced, enlarging the product palette. In 1948, a new 
Toto legislation opened the field for sports betting and on 23 October 1949 the first Toto 
competition was realised. In 1966 betting on the outcome of European football matches 
started. During the 1980s a number of new lottery products were developed and offered. 
Following the adoption of the Gambling Act in 1989, the Austrian Lotto Toto society took 
over the operation of all games of chance from the Austrian gambling monopoly 
administration. In 1991 the organisation was renamed in ‘Österreichische Lotterien 
Gesellschaft m.b.H. (short Österreichische Lotterien)’. 
In regard to casinos, the first gambling houses opened in 1934 in Baden, Salzburg and 
Kitzbühel. However, in 1938 all gambling was forbidden in the casinos, with the exception of 
the one in Baden. Only in June 1950 was another casino opened in Austria. The whole 
gambling system was revised in June 1962 with the Gambling Act of 1692. On the 1st 
January 1968, the Österreichische Spielbanken, today known as Casinos Austria, received 
the only concession to operate casinos and took over all casinos (Zollinger 1997). Casinos 
Austria is still today the sole concessionaire for the 12 casinos allowed in Austria. 
Betting on sport events was first regulated through an imperial ordinance in 1916. This act 
concerned the obligations on betting and provided for measures to prohibit betting without 
concession. After the end of the empire, the same rules were taken over by the parliament in 
1919. The federated states were responsible for the enforcement of the law, which at that 
time had no legislative powers of their own (Zollinger 1997). This changed with the Federal 
Constitution of 1920 which attributed certain legislative functions to the parliaments of the 
federated states. Since then the Länder in Austria have enacted nine different Laws on 
Totalisators and Bookmakers (Betting Acts).90 On the federal level the Austrian Gambling Act 
(GA) was adopted on 28 November 1989 (Austria 1989) and is the current legal basis for 
games of chance in Austria.  
 
                                                
90 Burgenland (1919); Kärnten (1996); Niederösterreich (1978); Oberösterreich (2007); Salzburg (1994); 
Steiermark (2003); Tirol (2002); Vorarlberg (2003); Wien (1919). 
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5.6.2 The current gambling regulation 
Games of chance or gambling are regulated in the GA of 1989, which establishing a state 
gambling monopoly (Austria 1989: §3). This act applies to all gambling with some 
exceptions, such as games of chance for non-commercial purposes and for limited amounts 
(Austria 1989; §4). Unauthorised games of chance are forbidden under provision 168 of the 
Penal Code (Austria 1974).  
TABLE 45: THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES OF CHANCE IN AUSTRIA 
The GA, the basis of games of chance in Austria, does interestingly enough not include any 
provision concerning objectives of the act. In its first paragraph it outlines the range of 
application and provides the delimitation of games of chance. A game is a game of chance if 
the outcome depends exclusively or predominately on chance (Austria 1989: §1). Hence, 
when the outcome depends also on knowledge it is not considered to be a game of chance. 
This raises the question of whether betting would fall under the definition of games of 
chance in Austria. To answer this, consideration has to be given to the Austria Civil Code 
(ABGB)92 of 1811, as last modified in 2013 (Austria 1811). In its section 1267 it elaborates 
‘contracts of luck’93 as contracts promising the hope of acquiring a yet uncertain advantage 
(Austria 1811). Section 1269 of the ABGB labels a bet as a ‘contract of luck’. Implicitly, all 
‘contracts of luck’ depend on an element of chance but the AGBG does not specify the 
extent of that element of chance in order to characterise each type of ‘contract of luck’ 
‘contract of luck’ (Österreichischer Buchmacherverband 2011). A bet is defined in section 
1270 of the ABGB as a treaty in which two parties fix a prize for the one whose affirmation 
over the outcome of an uncertain event will hold. The important element is that both parties 
do not know the outcome of the event in advance. As the random character of the bet is not 
sufficient to categorise it as a game of chance, the bet is not seen as gambling 
(Österreichischer Buchmacherverband 2011). Following this line of argument, the Ministry of 
Finance has also argued that hazard is the separating element between gambling and sport 
betting, by virtue of section 1 of the GA (Nikodem 2010). In this logic, sport betting is not a 
                                                
91 Author’s translation of: Bundesgesetz vom 28. November 1989 zur Regelung des 
Glücksspielwesens (Glücksspielgesetz GSpG). 
92 Author’s translation of: Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch für die gesammten deutschen 
Erbländer der Österreichischen Monarchie (allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch ABGB). 
93 Author’s translation of: Glücksvertrag. 
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game of chance because it does not depend exclusively or predominantly on chance. The 
outcome of a bet is dependent on the skill of the player. In the case of sport betting, the 
putter knows the game, the team and the athlete and it as a result of this knowledge that the 
bet is placed.  
Another element to consider is whether betting on non-sport events is a game of skill or a 
game of chance. Sport betting is regulated on the level of the federated states. These laws 
are based on a former Law of 28 July 1919 concerning the Fees of Totalisators and 
Bookmakers and Other Measures94 (Austria 1919). It is not clear whether betting on non-
sport events is regulated under the Austrian Gambling Act or whether it lays outside this 
jurisdiction and is a matter for the federated state level. The Ministry of Finance finds that 
they are indeed part of the GA (Nikodem 2010). However, the betting laws of the states of 
Styria and Vorarlberg do not limit the operations of bookmakers and totalisators to sport 
betting, but also include betting on non-sport events (‘Gesellschaftswetten’), allowing it 
when an authorisation has been delivered by the government of the state in question 
(Nikodem 2010). This stands in sharp contrast to the other federated state laws and to the 
Act concerning the Fees of Totalisators and Bookmakers and Other Measures (Austria 1919) 
as betting on non-sport events are part of the gambling monopoly. Avoiding entering this 
legal debate, the discussion here will simply consider sport betting as laying outside the 
gambling monopoly, though it will be kept in mind that it is an issue of ongoing discussion. 
Another important element is that bets on virtual sport events generated through computers 
fall under the gambling monopoly and not in the category of the traditional sport betting 
games (Austria 1989: § 52°1). 
So in summary, the gambling regulation, based essentially on the 1989 GA, comprises 
casino gambling, lotteries and games of chance on the internet and games of chance 
operated through video lottery terminals (Austria 1989: §2°a). The Casinos Austria holds the 
12 concessions for the casinos and operates all of them. Similarly, the concession for the 
lottery is held by ‘Österreichische Lotterien’. Due to pressure from the EU, an international 
tender was organised in 2012 and the ‘Österreichische Lotterien’ received the new 
concession for the next 12 years. Also as a result of pressure from the EU, similar tenders 
have needed to be held in the casino sector as well. The Casinos Austria thus received the 
concession for the first six casinos. The second tender started in early 2013 for the other six 
casinos. In regard to online games of chance, Casinos Austria and ‘Österreichische 
Lotterien’ operate the website win2day together. The gambling regulation is strict in nature, 
establishing several requirements for the operators, taking measures in gambling addiction 
prevention and being monitored by the Ministry of Finance. The gambling authority is 
responsible for implementing the Gambling Act, taking due consideration of public order 
objectives. The Ministry of Finance issues the concessions for the casino, lottery and toto 
games as well as for other number lotteries (Austria 1989: § 6 - §12°b and § 32).  
 
                                                
94 Author’s translation of: Gesetz vom 28. Juli 1919 betreffend die Gebühren von Totalisateur- und 
Buchmacherwetten sowie Maßnahmen zur Unterdrückung des Winkelwettwesens. 
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Next to these games of chance, the ‘kleines Glücksspiel’ also exists. This game is rooted in 
the machines called one-armed bandit and used to be strictly limited in terms of the allowed 
wagers. This kind of game is also regulated on the level of the individual federated states. 
But, due to technological progress having increased the redistribution rate, there is at the 
moment a large discussion in Austria as to whether this game should be forbidden outside 
the gambling monopoly, because it is no longer really a ‘kleines Glücksspiel’. Already today 
it is only legal in four out of the nine federated states, though it is practised in all of Austria. 
Moreover, the tax department levies taxes in all of the nine states, including in those where 
it is normally forbidden, something that bolsters the grey market. On the contrary, sport 
betting, except for when it relates to more than ten sportive events on a fixed quota basis, 
(e.g. toto games) is regulated by virtue of article 15.1 of the Federal Constitution95 (Austria 
1920: §15°1) by nine regional sport betting laws. It is this type of sport betting games which 
are in the focus of the next section.  
The territorial reach of the gambling regulation is unified and contrasts sharply with the 
territorial reach of the sport betting regulation, which is fragmented in nine territories. It 
would go beyond the scope of this study to discuss each of the laws in detail, and this is 
also not necessary for the objective of the thesis, so therefore, some main points will rather 
be highlighted, with references to some laws as examples. 
I. The regulatory scope of the sport betting regulation 
The market structure is in all of the nine federated states based on a concession system. In 
case an operator wants to offer nation-wide sport betting games, concessions from all nine 
individual states are required.  
The nine Betting Acts regulate most of the concession procedure. In some situations and in 
some states a concession is not needed if the betting is offered only for two weeks or three 
sportive events per year, at a specific event and/or series of events at a particular place or 
by a totalisator or bookmaker holding comparable concession in another Member State of 
the EU (Section 1 Carinthia and Salzburg Betting Act; Section 5 Tyrol Betting Act). The 
concessions are issued either by the government of the federated state96 or by the district 
authority acting on behalf of the government of the federated state (Section 13 Upper 
Austria and Vorarlberg Betting Act; Section 1 Burgenland, Vienna, Salzburg, Carinthia and 
Lower Austria Betting Acts, Section 12 Tyrol Betting Act and Section 15 Styria Betting Act). 
After the application is made, the authority may make further investigations as for example 
with regard to the distance between the betting office and schools. The authority can also 
hear the applicant in person (Section 3(4) Vorarlberg Betting Act, Section 5(6) Tyrol Betting 
Act; Section 3(5) Salzburg Betting Act; Section 7(1) Upper Austria Betting Act) or take 
measures to ensure that the activity of totalisator or bookmaker is properly pursued (Section 
3(5) Vorarlberg Betting Act; Section 7(6) Upper Austria Betting Act; Section 4(1) Salzburg 
Betting Act).  
                                                
95 Author’s translation of: Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG). 
96 Author’s translation of: Landesregierung. 
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The regulatory reach of the federated states’ law is narrow and conditions to acquire the 
licences are outlined only after the license has been issued. To receive the concession the 
applicants need to prove their financial reliability. Moreover all betting laws require the 
licence holders to have fixed business premises where they offers bets and/or they may 
offer bets at particular sport events at a specific place with the consent of the organiser. To 
offer bets the concession holders have to be over 18, with the exception of in Carinthia 
where the minimal age limit is 24 (Section 11 Carinthia Betting Act in connection with 
Section 8(1) of the Austrian Industrial Code 1994). The various Betting Acts pose numerous 
requirements, especially that of Tyrol (with seven requirements in total). These requirements 
range from requirements needed already at the time of the application to requirements 
needed to have been fulfilled by the time the concession is issued. For the first category 
these requirements are first that the applicants have to prove their creditworthiness 
(Association of bookmakers 2010). Second, applicants need to prove their reliability (e.g. 
Section 3(1)(c), Section 5(2) and Section 5(3) Vorarlberg Betting Act). Third, a certificate for 
qualification is required in Salzburg and Tyrol (Section 3(4) Salzburg Betting Act, Section 
5(5) Tyrol Betting Act). Fourth, in some federated states the Austrian or EU citizenship is 
required (e.g. Section 3(1)(b) Vorarlberg Betting Act or Section 3(1)(1) Salzburg Betting Act). 
Next the applicant needs to prove the appointment of a person responsible in case the 
totalisator or bookmaker applies for more than one permanent betting establishment (e.g. 
Section 3(1)(g) Vorarlberg Betting Act). Finally, at the time of application, a copy of the 
general terms and conditions for betting has to be provided. All amendments will need to be 
notified to the authority. These terms and conditions need to be visibly posted in the 
establishment (e.g. Section 7, 8 and 10 Upper Betting Act).  
The numbers of concessions are not limited in any of the nine Federated States. As a result, 
numerous operators offer sport betting games in Austria. The most important one is 
Admiral, an organisation that is held by Novomatic AG, an international operating gambling 
concern, and Österreichische Sportwetten (tipp3) that is part of Casinos Austria and 
Österreichische Lotterien corporate group. Admiral Sportwetten has around 200 outlets 
across Austria and it is the market leader. Tipp3 uses the lottery distribution network and 
therefore sells bets on 3650 points of acceptance. Besides operators operating in all nine of 
the Länder there are also many other bookmakers who are only locally present. The Austrian 
bookmaker association for example counts 32 members that all have at least one selling 
point. The issuing of the concession can be linked to the fulfilment of certain light 
conditions, such an Austrian residence or citizenship, a declaration of the address of the 
selling points, an authorisation of all new betting terminals or the establishment of a betting 
code of conduct. 
No specific public use of money is outlined and the type of ownership is also not imposed. 
Individuals licensed to offer bets professionally are named either bookmakers or totalisators 
(Anderson et al. 2012). In the regional Betting Acts these can be individuals, with the 
exception of Upper Austria. In Upper Austria only companies can act as a totalisator and 
bookmakers can apply for a concession (Section 2(10) and (11), Section 7(1) and Section 
2(9), Upper Austria Betting Act). A totalisator is a concessionaire who conveys bets between 
individuals. The totalisator manages the paid bets on a commission basis but does not bet 
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on its own account. This is in contrast to the bookmaker who bets on his or her own 
account against other individuals. He or she thus bears the risk of losing the bet and having 
to pay out the players, but also of earning the bets made by the putter (Anderson et al. 
2012). Bookmakers and totalisators offer betting on the occasion of one or more sport 
events. It hardly needs to be said that no degree of publicness is present in regard to the 
totalisator or bookmakers holding a concession.  
The regulatory scope of the sport betting sector 
Market structure  Competitive open license system 
Regulatory reach Narrow 
Specific public use of money No 
Type of ownership Not imposed 
Publicness None 
TABLE 46: RSC SPORT BETTING SECTOR IN AUSTRIA 
II. The regulatory stringency of the sport betting regulation 
a. The regulator level 
In the nine jurisdictions, no special gambling body is established. The local governments 
issue the concession and monitor their legal compliance In regard to the competences, 
concession can be retrieved in case the reliability is not guaranteed any more or other 
infringements are made.  
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting sector: the regulatory level 
Presence of a regulator  No, local governments issue licence  
Competences of regulator No 
TABLE 47: RS I SPORT BETTING SECTOR IN AUSTRIA 
b. The organisational level 
The sport betting wagers are taxed in most federated states. Moreover in some of them the 
annual profits are also taxed. For example in Burgenland the operator has to pay an annual 
fee of 20% on the benefits resulting from the bets (Burgenland 1919: §3). In the interviews 
and reports, the taxation element was often referred to as very heavy and as increasing the 
regulatory intensity (Casinos Austria 2012a; Novomatic AG 2012a; Interview 4, 5, 6).  
The laws do not impose many restrictions for the operation of bets and the ones established 
are mostly common sense. Bookmakers and totalisator are for example not allowed to offer 
betting at more than ten sport events because this would be gambling under the GA of 1989 
(Austria 1989). The bets may be on any kind of result, including interim results, final results, 
handicaps or goals. The only restrictions outlined in the laws97 are that bets are prohibited 
from (Oberösterreich 2007):  
• Aiming at the death of human beings or animals; 
• Grossly violating human dignity; or 
• Humiliating human beings in regard to their sex, race, colour, nationality, ethical 
origin, religious believes or disabilities. 
                                                
97 Stipulated in Section 10 Upper Austria Betting Act, Section 7 Styria Betting Act. 
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It is also required that the totalisator or bookmaker has to mark the permanent betting 
establishment at all times clearly for the public. In case the totalisator or bookmaker owns 
several establishments they have to be marked in the same way and to the main betting 
establishment has to be indicated (e.g. Section 9(2) Upper Austria Betting Act). Another 
requirement is that the totalisator or bookmaker has to keep an electronic betting book that 
records all bets chronologically. It has to be ready for inspection by the authority any time 
for at least one year (e.g. Section 9(1) Vorarlberg Betting Act).  
Finally, if the bet exceeds a certain amount, for example 50 Euros in Tyrol or 2500 Euros in 
Styria, the bookmaker or totalisator has to verify and register the identity of the putter, the 
related data from the identity card and the amount of the bet. If there is suspicion of money 
laundering, the totalisator or bookmaker has to inform the authorities. In regard to 
distribution channels, some betting laws only allow for retail betting in the permanent betting 
establishment. Some betting laws do allow betting through the internet (e.g. Section 2(3) 
Vorarlberg).  
The study of the Austrian sport betting regulations does not result in any identification of 
advertisement restrictions. In regard to obligations to prevent gambling addiction the federal 
laws stipulate nothing and no requirements are imposed on the bookmakers or totalisators. 
In regard to minor gambling, most federated states restrict access to betting games to 
persons who are 18 or older. For all of these reasons, the regulation of sport betting in 
Austria is of a very low intensity. In the next section we will analyse the performance 
orientation of operators in Austria.  
The regulatory stringency of the sport betting sector: the organisational level 
Distribution channel restrictions  None to low 
Advertisement restrictions None 
Obligations in regard to gambling addiction None 
TABLE 48: RS II SPORT BETTING SECTOR IN AUSTRIA 
5.6.3 The performance definition of Austrian sport betting operators  
The performance orientation in the Austrian sport betting sector seems to be 
multidimensional, but concentrates on the economic entrepreneurship, i.e. mainly the 
financial and operational ones. The table below summarises the results of the qualitative 
analysis in the different performance dimensions: 
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TABLE 49: OCCURRENCE AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS OF SPORT BETTING OPERATORS IN 
AUSTRIA  
I. The financial dimension 
The financial dimension is quantitatively (122 in the reports and 29 in the interviews) and 
qualitatively very important to the organisations under scrutiny.  
In the different reports the financial dimension is crucial, if not the only dimension of 
success (Casinos Austria 2012; Novomatic AG 2012). Of course these reports do not only 
focus on sport betting organisations in Austria, but are corporate group reports. 
Nonetheless they are relevant for the performance nature of individual organisations of the 
group. 
Another group of information in the reports is dedicated to growth analysis and 
development of turnover and results (Novomatic AG 2012a; Interview 4). The long-term 
development is very important for the organisations and this more so than short-term 
benefits (Novomatic AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a). Another indicator of the financial 
dimension that is worth mentioning is the need for organisations to have sufficient liquidity 
to pay-out significant amounts to winners immediately (Interview 4). Of course the benefits 
are very important (Interview 5), as are market shares (Interview 4, 5). Increasing market 
shares also indicate acceptance among citizens, and one interviewee even stated that the 
introduction of the sport betting of tipp3 helped democratising sport betting in Austria and 
improving the image of sport betting (Interview 5). This is an important element in an 
integrated company such as Novomatic AG, where sport betting is only one aspect of 
operations and not necessarily the one where profits are made (Novomatic AG 2012a; 
Interview 5). Often, sport betting is offered to attract customers that come into the shops 
and they are then seduced by the gambling machines (Interview 5). Interestingly, the 
redistribution to players is only an issue in the Casinos Austria reports. 
Interestingly, sustainable business is an issue that comes up in the reports (Novomatic AG 
2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a). For example, the importance of the company to the Austrian 
                                                
98 Double quantity of reports was analysed, as there exist multiple operators. 
Occurrence and evaluation of 
dimensions 
Interviews Reports of Organisation98 
  
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quantitative 
occurrence 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Financial dimension 29 ++ 122 ++ 
Operational dimension 44 ++ 126 ++ 
Stakeholder management dimension 18 - 34 - 
Legal requirement dimension 26 = 33 - 
Social issue participation dimension 20 - 49 - 
Public values dimension 16 -- 7 -- 
Total 150  360  
Legend:  ++ very high importance  + high importance  = neutral importance 
   - low importance   -- very low importance 
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macro-economy is mentioned at several instances, and the social and sustainable aspect of 
the organisation in providing employment opportunities and paying taxes is underlined 
(Novomatic AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a). It is surely valid to link this to sustainability, 
but it does not point to the social issue participation dimension but to the financial and 
operational dimensions.  
The financial dimension is clearly linked to the operational or the legal requirement 
dimensions. The regulatory requirements influence the performance in the financial 
dimension. In the Austrian regulation the only element influencing the organisation is the 
level of taxation of sport betting. It used to be 7.5% and the reduction to 2% benefited the 
financial results of the organisations highly (Interview 5). In regard to the operational 
dimension the positive results were directly linked to the improvements of operations and 
increased the focus on cost efficiency (Casinos Austria 2012a, Novomatic AG 2012a).  
In summary, the financial performance is simply the ‘raison d’être’ of the organisations; it is 
just how business works (Interview 3, 4, 5). 
II. The operational dimension  
The operational dimension is quantitatively (126 references in the reports and 44 in the 
interviews) and qualitatively evaluated to be very important for the performance definition of 
the Austrian organisations.  
The customer perspective is very important for the organisations and is a core aspect of the 
strategy (Novomatic AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a; Interview 4). Throughout the data 
set customer satisfaction, customer acquisition and customer profitability are frequently 
used indicators (Casinos Austria 2012; Novomatic AG 2012; Interview 4, 5, 6). Customer 
acquisition is linked to the attractiveness of the products offered (Novomatic AG 2012a; 
Casinos Austria 2012a; Interview 4). Furthermore, some organisations find customer 
acquisition as less important, since the market is already very saturated (Interview 6). 
Another important aspect is customer loyalty and its success is indicated because also 
during times of economic distress the number of customers was stable or even increased 
(Interview 4, 5, 6; Novomatic AG 2012a). Customer focus is also closely linked to the brand 
recognition (Interview 5) and to sponsoring activities, for example in sports, something that 
anchors the company in the Austrian market (Novomatic AG 2012a; Österreichische 
Lotterien 2012; Interview 5). 
The learning and growth perspective is also judged to be very important throughout the data 
set. Especially innovations in product, distribution channels and new technologies are 
success factors for the organisations (Novomatic AG 2012a; Interview 4, 5, 6). R&D units 
take an important role for the future of the organisation (Novomatic 2011; Interview 4; 
Interview 5; Interview 6). New technologies open new ways to offer products to the 
customers and to increase market shares and penetrate the markets differently (Casinos 
Austria 2012a; Interview 5).  
 
 195 
Also the internal business process perspective occurs frequently in the data set and is 
important for the operational dimension. Indicators relate to the integrated production of the 
products in house (Novomatic AG 2012a) and the efficient and large distribution system 
increasing the success of the organisations (Novomatic AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a). 
The human capital also contributes to the high quality of the production process (Interview 
4; Novomatic AG 2012a). It is also important to constantly train the employees so that they 
can keep track with new technologies and internal business processes (Interview 4, 5, 6; 
Novomatic AG 2012a). Teamwork and low fluctuation rates contribute to the well 
functioning of the internal processes (Interview 5).  
Another important aspect of success is the risk management and the monitoring of the 
sport betting system, and quality controls are regularly undertaken (Interview 5, 6; 
Novomatic AG 2012a). Moreover, a restructuration of the internal processes has allowed for 
an increase in efficiency, and contributed to the improvement of the financial results 
(Casinos Austria 2012a). Another interviewee pointed to the importance of planning and 
successful realisation of projects for the success of the organisation. The flow of information 
within the organisation and between its different units should also not be neglected in order 
to generate solid solutions and to prevent for ad hoc measures (Interview 5). 
In summary, the operational dimension is very important for the performance definition of 
organisations in the Austrian sport betting sector and it is evaluated as enhancing future 
financial performance. It is important to constantly innovate, improve the efficiency of the 
internal processes and to satisfy the customers, in order to drive the financial performance 
of the organisations.  
III. The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension is quantitatively (18 references in the interviews 
and 32 in the reports) and qualitatively of little importance to the performance definition. 
Some may argue that it is an important performance dimension as the organisations 
produce sustainability reports, but a closer look at the CSR conceptualisation reveals that 
many of the aspects are related to the operational and financial dimensions. Nonetheless, 
some elements of the stakeholder management dimension have been detected. The most 
important aspects are first the employees and second environmental protection (Novomatic 
AG 2012a). In regard to employees several targets are outlined and measured (Novomatic 
AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a). Investments in education and training of the employees 
are examples of indicators that aim to have a qualified human capital in the future (Interview 
4, 5; Novomatic AG 2012a). Employees’ satisfaction is another indicator of the stakeholder 
management dimension (Interview 5). Other aspects in regard to the human capital are 
equity, diversity, health and work security (Novomatic AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a). In 
regard to environmental protection, targets are developed and measured through indicators. 
Examples are the reduction of waste and energy used (Novomatic AG 2012a; Casinos 
Austria 2012a).  
In summary, as in the case of Belgium, the CSR concept does not exclusively relate to 
social and environmental aspects but also includes indicators for the operational and 
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financial dimension. Overall the stakeholder management dimension is of little importance to 
Austrian organisations and is mainly seen to drive future economic profits.  
IV. The legal requirement dimension 
The legal requirement dimension is quantitatively (26 references in the interviews and 33 in 
the reports) and qualitatively of little importance to the performance definition of the 
organisations.  
The respect of the legal obligations is very important (Novomatic AG 2012a; Interview 4, 5, 
6). Nonetheless, compliance with legal requirements is seemingly not part of the 
performance definitions of the organisations. Overall reference is mainly made to two 
aspects. First, quotations indicate that in the provided legal framework, organisations 
develop new business opportunities to operate games of chance, and that they only operate 
in regulated markets where clear public order and legal frame conditions exist (Novomatic 
AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a). The exception is tipp3, that engages in measures for the 
protection of players and prevention of gambling addiction and thus the mandatory 
obligations taken in regard to responsible gambling (Interview 5). This is argued to be a 
result of the affiliation of tipp3 to the monopoly holders and the assimilation of the strategies 
across the sectors (Interview 5).  
The second issue frequently referred to in the quotations of the legal requirement dimension 
is the payment of the betting tax and the general taxes generated for the state budget 
(Novomatic AG 2012a; Casinos Austria 2012a; Interview 4, 5, 6). The tax burden is also 
often mentioned as being a competitive disadvantage and one interview participant stated 
that the respect of the regulation and political conditions cost them a lot and other 
operators, based in Malta or Gibraltar, do not have that burden and can operate differently 
(Interview 5).  
In summary, the legal requirement dimension is not important to the conceptualisation of 
organisational performance in Austria. This is on the one hand due to the fact that there is 
close to no regulation in place resulting in an absence of legal obligations to fulfil (Interview 
5) and second, compliance aspects are not seen as part of the performance definition but 
constitute activities performance is not measured in. This does not indicate that legal 
requirements are not important or not respected but that it is a prerequisite dimension for 
conducting the business, but not a proper performance dimension (Interview 4, 5, 6).  
V. The social issue participation dimension 
The social issue participation dimension is quantitatively (20 quotations in the interviews and 
49 in the reports) and qualitatively of low importance to the performance definition of the 
Austrian operators. 
A limited amount of indications for the social issue participation dimension was discovered 
in the data set, highlighting its low importance for the performance definition. Some 
voluntary measures in regard to gambling addiction have been taken (Novomatic AG 2012a; 
Casinos Austria 2012a, Interview 5), for example information material, training of the staff of 
retailers, self-evaluation of players, the possibility of limitation setting by players etc. 
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Interestingly, tipp3 is very active in this regard. One interviewee outlined that as the 
organisation is part of the corporate group holding the monopoly licences for casinos and 
lotteries in Austria, and since these organisations are very active in this field, tipp3 takes 
after their example in putting responsible gambling at the centre of attention (Interview 5). 
This suggests a strong influence of regulation on the performance definition of regulated 
organisations.  
Second, activities have also been undertaken to fight match fixing and to keep crime out of 
gambling. Such measures have comprised for example information on the subject, working 
groups with government and interested associations, engagement in international 
associations etc. (Casinos Austria 2012a; Novomatic AG 2012a; Interview 4, 5). 
The third indicator is voluntary redistribution for social and humanitarian causes. It is 
however rather difficult to separate this activity from sponsoring and the aim of increasing 
future economic value. However, in order to be coherent with the other cases, some of 
these sponsoring activities can be taken into the social issue participation dimension as 
they support cultural and social projects, sport etc. (Casinos Austria 2012a; Interview 4, 6).  
In summary, the social issue participation dimension is of low importance to the 
performance definition of the Austrian organisations. The most important indicator is the 
voluntary measures in regard to gambling addiction. One remark can be made in regard to 
the different organisations in the sample. The examination of the data set suggests that 
larger organisations are more active in the social issue participation dimension than their 
smaller counter-parts (Interview 4, 5, 6). It could be, and this is only an assumption, that 
larger organisations have more financial resources to engage in social issues and are more 
present and are more exposed in society, something that requires them to be more 
committed to social issues.  
VI. The public values dimension 
The public values dimension is quantitatively (16 references in the interviews and 7 in the 
reports) and qualitatively of a very low importance to the performance definition of Austrian 
sport betting operators.  
Nonetheless some public values were found in the data set, such as equity, security, 
fairness, responsibility and transparency (Casinos Austria 2012a; Novomatic 2012; Interview 
4, 5, 6). These values were mostly outlined in regard to the internal processes and are hence 
linked to the operational dimension or to the reputation of the organisation. Something that 
is very interesting in the case of Austria, is that when interview participants had to evaluate 
the performance dimensions’ importance to the definition of performance, the public values 
dimension was left out several times and it was argued that it is not used to define 
organisational performance. This suggests that public values dimension is not a piece of the 
performance definition. In addition, at no moment during any of the interviews did any 
interviewee directly address the issue of public values.  
In summary, the public values dimension is suggested as not being part of the performance 
dimensions, and as only marginally guiding business processes.  
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VII. Concluding remarks: a bottom-up reflection 
In conclusion the performance definitions of the analysed Austrian sport betting 
organisations are multidimensional but marked by the saliency of two dimensions: the 
financial- and the operational dimensions. Among the other performance dimensions a clear 
hierarchy becomes apparent.  
The bottom-up approach identified the following indicators as occurring frequently in the 
data set: profitability, sales and other key financial indicators, i.e. the financial dimension. 
Others include product developments, innovations, new technologies and attractive game 
portfolios, which all point to the operational dimension, but also compliance indicators (i.e. 
the legal requirement dimension), indicators on responsible gambling (i.e. the legal 
requirement and social issue participation dimensions) and sponsoring (i.e. the stakeholder 
management and/or social issue participation dimensions). What is interesting in the 
Austrian case, and also something of a more general comment valid for other organisations 
in the sample, is that often organisations have a CSR or sustainability report structured 
based on international standards such as GRI, and which includes environmental indicators 
(i.e. the stakeholder management dimension), indicators on employees (i.e. the operational 
and stakeholder management dimensions), and indicators on outcomes of products (i.e. the 
social issue participation dimension), indicators on compliance (i.e. the legal requirement 
dimension) and contribution to welfare of local community in terms of economic value (i.e. 
the financial and legal requirement dimensions). But such aspects are not automatically 
related to the social issue participation dimensions but include elements which refer to 
many other performance dimensions, such as the financial, operational and stakeholder 
management dimensions. Hence, to form a deep understanding of organisational 
performance one has to look closely at that which is hidden behind popular terms and 
slogans such as sustainability or corporate responsibility. 
5.7 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 
The aim of this chapter has been to describe the regulation of each of the cases and to 
present the results of the analyses in regard to the performance definition and its 
multidimensional nature. Across the sample, several of the theoretically constructed 
dimensions of performance were identified in practice. Nevertheless, the degree to which 
the different dimensions are used varies and the question that is raised now is whether in 
cases belonging to the same group, i.e. group A (high regulatory intensity, public 
ownership), group B (high regulatory intensity, private ownership) and group C (low 
regulatory intensity, private ownership), performance is defined in the same way, i.e. using 
the same dimensions and attributing them the same weight. The line of reasoning explored 
argues that the level of regulatory intensity actually influences the composition of the 
performance definition. To explore this question, for each of the groups of cases identified 
in the research design, the pattern of the different performance dimensions needs to be 
discussed further. This is what the next chapter attempts to do.  
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6 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The previous chapter examined the performance definition for each organisation 
individually. As well, the performance dimensions that had been theoretically constructed 
based on the public and private performance literature were identified in the data sets for 
each case. This chapter explores the multidimensional performance definition in each group 
of countries further, in order to investigate whether the regulatory environment—as 
operationalised through the regulatory intensity—actually does influence the performance 
definition used by regulated organisations. In doing so, the cases belonging to the same 
groups are first analysed. A first section (6.1.1) starts with the FDJ and Norsk Tipping (group 
A—high regulatory intensity and public ownership), a second section (6.1.2) turns to De 
Lotto and Camelot (group B—high regulatory intensity and private ownership) and in a third 
section (6.1.3) the different organisations active in Belgium and Austria (group C—low 
regulatory intensity and private ownership) are presented. This exercise will further explore 
the multidimensional character of organisational performance and prepare the different 
groups for cross-case analysis.  
In a second part (section 6.2), the research question of whether and how the regulatory 
intensity influences the selection of organisational performance dimensions used by 
organisations is explored. In order to address this question in a systemic way, the groups A 
and B (high regulatory intensity) are compared to group C (low regulatory intensity) (section 
6.2.1). Second, the codes identified in the data set that relate to the impact of the regulatory 
environment on the performance definition are explored, in order to further investigate the 
first results (section 6.2.2). Finally, the influence of the regulatory intensity on each individual 
dimension is briefly discussed and the quantitative questions of the interviews and surveys 
are analysed (section 6.2.3). It must be remembered that the latter can only be used to 
illustrate some of the results; these results are not reliable enough to allow drawing large 
conclusions.  
This step-by-step approach aims to clarify whether and how the regulatory environment 
influences the definition of performance. In a last section it is explored whether the type of 
ownership does in fact influence the definition of performance, and which role the type of 
ownership plays in the link between the regulatory intensity and the definition of 
performance. For doing so, in section 6.3.1, group B is compared to group A and group C, 
as it represents the intermediate group (high regulated, private ownership) between the two 
extremes that are group A (high regulated, public ownership) and group C (low regulated, 
private ownership). In section 6.3.2, interview questions on the matter are discussed and 
screened for quotations and the opinions of the participants on the matter.  
6.1 THE PERFORMANCE DEFINITIONS OF THE DIFFERENT GROUPS OF CASES 
In the next sections, the performance definitions for each group of cases will be constructed 
and presented in order to then proceed with the examination of the main research question, 
i.e. that of whether the regulatory environment influences the definition of performance. 
Different attributes of the performance dimensions will be presented for each group, 
whereas the discussion will concentrate on the characteristics of and the linkage between 
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performance dimensions, having already discussed the importance of the performance 
dimensions in chapter five. Nonetheless, first, the importance of individual performance 
dimensions for the performance definition will be recalled. Before ending with a discussion 
on the possible linkages between dimensions as well as the (partial) integration between 
them, some characteristics of each dimension that were detected during the data analysis 
for the performance definition will be highlighted. Thus, a series of sequential element will be 
introduced in the performance conceptualisation: Prerequisite dimensions intervene before 
the other dimensions and can be thought of as forming the prerequisite, before any 
organisational activities can be undertaken. Guiding processes dimensions are on-going 
aspects, which are more subliminal in nature, and which tend to guide organisational 
activities. Organisations rarely measure performance in such dimensions. Contributor and 
final performance dimensions are directly identified as part of the performance concept by 
the organisations themselves and clearly constitute main performance aspects. Contributor 
dimensions are dimensions that drive another performance dimension, whereas final 
performance dimensions are a final aspect of the performance concept.  
6.1.1 Group A: high regulatory intensity and public ownership 
The comparison of the results of the in-group analysis of the French and Norwegian cases 
yields the same performance definition for both organisations, as illustrated in the following 
table: 
Group A: France & Norway 
High regulated, public organisations 
Dimension Importance  Characteristics Linkage to other dimension 
Financial Very high Final  
Social issue participation  
Legal requirement 
Operational High Contributor Financial  
Stakeholder management Moderate Contributor Customer perspective 
Legal requirement High 
Final  
Prerequisite 
Not detected 
Social issue participation Very high Final Not detected 
Public values None 
Guiding 
processes 
Not detected 
TABLE 50: PERFORMANCE DEFINITION OF GROUP A 
The financial and the social issue participation dimensions are very important for the 
performance definition of group A, closely followed by the legal requirement dimension and 
the operational dimension. The stakeholder management dimension is only of a moderate 
importance whereas public values are of no importance at all for the performance definition. 
A sequential feature is detected in the performance conceptualisation in the sense that 
some dimensions intervene in advance. As briefly mentioned above, prerequisite 
dimensions intervene before the other dimensions and can be thought of as the base line of 
the organisational activities. The prerequisite compliance with the licence obligations and 
the strict adherence to the rules is a prerequisite for the organisations of group A. 
Throughout the data set, the legal requirement dimension is not directly expressed as a 
performance dimension but as a condition for the pure existence of the organisations.  
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Guiding processes dimensions are continuously on-going, more subliminal aspects, which 
guide organisational activities. Organisations do not directly evaluate these dimensions as 
performance dimensions and hence their performance is rarely measured. For group A, the 
public values dimension is such a guiding processes dimension. Evidence from the 
interviews even seem to suggest that public values such as ‘transparency’, ‘fairness’, 
‘equity’ are dissatisfier factors: as long as they are respected an increased focus on these 
aspects would not result in the higher satisfaction of the clients, regulators and society as a 
whole. But non-respect and underperformance in these aspects would result in an 
immediate reaction and would be perceived by the society and regulators as negative (e.g. 
Interview 1, 2, 3). ‘Responsibility’ frequently appears in the data set and is suggested to be 
a guiding process indicator. It is even suggested that it be added as a core value of the 
organisations, even though it is not sensu stricto a public value.  
The operational dimension is a contributor dimension, contributing to financial performance. 
The three perspectives are affiliated to the operational dimension and the internal business 
process and the learning and growth perspective were often identified in the data set as 
contributing to the customer perspective. An example frequently detected in the data set is 
the need to innovate in order to have an attractive offer satisfying consumers (e.g. learning 
and growth contribute to the customer perspective). Consequently, a mutual influence 
exists between the three perspectives. Taking the example of customer satisfaction and 
innovations, well-functioning processes are needed in order to develop innovations, 
something that may lead to an increased customer satisfaction. Another contributor 
dimension—though a less important for the performance definitions of group A—is the 
stakeholder management dimension. This dimension focuses on the employees (especially 
for the FDJ), the state and the customers and the performance for employees and 
customers is evaluated. An overlap with the customer perspective can hence be identified 
between these two components: customers are at the heart of operations but also form an 
important stakeholder group for the organisations.  
Final dimensions are dimensions which represent the overall achievements of the 
organisations. For the group A, the final dimensions include the financial, the social issue 
participation and the legal requirement dimensions. Especially for the legal requirement 
dimension mention should be made of redistribution to good causes and compliance with 
legal obligations in regard to gambling problems. As presented above, the other aspects of 
the legal requirement dimension, for example compliance with licence obligations, are rather 
preconditions for the activities of the organisations. All three dimensions are very important 
for the group A. 
Interestingly, some performance dimensions are clearly linked to each other: the financial 
dimension—which is clearly a final dimension—also partly contributes to the social issue 
participation and legal requirement dimensions, as the performance in the financial 
dimension contributes positively to the performance in the these other two dimensions. 
Another linkage between performance attributes can be identified in the operational 
dimension, as the internal business process and the learning and growth perspectives 
positively contribute to the customer perspective.  
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In summary, it can be said that the performance definitions of group A are multidimensional, 
whereas not all dimensions identified in the literature are actually directly used as 
performance dimensions, though some of their characteristics are present in the data set. 
This is mainly the case for the public values dimension and partially also for the legal 
requirement dimension. One interviewee argued that public values are currently not being 
measured as they are well respected, but that as soon as there would be doubt in regard to 
the respect for public values, it would result in an increased focus (Interview 3). Hence, the 
public values dimension and the value of ‘responsibility’ generally guide all business 
operations, but they are more hidden dimensions that are not considered as part of the 
performance concept by the organisations. This by no means indicates that they are not 
important aspects but simply that they are not attributes of performance or at least not 
identified by the organisations as such. Another remark should be made in regard to the 
legal requirement dimension, which occurs twice: first as a prerequisite and second as a 
final performance dimension. Compliance with legal aspects is fundamental for the 
organisations and intervenes in the beginning of any organisational activities. But it is also a 
final dimension in view of mandatory redistribution and the mandatory measures taken in 
regard to gambling problems that frequently depend on the financial results achieved.  
Having thus presented the performance definition of the first group of cases the following 
section examines the performance concept of the group B cases. Group B cases share the 
high regulatory intensity with group A, but differ in regard to ownership as they are privately 
owned.  
6.1.2 Group B: high regulatory intensity and private ownership 
The comparison of the results of the in-group analysis of the Dutch and British cases (group 
B) yields the same performance definition for the two group B countries, which can be seen 
in the following table: 
Group B: Netherlands & United Kingdom 
High regulated, private organisations 
Dimension Importance  Characteristics Linkage to other dimension 
Financial Very high Final Legal requirement 
Operational High Contributor Financial  
Stakeholder management Moderate Contributor Customer perspective 
Legal requirement Very High 
Final 
Prerequisite 
Not detected 
Social issue participation High Final Not detected 
Public values None Guiding processes Not detected 
TABLE 51: PERFORMANCE DEFINITION OF GROUP B 
The financial and the legal requirement dimensions are very important for the performance 
definition of group B, closely followed by the social issue participation dimension and the 
operational dimension. The stakeholder management dimension is only of a moderate 
importance whereas public values are of no importance at all. 
For group B, compliance with the licence obligations and a strict adherence to the rules, i.e. 
parts of the legal requirement dimension, are prerequisites for the organisations. 
Consequently, for group B, and as was directly expressed in the interviews, the legal 
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requirement dimension is the basis of the business activities, the condition for the existence 
of the organisations and a very important aspect of the performance concept.  
The public values dimension can be qualified as a guiding processes dimension as it was 
very little detected across the data set, and could not be identified as a performance 
dimension. Public values were not deliberately raised in the interviews, but were only 
mentioned when the questions referred to them (Interview 1, 9, 11, 14). Nevertheless the 
data indicates that public values are respected and do accompany the activities of the 
organisation. Organisations attribute a high importance to values such as ‘fairness’, ‘equity’ 
and ‘transparency’. Another guiding processes aspect for group B is ‘responsibility’ towards 
players. ‘Responsibility’ frequently appears in the data set, and seems to guide the 
processes and activities carried out. It even appears as a core value of the organisations.  
The operational dimension is directly identified as an important part of the performance 
definition and as a contribution to the financial dimension. A mutual influence and linkage 
between the three perspectives that make up the operational dimension can be observed. 
The small appearance of the internal business processes perspective could arguably be 
explained by the fact that it is a dissatisfier factor. As long as it functions well, it is not a 
main focus, but underperformance would result in an immediate reaction and the 
performance in regard to the internal business processes would then become the centre of 
attention. The learning and growth perspective contributes to the customer perspective 
dimension and is very important for the organisations. In order to keep or enhance the 
attractiveness of the games for the customer, new products and distribution channels need 
to be constantly developed (Interview 1, 11, 12). The customer perspective is clearly a core 
aspect for the performance definition, as revealed by both the reports and the interview 
data. Another contributor dimension is the stakeholder management dimension, which is of 
moderate importance to the performance definition for the group B cases. Nonetheless, 
employees and customers are important stakeholder groups. The proximity of the customer 
perspective and the stakeholder management dimension can be detected as customers 
form the most important stakeholder group. The social performance of suppliers is rarely 
mentioned and only little attention is paid to the employees’ satisfaction. Some codes were 
detected in regard to environmental protection and the improvement of the ecological 
footprint of the company but only for Camelot. Much more important, if not the most 
important aspect in the stakeholder dimension, is the relationship with on the one hand the 
regulator and the government, and on the other hand the beneficiaries (Interview 1, 11, 12, 
14).  
Final dimensions are the financial, the social issue participation and the legal requirement 
dimensions. Especially for the legal requirement dimension it is worth mentioning the 
redistribution to good causes and the compliance with legal obligations also as concerns 
gambling problems. This contrasts with some other aspects of the legal requirement 
dimension, which were—as presented above—prerequisites for the activities of the 
organisations. The social issue participation dimension is also a final performance 
dimension, especially in regard to the fight against the negative externalities arising from 
games of chance. Two dimensions are essentially of crucial importance to the 
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organisations, namely the financial and the legal requirement dimensions. This is very well 
illustrated through the statement of an interview participant, who explained that overall 
performance is simply judged based on financial and legal performance. It is these two 
elements that need to be balanced in the strict regulatory framework the organisation faces 
(Interview 1).  
Interestingly, some performance dimensions are unmistakably linked to each other: the 
financial dimension—which is clearly a final dimension—is also partially a contributor to the 
legal requirement dimension. This is linked to the fact that the mandatory redistribution is 
either based on a tax rate or on the complete use of profits for good causes. For this reason 
the performance in the financial dimension influences the performance in other dimensions. 
Another linkage between performance attributes can be identified in the operational 
dimension, as the internal business process and the learning and growth perspectives 
positively contribute to the customer perspective.  
In summary, it can be said that the performance concepts of the group B cases are 
multidimensional. But not all dimensions identified in the literature are actually used as 
performance dimensions, though some of their characteristics are present in the data set. 
This is mainly the case for the public values dimension. Public values and ‘responsibility’ 
guide all business operations but these are more hidden attributes which are considered 
part of the performance concept by the organisations. The legal requirement dimension 
intervenes twice: first as a prerequisite for the organisational activities and in that sense as a 
preparatory indicator and second, in a more subsequent nature as concerns mandatory 
redistribution and the mandatory measures taken in regard to gambling problems. The legal 
requirement dimension is directly outlined as a performance dimension by the organisations 
as it is crucial for a successful organisation to respect the law and to fulfil all obligations 
(Interview 1, 11, 14).  
Having thus explored the definition of performance for group B, the next section examines 
the question of multidimensionality of the performance concept for group C. Group C 
shares the characteristic of private ownership with group B, but faces a low regulatory 
intensity. 
6.1.3 Group C: low regulatory intensity and private ownership 
The comparison of the results of the in-group analysis of the Belgian and Austrian cases 
provides a common performance definition for group C cases, which can be seen in the 
table on the next page.  
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Group C: Belgium & Austria 
Low regulated, private organisations 
Dimension Importance  Characteristics Linkage to other dimension 
Financial Very High Final 
Social issue participation  
Legal requirement 
Operational Very High Contributor Financial 
Stakeholder management Low Contributor 
Integrates aspects of social issue 
participation  
Legal requirement Moderate 
Final 
Prerequisite 
Not detected 
Social issue participation Low Guiding processes Financial  
Public values None Guiding processes Not detected 
TABLE 52: PERFORMANCE DEFINITION OF GROUP C 
The financial and the operational dimensions are by far the most important dimensions for 
the performance definition of group C. The legal requirement dimension is of moderate 
importance, followed by the stakeholder management dimension and the social issue 
participation dimension. Public values are of no importance for the performance definition. 
Based on the indicators of compliance with licence obligations and a strict adherence to 
rules, the legal requirement dimension, is a prerequisite dimension for the organisations. 
This is not a surprise as the regulation in the group C cases is mainly based on market 
access, in the form of licences or authorisations. Consequently, for group C, and also as 
directly expressed in the interviews (Interview 3, 4, 5, 10), the legal requirement dimension 
appears as the fundament of the business activities, but is not considered a performance 
dimension per se.  
The public values dimension is not a performance dimension either, and the data set 
suggests that it is only marginally a guiding processes dimension. Transparency in business 
operations can be found in the data set, and so at least in that aspect the public values 
dimension appears present, but not as a piece of the performance definition. Moreover, the 
need for transparency is also closely linked to business operations, as it enhances customer 
trust. 
The operational dimension can be directly identified as a performance dimension and a 
mutual influence exists among the three components. The internal business process 
perspective and the learning and growth perspective are both very important and enhance 
the customer perspective. The customer perspective is very important for the performance 
definition and throughout the data set it is highlighted that the customers are at the core of 
the business (Ladbrokes PLC 2012b; Interview 3, 4, 5, 10). 
The stakeholder management dimension is of little importance to the performance definition 
of group C cases. The organisations may disagree with this statement, as on first sight it 
seems a very present dimension in view of the CSR and sustainability reports. However, a 
closer look reveals that the CSR conceptualisation integrates many elements from other 
dimensions, for example the operational and financial ones. Nonetheless, employee 
satisfaction and environmental protection were more frequently mentioned than other 
stakeholder management elements. Another aspect that is worth mentioning is the concept 
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of responsible gaming that (even though it in general belongs to the social issue 
participation dimension) is linked to the stakeholder management dimension for group C. 
Therefore, the social issue participation dimension is integrated into the stakeholder 
management dimension. Responsible gaming activities are seeing undertaken essentially in 
order to take care of the players because an organisation has no interest in having addicted 
players who cannot afford to play anymore (Interview 10). Another argument proving the 
integration of the social issue participation into the stakeholder management dimension is 
that complete inactivity in regard to gambling problems could induce calls from the society 
for higher regulation, something which would not necessarily be desirable for the 
organisations (Interview 5, 8). 
The financial dimension, and to a smaller degree the legal requirement dimension, are final 
dimensions in the group C cases. The financial dimension occurred most frequently in the 
data body and is definitely the most important performance dimension in this group. This 
does not mean that the other dimensions are absent, but rather that they are directed 
towards financial performance. One aspect of the social issue participation dimension in 
particular is integrated into the financial dimension, namely the voluntary redistribution to 
good causes. Organisations allocate money to good causes on a voluntary basis, but this is 
mainly done when the financial performance was good and not automatically on a regular 
annual basis. So the voluntary redistribution is directly associated with the financial 
dimension and evaluated more as an aspect of sponsorship than on of patronage.  
The financial dimension contributes positively to the performance in the legal requirement 
dimensions, in the form of tax yields to the state budget. The higher the financial 
performance, the more tax revenue is allocated to the state. Organisations do not miss out 
on opportunities to state that they make an important contribution to the state budget in this 
way, and on the contrary, taxation is frequently referred to in the reports and interviews. The 
data confirms that the tax level is associated with a high regulatory intensity and is the main 
element of regulation, after market access has been granted and the organisations comply 
with the licence agreements. Organisations frequently mentioned that the tax burden 
renders them less competitive, especially in comparison with illegal online operators. It is for 
this reason that performance is measured and reported in this regard.  
Some performance dimensions are clearly linked to each other: the financial dimension for 
example partially enhances the legal requirement dimension. Another linkage between 
performance components can be identified in the operational dimension, as the internal 
business process and the learning and growth perspectives positively contribute to the 
customer perspective.  
In summary, it can be said that the performance concepts of group C are multidimensional 
but very hierarchical. The financial and operational dimensions are the most important 
dimensions, with the financial dimension at the top of the pyramid and the operational 
dimension as a very important contributor for financial performance. The stakeholder 
management dimension and the legal requirement dimension are present but to a smaller 
degree. Some aspects of the social issue participation dimension are integrated in other 
performance dimensions, like the financial or the stakeholder management dimensions. In 
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consequence, the social issue participation and the public values dimensions are close to 
inexistent and are thus not evaluated as distinct performance dimensions.  
6.1.4 Concluding remarks  
The examination of the nature of the performance definitions proves the multidimensionality 
previously identified in literature. In all three groups, the theoretical constructed dimensions 
are present, though not necessarily directly referred to. Indeed, not all performance 
dimensions receive the same focus and are of the same importance to the performance 
definition across the cases. This leads to a differing conceptualisation of performance in the 
various organisations. The public values dimension in particular does not appear to be a 
distinct performance dimensions. Public values are present in the data set but are not 
directly related to the performance concept, but do instead guide the activities of 
organisations. This is in accordance with the discussion of public values in the literature 
(Talbot 2010). Having thus presented the performance definition for each group, the next 
section will look closer at the main research question of this study, i.e. investigate whether 
the regulatory environment influences the performance definitions of regulated 
organisations.  
6.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT ON THE PERFORMANCE DEFINITIONS 
In order to explore the influence of the regulatory intensity on the performance definitions 
identified in the previous sections, the performance definitions of groups A and B together 
will first be compared with the performance definition of group C (section 6.2.1). In a second 
section (6.2.2), the interview responses relevant for this context will be explored in order to 
find indications as to whether the regulatory intensity influences the performance definitions 
in the cases analysed. In a third section (6.2.3), the hypothetical questions99 as well as some 
qualitative findings are considered for each individual dimension, in order to gauge the 
participants’ opinions on the influence of regulatory intensity on the composition of the 
performance definitions. The quantitative data is only considered as an illustration and no 
conclusions are drawn from it, as the number of cases is far too small, but they are reported 
for the sake of completeness and because they complement the qualitative analysis well.  
6.2.1 Cross-group comparison 
All three groups have in common that the legal requirement dimension appears to be a 
prerequisite dimension. This is of course not very surprising, as the conditions to acquire a 
licence need to be fulfilled before any operations can begin. Hence, the legal requirement 
dimension is the basis of the performance conceptualisation, and a precondition to other 
dimensions. It could even be argued that at this stage for all three groups, the legal 
performance is actually not yet integrated in the organisational performance definition.  
For all three groups the public values dimension guides the activities of the organisations, 
but it does so to varying degrees. Groups A and B are very similar in this regard, with a 
good representation of the public values, in particular ‘responsibility’. For group C, the 
                                                
99 See Annex III. 
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public values are not integrated in the performance concept even though some aspects 
such as ‘transparency’ or ‘fairness’ can be identified. This is because these values are in 
any case important for the sport betting and lottery operations in general and therefore they 
need to be respected. In this sense, public values are more part of the operational 
dimension than of the public values dimension. A sharp contrast can be observed between 
A/B and C in regard to ‘responsibility’. In groups A/B it can be considered a value that 
accompanies business activities and which can even be associated to the public values 
dimension, though it is not really ‘public’ in nature. In group C however, the responsibility 
element does not seem to intervene in the guiding processes dimensions but more as a part 
of the stakeholder management dimension. Overall, the public values dimension does not 
appear as a distinct part of the performance definition, but rather guides processes for 
groups A and B, relates to the operational dimension for group C.  
Turning to the performance dimensions directly identified as such, the operational 
dimension is evaluated across all three groups as being important for the performance 
definition. Hence, close to no difference can be identified in regard to the operational 
dimension and it seems to be a very valid component for the performance concept. All 
organisations underline the importance of the customers and position them at the core of all 
business activities. Because the internal business process and the learning and growth 
perspectives seem to positively influence the customer perspective, a linkage can be 
identified between these components of the operational dimension. Overall the operational 
dimension is an important dimension and good performance in the operational dimension 
will contribute to future financial performance.  
The stakeholder management dimension can be identified in all three groups, though a 
difference seems to apply in regard to what is counted into the stakeholder management 
dimension between groups A/B on the one hand and group Con the other. For group C, the 
responsible gaming element of the social issue participation dimension is integrated into the 
stakeholder management dimension. Indicators here are that the organisations focus on the 
security of their players and responsible gambling (or more often responsible ‘gaming’), and 
they are frequently referred to in the interviews and the data set. However, the aspects 
associated with responsible gambling deal mostly with youth protection measures and 
player protection from fraud, underline the security of transactions and processes and 
establish self-tests for players to evaluate the individual gambling behaviour. This stands in 
contrast to the topics related to responsible gambling for groups A and B (i.e. the highly 
regulated countries) as they go much further in regard to responsible gambling by including 
research, funding of treatment centres, training of staff or risk-evaluation of new products, 
etc. For group C, responsible gaming is centred on the players and does not go further in 
regard to societal responsibilities and it does therefore not appear as if it should be 
interpreted in a philanthropic light.  
Finally, in regard to final performance dimensions groups A/B differ to group C to a rather 
large extent. Across all three groups the financial dimension is not only identified as a final 
dimension, but also as being of a very high importance to the organisational performance 
definition. This is certainly not surprising, as the organisations’ aim of efficiency and 
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profitability is (part) of their ‘raison d’être’. However, for group C the financial dimension is 
the main result dimension whereas in the groups A/B the social issue participation 
dimension and the legal requirement dimension are also final dimensions. Another main 
difference can be observed in regard to the voluntary redistribution of profits, which is 
integrated as a component of the financial dimension for group C, whereas it is either part of 
the legal requirement dimensions—when mandatory—or the social issue participation 
dimension—when voluntary—for groups A and B. For groups A/B performance in the social 
issue participation and legal requirement dimensions is a direct consequence of the 
financial dimension, because more profits result in more money for redistribution and this 
both on a mandatory and a voluntary basis. For group C, the legal requirement dimension is 
also linked to the financial dimension because the organisations have to contribute more in 
the form of taxes when the results (i.e. the financial dimension) improve. Throughout the 
data set, the group C cases underline financial success—both for the organisations and for 
society—and the positive contribution gambling activities make to the national economy by 
generating jobs and contributing to the overall GDP. In the cases of group A and B, these 
aspects are close to never mentioned in the data set. Groups A and B concentrate on 
charitable redistribution, but without mentioning the mandatory nature of this distribution, 
but instead emphasising the voluntary nature when they contribute to good causes in the 
absence of any legal obligation.  
Overall, the graphical representation of these findings result in the following figure, which 
illustrates the much closer positioning of group A and B, as compared to group C: 
 
Legend: The further from the centre, the higher the importance of the dimension for the definition of 
performance. The closer to the centre, the lower the importance of the dimension for the definition of 
performance. 
 Figure 11: The dimensions of performance compared across groups 
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Group A and B thus have very similar performance definitions, though they are not identical. 
The performance definition of group B differs more strongly from the performance 
conceptualisation of group C than from the performance definition of group A.  
This first comparison confirms that the regulatory environment actually does influences the 
definition of performance, as indeed, a huge difference can be observed between the 
organisations that face a high regulatory intensity (group A and group B) and the 
organisations that face a low regulatory intensity (group C). In order to examine this 
statement further, the next section explores the interview responses which point to the link 
between the regulatory intensity and the performance definition. 
6.2.2 Exploring the interview responses 
In the first question of the interview, the interviewees100 were asked to define the success of 
their organisation and this without any indications as to the different dimensions that are at 
the basis of the performance definition. These qualitative answers were summarised and the 
table below illustrates the performance dimensions that were referred to:  
Dimension Financial Operational 
Stakeholder 
management 
Legal 
requirement 
Social issue 
participation 
Public 
values 
Interview 1 √ √ - √ √ - 
Interview 2 √ √ - √ √ √ 
Interview 3 √ √ - √ √ - 
Interview 7 √ - - √ - - 
Interview 9 √ √ - √ - - 
Interview 11 √ - - √ √ - 
Interview 12 √ - - √ - - 
Interview 13 √ - √ √ - - 
Interview 14 √ √ - √ √ √ 
Interview 4 √ √ - √ - - 
Interview 5 √ √ √ - - - 
Interview 6 √ √ √ - - - 
Interview 8 √ √ - - - - 
Interview 10 √ √ - - - - 
Average score 
in % (n=14) 
100% 57% 21% 71% 36% 14% 
Legend:             √ dimension is identified                                       - dimension is not identified 
TABLE 53: PRESENCE OF DIMENSIONS IN OPEN INTERVIEW QUESTION 
This summary of the content of the interview responses not only indicates that the 
organisational performance concept is multidimensional, but the clear difference between 
the answers from low regulated cases (in green) as compared to the high regulated cases (in 
red) also further points to a likely influence of regulation in regard to the definition of 
performance. It also indicates the predominance of the financial dimension followed by the 
legal requirement dimension and the virtual absence of the public values dimension.  
Several quotations in the data set indicate an influence of regulation on the performance 
definition. One interview participant explained that an increase of regulation would be an 
                                                
100 General comment for the following sections and tables: in green are interviews of low regulatory 
intensity cases and in red are the interviews of high regulatory intensity cases. 
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enormous setback. He argued that the organisations in Austria were lucky that sport betting 
was so little regulated; even used the expression ‘no regulation’, though there is a licence 
requirement for retail (but not for online) operators. The interviewee believed that the 
absence of online regulation was the reason for the success of Bwin and consortium, an 
argument which could be backed up by the success of the British operators, which also 
face a low regulatory intensity. Austria is a small country and without a lack of regulation 
these success stories would arguably not have been possible (Interview 5).  
Considering a hypothetic decrease in state regulation, some interviewees highlighted that 
this would mean a decrease in the level of taxation, as this is the only element that 
differentiates the sport betting sector from a free market and hence it would strongly 
influence the position of the financial dimension in the performance definition (Interview 4, 
5). In strongly regulated environments, an organisation has to balance financial performance 
with values (Interview 2). One interview participant stated that there are three possible 
strategies: values without business, business without values or business and values 
together. This interviewee concluded that FDJ follows the latter strategy (Interview 2), which 
is the most complicated one, but it is arguably this complexity that indicates the need for a 
monopoly in France. Another interview participant added that the fascination of the 
gambling business is that it negotiates the narrow line between responsibility and customer 
attraction. An organisation cannot be so responsible that it gets boring for the customers, 
but it can also not to be so attractive that it triggers gambling addiction (Interview 3).  
Another interviewee (Interview 14) explained that such a balancing is inherent to gambling 
activities (and to lotteries in particular), as they are not a ‘normal’ economic activity. Indeed, 
operators in a highly regulatory environment are not driven to make profits, as they would 
be the case of a normal economic activity, but their aim is to operate games of chance and 
making profits in a certain way. Organisations facing a high regulatory intensity do not offer 
games of chance in an aggressive manner, and do not go to the edge of what is possible, 
but they want to offer games which are less addictive and risky than other games. The 
financial dimension is of course important but there is more to the sector. The lottery sector 
is arguably marked by the four principles of solidarity, integrity, precaution and subsidiarity 
(Interview 14).  
Subsidiarity refers to the idea that regulation should take place on the level where 
organisations are embedded, meaning in their own social and cultural environment. 
Solidarity refers to the redistribution of at least some of the profits to society. The solidarity 
principle further implies the need for an organisation to account not only to stakeholders but 
also to society, and hence to adopt a broad conceptualisation of social responsibility. 
Integrity refers to how an organisation structures its operations, and refers to negative 
externalities, such as match fixing, but also responsible marketing, respect of rules and 
protection of consumers. The interviewee in question argued that lotteries have to provide 
good examples for society, and be some sort of role models. And finally, precaution refers 
to the idea of not doing anything without knowing its consequences. This is in line with the 
social issue participation, such as research in gambling addiction or treatment of gambling 
problems. The interviewee outlined that it is along these four principles organisations should 
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measure their success and define performance targets and indicators (Interview 14). The 
four principles very much mirror the different performance dimensions developed in this 
study and make the case for a balanced performance definition.  
Another example of the influence of regulation on the performance definition is provided by 
the case of tipp3. Of all the organisations studied for group C, it is the only one that actually 
has voluntary measures in place with regard to gambling problems (i.e. the social issue 
participation dimension), in addition to measures that are legally required. One interview 
participant explained that this clearly done in order to comply with the monopoly licenses 
the firm holds for the lottery- and casino sectors. Austria Casino and Austrian Lotteries are 
the owners of tipp3 and under the monopoly licence they have a clear mission of engaging 
in prevention and treatment of gambling problems (Austrian Casino, 2012; Interview 5). 
Another interviewee argued that organisations could focus on social aspects because they 
benefit from a monopoly situation, which places the emphasis on other dimensions that 
would be neglected in a competitive environment (Interview 2). It is possible that protected 
organisations have a more sustainable, social view of the business than organisations facing 
competition, because if organisations facing a high regulatory intensity were inactive in 
regard to the social components of performance by for example not measuring or 
integrating them in their performance definition, it would be very hypocritical (Interview 2, 7). 
These responses provide additional indications as to the existence of an influence of 
regulation on the performance definitions used by the interrogated organisations. These 
impressions are further consolidated when looking at each dimension individually and the 
various responses given to the hypothetical likert scale questions on how a change in the 
regulatory intensity would affect the definition of success. 
6.2.3 The evaluation of the influence of the regulatory intensity in regard to each 
dimension  
The participants were questioned on the influence of a hypothetical change in the regulatory 
intensity and the consequences on the definition of success in the organisation. 
Unanimously, the interview participants attested that the regulation influences the definition 
of the organisational performance and the position of the performance dimensions 
(interviews 1-14). Further, several interviewees emphasised that it is very important to 
balance the different dimensions well, and especially to find a good balance between 
regulatory compliance and the satisfaction of shareholders, and that this balance is affected 
by changes in the regulatory intensity (Interview 1, 2, 3). In the following sections the 
responses to the questions on the hypothetical situations as well as the statements made 
during the interviews in regard to this issue are presented for each individual dimension. By 
doing so, further indications on the influence of regulation on the performance definition can 
be found for the cases of the study. The quantitative data is not intended to prove the 
qualitative results true or false, but to illustrate some patterns that were suggested in the 
data set. The number of cases is far too small to make any general conclusions, but serves 
to illustrate the qualitative findings. In the hypothetical questions, the respondents were first 
asked to evaluate the importance (from 1=most important to 6=least important) of each 
performance dimension under the present regulatory intensity (Question 9), under a lower 
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regulatory intensity (Question 13) and in the case of a higher regulatory intensity (Question 
15). The respondents were also asked to evaluate whether the importance of each 
dimension changes (from 1=changes extremely to 5=changes not at all) if the regulatory 
intensity changes, both towards a lower regulatory intensity (Question 12) and towards a 
higher regulatory intensity (Question 14). 
I. The financial dimension 
The financial performance dimension is undoubtedly, and as also found both through the 
interviews and the documents, very important. The regulatory intensity influences the weight 
of the financial dimension for the performance definition, but the extent to which the 
financial dimension changes is generally not very high and remains stable, by being little 
affected by changes in the regulatory intensity. It is rather question of balancing different 
performance dimensions in the case of a higher regulatory intensity (Interview 7, 5, 7, 8, 10, 
11, 12, 14). In lower regulatory environments, the focus of organisations would be more on 
financial and customer-oriented goals, and less on other dimensions (Interview 1, 2, 5, 10). 
In regard to the hypothetical questions, for the financial dimension, 23 valid responses were 
evaluated and summarised in the table101 below.  
Financial 
dimension102 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation HRI 
Question 15 
Interview      
Ø LRI n=5 1.60 2.00 1.00 1.20 1.20 
Ø HRI n=6  2.13 2.75 1.50 3.50 3.50 
Survey       
Ø LRI n=5 1.88 2.00 2.00 1.60 1.60 
Ø HRI n=5 2.08 2.62 1.69 3.38 3.38 
N° n/a 1 HRI - - - - 
Legend: RI=Regulatory intensity      LRI=Low regulatory intensity       HRI=High regulatory intensity 
n/a=no answer available  
TABLE 54: THE FINANCIAL DIMENSION 
The financial dimension is evaluated for all cases to be very important.103 The qualitative 
analysis further highlights that a stronger regulation does not necessarily reduce the focus 
on the financial dimension but renders the performance orientation broader, also including 
regulatory aspects such as responsible gambling. But a very restrictive regulation may result 
in a very unbalanced performance orientation, as organisations feel obliged to neglect 
financial aspects because they may be limited in their commercial activities (Interview 1, 7, 
8, 13).  
                                                
101 A general comment for all dimensions, the complete tables with the individual interview responses 
can be found in appendix I.  
102 Only one interviewee did not respond to the question and in one survey, one ‘n/a’ was given. This 
is ‘n/a’ is a bit inconsistent, as the financial dimension should be evaluated under the current 
regulatory regime as the respondent evaluated the financial dimension in the rest of the questions. It 
could be that the survey respondent did forget to evaluate the dimension or had technical difficulties. 
103 As there are two survey responses that evaluated the financial dimension as less important in an 
even lower regulation (survey 9 and survey 10), and this seems to be inconsistent, the average for the 
interview responses were introduced as they are in any case more illustrative than the individual 
survey answers. 
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II. The operational dimension 
The operational dimension is clearly affected by the regulatory intensity. At several 
occasions in the interviews it was mentioned that in a low regulatory environment in which 
organisations face a lot of competition, the operational dimension is crucial, since without it 
the business could not exist and no money could be made (Interview 7). This does not imply 
that the operational dimension is not important in a high regulatory intensity, but as the 
competition is in this case absent or very low, the operational aspects are under less 
pressure (Interview 1, 7, 13). In regard to the hypothetical questions, 23 valid responses 
were given for the operational dimension.  
Operational 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation 
HRI 
Question 15 
Ø LRI n=10 2.40 2.45 2.10 1.70 2.60 
Ø HRI n=13 2.92 3.00 2.69 3.15 3.08 
N° n/a 1 HRI     
Legend: RI=Regulatory intensity      LRI=Low regulatory intensity       HRI=High regulatory intensity 
n/a=no answer available 
TABLE 55: THE OPERATIONAL DIMENSION 
The operational dimension is important for all organisations studied. Indeed, all respondents 
confirm that a change in regulation would result in a change in the importance of the 
operational dimension. A decrease in the regulatory intensity is argued to change the 
importance of the operational dimension by increasing the position of this dimension for the 
definition of success (Interview 1, 7). It is generally argued that in cases where no more 
profits can be realised, due to a restrictive regulation or too high a competition, the 
operational dimension gains in strength because an organisation needs to be cost-efficient 
to further increase or achieve the same results (Interview 1, 5, 10).  
III. The stakeholder management dimension 
The stakeholder management dimension is not highly affected by a change in the level of 
the regulatory intensity. The evaluation of the document and interviews indicated that in the 
case of higher regulatory environments the stakeholder groups are broadened to include 
society at large, whereas in lower regulated organisations the focus is narrower, 
concentrating on more direct stakeholders, such as customers, shareholders and suppliers.  
Stakeholder 
management 
dimension104 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation 
HRI 
Question 15 
Ø LRI n=10 2.67 3.10 3.10 2.20 2.70 
Ø HRI n=13 2.64 2.31 3.77 3.08 2.77 
N° n/a 1 LRI // 2 HRI      
Legend:     RI=Regulatory intensity     LRI=Low regulatory intensity     HRI=High regulatory intensity 
n/a=no answer available  
TABLE 56: THE STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT DIMENSION 
                                                
104 In three cases (Interview 9, 11; Survey 9) there was no response to the question of the current 
evaluation. The reasons behind can only be speculative such as that the participants might not know 
or are not willing to respond. 
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In regard to the hypothetical questions, for illustration, 23 valid responses were given. All 
respondents confirmed the influence of regulation on the evaluation of the stakeholder 
management dimension, but no clear pattern can be identified or even used in the cases as 
regards the direction of this influence. One idea is that it is less a question of the importance 
attributed to the dimension but to the type of indicators developed. This is closely linked to 
what has mentioned above in regard to which target groups the organisation focuses on. In 
general it seems that customers are the main target group of a lower regulated organisation, 
resulting in the adoption of indicators measuring performance in this regard (Interview 5, 8, 
10). On the other hand, highly regulated organisations seem to concentrate more on the 
players, the regulator and society as such, something that results in a broader definition of 
the stakeholder groups (e.g. Camelot 2012c; Française des Jeux 2012b; Norsk Tipping 
2012). 
IV. The legal requirement dimension 
The qualitative data analysis clearly illustrates that the regulatory intensity influences the 
legal requirement dimension, and that the latter would be affected in the case of a change in 
the regulatory framework (Interviews 1-14). The high regulatory intensity cases have a 
strong compliance focus per definition, and they associate performance with the respect of 
obligations (Française des Jeux 2012b; Norsk Tipping 2012; Interview 1, 2, 7, 14). As an 
illustration, it can be noted that in regard to the hypothetical questions, 23 valid responses 
were provided in the interviews and the survey for the legal requirement dimension.  
Legal requirement 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation 
HRI 
Question 15 
Ø LRI n=10 2.11 2.00 3.10 1.90 2.44 
Ø HRI n=13 2.67 2.23 3.42 2.38 1.93 
N° n/a 1 LRI // 1 HRI   1 HRI  1 LRI 
Legend:      RI=Regulatory intensity     LRI=Low regulatory intensity     HRI=High regulatory intensity 
n/a=no answer available  
TABLE 57: THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT DIMENSION 
The small sample does not allow for any deduction of findings but in overall the responses 
tend to illustrate the results of the qualitative analysis, i.e. that the higher the regulation, the 
higher the importance of the legal requirement dimension. Indeed, this result is not very 
surprising in the sense that if this were not the case, the effectiveness of the regulation 
would need to be questioned.  
V. The social issue participation dimension 
Interview participants generally agreed that in a higher regulatory intensity the social issue 
participation dimension would be more important, because the organisations would want to 
show to the public that they are socially active and working in accordance with the 
regulatory objectives (Interview 10). Further, it was argued that in lower regulatory 
intensities, commercial issues are more important and hence the social issue participation 
dimension is much less in focus (Interview 10, 13). This difference is not so much a question 
of not wanting to engage socially, and more a question of focusing on the drive for future 
financial benefits. In this regard, the interviewees also emphasised that it was not be up to 
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the organisations to engage in such social activities (Interview 8, 13). This reveals the idea of 
who is accountable for the negative effects of games of chance, a question which is clearly 
a political choice. In Belgium for example, the regulation makes the regulator accountable 
for responsible gambling (Interview 8). As an illustration, 23 valid responses for the social 
issue participation dimension were provided in the interviews and the survey in regard to the 
hypothetical questions.  
Social issue 
participation 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation 
HRI 
Question 15 
Ø LRI n=10 4.00 3.30 3.60 2.60 3.90 
Ø HRI n=13 3.82 3.23 4.00 3.15 3.25 
N° n/a 2 LRI/3 HRI   1 LRI/1 HRI  1 HRI 
N° out 2 LRI     
Legend:    RI=Regulatory intensity     LRI=Low regulatory intensity     HRI=High regulatory intensity 
n/a=no answer available    out=not part of performance definition  
TABLE 58: THE SOCIAL ISSUE PARTICIPATION DIMENSION 
Under the current regulation the social issue participation dimension scores 4.00 for LRI—
and 3.82 for HRI cases. This does not really correspond to the findings of the qualitative 
analysis, and indicates the weakness of the quantitative data. The idea is that for 
respondents it is difficult to evaluate this dimension because it is difficult to understand. 
Hence this is the strong case in favour of the qualitative research, which has allowed for 
proper explanations of the concepts behind the study. In the interviews and the documents 
the social issue participation dimension is clearly an important performance dimension for 
highly regulated organisations. This is especially true for cases where the organisations 
have a certain autonomy in using a share of the profits for voluntary measures aimed for 
example at gambling problems, funding of research or engagement in the local community 
(Française des Jeux 2012; Camelot 2012). It was further mentioned in the interviews that 
this is a result of the regulation, i.e. the idea of protecting organisations from competition 
also allows them to contribute socially (Interview 2, 7, 14). Further it was mentioned at 
several occasions that the organisations even perceived it as their duty to engage in social 
activities on a voluntary basis (interview 2, 14). It seems that low regulated organisations are 
less active in this regard and that they concentrate more fully on the business and the 
customers. It was further argued that this is a result of competition, which pushes the 
organisations to focus on the business side of their activities (Interview 8), but also a result 
of pressure from private shareholders, who are less concerned with redistribution and 
solidarity (Interview 4, 5, 13, 14). Whatever the reasons and motivations behind these 
differences, the qualitative analysis finds that the inclusion of the social issue participation 
dimension in the performance definition can be linked to the regulatory environment.  
VI. The public values dimension 
The public values dimension does not appear to be highly influenced by a change in the 
regulatory intensity. In the interviews it was outlined that the level of empathy would be the 
same regardless of the degree of regulatory intensity (Interview 13). Further, the hypothetical 
questions reveal, for illustration, that the dimension is not easily evaluated, as eight ‘outs’ 
were recorded in the survey responses. Though no final conclusion can be drawn based on 
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this, it nonetheless indicates public values do not constitute a performance dimension on 
their own, something that was also found in the qualitative analysis.  
Public values 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation 
HRI 
Question 15 
Ø LRI n=10 4.33 3.67 4.00 2.44 3.90 
Ø HRI n=13 3.00 3.67 4.08 3.25 3.25 
N° n/a 2 LRI/1 HRI  1 LRI/1HRI 1 HRI 1 LRI/1HRI 1 HRI 
N° Out 2 LRI     
Legend:    RI=Regulatory intensity    LRI=Low regulatory intensity    HRI=High regulatory intensity 
n/a=no answer available   out=not part of performance definition 
TABLE 59: THE PUBLIC VALUES DIMENSION 
Furthermore, though vague, these results also implicitly confirm the earlier conclusion that 
the public values dimension is more a processes guiding dimension than a performance 
dimension. Public values were detected in the coding of the text material but their 
evaluation indicates that they constitute values that are important for the organisation but 
which are not included in any performance statements (e.g. Française des Jeux 2012; 
Camelot 2012; Ladbrokes 2012, Interview 1, 2, 3).  
6.2.4 Concluding remarks 
The exploration of the data set composed of reports, interview transcripts and survey 
responses allow for a positive answer to the general research question of whether the 
regulatory environment influences the definition of performance in regulated organisations. 
The cross case comparison of the qualitative questions of the interviews and codes 
identified in the data set yield a different performance conceptualisation for groups A and B, 
as compared to group C. Across all three groups, the financial dimension is present and 
very important for the performance definitions. The operational dimension is also highly 
present, and it appears that it is in a similar focus in the groups of high regulated cases, and 
varies slightly in regard to the group of low regulated cases. This is also true for the 
stakeholder management dimension, which is present to the same degree in the 
performance definition of groups A and B, whereas it is slightly more present in group C. 
The legal requirement dimension differs in its importance for the performance definitions 
across all groups. The importance of the social issue participation dimension for the 
performance definition also differs across all three groups, but with a similar position in 
groups A and B. In regard to the public values dimension, the groups differ in regard to the 
importance they give for the performance definition, but with a smaller difference between 
group A and B as compared to group C.  
As concerns the way the regulatory environment influences the definition of performance, 
several observations can be made. Among the performance dimensions applied, a different 
relationship is identified between organisations facing a low regulatory intensity and those 
facing a high regulatory intensity. Organisations facing a low regulatory intensity have a 
hierarchically ordered performance definition, in which the financial dimension is put at the 
top. Hence a clear vertical order applies and the dimensions are not all given the same 
weight. Organisations facing a high regulatory intensity also apply a multidimensional 
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performance definition, but in a horizontal fashion, as they emphasise several performance 
dimensions in equal measure, the financial dimension not being the only final dimension. 
Having thus examined the relationship between the dependent variable—the definition of 
performance—and the independent variable—the regulatory intensity—the remaining 
question is that of which position the type of ownership has in this dynamic. The next 
section will therefore explore whether the type of ownership, as a control variable, can be 
qualified as a moderator or a mediator in the relationship between the regulatory intensity 
and the definition of performance.  
6.3 CONTROL VARIABLE: THE TYPE OF OWNERSHIP—A MODERATOR OR A MEDIATOR? 
In order to examine the question of whether public or private ownership influences the 
definition of performance in the cases under study, a cross-group comparison will first be 
conducted (section 6.3.1). In doing so, the performance definitions of group B—the private 
organisations facing a high regulatory intensity—are compared to those of group C—the 
private operators facing a low regulatory intensity and of group A—the public organisations 
facing a high regulatory intensity. This analysis will provide indications with regard to the 
interplay between regulation and ownership as concerns the shape of the performance 
definition of the various organisations. In a second step (section 6.3.2), the quotations found 
in the interviews and documents analysed in regard to the type of ownership and its 
influence on the performance definition will be discussed.  
Chapter two illustrated the fact that different performance conceptualisations seem to apply 
in private and public organisations. One aspect which has been lacking in research until 
now, is whether this situation also applies to organisations, public and private, facing 
regulation. The contention formulated in this study is that the regulatory intensity is assumed 
to outweigh the type of ownership in defining the performance definition of organisations. If 
this proposition holds, less divergence between the cases of high regulatory intensity, but of 
different types of ownership should be observed, than between the cases of same type of 
ownership but of different regulatory intensity.  
6.3.1 Cross-group comparison: convergence or divergence in performance 
dimensions? 
The starting point of the comparison is group B, which represents the intermediate case 
(highly regulated but privately owned). Group B is compared to group A (highly regulated, 
publicly owned) and group C (low regulated, privately owned) to address the question of the 
role of the type of ownership in the relationship between the regulatory environment and the 
definition of performance. 
First in regard to the legal requirement dimension, a convergence across the groups A, B 
and C can be observed as in all three groups the legal requirement dimension is suggested 
to be a prerequisite dimension and in all of the groups it is identified as an aspect underlying 
any organisational activity. Especially, the interview participants belonging to group B and 
group C directly pointed it out as the basis upon which any business activity needs to be 
undertaken (e.g. Interview 1, 9, 14 etc.). However, for group C, the statements focussed on 
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the access to the market and the acquisition of licences whereas, in group B the content of 
the comments went further, by including also the respect of the licence agreements and the 
constant control of compliance with the laws and licence conditions, as for example in 
regard to products allowed or responsible gambling (e.g. Interview 1, 9, 11). In group A, 
even though the legal requirement was an important prerequisite dimension, it was less 
directly highlighted across the data set. This seems to be linked mainly to the type of 
ownership, as a public organisation first of all has to follow the laws and rules that apply. 
This is hence understood as a ‘fait accompli’ that does not need to be expressed as a 
performance dimension (Interview 2, 7).  
In regard to the public values dimension, a divergence between groups A, B and C can be 
observed, even though none of the cases include in their performance definition. Again, 
there is some commonality between the groups A and B as opposed to group C. The public 
values dimension is categorised as a guiding processes dimension. For group A, public 
values are a core for the organisations, which accompanies all activities and reflections 
(Interview 2, 7). Group B also focuses on public values, and they are underlined as being 
very important but do also seem to not be a distinct performance dimension. Disrespect 
would enhance the focus on these values but as long as they are respected no special 
attention is paid (Interview 3). Public values in group C do not appear to have a special 
position and do not accompany the business activities to the same degree as in the other 
groups. Some public values, such as transparency, are important for these private 
organisations but it has to be remembered that in the understanding of group C, public 
values are more part of the operational dimension, related to security aspects in 
transactions or transparency in regard to the processes of the game (Interview 4, 5, 6, 10).  
A very similar conclusion can be drawn in regard to responsibility. Responsibility, not 
necessarily a public value, was frequently outlined in the HRI cases (groups A and B). It is 
even suggested to merge responsibility with the public values dimension. But responsibility 
is not present at the stage of a guiding processes dimension in the low regulatory intensity 
cases (group C). This does not suggest that responsibility is absent but that it intervenes in 
relation to the operational and the stakeholder management dimensions.  
Multiple dimensions were identified as being actual performance dimensions. Nevertheless, 
their use in constructing the performance definition varies between the different groups. 
Convergence occurs among the three groups in regard to the operational dimension and the 
data analysis supports the idea that the operational dimension has a similar position for the 
performance definition in all three groups, in spite of the different types of ownership or 
levels of regulation.  
In contrast, the position of the stakeholder management dimension for the performance 
definition differs among the groups. A convergence is observed between groups A and B. 
The conceptualisation of group C on the other hand diverges from groups A and B in regard 
to the stakeholder management dimension. Indeed, group C puts more emphasis on the 
stakeholder management dimension as it incorporates the aspect of voluntary measures 
taken in regard to gambling problems, which is elsewhere part of the social issue 
participation dimension. Hence, the stakeholder management dimension differs more 
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between groups C and B, than the use of the stakeholder management dimension does for 
groups A and B.  
Multiple dimensions can be identified in the analysis as being of the nature of final 
performance dimensions. There is a large convergence between groups A, B and C in 
regard to the financial dimension, as it is of a very high importance for the performance 
definition in all groups. The financial results are in a very strong focus and this both in the 
private and in the public organisations, regardless of the regulatory intensity. The legal 
requirement dimension is present in all three groups as a final dimension but divergence 
occurs between the different cases, the differences between groups A and B being smaller 
than those between groups B and C. This has mainly to do with two elements: the 
mandatory redistribution and the mandatory obligations for gambling problems. In regard to 
the mandatory obligations for gambling problems, they are present in all of the three groups 
but are argued to have a much stronger presence for group B and group A, as an effect of 
the regulatory intensity. Group C has little obligations in that regard and hence the legal 
requirement dimension is less important. The other element explaining the importance of the 
legal requirement dimension is unquestionably the mandatory redistribution. This aspect 
applies to all three of the groups but with a sharp difference between groups A/B as 
compared to group C. Also in group C, taxes are collected by the state but this element is 
much less in focus in the performance definition. On the other hand, groups A and B 
frequently reference mandatory redistribution, even when they do not discuss the 
mandatory element. Despite the similarities between group A and B, the legal requirement 
dimension is seemingly slightly more in focus in group B than in group A. The cases of 
group B often refer to the compliance with laws and regulations in the data set (Interview 1, 
9, 12, 14). It appears that the public organisations (group A), as they are public, do not 
underline this dimension strongly, something that does not imply that it is not part of the 
performance definition, but that it is a prerequisite, i.e. a ‘fait accompli’ that they comply. 
In regard to the social issue participation dimension divergence can be observed between 
groups A, B and C, with common points between groups A and B. It is even suggested that 
in regard to group C it is part of two other dimensions. First, as concerns sponsoring or 
partnerships it is part of the financial dimension. Voluntary redistribution is not very present 
in the data set and it is suggested to be completely dependent on the financial performance 
of each year. Second, in regard to the voluntary measures against gambling problems, they 
is suggested to be part of the stakeholder management dimension, as these measures are 
addressed exclusively to their players and not to society at large. Groups A and B are very 
similar in regard to the social issue participation dimension and it is for both an important 
aspect of the performance definition. Nonetheless, the public organisations (group A) seem 
to attest a slightly larger presence to this dimension than the private organisations (group B 
and C) and hence a different conceptualisation can also be observed between groups A and 
B, but the difference is smaller in degree than that found between groups B and C.  
In summary, the first comparison of the results from the data analysis indicates that the type 
of ownership has a moderate but not a large impact on the definition of performance for 
regulated organisations. In cases of divergence in the use of the different performance 
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dimensions the gaps between group C and B are much larger than the gaps between 
groups A and B. However, before drawing any conclusions on the interplay between the 
type of ownership and the regulatory intensity with regard to the performance definition, the 
quotations found in the data analysis of the reports of the organisations and the interviews 
conducted will be considered.  
6.3.2 Exploring the interview and survey responses 
In the interviews and surveys, two questions on elements that influence the definition of 
success were asked. The first question asked the interviewees to evaluate the importance of 
the different external spheres on the definition of performance (question 5). The table below 
summarises the answers for each group individually (1=very much important to 5=not at all 
important): 
Influence of sphere Group A Group B Group C Ø per sphere 
Social-cultural sphere 1.71 2.67 2.10 2.04 
Political and legal sphere 1.29 1.57 1.40 1.42 
Technological sphere 2.29 2.43 1.50 2.00 
Economic sphere 3.14 2.29 1.90 2.38 
Ø all spheres  2.11 2.24 1.73 - 
Number of responses (n) n=6 n=8 n=10 n=24 
TABLE 60: ENVIRONMENTAL SPHERES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE DEFINITION OF PERFORMANCE 
In the opinion of the respondents, all four spheres are judged to influence the definition of 
success of the organisations. This is not surprising in so far as it supports the organisational 
theories arguing that organisations are open systems interacting with the external 
environment (Hatch 2006; Lawrence & Lorsch 1967, 1972; Levinthal 1991; Rosenzweig & 
Singh 1991). Some interview participants also mentioned the importance of all spheres on 
the definition of success. One interviewee summarised that the organisations cannot escape 
the political and legal spheres, as the regulation obliges them to act in certain ways. He 
further argued that the gambling activity is not an ordinary economic activity and that the 
operators have to consider various aspects, such as ensuring a balanced development of 
the sector, preventing fraud and criminality, being transparent, not destabilising the branch 
and protecting vulnerable persons. Hence these aspects concern several spheres and the 
organisations are highly impacted by the regulation lying out these obligations (Interview 7).  
In regard to the social-cultural sphere all groups attested an influence on the performance 
definition, and especially in the highly regulated cases it was argued that the regulation itself 
imposes reflections in regard to social values, and the organisations have to consider these 
influences and need to respond to these needs (e.g. Interview 7). For lower regulated cases 
this is important insofar as that it can influence the image of the brand (e.g. Interview 4, 5, 6, 
7). A disregard for social values could result in higher regulation, something that the 
organisations would not necessarily find desirable. One interview participant added that the 
social-cultural sphere is important, as the organisation could act in a more aggressive and 
profit-oriented manner, but if this goes against the culture of both the organisation and 
society it is not desirable that it does so. As the organisations are embedded in a wider 
socio-cultural environment, they are affected by that which is happening in society 
(Interview 14). Furthermore, it was several times mentioned in the interviews that low 
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regulated organisations have more leeway in regard to whether or not to consider the 
social-cultural components of the society they are operating in (e.g. Interview 1, 5, 10, 14). 
Interviewees agreed that organisations need to consider the social values as this impacts on 
their public image (Interview 1, 3, 7, 13, 14). For instance, in the case of Camelot it was 
mentioned that the organisation markets itself as socially responsible, showing consumers 
that they could be more aggressive, but that they do not want to because it would be badly 
perceived (Interview 13). For illustration, the quantitative evaluation backs the qualitative 
results, yielding an average score for all groups of 2.04, as illustrated by the table above. 
Across the three groups, the political and legal sphere is evaluated to matter a lot for the 
definition of success in the organisations. It is also in this dimension the regulation for the 
sport betting and lottery sectors is included. The political and legal aspects are seen as 
legitimating the activities of the organisations (Interview 4, 7, 5, 14). One interviewee 
mentioned that in his view the political and legal sphere is the most important sphere 
because the organisation is owned by the state and the mission is to do business in a social 
way. In the interviewee’s opinion the government must see an advantage in owning their 
own company and keeping the monopoly, otherwise they would go to a licence based 
system and allow competition (Interview 3). One interviewee outlined that an important 
aspect in regard to the legal and political sphere is the question on how the organisations 
can influence the debate and that the organisations define their success in regard to how 
well they are able to influence future regulation (Interview 9). Another interview participant 
added that when the political and regulator level do not understand the system it can go 
very wrong, something which would very much influence the definition of success in the 
organisations (Interview 3, 14). Good communication is required in order to inform policy 
makers (Interview 14). The legal and political aspects risk being a obstacles for 
organisations trying to do a good job (Interview 3). Another argument is that the political and 
legal sphere is very important for the definition of success but one has to make a distinction 
between the legislation and regulations that control the organisations and the ones that 
have negative impacts, as for example heavy taxation systems which decrease the 
competitiveness of legal organisations facing illegal competitors. Regulation, in the view of 
this interviewee, can be helpful but it can also be very detrimental (Interview 4, 5, 10). 
Further it was outlined at several occasions in the interviews that the legal and political 
sphere limits the autonomy of the organisations, restricting their scope of action, and for 
example which games they can offer (Interview 7, 14). For illustration, the quantitative 
evaluation backs the qualitative results, as illustrated in the table above, yielding an average 
score for all groups of 1.42. 
The technological sphere is also an important aspect of success for the organisations and 
organisations have to be technologically advanced (Interview 1, 4, 5, 14). The technological 
sphere is important, and this for all cases, because it is directly linked to the operation of 
games of chance, especially for online gambling (Interview 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10). With increased 
competition, legal or illegal, organisations have to be particularly innovative to satisfy 
customers and attract new ones (Interview 1, 2, 3, 13). A successful organisation is one that 
anticipates which technologies will be developed in the future and what kind of games 
customers will demand. One example mentioned at several occasions by different 
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interviewees is Veikkaus. In the beginning, when Veikkaus started with the internet business 
they developed the whole technology by themselves, as it did not exist at that time. Hence 
they were at the forefront in regard to the technological developments and were very 
successful in acquiring customers online (Interview 2, 13, 14). For illustration, the 
quantitative evaluation back the qualitative results as illustrated in the table above with an 
average score of 2 across the groups.  
Further it is argued that organisations are obliged to take into consideration the economic 
sphere because as games of chance are an economic activity the offer needs to be adapted 
to the demand and this implies for example adapting the quotes or developing a planning 
systems for pay-out rates (Interview 1, 2, 7). The importance of the economic sphere is 
clearly attested and several interviewees argued for example that the lottery games are anti-
cyclic, i.e. people tend to play more in times of economic crisis because they hope to gain 
money (Interview 2, 13, 14) whereas sport betting games are more cyclic (Interview 5, 10). 
This moderate importance of the economic spheres is further illustrated with the quantitative 
evaluation, yielding a 2.38 average score for all groups.  
Organisations evaluate that all spheres have to be considered when operating games of 
chance but especially the legal and political aspects are primordial because an organisation 
needs to comply with them (Interview 1, 2, 5, 7, 13). This is in line with the discussion above 
on the influence of regulation on the definition of performance in the organisations. 
The second question in the interview on the interplay between the type of ownership or the 
regulatory framework on the definition of the performance, the respondents were asked to 
evaluate the importance of different elements on the definition of success used in the 
organisations.  
 Group A Group B Group C Ø 
Regulation in place 1.8 1.85 1.3 1.61 
Type of ownership 1.8 2.5 1.8 2.04 
Public mission of the organisation 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.78 
Number of responses (n) n=6 n=8 n=10 n=24 
TABLE 61: FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFINITION OF PERFORMANCE 
All the interview participants evaluated the importance of regulation on the definition of 
success as being high. The quantitative evaluation (1.61 in average for all groups) is a nice 
illustration for the results presented. One interviewee argued that De Lotto evaluates itself 
successfully when it complies with all the laws and regulations (Interview 9). This is also 
often stated by the organisation as being an important ingredient of the performance 
definition (Interview 9). Moreover, one interviewee added that as there is at the moment a 
very low regulation in place, its effects are less important, but that when there would be 
more regulation it would become very important for the shape of the performance definition 
(Interview 5). Similarly, another interviewee emphasised the importance of the regulatory 
framework but added that it can have negative or positive effects (Interview 14). It can be 
positive if it enhances the potential of the organisations to execute their task and to 
effectively implement their goals. In the view of several interview participants, Veikkaus is an 
example of such a positive effect of regulation on organisations. A negative attitude of the 
regulation is one that thinks gambling in general is too dangerous and restricts the gambling 
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activities very much without successfully combating illegal gambling activities. The negative 
example mentioned at several occasions in the interviews is Germany, that has a very 
restrictive gambling regulation but also a growing community of online gamblers playing on 
illegal gambling websites. One interviewee explained that Germany is a disaster in that 
regard because the government did not understand the sector, something that resulted in 
the loss of market shares in sport betting to illegal operators. The prohibition of 
advertisement is an example of what went terribly wrong in Germany (Interview 14). This 
indicates that not only the regulatory intensity but also the quality of the regulation in place 
is important for the definition of performance in the organisations.  
Across the sample, most interviewees evaluated the type of ownership as being an 
important element with regard to the definition of success, but that it has to be put in 
context. One interviewee from group B argued that as De Lotto is a non-profit organisation, 
it differs from one that is profit oriented, as they want to generate money for their owners 
and hence less would go to good causes (interview 9). This would points in the direction 
that there is a distinction to be made between different types of private organisations. The 
influence of the type of ownership, even though argued to be very important, seems to be 
abated by the regulatory environment however. One interviewee stated that: “In my view the 
type of ownership is very important, but not in all circumstances. There are companies like 
Camelot, because of the regulatory environment, are safeguarded against the negative 
attitude of private organisations. But you can see other private organisations facing a less 
restrictive regulatory environment, where the values are probably not preserved in the same 
manner (...)” (Interview 14). This opinion underlines the importance of the regulatory 
framework on the definition of success and that it seems to be more influential than the type 
of ownership. This is an argument that is shared in the interviews, especially with the belief 
that with the right regulation a private organisation can also function in the way the public 
organisations do. One interviewee outlined that a private organisation with private 
shareholders, which has obligations of the same kind as the public organisations in its 
licence agreement, or private organisations that are held by the state can result in the same 
outcomes despite the different structure (Interview 7).  
The views expressed in the interviews support the argument that the regulation in place 
affects the definition of performance more than the type of ownership. One interviewee for 
example mentioned that in a public organisation the state is the regulator but also the owner 
and the goal of the organisation is not to make profits but to offer secure gambling services 
for the public (Interview 2). The interviewee outlined that if tomorrow you would put private 
investors next to the other shareholders a conflict of interest would occur, because private 
shareholders seek to maximise the profits in accordance with the legal framework outlined 
by the state. In a private organisation you do everything that is not forbidden whereas in a 
public organisation like the FDJ you do only what is authorised (Interview 2). The aspect of 
shared values across the shareholders is also an element detected in the annual report of 
Camelot with the change in ownership to the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund (Teachers’) 
(Camelot, 2012). Another interviewee argued that the type of ownership is crucial but that it 
could be possible to operate a private organisation in the same way as a public organisation 
if the regulation is strict (Interview 3). Yet another interviewee added that public 
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organisations have it easier because when you are a flexible, dynamic organisation 
benefiting from a monopoly, you have an advantage in operating games of chance because 
you have a large market share (Interview 10). This opens the discussion of the public versus 
private organisation. 
One interviewee raised the question of whether the FDJ is really a public organisation. In his 
view it is not the case because it is founded as a stock corporation. Hence it is de facto not 
a public organisation, with the exception that the state is the main shareholder. Hence the 
FDJ incorporates a high degree of publicness as along with exclusive rights to operate 
games of chance, obligations of public order or public interest are imposed on the 
organisation rendering it more public (Interview 7). In the opinion of the interviewee, it is not 
a public organisation in the sense that the FDJ is not an administration nor is the 
organisation subject of public law (Interview 7). Hence, attention has to be paid to the 
nuances between public and private organisations (Interview 7). In other jurisdiction a 
games of chance operator may clearly be a pure public entity as it is integrated in the 
administration but in France the FDJ is a commercial organisation subordinated to private 
law but with the state as major shareholder. The state governs the organisation in the Board 
of Directors but it is not subject to public law (Interview 7). Contrary to that line of argument, 
another interviewee mentioned that the FDJ is a mixed organisation, but that it is de facto a 
completely public organisation because the minority shareholders are strategically aligned 
with the state, holding the majority of the shares. Hence, all shareholders share the same 
vision (Interview 2). These two contradictory opinions illustrate quite nicely that it is not 
really a question of a public-private dichotomy, but one of the regulatory intensity, 
enhancing the level of publicness, that influences the shape of the performance definition of 
the organisations. Another example for this reflection is the case of Camelot. It was argued 
in the interviews that Camelot, a private organisation, has a lot of traits of a public 
organisation, especially in regard to the redistribution of revenues to social causes and the 
activities in regard to responsible gambling (Interview 13, 14).  
One element that occurred at several occasions in relation to the question of type of 
ownership was the public mission of the organisation. The public mission of the 
organisation is an element making up the regulatory intensity and influencing the definition 
of success (Interview 14). Several other respondents share this opinion (Interview 2, 7, 8). 
The influences, of state or private nature, on the organisations seem to be more decisive 
than the type of ownership (Interview 5).  
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Another interviewee outlined that due to regulation Camelot is not purely private because it 
carries a lot of the traits of a public organisation. Hence, they have a certain degree of 
publicness (Interview 13). Hence it seems that it is less the type of ownership that matters, 
and more the regulation, and particularly one attribute of the regulation, namely the public 
mission imposed on the organisation and the degree of publicness. Camelot for example is 
a private organisation with a public use of profits and the level of profits Camelot can keep 
is actually very limited. This is for example not the case with the Austrian Lotteries or 
Lottomatica, two organisations that pay a high amount of taxes, but their objective is still to 
make money for the shareholders (Interview 14). So the public mission is also important for 
the definition of performance in organisations and points again to the regulation in place as 
being decisive for the definition of performance in regulated organisations. 
6.3.3 Concluding remarks 
To sum up, the type of ownership has a moderate but not a large impact on the definition of 
performance for regulated organisations and is arguably, for the cases studied, not an 
alternative explanation for a different definition of performance. The highly regulated 
organisations, despite a different type of ownership, share a very similar performance 
definition, using multiple result dimensions. In the case of divergence in the use of the 
different performance dimensions the gap between group C and B is much larger than the 
gap between groups A and B. The regulatory environment decides not only the type of 
ownerships but also other elements, such as the public mission of the organisations or the 
degree of competition, and it is hence much more influential on the definition of success. 
6.4 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 
What are the conclusions that can be drawn from the various elements presented in this 
chapter? Some concluding remarks have been provided already at the end of each section, 
but coming to an end of the qualitative analysis, it is useful to synthesise the elements that 
allow for an answer to the central research question. 
This study has successfully highlighted that the definitions of performance in all cases 
analysed are indeed multidimensional, as outlined in chapter two. While not surprising, the 
identification of this multidimensionality in the units of analysis was nonetheless an 
important first step that prepared the cases for the examination of the research question. 
The cases were divided into three groups (namely group A of high regulated and public 
owned organisations, group B of high regulated and private owned organisations and group 
C of low regulated and private owned organisations), and for each of these groups a 
performance definition was constructed based on the interviews and the documents 
analysis. The FDJ and Norsk Tipping, belonging to group A, have a multidimensional 
performance definition with a strong focus on the financial, the social issue participation and 
the legal requirement dimensions, whereas the other dimensions, with the exception of the 
public values dimension, are also part of the definition of performance. It should be noted 
that the legal requirement dimension is mostly indirectly detected in the data set. For this 
group of organisations, the social value and the economic value creation are crucial and 
equally important in doing business. Indirectly, the legal objectives outlined in the regulation 
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are certainly addressed, though they are not presented in this manner in the discourse of 
the organisations, something that seems to be closely linked to the public character of the 
organisations. This could be indicative of the fact that because of the public character of the 
organisations, the respect of legal obligations and the fulfilment of regulatory objectives is 
their ‘raison d’être’, and this respect therefore does not need further specification.  
De Lotto and Camelot, belonging to group B of high regulated and privately owned 
organisations, also have a multidimensional performance definition with a strong focus on 
the financial and the legal requirement dimensions, closely followed by the social issue 
participation and the operational dimensions and with a moderate importance of the 
stakeholder management dimension. Interestingly, the legal requirement dimension was in 
this group of cases directly identified as an important part of the performance definition. 
Organisations weigh the financial and the legal/regulatory objectives equally, while not 
neglecting social responsibility.  
Belgium Ladbrokes and the Austrian sport betting organisations face a low regulatory 
intensity and are privately owned (group C), and they apply multidimensional performance 
definitions with a clear hierarchy between the dimensions with the financial performance at 
the top, underlining the economic value creation of the organisations for their shareholders. 
Certainly, other dimensions, such as the operational dimension or the stakeholder 
management dimension are also very important as they contribute to future financial 
performance. This does not imply that the legal requirement dimension is absent. Certainly, 
regulation is important and compliance aspects are frequently mentioned in the data set. 
The contribution of the organisations in form of taxation to the state budget is frequently 
detected in the analysis. Finally, the social issue participation dimension does not occur 
frequently in the data set and is evaluated to be of low importance to the performance 
definition.  
All three groups share the idea that public values dimension is not a performance dimension 
by itself. This does however not imply that public values are absent in the data set. On the 
contrary, organisations in all three groups highly evaluate values such as fairness, equity or 
transparency. This could be indicative of the fact that public values form part of 
organisational values but are not included at the heart of performance management and are 
hence not core aspects of the strategy. This makes the case for not linking every 
organisational activity with the buzzword of performance. It is arguably more adequate to 
clearly outline what is considered when measuring performance and which aspects are 
excluded from the performance definition, but are still important for the organisation. Hence 
the concept of performance could be streamlined by being constructed based on fewer but 
maybe stronger legs. 
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Indeed, legal, social and environmental aspects appear to be included in definitions of 
performance of organisations in sport betting and lottery sectors. It could be argued that 
organisations do not exclusively focus on economic value creation but also consider social 
and legal entrepreneurship to be important aspects of business making, something that is 
underlined by the integration of these elements in the performance management. The 
regulatory environment surrounding and influencing organisations clearly influences the 
integration of the various aspects in the performance management.  
The research question of whether this influence exists can therefore be positively answered 
(section 6.2). Indeed it is safe to say that the regulatory environment, as argued in literature, 
changes the behaviours of organisations, and though the definition of organisational 
performance is not necessarily directly targeted, it is affected. Across the sample, explicitly 
expressed in the interviews, and implicitly detected through the comparison of data across 
the groups, the regulatory intensity is seen to influence the definition of performance. In 
regard to how this is done, several observations can be made. 
Organisations facing a low regulatory intensity apply a hierarchical performance definition, in 
which the financial dimension is at the top. Hence a clear vertical order applies and the 
dimensions are not all given equal weight. Generally speaking, low regulated organisations 
adopt a more economic entrepreneurial performance strategy, multidimensional but 
hierarchically ordered with the financial dimension on the top.  
Organisations facing a high regulatory intensity also apply a multidimensional performance 
definition and this in a horizontal order, with an equal emphasis put on several performance 
dimensions. Hence, highly regulated organisations adopt a more diverse performance 
strategy, which is also multidimensional, but which is horizontally ordered, and does not 
exclusively concentrate on economic entrepreneurship but also on legal and social 
entrepreneurship dimensions.  
This is interesting insofar that highly regulated organisations—as highlighted by Mahon and 
Murray Jr. (1981) in a study on the influence of the level of regulation on strategy—adopt a 
political/social performance strategy, whereas low regulated organisations follow an 
economic/political performance strategy and this in public as well as private organisations. 
These different performance strategies of the organisations are a result of the influence of 
regulation on organisations. This postulate not only acknowledges that regulation does 
indeed alter organisations’ behaviours, but it also indicates that it affects a core concept of 
management, namely performance. This could be indicative of the fact that it is not only the 
economic value that is in focus of organisation but that it is an alignment of economic and 
non-economic organisational goals. Arguably, organisations facing a low regulatory intensity 
evaluate the economic goals as being final goals whereas the non-economic aspects are 
mostly considered when believed that they could further increase the economic value 
creation of the organisation. Further, the results may indicate that highly regulated 
organisations balance the economic and non-economic aspects, reflecting the social 
aspects in the performance definition.  
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This further implies that, in contrast to the conceptualisation in public performance 
literature, the type of ownership is less important in defining performance than the 
regulatory intensity (section 6.3). In this study, the type of ownership matters but it can be 
judged to be a moderator in the relationship of the regulatory intensity and the performance 
definition. The influence on the performance orientation of organisations seems to be less a 
question of public versus private organisations and more a question of low and high 
regulatory intensity. The performance definitions in the three groups are different and can be 
linked to the different level of regulatory intensities organisations face. Group A and B share 
a similar definition of performance, equally weighing several dimensions, whereas group C 
adopts a very hierarchical performance definition with the focus of the financial 
performance.  
Arguably, the regulatory environment is hence a certain protection for organisations, 
something that allows for a deployment of resources, which would otherwise be used for 
the core business activities, for more social and environmental concerns. In competitive 
situations, organisations concentrate on the core aspects of business, resulting in a 
concentration on the financial dimension as the sole final performance dimension. In 
monopolistic situations, organisations diversify business activities, something that results in 
a wider focus mirrored in a performance definition that includes social outcomes. This is 
indicative of the fact that regulation leads organisations to balance different performance 
dimensions goals equally. Arguably, regulation can affect organisations to include a non-
financial outcome focused performance definition, internalising regulatory objectives in the 
performance management and measurement process. But does that mean that regulatory 
intensity could be increased, thereby turning organisations into entities focusing more on 
social than financial aspects? With regulation, organisations are accountable for what they 
are doing and hence adjust the organisational goals against the regulatory goals. 
Nonetheless, organisations in the studied sectors are economic entities and exist to perform 
well financially as well. The idea is not to necessarily unbalance the performance 
dimensions towards more legal, social and environmental performances at the expense of 
financial performance, but to balance the different performance dimensions.  
Overall the analysis and exploration of the data suggests that the regulatory intensity plays a 
crucial role for the definition of performance in organisations and this to a far higher degree 
than the type of ownership. What this means for this research, theory and practice will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This study has looked at the questions of whether and how the regulatory environment 
influences the definition of performance in organisations. This research focus flowed from 
the observation that despite an abundant literature on public performance, the regulatory 
environment is rarely analysed in terms of its influence on the definition of performance. The 
empirical case studies undertaken here have shown that the regulatory environment does 
indeed influence the definition of performance.  
The previous chapters have constructed tools to analyse the definition of performance on 
the one hand (chapter 2) and the regulatory intensity on the other hand (chapter 3). The 
relationship between the two elements has then been empirically analysed through a model 
applied to the definition of performance in the sport betting and lottery sectors and this in 
six different countries (chapters 4 to 6). This study has challenged the conventional view of 
organisational performance as simply being defined differently in public and private sectors, 
and has instead illustrated the impact of the regulatory environment organisations face, be 
they public or private. The research methodology used in this study was chosen following a 
detailed analysis of the two different elements, namely the definition of performance and the 
regulatory environment, their underpinning logics, and the various ways in which they could 
be explored. The conceptual model, constructed from an extensive literature review, was 
consequently empirically examined through semi-structured interviews with experts in the 
field, as well as through an extensive content analysis of relevant documents and the 
interview transcripts. The cases serving as examples to examine the model were discussed 
and the results were presented first on a case-per-case basis, and then through a cross-
case analysis. Having now come full circle, this chapter will reposition the research in its 
wider context and underline the various stakes involved (section 7.1). It will then link the 
results back to the research model and the practical aspects of the research (section 7.2). 
Third, the performance, regulation and gambling debates will be discussed in light of the 
results, and more particularly in terms of the contribution of this study to these fields 
(section 7.3).  
7.1 WHAT IS AT STAKE 
Before discussing the conclusions of this research further, it is necessary to place them in 
their proper context, repositioning the main stakes of this debate. The wider objective of the 
research has been to better understand and clarify the substance of performance in 
regulated environments, and this for both public and private organisations. Under the 
regulatory state, the implementation of public policies is increasingly trusted to 
organisations outside the central administrative structure, including to private entities. 
Nonetheless, the language on performance is still marked by the public-private opposition, 
disregarding all other contexts, including the regulatory environments. Hence, the results of 
this study provide interesting insights for the performance management of organisations 
facing regulation, because—as illustrated in chapter two—performance is at the heart of any 
organisation, be it private or public.  
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The results of the study clearly confirm the multidimensionality of performance. The 
analyses were based on a tool constructed for an in-depth examination of the performance 
definition used by organisations. The multidimensionality of performance was expected, and 
is thus certainly not to be considered a novel conclusion, but through the research, this 
characteristic of performance has been given a sector specific analysis. Furthermore, this 
analysis has been given added-value through the tool constructed to examine performance. 
The integration of six performance dimensions in a tool which was then empirically tested 
not only allowed for an identification of the substance of performance, but it also gave 
further insights with regard to the nature and importance of these dimensions for the 
performance definition. This has underlined the changing shape of the performance 
definition in connexion to the specific situations of organisations. For instance, the financial 
and the operational dimensions have been identified as being very stable in their positions 
with regard to the definition of performance, operational performance being positively linked 
to financial performance. Though the financial dimension is a final performance dimension in 
all groups, the position of other performance dimensions is far more variable, influenced as 
it is by the level of regulatory intensity. This differing nature of performance dimensions 
could be indicative of the fact that, as outlined in previous research and theory, no 
standardisation of performance measurement is possible. That which is considered when 
evaluating the success of performance is largely dependent on the regulatory intensity the 
organisation faces. Moreover, the stable position of the financial and operational dimensions 
could be indicative of the fact that organisations are first and foremost economic entities, 
which need to be profitable and to create economic value, at least for their shareholders. 
While this is certainly the case, a solely economic entrepreneurship is not sufficient in a 
more regulated environment, as illustrated by the results of this study. As presented in 
chapter two, social and environmental aspects are indeed integrated in the performance 
definitions of both private and public organisations.  
In the cases of low regulatory intensity, social and environmental activities are undertaken 
and measured when they are believed to contribute to financial performance. In cases of 
high regulatory intensity however, such aspects are also seen as final performance 
dimensions that are as important as financial performance. Their position for the overall 
performance conceptualisation therefore varies depending on the degree of regulatory 
intensity. Hence, the complexity of defining performance is linked to the balance of different 
performance dimensions, something that for some organisations results in a very 
hierarchical performance construction, whereas for others it is rather flat. This could be 
indicative of the fact that even though CSR is an important concept for organisations, and 
many organisations have implemented CSR guidelines in their activities, they do not seem 
to be an integral, final part of the performance definition. This unless the regulatory 
environment pushes organisations to also adopt legal entrepreneurship, and/or protects 
them so that they can adopt social entrepreneurship. If this is done, the result is that several 
dimensions become equally important when it comes to evaluating performance. 
This raises important questions for the state monitoring organisations and the management 
of the organisations facing regulation. For the former, the effects of regulation can be 
observed through the performance orientation selected by organisations. It raises the 
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questions of the state’s desire of further altering the organisation’s behaviour, and thus their 
performance orientation. For the latter, the economic and regulatory objectives have to be 
balanced under regulation. Organisations in regulated environments—be they public or 
private—are accountable to the government for their activities, something which arguably 
indicates more complex performance management requirements. How to successfully 
integrate the different interests of regulators, society and shareholders?  
The results further indicate that it is less question of the type of ownership, as has often 
been claimed in the literature, but more one of regulation, which blurs or abates the effect of 
the type of ownership in regulated environments. Also private organisations have to include 
regulatory objectives and to respond to a larger set of interest, something that is mirrored in 
performance definitions which balance several dimensions. Though it has not been possible 
to confirm here, this arguably implies that in an environment of low regulated intensity, a 
public organisations would focus more on the financial dimension, and adopt a performance 
definition similar the one identified in this study for low regulated private organisations. 
Further, the results of this study raise the question of the effect of the democratic 
governance mode of management, i.e. management based on accountability, transparency 
and openness. The absence of the public values dimension in the performance definitions 
across all cases—be they public or private—raises the question of how far democratic 
governance has really entered the management processes of the organisations. If 
democratic governance is a current mode of management, should not organisations mirror 
this fact by including transparency, equity or accountability aspects in their performance 
management? The results of the study are indicative of the fact that the notions of 
democratic governance are transversal additions to the management of performance, but 
they seem not to be integrated in the definition of performance. Of course, this is only a 
reflection based on the results of this study, which has focused on providing a tool to 
investigate the substance of performance, and not on the mode of public management 
organisations are following. Nonetheless, the findings indicate that such values are not yet 
part of the performance definition of any organisation, public or private, highly or lowly 
regulated. 
Having thus positioned the results of the study, the following section will discusses them 
more particularly with regard to the model of the research.  
7.2 DISCUSSING THE MODEL IN LIGHT OF THE RESULTS 
The empirical examination (chapters five and six) proved, for the cases in question, the 
veracity of the propositions formulated in the model, i.e. the existence of an influence of the 
regulatory environment on the definition of performance. In spite of the overall validity of the 
conceptual model and the positive response to the research question, some adjustments to 
the model could be made. Any theoretical model is per definition a simplified picture of 
reality, and this was something that the empirical part of the research illustrated well. This 
section will highlight some implications of the results with regard to the research model, first 
considering the dependent variable (section 7.2.1), second, the independent variable 
(section 7.2.2), third, the overall research methodology (section 7.2.3) and fourth, the 
research model (section 7.2.4). 
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7.2.1 The construction of the performance definition in light of the results 
From the literature review six different performance dimensions have been constructed in a 
tool, covering the whole range of possible performance types: a financial dimension 
referring to economic value creation, an operational dimension concentrating on processes, 
innovation and customers, a stakeholder management dimension highlighting the 
undertakings for stakeholders crucial for future economic value, a legal requirement 
dimension referring to regulatory compliance, a social issue participation dimension 
referring to the social value creation, and a public values dimension referring to the creation 
of values important for the society and the organisation. Theoretically categorised in 
economic (the first three dimensions), legal (the fourth dimension) and social 
entrepreneurship (the last two dimensions), the empirical research attests their validity, but 
two alterations to the model could be undertaken to further research. 
First, in regard to the differentiation between the stakeholder management and the social 
issue participation dimensions, the empirical examination has shown that separating the two 
is very difficult in practice. Theoretically, the differentiation is clear, and it depends 
essentially on intent. Thus, the stakeholder management dimension refers to the level of 
achievements in social, environmental and other issues believed to result in an increased 
shareholder value. The social issue participation dimension for its part refers to similar 
outcomes, with the difference that their achievements result in a decrease of future 
economic value or are based on the use of resources normally used elsewhere. These 
activities are believed to make a societal contribution in some way or another. Not only is 
this differentiation difficult to prove in practice, but as the motivation behind the action is not 
here under study, it might have revealed redundant to uphold two separate performance 
dimensions. For all of these reasons, for any further examination of the model, it would be 
more appropriate to merge these two, which then could be called the societal dimension. If 
the motivation behind the performance in such a dimension is under scrutiny, organisations 
it could be directly queried as to why these actions are undertaken. Consequently the 
differentiation could be made in the interpretation of the results, but in terms of two different 
performance dimensions. 
Second, the empirical examination of the research question has highlighted that the public 
values dimension is not actually a performance dimension. The public values, detected 
across the integral data set, have rather tended to accompany and guide the business 
activities of the organisations, and this especially in the case of public organisations. The 
model constructed from the literature went a step further in arguing that the public values 
themselves constitute an aspect of performance, and that the level of achievements in the 
creation and respect of public values could be part of the performance definition. The 
empirical study proved otherwise however, and the findings indicate that public values are 
not a measured performance dimension in themselves, though they accompanying the 
assessment of performance in an organisation and organisational activities.  
Consequently, the model developed for this study could be altered to define performance as 
a construct based on four different dimensions, namely a financial, an operational, a societal 
(merging social issue participation and stakeholder management dimensions), and a legal 
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requirement dimension. Importantly however, these suggested alterations do not put the 
overall validity of this research into question. 
7.2.2 The construction of the regulatory intensity in light of the results 
In order to operationalise the regulatory environment, this study used the latent variable of 
the regulatory intensity. The analytical tool developed to evaluate the regulatory intensity 
based on ten different factors has proved appropriate. Indeed, the construction of the 
regulatory intensity has appeared robust, and to have held up to the empirical examination. 
It has allowed for capturing more facets of a regulatory system than simply the degree of 
competition, and it has successfully illustrated the various degrees of the regulatory 
systems organisations are faced with. No modifications to the regulatory intensity variable 
have therefore revealed themselves. What it has revealed is the necessity of being cautious 
in the use and conservative as to the conclusion deriving from it.  
7.2.3 The research methodology in light of the results 
The respect of different quality standards is crucial to guarantee credible empirical research 
(Creswell 2009; Lamnek 2005; Rubin 2011). A consideration will therefore first be made of 
the main quality standards—namely validity, reliability and generalisability—before the 
discussion will turn to triangulation.  
Validity refers to the relationship between conclusions and reality, and it has to be assessed 
in connection with the purpose and circumstances of the research. Indeed, validity threats 
are neutralised through evidence, rather than through methods (Creswell 2009; Lamnek 
2005; Rubin 2011). Maxwell (2005) has argued that validity is a goal rather than a product 
and by validity he has referred to the correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, 
explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account. Rich data, meaning data that provide a 
complete representation of a situation, can reduce validity threats. Additionally, a researcher 
should look for discrepant evidence, i.e. negative cases, and evaluate them as well. In order 
to guarantee the validity of this study, different sources of data have been integrated and 
each step of the data collection, data analysis and data interpretation stage has been 
reported. Further, the research has been tested through a control variable, i.e. the question 
of whether it is in fact the type of ownership that is decisive for the definition of performance 
was raised, thus exploring an alternative explanation that is frequently found in literature. 
The author has also presented the research at several international conferences105 in order 
to confront it to the international academic community and to gain new insights. Moreover, 
the interview questions and the content of the research have been intensively discussed 
with different executives and regulators.  
In regard to generalisability, this research does not claim external generalisability, as this 
would call for further examination of the model in many regulated sectors, and in a higher 
                                                
105 Such as at the conference on Socio-legal Perspectives on the ’Glocalised’ Gambling Industry, 30 
June to 1 July 2011, Onati or the conference of the International Research Society for Public 
Management, IRSPM, 11 to 13 April 2011, Dublin. 
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number of countries.106 Instead, this study has sought and reached internal generalisability, 
as it has aimed to analyse whether, in a particular setting, the regulatory intensity can be 
associated with the concept of organisational performance dimensions.  
It is a challenge to reach reliability in qualitative research, and scholars generally agree that 
such research therefore needs to be inter subjectively replicable (Maxwell 2005; Yin 2009). If 
this is not the case, an evaluation by third parties would be impossible (Yin 2009). To test its 
reliability, a number of assessment criteria identified in literature have been followed in this 
research (Maxwell 2005; Rubin 2011; Yin 2009). First, qualitative research arguably needs to 
be documented in a holistic form and explained throughout the process (Creswell 2009; 
Rubin 2011). With the explanation of the theoretical conceptual knowledge, the description 
of the research approach and the detailed description of the integral research process, this 
quality criterion has been addressed in this study. Second, the interpretation of data 
material should not be arbitrary but needs to be empirically based (Rubin 2011). The 
researcher has the duty to look for contrary explanations in order to prevent false 
conclusions (Creswell 2009). In this study, the empirical part of the research has been 
guided by the construction of a tool to examine the performance concept. Further citations 
of statements have completed the analytical results found by the researcher, by way of 
proving the results and preventing arbitrary interpretation. Third, even though adaptations 
and modifications in the research process are allowed in qualitative research, the overall 
approach should be systemic and coherent (Rubin 2011; Yin 2009). This criterion has been 
met through the research design and the step-by-step documentation of the content 
analysis. Fourth, the researcher has to have a certain distance to the research object 
(Lamnek 2005; Maxwell 2005; Rubin 2011; Yin 2009). The interview participants were in this 
case interviewed in their usual environment and the researcher acted as an objective 
observer on the scene, keeping her distance to the research object.  
                                                
106 Internal generalisability seeks to generalise a conclusion within the setting or group studied, while 
external generalisability seeks to generalise beyond that setting or group. Internal generalisability is 
clearly a key issue for qualitative case studies, in contrast to external generalisability. This does not 
mean that qualitative studies are never generalisable beyond the setting or informants studied 
(Maxwell 2005). 
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The study was exploratory, in the sense that it did not aim to examine a previously existing 
model. Therefore, based on a comparative document and interview approach, evidence 
through which the model could be explored and the research question answered was 
collected. To ensure the validity of the data, the study was triangulated, i.e. different 
approaches were combined for a specific research interest, by including different data 
sources in the research process. Thus, three sources were used for document analysis, 
including documents from the organisations in question (e.g. annual reports and interviews 
and survey data), the regulator (e.g. legal sources and regulatory reports if available and 
pertinent) and society at large (e.g. newspapers about the performance concept, where 
available). This triangulation of data was done to make the analysis more robust. 
Furthermore, the selection of cases was based on a personal evaluation, in parallel with an 
expert panel evaluation. The case selection also focused on the type of ownership (e.g. 
private and public organisations), the geographic location (i.e. only European countries) as 
well as the longevity of the organisations (i.e. over ten years).  
Although the study mainly makes use of qualitative research methods it does not exclude 
the integration of quantitative or a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods to generate 
data (Yin 2009). Instead, the research has integrated quantitative data in the qualitative 
research design. An exclusively quantitative approach was judged too restrictive in this 
case, and pragmatic concerns rendered a large-scale survey difficult. The lack of feasibility 
of a large-scale quantitative survey was due to the particularities of the unit of analysis. The 
sport betting and lottery sectors do not have a large number of cases in different regulatory 
intensities. The risk was therefore high that too little data would be gathered in order to 
measure the model, something that would have rendered an exclusive quantitative 
methodology more difficult and also less appropriate.  
Consequently, the research problem called for an altered methodology, which focuses 
particularly on correctly understanding the situation and gathering valid information. The 
research design of this study was therefore more qualitative, though it still included some 
quantitative data. Through selected interviews in a small number of countries, more specific 
information has been gathered, something that has helped answering the research question 
and to strengthen the developed model. The interview-based approach has included a 
quantitative aspect and this for two reasons. First, as it was deemed difficult to ensure ‘true’ 
responses in the interviews, as they would be likely to have a bias towards political 
correctness, some quantitative questions were asked during the interviews in order to 
validate some of the qualitative data. Second, through the use of a small survey, an attempt 
was made at gathering more answers, which would also have provided additional opinions 
on the matter. Both approaches looked at the same issue but from different perspectives. 
The aim was to then compare the responses in order to see whether the direction of the 
qualitative and quantitative data was the same, thus allowing for a validation of the data and 
the analysis. Nonetheless, it was judged in the end that the qualitative avenue would 
consolidate the model and allow for deeper insights than would have been the case with a 
quantitative online survey. 
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The results presented in chapter six raise an important question in regard to the quantitative 
data generated in this study. As mentioned above, quantitative questions were developed in 
order to complete the interviews and evaluate the presence and importance of each 
performance dimension for the definition of performance. Two major implications can be 
deduced. First, as discussed in the analysis, a few contradictions in the responses between 
the quantitative questions could be detected. This can be indicative of the fact that looking 
at performance as constructed based on six dimensions is a very abstract and theoretical 
exercise, which challenges participants to answer with regard to hypothetical situations. It 
has to be noted that the inconsistencies found did not pertain to the level of the influence of 
regulation on the dimensions, but on the attributed importance for individual dimensions in 
different settings. A solution for another examination based on the same kind of questions 
would be to remind the participants of the score attributed in the previous question. This 
would reduce the level of abstraction and reassure participants. During the interviews, when 
assistance was provided in responding to the questions, the issue of what was answered in 
the previous question was often raised, indicating that the questions were arguably too 
abstract for the respondents.  
The second implication drawn from the quantitative part of the empiric study is the low level 
of respondents in the survey. Interview participants of sport betting and lottery 
organisations were asked to diffuse the survey among their employees. Unfortunately only 
few additional surveys were collected. This low response rate could be linked to the first 
implication and it would thus underline the complexity of the object of analysis. Another 
possible explanation—and this is the author’s own interpretation—could be found in the fact 
that the interviewees’ were the top-level respondents of each organisation, and as they have 
the role of focusing on the strategic nature of the subject, they were possibly the only 
people able to respond to the questions. Further it could be argued that to define the 
success of organisations is such a delicate a topic that some people did not want to 
respond to the questions, although it was clearly stated that they did not target the level of 
performance but rather its orientation. 
Despite these two drawbacks, the quantitative questions were nonetheless very useful for 
the interviews. In view of the length of the interviews—an hour on average—the quantitative 
questions (and especially the ones which were designed as a card game) added a playful 
component to the otherwise technical interviews, and provided a very pleasant ambiance, 
something which was generally highlighted by the respondents. For a future examination of 
the model, it should be noted that the quantitative questions certainly have their validity, but 
in the case where no assistance is provided in answering them, some modifications in 
regard to the explanations would have to be made.  
7.2.4 The significance of the results for the overall validity of the research model  
Having discussed the results in relation to the different components of the research model 
and methodology, this section discusses the use of the developed model, as adapted 
following on the above discussions. The results of the study validate the research model 
and a replication of it can be strongly recommended for the same or other regulated 
sectors. Indeed, the analytical model developed in this study can be used as a tool to 
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examine other regulatory contexts than the sport betting and lottery sectors. As discussed 
in chapter three, regulation is an important instrument of governments for achieving and 
implementing public policies. Being related to economic, social, health or other issues, 
regulation is often used by governments to reach a desired outcome. The model outlines 
how a regulatory environment can be analysed based on clear indicators capturing the 
integral regulatory spectrum that may exist. The model was explicitly developed in order to 
be adaptable to other regulated sectors. As concerns the independent variable, most of the 
criteria have been generally formulated. Only the last section has been oriented towards 
addressing negative externalities. Of course these elements would vary from one sector to 
another. In regard to the dependent variable—and bearing in mind the above mentioned 
proposal to reduce the number of dimensions—they can be used, as they are, in a further 
investigation of the research model in another context. In order to use the bottom-up 
approach identifying indicators pointing to the different dimensions, these indicators can be 
based on the list identified in this study but can also be further enlarged based on the 
specific research context. One possible idea for future consideration, among others, could 
be hospital regulation. Hospitals are increasingly faced with non-medical regulations or 
health service regulations in order to ensure that standards of care are met. Calls for more 
transparency and cost reduction in hospitals go hand in hand with the need to guarantee 
quality in treatment. Hence, hospitals have to balance different objectives due to regulation, 
and it would be interesting to investigate whether this influences their definitions of 
performance. 
Having thus linked the results of the study to the theoretically constructed model and 
illustrated some alterations that could be undertaken in regard to the model and the 
research methodology, and how it can provide a fruitful analytical research model for other 
contexts, the following section will discuss the results in light first of the performance 
debate (section 7.3.1), second of the regulation debate (section 7.3.2) and third of the 
gambling debate (section 7.3.3). 
7.3 WHAT OF THE PERFORMANCE, REGULATION AND GAMBLING DEBATES IN LIGHT OF THE 
RESULTS? 
The results provided in chapter six contribute to different theoretical and practical streams, 
as will be presented in the following sections. 
7.3.1 The performance debate in light of the results 
In line with the performance literature dealing with the multidimensional character of 
performance, the accounts presented in this study have generally confirmed the existence 
of non-financial dimensions of performance. This has been seen not only from a purely 
public stance, but it has also been showed that private organisations under regulation make 
use of similar multidimensional performance definitions. The results of the study thereby 
clearly provide an example of sector specific research attesting the multidimensionality of 
the performance definitions. The results suggest that the tool constructed to include 
different performance dimensions can be successfully used to analyse the substance of 
performance. Further the study provides an in-depth demonstration of how to better seize 
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the concept and nature of performance and thereby more adequately target it in the 
management effort. Finally, this study has bridged public and private performance literature 
in order to highlight a performance definition that is not simply ownership dependent. In 
literature, the public-private differences prevail, and though these differences certainly have 
validity in the context of these studies, this is not so clearly the case in a specific context 
such as regulation. Here the public-private dichotomy becomes blurred as the performance 
definition is constructed around the regulatory intensity.  
This goes hand in hand with the discussion on ‘publicness’, which argues that all 
organisations are ‘public’ to a certain degree. As successfully illustrated in this study, this 
suggests that as private organisations face a high regulatory intensity, they also apply a 
multidimensional performance definition, similar to that of public organisations. Of course, 
the public-private dichotomy is not completely abandoned, since the management of 
private and public organisations differs, but it is argued that among the cases studied, the 
regulatory intensity has a stronger influence on the performance definition than the type of 
ownership. Another implication could be outlined in regard to the evolution of the concept of 
performance. Especially with consideration of the dimensions referring to public values, the 
performance concept has arguably changed since the beginning of the NPM movement. 
Thus, it could be argued that a fourth wave of performance movements, influenced by 
democratic governance and networks (see section 2.2.1), can be identified in the public 
sector. This has the implication of public administrative practices moving away from a 
hierarchical structure, and towards a more horizontal dispersion, including non-state actors 
in the delivery of public services. Consequently, the results of this study clearly enrich the 
performance theory and empirical performance research based on its holistic approach, and 
its move away from the public-private dichotomy. It moves towards a perspective that 
focuses more particularly on the organisation as such, and analyses its particular 
relationship with its regulatory environment.  
7.3.2 The regulation debate in light of the results  
Previous research has limited the understanding of regulatory intensity to only a handful of 
factors. This study has developed a multifactor model composed of ten criteria, which 
capture the regulatory intensity of a regulated sector. It is believed that with this approach 
the complexity of regulation can be embraced in its full form. The empirical part of the study 
confirmed this construction of regulatory intensity, at least within the range of the selected 
cases. The multifactor model therefore appears as a promising tool to evaluate the 
regulatory intensity. It opens up the academic debate, which has so far remained 
constrained to comparing simple market access barriers and monopolies with situations of 
competitive markets. With the enlargement of the regulatory stringency on the 
organisational level, a novel approach has been developed, which allows for the inclusion of 
the regulated entities and the obligations imposed upon them.  
The results further open up the discussion, allowing for a reflection with regard to the 
prevailing dogma in the literature that regulation decreases the financial performance of 
organisations and that deregulation would hence be financially beneficial (Nicoletti & Pryor 
2006; OECD 1993b, 1994, 1997b). This is not contested here, but with regard to the how the 
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regulatory intensity influences the performance definition, this study suggests that regulation 
may increase the focus on other aspects of performance, such as social performance or 
legal performance. This may not be all that disadvantageous for the economy and for the 
society. Is it not the aim of governmental regulation to turn the focus of organisations on 
more societal issues, rather than simply on financial aspects? This is not to suggest that 
regulators should unbalance or otherwise modify the performance orientations. 
Furthermore, this study also suggests that regulation introduces the dynamic of goal 
ambiguity that has already been observed in regard to the public sector, to be also 
applicable to the private sector. Indeed, with regulation, private organisations are also 
confronted with balancing potentially conflicting goals and developing a strategy that suits 
all stake and shareholders.  
Frequently, organisations benefiting from regulation are confronted with calls for 
deregulation from organisations desiring to operate in the sector or have to defend their 
special status. Consequently the organisational legitimacy is an important postulate for 
regulated organisations.107 All organisations require some level of legitimacy but the 
pressure for legitimacy is accentuated for organisations facing sector-specific regulation 
because these organisations are under increased scrutiny (Ruef & Scott 1998). Generally 
speaking, organisational legitimacy results from the congruence between the social values 
associated with or implied by organisations’ activities, and the norms of acceptable 
behaviour in the larger social system in which they are embedded (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975). 
In other words, it is the perception that an organisation’s actions are desirable and aligned 
with a socially constructed system of norms and values that gives them legitimacy 
(Suchman 1995).  
Various observers have assessed organisational legitimacy and stakeholders to represent 
different internal and external constituencies (Ruef & Scott 1998). For regulated 
organisations, this implies that legitimacy has to be provided from regulators and society at 
large in order to justify the protection granted. In that sense, for public and private 
organisations, a multidimensional performance definition relying on financial and non-
financial aspects of performance and in equal parts can further enhance the legitimacy of 
this organisation, and be used to defend the regulation in place against pressures for 
liberalisation or more generally for any change in the regulation’s framework. This study 
consequently provides a contribution for regulation theory, acknowledging that the financial 
performance is not the ultimate outcome but that regulation broadens the notion of 
performance towards more socially desirable outcomes, something that is certainly 
important for organisations operating games of chance as illustrated in the following 
section. 
7.3.3 The gambling debate in light of the results 
Global gambling revenue is constantly increasing and the European Commission estimates 
the annual revenues of the overall EU gambling market at 84.9 billion Euros in 2011 with an 
annual growth rate of around 3% (European Commission 2013). One of the most rapid 
                                                
107 See Suchman (1995) or Ruef (1998) for an overview of organisational legitimacy. 
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growing sectors in this regard is online gambling. In consequence, gambling generates 
important incomes in the interest of all implicated parties: the public authorities, private and 
public operators, tourist regions, beneficiaries etc.  
Governments have an interest in receiving at least a share of the revenues created out of 
games of chance, not least in view of the necessity to fight gambling related problems. 
Indeed, states are faced with the ever-lasting paradox of regulating games of chance and 
benefiting in terms of revenues, but at the same time creating deviances, such as gambling 
problems or fraud, which need to be tackled. It is also worth highlighting that social and 
political circumstances and technological advances continuously alter the landscape of 
games of chance. The following sections present how the findings of this study can 
enlighten the reflections on the issue of games of chance in addressing four different types 
of challenges, namely gambling problems, cross-border gaming, criminality, and the 
challenges of emerging transnational, European regulation.  
First, gambling problems are one of the main reasons behind the establishment of a 
regulatory environment. Regulation has to address the challenge of how to find the 
equilibrium between an appropriate offer of games of chance and the socially negative 
consequences that result from this activity. Problem gambling is increasingly seen as a 
central issue for games of chance and their regulation, and thus at the heart of the gaming 
debate. 
As illustrated in chapter five, several regulations of the sport betting and lottery sectors 
impose obligations on operators in regard to gambling problems. Generally speaking, 
measures can intervene before the players play games of chance, during the period of play 
and/or after the game has been played. What strategies are taken is up to the regulatory 
system in place. Technological advances challenge prevention and treatment of gambling 
problems by rendering the games of chance faster, more accessible and less controllable. 
Moreover, especially the internet and the consequent presence of an illegal gaming offer on 
the internet further accentuate the risk of gambling addiction. Online gambling on non-
authorised sites is out of the control of public authorities and the measures to internalise 
and prevent gambling problems such as limits of wagers or restriction of opening hours are 
difficult to enforce. Moreover, the revenues of illegal operators are not taxed and no money 
is raised to prevent and treat gambling addiction. Therefore, the negative consequences 
resulting out of games of chance are left to the country of residence of the player.  
The results of this study illustrate that organisations are indeed active in regard to 
responding to these negative externalities of games of chance, and that social aspects are 
at the heart of gaming operations. It has been shown in this study that organisations adopt 
performance strategies balancing financial and social dimensions. This can be an indication 
of the fact that they are not necessarily making a choice between financial and non-financial 
performance, but that they in fact balance different performance dimensions and this in 
response to regulation. It can be said that it is not the question of an opposition of financial 
and social aspects but a weighing of the position of social aspects, depending upon the 
regulation in place, in the overall performance definition of organisations. This is interesting 
insofar as the debate has so far tended to be marked by a public versus private focus, and 
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the argument that public organisations are more socially active (and some would even say 
responsible). Arguably, this study provides insight to this debate, highlighting that it is more 
the intensity of regulation and not the type of ownership that plays a role in this regard. The 
role of the state then becomes that much more crucial. 
Second, advances in information technology have profoundly altered the functioning of 
gambling, not only by accentuating the problem of gambling addiction but also by 
contributing to a globalisation of games of chance. The legal and illegal offer has increased, 
and the internet in particular has contributed to the development of an unauthorised cross-
border market (European Commission 2011). Gamblers can play online on websites from 
operators based all over the world, making state borders almost obsolete. Given the current 
regulatory regimes, internet-based offers can be classified in three different categories. 
First, fully authorised organisations that provide the games of a country, something that can 
be found in most countries as traditional retail operators are given the option of offering their 
games on the internet (e.g. Norsk Tipping, Camelot) or of establishing a regulation for online 
gambling (e.g. France). Second, organisations licensed in a specific country also offer their 
games of chance in third countries, a category that is often labelled as a ‘grey market’ in the 
EU (European Commission 2011). The third category refers to unauthorised operators 
offering games of chance internationally.  
The last two categories represent complex challenges for national regulators and operators 
because such operators have no national legal standing in countries where they are not 
licensed, something that affects the national gambling sectors. The legal organisations are 
faced with an increased competition, one that is often more profitable for both organisers 
and players as they do not comply with regulatory rules and taxation (Anderson et al. 2012). 
In some countries, measures are taken that either ban or limit the possibilities of gambling 
on the internet sites of unauthorised operators. For example, ISP blocking (e.g. Germany, 
Sweden), which entails blocking access to gambling web sites, or the blocking of financial 
transaction (e.g. USA), which forbids financial operators from advancing bets and eventual 
winnings. Similarly, as seen in chapter five, there can also be advertising restrictions (e.g. 
most EU countries), which reduce the visibility of gambling operators, or fines (e.g. the 
Netherlands). An important question is how national regulations can face the emerging 
transnational tensions arising from globalised gambling sectors. New technologies require 
changed and/or new laws and hence an adaption of the regulatory regimes.  
Arguably, in defining solutions, it is important not to neglect the wide range of parameters a 
regulation can be built upon. The results of this study are an indication of the complex 
nature of the regulations of games of chance in Europe, and the degree to which they differ 
among countries. The national approaches in the sport betting and lottery regulations are 
very different in their intensities, something that raises the question of whether an 
international solution, such as increased collaboration in regard to cross-border gambling, 
could even be possible. Indeed, raising the debate on regulation to the international level 
arguably accentuates the complexity of an already complex issue. Seeing as these various 
challenges are to a large extent cross-national in their nature, they would arguably be most 
adequately addressed through an international collaboration. Nonetheless, in view of the 
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numerous parameters that would have to be taken into account, many of which are closely 
connected to national logics, the setting up of such an international solution would 
undoubtedly be exceedingly complex. Whatever the solution that will be devised, building or 
adapting a regulatory framework needs to reflect on the parameters founding a regulatory 
system. Any regulatory framework should be flexible enough to face not only current but 
also new developments.  
Third, it is not only the cross-border aspect that creates tension with regard to gambling 
regulation, but such tension is also triggered by illegal gambling and other crimes more 
generally. Even though these problems are not new, they are accentuated with the 
advances in technologies, as they facilitate illegal activities and render the enforcement of 
regulation difficult. The issue of money laundering is a reason for gambling regulation in 
close to all jurisdictions. Especially with the development of the internet, the problem has 
taken a new form. Another important topic is match fixing, an old issue that is becoming 
increasingly international and frequent. The huge benefits that can be generated by sport 
betting are a motivation for some to manipulate sport events in order to win a bet. Match 
fixing is not a new phenomenon and scandals of manipulation of sport competitions reach 
far back. The manipulation of a competition or an event endangers the integrity of sport and 
of sport betting, as both activities need to have a reliable reputation in order to be attractive 
for customers. #Sport betting is an economy of trust and match fixing clearly threatens this 
economic sector. 
All of these challenges point to one fundamental question, namely of how nationally 
developed regulations can be altered or adapted in order to counteract international 
deviances? How can widely diverging national regulatory regimes face such threats? Further 
how can an organisation provide an attractive offer of games of chance to players, in order 
to prevent that they turn to illegal offers? First, the existence of an illegal offer next to the 
authorised operators implicates a loss in terms of revenues for the state and the society, as 
illegal operators are not taxed, nor are profits collected and redistributed. Furthermore, it is 
very difficult for the authorised operators to compete with these illegal operators, because 
by not complying with regulation they have a competitive advantage in exploiting the 
market, for example in regard to more attractive pay-out rates to players. 
The results of this study indicate the fact that organisations have incentives on the business 
level to develop strategies to cope with these deviances. The presence of performance 
dimensions such as the stakeholder management or the social issue participation 
dimensions indicate the importance of the reputation, image and the brand to organisations. 
The interests of different stakeholders need to be addressed and the study highlights the 
importance of consumers, regulators and the society to the organisations studied. Further 
games of chance are based on trust, and being involved or not active in regard to fraudulent 
activities can highly damage an organisations reputation and have severe consequences in 
regard to its financial performance, and even its long-term survival. One approach observed 
in the gambling sectors is the standardisation processes in order to protect the quality and 
integrity of the gambling business. Examples are the certification of organisations by the 
world lottery association (WLA). This implies that organisations are aware of the negative 
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consequences games of chance may have and result in a balancing of financial and non-
financial performance dimensions in order to measure the success of the organisations.  
Finally, another contribution of the results of this study can be identified in regard to the 
discussion on the European level about the diversity of national gambling regulations and 
the common market approach. In the EU, in the absence of a common regulation of games 
of chance, national states have individually adopted their regulations. As seen in the 
analysis, several monopolies exist in the EU. Arguments have been made to limit these 
monopolies or even abandon them, in favour of a liberalised and hence competitive system. 
Several judgments of European Court of Justice (ECJ) have underlined this opposition of 
views on existing monopolies in the gambling sectors (Villeneuve & Diaconu 2011).108 The 
disputes are based on article 49—freedom of establishment—and article 56—freedom to 
provide cross border services—of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. The case law109 
on the matter has established certain conditions110 under which nation states are allowed to 
attribute an exclusive right to a specific body to operate games of chance. In doing so the 
ECJ has attested the legality of monopolies in the gambling sectors at the European level. 
The main argument allowing for executive licences is social protection, and an emphasis on 
notions such as public order, consumer protection and social order, rather than on financial 
revenues generated for the public. It is insufficient to claim that operators are following such 
protective objectives, but they need to be proven (European Court of Justice 2009).  
This study has demonstrated the diversity of the models in Europe to regulate games of 
chance and has thus provided a useful tool to analyse such regulation. By integrating other 
vectors, it has been proven possible to move away from the public monopoly versus private 
competitive system opposition, which takes up much space in the debate in regard to 
games of chance. The study contributes with a multifactor construction of the regulatory 
intensity highlighting the need to focus also on other aspects of regulation that are 
important and that might nourish and substantiate the debate on gambling regulation.  
To sum up, in rethinking the regulatory regimes, it is important to address the above 
outlined challenges. In spite of the fact that governments often establish regulatory 
frameworks for games of chance for the same reasons, the regulatory environments in 
different regions or countries can take very different forms and are of different regulatory 
intensities, as this study illustrates. The identification of clear criteria can assist in this 
process as it allows for the evaluation of the regulatory intensity. This research provides a 
new approach to describing the regulatory systems of games of chance, something that 
facilitates the task of analysing, discussing and comparing regulation across sectors, 
regions and countries.  
                                                
108 For an overview of this case law see e.g. (Littler 2011b; Littler et al. 2011). 
109 See Schindler (1994), Läära (1999), Zenbatti (1999), Anomar (2003), Gambelli (2003), Lindeman 
(2003), Placanica (2007), Santa Casa (2009), Engelman (2010) or Zeturf (2011) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/gambling/infringements/index_en.htm.  
110 European Court of Justice. (2009). Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional (CA/LPFP) and Bwin 
International Limited v Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa. Judgment 
of the Court of Justice in Case C-42/07.  
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Furthermore, this study has illustrated that organisations that have to be more and more 
accountable may focus increasingly on social dimensions of performance. Nonetheless, too 
strong a focus on social aspects may be perceived as an indication of an overwhelming 
presence of the negative aspects of games of chance. This could lead to an even stronger 
regulation, and thereby be counter-productive, as it would take the focus away from the 
economic aspects of the activity. Under high regulation it is important, as was highlighted in 
the interviews, to clearly balance the regulatory and the economic interests. This is not a call 
for stronger regulation, because a very high regulatory intensity results in an unbalanced 
performance definition leaving no room for the financial dimension, rendering the activity of 
games of chance—which is an economic activity of redistribution and entertainment—
unprofitable and resulting in the eventual non-survival of such organisations. Organisations 
of games of chance have to be profitable in order to ensure an attractive offer. Some people 
argue that a prohibition of games of chance results in an increase of clandestine activities 
(Folker 2011). Another question to be raised is the question of to which point it is for the 
organisations operating games of chance to engage in the reduction of the social problems. 
Similarly, should it be up both operators and the public to fight against such negative 
effects, or is it at the political level that such tasks should be tackled? Obviously there is not 
one solution to these questions but different models exist, all having their inconveniences 
and advantages.  
For instance, deciding that it is only up to the public hand to take care of negative 
externalities, and hence allowing for a very lowly regulated competitive system, would 
induce a very hierarchical performance definition of operators concentrating on financial 
performance, not only because they do not want to engage in social activities but also 
because they need all their resources to compete in the market. On the other hand, to 
impose full accountability on the organisation for all their negative externalities could result 
in them being unprofitable. This may induce a very unbalanced performance strategy that 
may endanger its very survival. It seems that there is a need to balance different 
performance concepts, including both financial and non-financial aspects, something the 
regulatory environment can influence. Whatever solution is adopted in a sector, it has to be 
clearly reflected on, and this study helps to identify not only the different components of the 
regulatory environment but also the influences of regulation on organisations in the way they 
are defining their performances.  
Having thus contextualised the results of the research, the next chapter will conclude this 
dissertation with some reflections on the challenges and limitations faced by the thesis 
project, and also some recommendations and directions for future research.  
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8 CONCLUSION 
This study has successfully examined the influence of the regulatory environment on the 
definition of performance by using specifically constructed tools to make a sector specific 
analysis of the definitions of performance and regulatory intensity respectively. Instead of 
following the classical public versus private performance conceptualisation, it has taken a 
holistic perspective, looking both at private and public organisations in order to examine 
whether the impact of the regulatory environment outweighs that of the type of ownership. 
Indeed, it has been proven that for the cases under study, though the effect of the type of 
ownership is not completely absent, it is clearly abated by the regulatory setting. This 
chapter will first present the challenges and limitations that the thesis project has been 
confronted with (section 8.1). In a second section, some theoretical and practical 
recommendations will be made, both for the organisations facing a regulatory environment 
and for regulators and lawmakers who establish and implement specific regulations (section 
8.2). In a third section, directions for future research will be identified and discussed (section 
8.3). The chapter—and the dissertation—closes with some final thoughts about the research 
project (section 8.4).  
8.1 THESIS PROJECT CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
This project has evolved over a period of over four years, from the germ of an idea to a 
completed thesis. I still have far to go as a scholar but have learned a great deal as I have 
worked on this project, and this particularly in view of the various challenges that I 
encountered. These challenges will now be discussed, though not necessarily in order of 
importance or difficulty. 
Small sample size—Given the fact that I only examined six cases, the research does not 
claim external generalisability. However, the work I carried out, especially the conceptual 
model created, could serve as a basis for developing a broader survey for a larger number 
of organisations. 
Other factors influencing the performance definition in organisations—Of course the 
regulatory intensity is not the only variable that may influence the performance definition in 
organisations. Other factors, such as the type of leadership in the organisation, the personal 
attributes of the CEO or the cultural tradition of a country, are all susceptible to also have an 
influence on the same dependent variable. But the boundaries of a research project have to 
be limited, and the variable of interest for me is the regulatory environment. Regulation has 
for a long time been used in public management and will continue to be so, as can be seen 
by recent discussions on banking and financial regulation. Hence it is crucial to know how a 
regulation influences the performance focus of regulated entities.  
Order in which I conducted the research—If I could start this project over again, I would 
do the background reading on a case, develop the interview questions, conduct the 
interviews, transcribe and at then lastly code the material (if not write up the case) before 
moving on to the next case. By carrying out the interviews for all six cases within four 
months, I rushed the process and I did not leave myself much time for reflection in between 
the cases. Consequently, I did not draw from ideas and questions from one case to the 
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next, which I think would have helped me zero in on the key issues and obtain richer 
information from subsequent interviews. On the other hand, this standardised and systemic 
approach allows to treat all cases with the same distance and prevents privileging one case 
over another. The rush in regard to the data collection stage was also due to another 
challenge I faced, which is outlined in the next point.  
Discrepancy between research in theory and research in practice—Originally, a larger 
empirical study was to be conducted in the sport betting sectors of four countries facing 
high regulatory intensity and four countries facing low regulatory intensity. Despite previous 
reassurance of participation in the respective organisations, it became clear at the time of 
the data collection that it would not be possible to gain access to interview partners in the 
English and Irish sport betting organisations. This was also the case in other jurisdictions; 
organisations were not willing to participate in the interviews, despite previous agreement. 
Hence, on short notice, the research methodology had to be adapted to focus on sport 
betting and lottery sectors in six different cases representing two categories of regulatory 
intensities. Moreover, the focus was enlarged to include not only experts from within 
organisations, but also external gambling experts. Even though this adapted research 
methodology in the end proved valid and appropriate for examining the model and 
answering the research questions, the necessary change meant that precious time was lost. 
On the positive side, triangulating the data sources by including the external experts turned 
out to be very a fruitful exercise which enhanced the robustness of the data and hence of 
the research. 
Small number of survey responses—Another challenge faced during the research was the 
small response rate in the survey conducted in parallel with the interviews. However, the 
difficulty in encouraging participation had been foreseen from the beginning. The idea was 
that after having conducted the interviews in the organisations, the organisations would 
disseminate the survey among the top-level management. Even though this was done in 
some cases, others were unwilling to disseminate the survey. The real reason behind this 
can only be guessed, but organisations arguably want to control that which employees tell 
the public even if for a PhD thesis. This low response rate is not an impediment to the 
research in so far as it was anticipated from the beginning. It was therefore intended more 
as an experiment than as an actual part of the data collection stage. Moreover, the 
interviews allowed for capturing the opinions of the highest level of management in the 
organisations, and this is clearly the perspective that counts the most in terms of their 
strategic orientation. 
Perception versus reality—A final remark should be made in regard to the collected 
primary data. Even tough I speak in the study about the performance definition as applied 
by the organisations, the sources of the data are made or transmitted by human beings and 
hence rely on the perception and interpretation of something by someone. Nonetheless, as 
the interview participants are high executives in the organisations or experts in the field of 
gambling who know the gambling sector and the organisations from insight out, it can be 
argued that this is a valid approach through which to get to the core of a research object—
or relying metaphorically to the words of Goethe (1808: 13): “Daß ich erkenne, was die Welt ! 
im Innersten zusammenhält”. 
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8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following elements are recommendations based both on the process and the results of 
this study. This last section is devoted to insights that may be useful, both in terms of theory 
and practice.  
8.2.1 For theory 
I would start by recommending that research and literature on public performance clarify the 
way in which terminology is used, so that future research could use this terminology 
coherently. Such a global consensus may seem idealistic and naive and hence I would 
suggest that at least within one and the same study, terms are used in a coherent manner. 
The numerous terms such as concepts, dimensions, components, sub-concepts and 
themes that are used to refer to performance, make any literature review difficult and 
obliges new researchers to reinvent the wheel over and over again.  
Second, even though the public and private performance discourse naturally has its own 
validity, I would suggest that researchers try to look beyond their own spheres, as there may 
be interesting concepts to be borrowed and/or combined from other fields. This is what this 
study has attempted to do by considering the influence of the regulatory context in 
performance management, in addition to the standard public-private dichotomy.  
Finally, I would suggest that the regulation literature in particular broadens its focus on the 
effects of regulation. Instead of looking only towards the negative influence regulation may 
have on financial performance, it would be useful to also consider the integration of other 
performance dimensions, and the positive influence regulation may have. Of course, it is not 
argued that the negative influence on financial performance is false but it may not be the 
objective of the regulation to increase financial performance but rather to multiply the 
performance focus to other non-financial performance dimensions.  
8.2.2 For practice 
Generally speaking, for organisations facing a sector specific regulatory environment, I 
would suggest that they underline the regulatory influence on the performance definition 
more strongly, and to consider their legal performances as actually being a part of 
organisational performance. This could be beneficial for the legitimacy of the organisation, 
both with regard to their relationship with the regulator and with regard to society at large. 
This point illustrates the important influence of political decisions on the strategic 
management of public and private organisations in general and performance management 
in particular. A clearer stance of an organisation’s engagement to fulfil regulatory objectives 
is indeed likely to enhance the position of the organisations, strengthening its organisational 
legitimacy and giving it more weight in its relationship with the regulator and other 
stakeholders. 
For gambling organisations more particularly, I would suggest that they make a clearer 
division between the mandatory and voluntary activities they undertake. This would give 
them more credibility and strengthen their position in society. Especially in cases where 
activities are undertaken in addition to mandatory measures, measuring their success is 
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likely to positively influence the image of the organisation. This is even more the case in a 
sector such as gambling, which is sometimes still seen in a bad light in view of the 
deviances it generates. Here it would therefore clearly be beneficial to emphasise any 
indirect contribution to society, for example redistributions, or contributions to the state 
budget.  
Moreover, as the debate on monopoly-versus-deregulation (but not full liberalisation) is the 
focus of most of the attention in the gambling sector, it is important to remember that it is 
too simplistic to put the public organisations in the monopoly camp and the private 
organisations in the non-monopoly camp. The market structure is only one criterion of many 
contributing to the regulatory setting. Moreover, with a proper regulatory system in place, 
private organisations, even when facing competition, can also have a multidimensional 
performance focus. Indeed, as this study has showed, the influence of the regulatory 
intensity on the definition of performance outweighs that of the type of ownership. Hence, a 
move away from the monopoly-competition discussion is suggested, as it is too limited to 
correspond to reality. 
Finally, several of the organisations analysed in this study use international reporting 
standards such as those of the Global Reporting Initiative. The framework is a very good 
tool and I do not contest its validity, but in regard to the cases analysed and for 
organisations facing social regulation some of its categorisation are not relevant (e.g. human 
rights). In addition, in some cases, operational or stakeholder management dimensions 
being lumped together and therefore being hidden under the heading of social dimensions. 
In my view, this reduces the power and validity of such an instrument as it may look as if 
those organisations are ‘covering up’ operational aspects in the name of social 
performance. In my view, as the regulated entities analysed in this study are all facing some 
level of obligations in social regards, they do not have to do undertake such a ‘hide-and-
seek’ approach.  
For regulators and lawmakers I would suggest that they take a closer look at the 
organisations they regulated, not only when implementing the law but as well when 
developing the regulation. Regulatory impact assessment is a common tool among 
governments but this instrument focuses on the effects of regulation on society as a whole 
and not especially on the management of the organisations. This contribution has therefore 
wished to focus of the influence of the regulatory intensity on one specific management 
aspect, namely performance management. Hence, I would suggest that before developing a 
regulation it would not be harmful to reflect on what kind of organisational shape the 
government desires to generate through that regulation, and to include a multifactor 
approach when attesting the level of intensity of a gambling regulation. The private-public 
ownership question is only one possible way among several to address this issue. As 
attested in this study, others seem to be equally, if not more, important, for the performance 
definition (e.g. the public mission imposed on an organisation or the public use of profits).  
Lastly, it is important to note one more issue that came up during this research, and which 
may be useful for upcoming debates on gambling regulation. A licence system where 
renewal of the licence is done on a regular basis surely has its advantage in controlling the 
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sector, but it was outlined at several occasions in the data set that organisations use a lot of 
resources in preparing their applications for the licence tender procedure, resources that 
could be better used elsewhere. Indeed, some interviewees argued that the prospect of 
needing to apply for a new licence in order to be able to keep the right to operate influences 
the behaviour of the organisation. Consequently, for a certain period the organisation only 
concentrates on getting its licence, rather than on compliance or social contributions. I do 
not suggest a preference for life-long monopolies or very long-term licence agreements, but 
simply that this point needs to be addressed, as a licence tender is clearly an additional 
charge for the organisations. There are transaction costs to such a model. 
8.3 DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis leaves much to be explored and strategies for future research can mainly be 
formulated on two levels. First, in the aim of widening the study, the research model and 
questions could be analysed in regard to a larger number of organisations, in more 
countries. Moreover, as I examined only a few organisations operating lottery and/or sport 
betting games, other gambling sectors could be explored such as casino gambling or 
internet gambling (and of course other remote gambling). The way the research and 
research model have been constructed also allows for transposition to other regulatory 
environments than games of chance. An example of an interesting regulation for 
consideration would be that of hospitals, which are increasingly confronted with non-
medical regulations influencing their management. 
Second, with the aim of deepening the research, two strategies could be envisaged. On the 
one hand different approaches could be identified to observe the results under a different 
light. For example, a structural equation modelling could be undertaken by not only 
conducting a large-scale survey research of the dependent variable, but also for the 
independent variable. This would allow for an examination of the research question through 
a quantitative approach and for testing whether the qualitatively elaborated results of this 
study could be verified in a quantitative research. In addition, structural equation modelling 
would allow for the identification of the factors of regulatory intensity that may have a bigger 
impact on the dependent variable, and for the examination of whether the factors are 
correlated or not. As suggested in the qualitative research, the factor of the public use of 
profits and the public mission of the organisations are at several occasions mentioned to be 
of crucial importance for the definition of performance. Hence, it would be interesting to test 
this proposition. A second strategy for deepening the study would be to use the results and 
move them forward. For example, a next research could focus on the linkages between the 
different dimensions of the performance definition, or the effect of the degree of ‘publicness’ 
on the performance definition could be looked at in isolation. Further research could also 
concentrate on the public mission imposed by the regulation on the organisations that seem 
to play a crucial role for the definition of performance. 
Another topic, identified in this research and mentioned by several interviewees, is the 
importance of the quality of the regulation. Regulation can be positive when it enhances the 
potential of the organisations to execute their task, to effectively implement their goals and 
to channel the players’ gaming behaviour towards authorised games. An example of a 
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successful organisation mentioned independently by a majority of interview participants is 
Veikkaus, the Finnish sport betting and lottery operator. They have succeeded, after having 
received the authorisation of the government to operate online, to channel the gambling 
activities towards the licensed, regulated organisation. Veikkaus would be an interesting 
case study to analyse the different elements of the regulation and the performance focus of 
the organisation. 
Finally, another topic which could be interesting for future analysis is the alignment of the 
objectives of the shareholders of the organisation, both with each other and with the 
regulation in place. This could be looked at in-depth in the cases analysed in order to see 
whether a difference is observed between the low and high regulatory intensity cases. 
Leading questions could be the different objectives these actors have, and whether their 
strategic objectives are aligned or not. It seems to be important for the definition of success 
of the organisation that the regulator’s and the organisation’s sides are aligned. Similarly, 
the issue of regulatory capture can be interesting for future research. For instance, in the 
case of Camelot, the regulatory reports underline the financial success of the organisations 
and one interviewee spoke of a ‘symbiotic’ relationship between the regulator and Camelot, 
arguing that this was actually what justified the existence of the regulator (Interview 13). 
Though it could be difficult to obtain reliable data, it would be interesting to attempt an 
analysis of the alignment of the regulator with the regulatee, and examine whether the 
regulatee is successful in influencing the former. 
8.4 FINAL THOUGHTS 
This research was launched due to an identified lack in the performance literature on the 
nature of performance and the dimensions founding the performance construct. Despite a 
huge amount of research on performance, I felt unsatisfied with regard to the question of 
what it is actually composed of. More specifically, the complete lack of studies considering 
the influence of regulation on the definition of performance had come to my attention. 
Hence, I wanted to bridge performance and regulation research in order to see not only 
whether performance dimensions identified in literature would apply in a specific sector, but 
also whether the performance definition can be associated with the regulatory environment 
surrounding and influencing organisations. It has since many years been clear in most 
countries that the government is not the only actor delivering public policies. Rather, public 
policies are increasingly implemented through, or with the help of, private organisations or 
public organisations founded in private law. Regulation has become a prominent way of 
monitoring and controlling the way such private organisations achieve public policy 
objectives. A such regulation is a mode of governance that promises to stay. Despite this 
importance, the public performance literature and research has so far not considered the 
performance of private organisations operating in regulated environments. This is in my view 
a significant research gap that this contribution helps to address.  
Furthermore, in recent years the focuses on the social responsibilities of public and private 
organisations have come to be increasingly highlighted. The growing body of research on 
CSR and the implementation of frameworks such as the GRI illustrate this well. However, 
the crucial question in my view is whether organisations are in fact also measuring their 
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achievements in this regard. To implement such instruments and to define social 
responsibility objectives in the strategy is one thing, but to actually measure performance in 
these dimensions is another completely. In my view, only when organisations are actually 
measuring performance in such aspects, i.e. by including them in the evaluation of their 
success, can they be considered as truly integrated within the organisational goals. 
To focus on organisations in order to raise the question of the definition of performance, and 
to start from a regulated environment and not from the type of ownership, is in my opinion a 
promising way to gain new insights on performance management. This especially in view of 
the significant move away from traditional government structures and towards an 
involvement of private and public organisations. With this study I have aimed to add some 
insights on specific sector research—in my case the sport betting and lottery sectors—
thereby not only contributing to the performance and regulation debate but also to the field 
of gambling, an interesting, multi-disciplinary topic with a huge social and economic 
importance for nation states and civil society.  
The results of this study in the European context of sport betting and lottery organisations 
have attested to the influence of the regulatory environment on the composition of the 
performance definition. Consequently, and to respond to the central question posed in this 
work, it is indeed safe to affirm the influence of regulation on the definition of organisational 
performance, though it is not the only decisive element. Regulators and organisations 
should think about this relationship when reflecting on the (re-)regulation of the gambling 
sectors and when managing organisations in regulated environments: the definition of 
performance should not be gambled upon.  
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APPENDIX I: PARTICIPANT RESPONSES—LOWER RI—PRESENT RI—HIGHER RI 
Financial 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation HRI 
Question 15 
Interview 1 2 3 1 3 3 
Interview 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Interview 3 2 2 2 4 4 
Interview 4 1 1 1 1 1 
Interview 5 2 1 1 1 1 
Interview 6 2 2 1 1 1 
Interview 7 4 1 1 5 6 
Interview 8 1 1 1 2 2 
Interview 9 3 4 3 4 4 
Interview 10 2 5 1 1 1 
Interview 11 2 5 2 2 2 
Interview 12 2 3 1 3 3 
Interview 13 1 2 1 2 1 
Interview 14 1 2 1 5 5 
Ø of valid n 
low RI 
1.60 2.00 1.00 1.20 1.20 
Ø of all valid n 1.92 2.46 1.31 2.62 2.62 
Ø n of valid n 
high RI 
2.13 2.75 1.50 3.50 3.50 
Survey 1 1 2 1 2 1 
Survey 2 1 4 1 5 1 
Survey 3 1 2 6 3 5 
Survey 4 2 3 1 3 5 
Survey 5 3 1 1 3 4 
Survey 6 3 1 1 2 2 
Survey 7 2 3 3 2 2 
Survey 8 2 1 1 2 3 
Survey 9 n/a 3 5 2 2 
Survey 10 2 2 5 2 1 
Ø of valid n 
low RI 
1.88 2.00 2.00 1.60 1.60 
Ø of all valid n 1.90 2.35 1.83 2.61 2.61 
Ø n of valid n 
high RI 
2.08 2.62 1.69 3.38 3.38 
 
INDICATIONS TABLE 
Weight: 
1=the most important to 4=the least important 
n/a=answer is not available 
out=the dimension was indicated to not apply. However in surveys out-answers are counted 
as n/a because it cannot be evaluated whether it was left out because it does not apply or 
because no answer was indicated. In interviews, the interviewer did ask the participants 
about the motivation to not use the dimension. 
Responses in green are of LRI cases 
Responses in red are of HRI cases 
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Operational 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation HRI 
Question 15 
Interview 1 3 3 2 3 1 
Interview 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Interview 3 2 3 2 2 3 
Interview 4 2 2 2 1 2 
Interview 5 2 5 2 1 2 
Interview 6 3 3 2 2 2 
Interview 7 3 3 2 2 1 
Interview 8 1 2 1 1 1 
Interview 9 n/a 3 5 4 6 
Interview 10 1 1 1 1 1 
Interview 11 3 2 1 4 3 
Interview 12 3 2 2 3 6 
Interview 13 2 2 2 4 5 
Interview 14 2 3 2 2 1 
Survey 1 3 4 3 2 3 
Survey 2 3 4 2 4 2 
Survey 3 3 3 4 3 3 
Survey 4 4 4 2 5 2 
Survey 5 4 3 6 3 4 
Survey 6 1 2 2 2 3 
Survey 7 4 2 4 2 3 
Survey 8 4 2 4 3 4 
Survey 9 2 3 2 2 2 
Survey 10 4 2 1 2 6 
Ø of valid n 
low RI 
2.40 2.45 2.10 1.70 2.60 
Ø of all valid n 2.68 2.74 2.43 2.52 2.87 
Ø n of valid n 
high RI 
2.92 3.00 2.69 3.15 3.08 
 
 
INDICATIONS TABLE 
Weight: 
1=the most important to 4=the least important 
n/a=answer is not available 
out=the dimension was indicated to not apply. However in surveys out-answers are counted 
as n/a because it cannot be evaluated whether it was left out because it does not apply or 
because no answer was indicated. In interviews, the interviewer did ask the participants 
about the motivation to not use the dimension. 
Responses in green are of LRI cases 
Responses in red are of HRI cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 277 
 
Stakeholder 
management 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation HRI 
Question 15 
Interview 1 3 3 4 5 4 
Interview 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Interview 3 1 2 4 4 2 
Interview 4 2 5 2 3 2 
Interview 5 3 5 3 1 2 
Interview 6 2 3 3 2 2 
Interview 7 2 4 4 2 2 
Interview 8 2 2 2 2 2 
Interview 9 n/a 3 4 4 5 
Interview 10 4 5 4 2 4 
Interview 11 n/a 3 3 4 4 
Interview 12 2 2 3 1 1 
Interview 13 2 2 4 1 1 
Interview 14 2 2 3 1 1 
Survey 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Survey 2 4 2 4 4 3 
Survey 3 2 2 5 3 6 
Survey 4 3 2 4 5 2 
Survey 5 6 1 5 4 3 
Survey 6 4 2 3 3 4 
Survey 7 3 2 2 2 4 
Survey 8 1 1 2 2 2 
Survey 9 out 4 4 3 3 
Survey 10 3 2 6 2 2 
Ø of valid n 
low RI 
2.67 3.10 3.10 2.20 2.70 
Ø of all valid n 2.65 2.65 3.48 2.70 2.74 
Ø n of valid n 
high RI 
2.64 2.31 3.77 3.08 2.77 
 
 
INDICATIONS TABLE 
Weight: 
1=the most important to 4=the least important 
n/a=answer is not available 
out=the dimension was indicated to not apply. However in surveys out-answers are counted 
as n/a because it cannot be evaluated whether it was left out because it does not apply or 
because no answer was indicated. In interviews, the interviewer did ask the participants 
about the motivation to not use the dimension. 
Responses in green are of LRI cases 
Responses in red are of HRI cases 
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Legal 
requirement 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation HRI 
Question 15 
Interview 1 2 1 3 2 2 
Interview 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 
Interview 3 3 2 1 1 1 
Interview 4 1 1 1 3 out 
Interview 5 6 5 6 1 4 
Interview 6 1 2 2 1 2 
Interview 7 1 3 3 3 1 
Interview 8 3 2 5 2 2 
Interview 9 2 5 2 5 2 
Interview 10 1 2 3 1 3 
Interview 11 1 4 4 3 2 
Interview 12 1 3 4 1 1 
Interview 13 4 2 5 1 6 
Interview 14 1 1 4 1 2 
Survey 1 out 2 Out 2 3 
Survey 2 2 2 3 2 1 
Survey 3 4 2 3 3 2 
Survey 4 6 1 6 5 1 
Survey 5 5 1 3 2 1 
Survey 6 2 1 5 2 1 
Survey 7 1 1 1 1 4 
Survey 8 3 2 3 2 4 
Survey 9 out 2 1 4 1 
Survey 10 1 2 4 2 1 
Ø of valid n 
low RI 
2.11 2.00 3.10 1.90 2.44 
Ø of all valid n 2.43 2.13 3.27 2.17 2.13 
Ø n of valid n 
high RI 
2.67 2.23 3.42 2.38 1.93 
 
 
INDICATIONS TABLE 
Weight: 
1=the most important to 4=the least important 
n/a=answer is not available 
out=the dimension was indicated to not apply. However in surveys out-answers are counted 
as n/a because it cannot be evaluated whether it was left out because it does not apply or 
because no answer was indicated. In interviews, the interviewer did ask the participants 
about the motivation to not use the dimension. 
Responses in green are of LRI cases 
Responses in red are of HRI cases 
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Social issue 
participation 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation HRI 
Question 15 
Interview 1 4 3 5 4 4 
Interview 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Interview 3 4 4 3 3 4 
Interview 4 out 5 3 2 2 
Interview 5 1 5 1 1 2 
Interview 6 out 3 3 3 3 
Interview 7 6 5 5 3 5 
Interview 8 4 2 5 2 3 
Interview 9 1 5 1 5 1 
Interview 10 3 4 4 3 4 
Interview 11 n/a 3 6 4 6 
Interview 12 3 4 5 2 3 
Interview 13 5 3 6 3 3 
Interview 14 2 3 3 2 2 
Survey 1 out 3 out 2 out 
Survey 2 6 2 6 3 5 
Survey 3 5 2 1 3 1 
Survey 4 5 2 3 5 3 
Survey 5 1 3 4 2 2 
Survey 6 5 3 4 4 5 
Survey 7 5 4 5 3 5 
Survey 8 out 3 5 3 5 
Survey 9 out 2 4 3 5 
Survey 10 6 2 2 2 5 
Ø of valid n 
low RI 
4.00 3.30 3.60 2.60 3.90 
Ø of all valid n 3.88 3.26 3.82 2.91 3.55 
Ø n of valid n 
high RI 
3.82 3.23 4.00 3.15 3.25 
 
 
INDICATIONS TABLE 
Weight: 
1=the most important to 4=the least important 
n/a=answer is not available 
out=the dimension was indicated to not apply. However in surveys out-answers are counted 
as n/a because it cannot be evaluated whether it was left out because it does not apply or 
because no answer was indicated. In interviews, the interviewer did ask the participants 
about the motivation to not use the dimension. 
Responses in green are of LRI cases 
Responses in red are of HRI cases 
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Public values 
dimension 
Present RI 
Question 9 
Change if LRI 
Question 12 
Evaluation LRI 
Question 13 
Change if HRI 
Question 14 
Evaluation HRI 
Question 15 
Interview 1 1 1 5 3 4 
Interview 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Interview 3 1 2 5 3 4 
Interview 4 out 5 4 2 2 
Interview 5 3 5 3 1 2 
Interview 6 out 4 2 2 3 
Interview 7 5 2 6 5 5 
Interview 8 4 2 5 3 3 
Interview 9 4 4 3 4 1 
Interview 10 2 5 2 1 4 
Interview 11 4 3 5 3 6 
Interview 12 3 5 5 n/a 3 
Interview 13 3 5 4 2 3 
Interview 14 1 4 2 5 2 
Survey 1 out 3 out 2 out 
Survey 2 5 2 5 2 5 
Survey 3 6 3 2 3 1 
Survey 4 1 2 5 5 3 
Survey 5 2 out 2 2 2 
Survey 6 6 3 6 4 5 
Survey 7 6 4 6 3 5 
Survey 8 out Out 6 out 5 
Survey 9 out 3 3 3 5 
Survey 10 5 2 3 3 5 
Ø of valid n 
low 
4.33 3.67 4.00 2.44 3.90 
Ø of all valid n 3.44 3.29 4.05 2.90 3.55 
Ø n of valid n 
high 
3.00 3.67 4.08 3.25 3.25 
 
 
INDICATIONS TABLE 
Weight: 
1=the most important to 4=the least important 
n/a=answer is not available 
out=the dimension was indicated to not apply. However in surveys out-answers are counted 
as n/a because it cannot be evaluated whether it was left out because it does not apply or 
because no answer was indicated. In interviews, the interviewer did ask the participants 
about the motivation to not use the dimension. 
Responses in green are of LRI cases 
Responses in red are of HRI cases 
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ANNEX I: LIST OF CODED DOCUMENTS 
 
Group A 
France 
Française des Jeux. (2012). Un modèle de jeu utile à la société - rapport d'activité 2011. 
Boulogne-Billancourt: Française des Jeux. 
Française des Jeux. (2012). FDJ en un Clin d'Oeil - chiffres clés 2011. Boulogne-
Billancourt: Française des Jeux. 
Norway 
Norsk Tipping AS. (2012). Annual Report 2011 - Giving the Dream a Chance Everyday. 
Hamar: Norsk Tipping AS. 
Group B 
The Netherlands 
De Lotto. (2012). De Lotto jaarverslag 2011 - Elke jubillaris is bijonder. Rijswijk: De Lotto. 
United Kingdom 
Camelot. (2012). Group and Company financial statements for the year ended 31 March 
2012. Watford: Camelot. 
Camelot. (2012). Running a world-class lottery - Camelot Stakeholder Report 2010 - 2011. 
Watford: Camelot. 
Group C 
Belgium 
Ladbrokes PLC. (2012). Game on! Annual Report and Accounts 2011. Harrow London: 
Ladbrokes PLC. 
Ladbrokes PLC. (2012). Fair Play - Corporate responsibility report: Part A -Responsible 
business principles and policies. Harrow: Ladbrokes PLC. 
Austria 
Casinos Austria. (2012). Geschäftsbericht 2011. Vienna: Casinos Austria. 
Novomatic AG. (2012). Jahresfinanzbericht 2011. Gumpoldskirchen: Novomatic AG. 
Österreichische Lotterien. (2012). Geschäftsbericht 2011. Vienna: Österreichische 
Lotterien. 
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ANNEX II: LIST OF CODES, SUB-CONCEPTS AND GUIDELINES FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
The list of codes is the result of the analysis of several annual reports of sport betting and 
lottery organisations as well as reports on gambling markets before the analysis. During the 
analysis the list was extended with indicators and concepts used to identify the different 
performance dimensions. The table resumes all codes used in the research to identify the 
dimensions. 
 
Financial dimension: codes 
Additional types of ratio Benefit 
Cost effectiveness Cost reduction 
Costs Efficiency  
Evolution of wagers  Financial results by sectors: betting 
Financial results by sectors: lotteries Financial results by sectors: scratch tickets 
Future objective (mid-term): increase of market 
share 
Future objective (short term): keep market shares  
GGR development across sectors GGR of scratch tickets 
GGR overall  GGR sport betting 
Growth benchmarks: Revenue growth, gross 
gaming revenue 
Indicators distribution channels  
Indicators employees  Indicators retailers  
Indicators suppliers  Input/output ratio (efficiency) 
Key financial results benchmarks: EBITDA 
(growth analysis), operating profit/EBIT 
Market share 
Net results Net results compared to 2010 
Net results paid to beneficiaries Objectives attained (effectiveness) 
Operational costs Operational results 
Other financial indicators  Outputs 
Part of wagers for public withdrawals  Part of wagers to cover for risks 
Part of wagers to distribution network  Part of wagers to operators 
Pay-out rate/redistribution to players Payout of winnings 
Production volume, number of products sold 
(output) 
Productivity 
Profit to redistribute by sector Profit to redistribute in total 
Progression of business Provisions paid  
Reasonable development Redistribution to company 
Redistribution to distribution network Redistribution to retailers  
Reduce of profits Repartition of capital to shareholders 
Repartition of wagers Results/profits 
Retail network Return on investment 
Return on taxpayer money  Revenue development 
Revenue related benchmarks: gross revenue/win 
margin 
Sales  
Sales development  Selling points  
Unit or per capita cost  Value for money 
Volume of wagers  
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Operational dimension—customer perspective: codes 
Brand recognition Cost of advertising;  
Customer acquisition Customer loyalty 
Customer orientation Customer participation 
Customer profile Customer profitability 
Customer satisfaction Customer survey 
Image of company Indicators customers 
Number of customers PR costs, media investment (communication) 
Sponsoring  
Operational dimension—learning and growth perspective: codes 
Distribution channel innovation Entering new market segments 
Innovations Innovative products lead to success 
Learning and growth New distribution channels 
New products New technologies 
Product developments Product innovation 
Responsible innovation  
Operational dimension—internal business process perspective: codes 
Distribution system  Formation of retailers for new systems  
Internal processes  Labour turnover 
Number of employees Number of employees part time 
On-time delivery Productivity 
Quality of services Reliability  
Technical Quality (TQM) Working capital/sales 
Workload indicators; number of applications 
processed; number of letters delivered; levels of 
activity, proficiency or operating characteristics 
(throughput) 
 
 
Stakeholder management dimension: codes 
Beneficiaries if they are the owner of the 
company 
Benefits for employees, investment in further 
education, support of staff (human capital 
investment) 
Consumer and user satisfaction; responsiveness 
to the needs of stakeholders 
Employees’ satisfaction 
Energy, water used and emissions, reducing 
manufacturing waste 
Environment protection 
Employees’ motivation 
Performance related pay, quantity and quality of 
work, timelines in completing, knowledge, skills, 
reliability, responsibility (Individual performance) 
Programme to follow winners 
Relation to politics, lobby group (political 
acceptability) 
Responsible gaming defined in narrow terms 
(customer, no minor players, employees) 
Satisfaction of retailers 
Shareholder focus: defence of sector against 
foreign investors that would absorb money 
Shareholders 
Social performance of suppliers Stakeholder focus 
Stakeholders (groups)  
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Legal requirement dimension: codes 
Beneficiaries of profits if mandated by regulation Defence of legal environment 
Indicators compliance Legal developments 
Proactive role  Public mission of organisation (mandatory)  
Redistribution mandatory 
Regulation is a preoccupation of Board of 
Directors and CEO 
Regulatory requirements/obligations; external 
audit obligation 
Reporting compliance with legal obligations 
Reporting to regulator Reserves for regulatory costs 
Respect of legal obligations Respect of rule of law 
Responsible gambling mandatory Social measures mandatory 
 
Social issue participation dimension: codes 
Corporate responsibility if not increasing future 
benefits (broader sense: society) 
Corruption 
Doping Fraud and other criminal behaviours 
Gambling addiction: general  
Gambling addiction: prevention measures 
established 
Illegal gambling Indicators responsible gambling 
Indicators social issues 
Involvement in local community (money given to 
local community) 
Match fixing 
Percentage of revenue used for diminishing 
negative effects; formation expenditures; 
specific prevention measures (Outcome) 
Philanthropic use of profits (voluntary – neither for 
future financial benefit nor due to regulatory 
obligation) 
Prevention measures voluntary 
Proactive actions in social matters Produced social costs (Outcome) 
Redistribution voluntary Responsible gambling voluntary 
Supported projects Voluntary business standards 
Voluntary compensation for negative externalities  
 
Public values dimension: codes 
Discrimination Equity 
Ethic Fairness 
Good corporate citizen Honesty 
Indicatory public values Other values the organisation 
Security Transparency 
Trust  
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ANNEX III: INTERVIEW AND SURVEY QUESTIONS 
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